Populistische Demokratiekonzeptionen und die Wahl der AfD: Evidenz aus einer Panelstudie

This contribution studies the effect of populist conceptions of democracy on voting for populist parties drawing on the case of the “Alternative für Deutschland” (AfD). Building on dominant definitions of populism, we conceptualize a populist orientation towards democracy via three elements–the privilege of the majority will over minority rights, the demand for absolute responsiveness from representatives to the majority will and negative views of political pluralism–and propose a corresponding measurement model. Our empirical analysis shows that such populist conceptions of democracy are particularly strong among AfD supporters. Moreover, they exhibit significant and substantial effects on voting intentions for the AfD in multivariate analyses and, leveraging the panel structure of the data, are able to predict changes in party preferences towards the AfD over time.     

Penal Populism and the Public Thermostat: Crime,Public Punitiveness,and Public Policy

This article makes the case that feedback processes in democratic politics—between crime rates, public opinion, and public policy—can account for the growth of penal populism in Britain. It argues that the public recognize and respond to rising (and falling) levels of crime, and that in turn public support for being tough on crime is translated into patterns of imprisonment. This contributes to debates over the crime–opinion–policy connection, unpacking the dynamic processes by which these relationships unfold at the aggregate level. This uses the most extensive data set ever assembled on aggregate opinion on crime in Britain to construct a new over‐time measure of punitive attitudes. The analysis first tests the thermostatic responsiveness of punitive attitudes to changes in recorded crime rates as well as self‐reported victimization, and then examines the degree to which changes in mass opinion impact on criminal justice policy.     

A New Divide? The Impact of Globalisation on National Party Systems

This article contributes to the ongoing discussion concerning the impact of globalisation and European integration on the structure of ideological space in Western Europe. The empirical investigation is based on an examination of Euromanifestos data from four European countries – Germany, United Kingdom, Greece and Portugal – for a time frame of up to 30 years. The findings largely support the hypothesis of a transformation of the content of the standard cultural axis due to the emergence of conflicts over the desirability for regional and/or global integration. However, this transformation occurs in different ways and by different actors across national contexts. Whereas in the United Kingdom and Germany objections against ongoing integration processes have been mainly articulated by political parties of the conservative and populist right, in Greece and Portugal left-wing political parties emerge as the main representatives of the anti-integration camp.     

Populism in election times: a comparative analysis of 11 countries in Western Europe

Abstract

The article comparatively examines the levels of populism exhibited by parties in Western Europe. It relies on a quantitative content analysis of press releases collected in the context of 11 national elections between 2012 and 2015. In line with the first hypothesis, the results show that parties from both the radical right and the radical left make use of populist appeals more frequently than mainstream parties. With regard to populism on cultural issues, the article establishes that the radical right outclasses the remaining parties, thereby supporting the second hypothesis. On economic issues, both types of radical parties are shown to be particularly populist. This pattern counters the third hypothesis, which suggests that economic populism is most prevalent among the radical left. Finally, there is no evidence for the fourth hypothesis, given that parties from the south do not resort to more populism on economic issues than those from the north.     

Harry Howe Ransom and American intelligence studies

In this interview Harry Howe Ransom, a leading American scholar of intelligence studies over the past 50 years, discusses how he entered the field and his views regarding some key intelligence topics. Foremost on his research agenda has been the study of whether in democratic societies secret agencies can operate side-by-side with an otherwise open government without violating basic civil liberties – the difficult balancing act between the need for security, on the one hand, and the cherished value of liberty, on the other. He has also been a leading critic of intelligence politicization, noting in this interview that there is a tendency for intelligence systems to provide information they think their top bosses want to hear, and for the top bosses – more often than not – to do what they wish in spite of intelligence to the contrary. Professor Ransom began his research into intelligence as a young political scientist at Harvard University and continued this work throughout his subsequent distinguished career at Vanderbilt University and into his retirement years.     

Populism as political communication style: An empirical study of political parties' discourse in Belgium

Abstract.  The scientific debate about populism has been revitalised by the recent rise of extreme-right parties in Western Europe. Within the broad discussion about populism and its relationship with extreme-right, this article is confined to three topics: a conceptual, an epistemological and an empirical issue. First, taking a clear position in the ongoing definition struggle, populism is defined primarily as a specific political communication style. Populism is conceived of as a political style essentially displaying proximity of the people, while at the same time taking an anti-establishment stance and stressing the (ideal) homogeneity of the people by excluding specific population segments. Second, it is pointed out that defining populism as a style enables one to turn it into a useful concept that has too often remained vague and blurred. Third, drawing on an operational definition of populism, a comparative discourse analysis of the political party broadcasts of the Belgian parties is carried out. The quantitative analysis leads to a clear conclusion. In terms of the degree and the kinds of populism embraced by the six political parties under scrutiny, the extreme-right party Vlaams Blok behaves very differently from the other Belgian parties. Its messages are a copybook example of populism.     

The double-edged sword: the political appropriation of the concept of populism

ABSTRACT

The concept of populism has been in use in political debate for over a century. Because ‘populist’ is often used in a pejorative sense today, those to whom it is applied to tend to reject it. However, a closer look at the history of the concept reveals that while its meaning may fluctuate and even be dismissed as irrelevant, its use can become a political tool. This study of the use of ‘populism’ refrains from making value judgments on the actual populist nature of certain parties or political tendencies. Instead, it analyzes uses of the concept from a historical perspective. Special emphasis is placed on politicians who chose to define themselves as populist, or accept the label imposed by others, with particular focus on the Finns Party of Finland. Such self-identified populists draw their conceptions of populism from the ever-growing field of populism research, striving to appropriate and realize what scholars have only hypothetically described as a professed ideal. A closer look at the uses of populism as a political self-identity forces us to rethink its uses as a pejorative, or as an analytical, concept.     

Don't call me a populist! The meaning of populism for western European parties and politicians

In recent years a common understanding of the core elements of populist communication has been achieved in academia. Yet, we know less about how the term populism is used by political parties themselves, despite widespread assumptions about the use of populism as a battle term to disqualify competitors. Based on a quantitative and qualitative content analysis of Twitter content from mainstream and populist actors in six western European countries, this study finds that populism is indeed used by mainstream parties in a pejorative way in order to label political competitors. Yet, not only populist but also mainstream competitors are labeled populist by the center parties linking a variety of different negative meanings to the term, which are often of a less demonizing nature not questioning the legitimacy of others. Populists in Italy and France refer to the term in a positive way, while Spanish and German populists rather reject the label.     

Australia and the China Threat: managing ambiguity

A China Threat – the fear of being taken over by China and the Chinese – has been an ever present in the politics of Australia since even before there was a Commonwealth of Australia. It was both a major cause of Federation in 1901 and a determinant of Australia's foreign policy thereafter. In the last 20 years, concerns about China have come to focus less on migration and more on economic integration and China's political influence. There are as always distinct paradoxes in the China Threat. It may be a useful vehicle for making a political point at election time but China has a place in the Australian economy that has led Australia's leaders to at least modify their resistance once in office.     

当前中国大众民粹程度测量研究

对民粹主义的内涵和实证研究的分析表明,民粹主义是一个可以测量的概念。通过对中国民粹主义的表现形式和网络民粹话语的梳理,形成了一个包含仇视官员、民族民粹主义、反体制、仇视富人、民粹司法和仇视专家等6个维度23个指标的民粹程度量表。运用这个量表考察中国社会各阶层样本,发现中国在整体上并不具备明显的民粹主义特征。     

State of the field: How to study populism and adjacent topics? A plea for both more and less focus

As a result of the steady rise of populist parties and politicians all over the world – and particularly since the Brexit referendum and the election of Donald Trump – populism research has become increasingly popular and widespread. The field, however, also faces some tricky challenges. First, it is easy to confuse populism with related concepts like, for instance, ‘nativism’ and ‘Euroscepticism’. This brings the risk of sloppy conceptualisation, and, as a result, invalid inferences. Second, populism research remains relatively detached from adjacent fields, and fruitful fertilisation across literatures is still rather uncommon. In order to deal with these challenges, populism research should become both more and less focused. How can these two seemingly conflicting recommendations be reconciled? When it comes to conceptualisation/categorisation strategies and drawing conclusions from studies by other researchers, populism scholars should employ a narrow framework and be precise, distinctive and consistent. Yet when it comes to exploring the literature in search of new hypotheses, scholars should employ a more open mind-set. After all, theories developed in adjacent fields can inspire populism scholars to formulate innovative new questions and expectations.     

What Sort of Semi-presidentialism do Finns Want? An Intra-systemic Comparative Analysis

Against the backdrop of moves by the political establishment, endorsed by political scientists, to shift towards a purely ceremonial presidency, this paper uses recent survey data to assess levels of popular support – and the socio-demographic structure of support – for two different types of semi-presidentialism in Finland. It represents an exercise in intra-country comparison – comparing public support for a return to the significant powers the head of state possessed under the 1919 constitution (Duverger-style semi-presidentialism) with backing for the more limited presidential prerogatives enshrined in the 2000 constitution (status quo semi-presidentialism). Correlation and multiple regression analysis of complementary data-sets led to two main findings. The vast majority of Finns seem content with the current limited powers of the president – status quo presidentialism – whilst among the minority that would apparently prefer a return to Duverger-style semi-presidentialism, there is a disproportionate number of persons with relatively low levels of formal education, low social status and predominantly left-wing party political persuasion.     

Changing Values among Western Publics from 1970 to 2006

In 1971 it was hypothesised that intergenerational value changes were taking place. More than a generation has passed since then, and today it seems clear that the predicted changes have occurred. A large body of evidence, analysed using three different approaches – (1) cohort analysis; (2) comparisons of rich and poor countries; (3) examination of actual trends observed over the past 35 years – all points to the conclusion that major cultural changes are occurring, and that they reflect a process of intergenerational change linked with rising levels of existential security.     

From chasing populists to deconstructing populism: A new multidimensional approach to understanding and comparing populism

This paper challenges some widespread theoretical assumptions and practices in the study of populism and proposes a new multidimensional approach to generate and analyse data on this latent construct. Rather than focusing on categorising subjects as populists or not, it recommends reaching a better understanding of what populism is, the salience and relative weight of its attributes and how they interact creating an inner populist logic. Despite the increasing media and academic attention, historical discrepancies in how to conceptualise and operationalise populism have hindered cumulative progress in the literature. Initially most efforts were devoted to the study of specific movements, without a clear comparative angle, and the concept of populism was often conflated with that of nationalism. When the literature started to pay more attention to the analysis of the attributes associated with populism serious disagreements emerged concerning its true essence. Populism has been conceptualised as an ideology, a cynical strategy, a performative style and a discursive logic of articulation. The disputes between these competing interpretations have arguably slowed down the generation of comparative data. Although this article is meant to be a critique of the current state of the field and a call to make it pivot into a slightly different direction, it does not adopt an iconoclast stance and largely tries to reconcile the different existing research traditions – ideational, discursive, performative and strategic. It shows that their efforts are to a great extent complementary but mostly operating on different rungs of the ladder of abstraction. This paper argues that shifting from minimal definitions into a multidimensional approach may stimulate the generation of comparative data on a wider range of attributes and facilitate the identification of degrees and varieties within populism. This paper develops a new analytical framework which deconstructs populism into five dimensions: (1) depiction of the polity, (2) morality, (3) construction of society, (4) sovereignty and (5) leadership. These dimensions, that synthesise the most influential conceptualisations of populism, are empirically and theoretically interconnected and encompass ideational, discursive and performative attributes suggested in the literature. These dimensions are in turn composed of lower order attributes forming a multilayered network structure. This multidimensional framework provides a heuristic template that can be adapted and operationalised in diverse ways depending on the hypotheses, type of data and subjects of the analysis. Some examples of how to turn these dimensions into variables to capture supply- and demand-side populism are introduced. Future empirical research could help map and better understand the network of interactions and intersections among these dimensions and attributes. This could be the key to settle some of the current conceptual debates about populism and its varieties.     

The ASEAN Way as a symbol: an analysis of discourses on the ASEAN Norms

Has the ‘ASEAN Way’ – a set of rules of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) centered on the principle of non-interference and consensus decision-making – really established its position as an ASEAN norm? This paper aims to analyze the discourses of each ASEAN country and empirically explain their attitudes toward the norm. Specifically, I review various documentations to examine how various ASEAN diplomats have used the term ‘ASEAN Way.’ How did they come to call the principle of non-interference and consensus decision-making ‘ASEAN Way’ in the early 1990s? Why have they begun using the term negatively, as something to be reformed, in recent years? By describing the discourses on the ‘ASEAN Way’ and their changes over the years, I show that the rationality of non-interference and consensus decision-making has changed over time and shifted the positioning of the ‘ASEAN way’ as a symbol. This presents a new and empirical interpretation of the changes in ASEAN Norms.     

Partisan Politics and Institutional (Re)Creation: Locating and Explaining the Origins of Modern Finance Capitalism

Why do some countries rely more heavily on equities markets, while others depend more on commercial banking? Analyses of the origins of contemporary capitalist institutions usually look back to the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. However, this paper demonstrates that financial institutions – regarded as central to the way capitalist systems are organised – changed radically in the mid-twentieth century in many countries. This paper argues that government partisanship in formative moments of institutional (re)creation can better account for their modern manifestation than prominent alternative explanations. A new measure of partisanship that is sensitive to these institutional transformations is presented. Case studies on Germany and France offer evidence consistent with this argument.     

Vom Rand in die Mitte – „Schamlose Normalisierung“

In this paper, I discuss the swing to the (far-)right in (Austrian) party politics during the election campaign and national election on October 15, 2017. This transformation is caused, I claim, by a process of normalisation, an accommodation to the, sometimes also extreme-right, agenda of formerly right-wing populist parties such as the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ). The election campaign of both the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) and the FPÖ focussed primarily on migration and refugee politics, based on a politics of fear and resentment. After first attempting to define the phenomenon of right-wing populism, I trace how tabooed and extreme right contents slowly became acceptable, as soon as the ÖVP shamelessly integrated some (not all) aspects of the FPÖ’s election program.     

The Church Committee Investigation of 1975 and the Evolution of Modern Intelligence Accountability

Since 1975, lawmakers have displayed four responses to the call for greater intelligence accountability on Capitol Hill. Some have taken the approach of ‘ostriches’, content to bury their heads in the sand and continue the earlier era of trust when members of Congress deferred to the decisions of the executive branch within the domains of intelligence. Others – indeed, a majority – have chosen to become unalloyed boosters for intelligence –‘ cheerleaders’ who view their job primarily as one of explaining the value of intelligence to the American people and supporting intelligence missions with robust funding and encouragement. Taking the opposite approach, another set of lawmakers – the ‘lemon-suckers’ – have consistently found fault with America's attempts to spy on adversaries or overthrow regimes that fail to accommodate US interests. Finally, some lawmakers have been ‘guardians’, striking a balance between serving as partners of the intelligence agencies on Capitol Hill and, through a persistent examination of budgets and operations, demanding competence and law-abiding behavior from these agencies. The guardian model fits best into the framework of democratic theory.     

First or Second Order Referendums? Understanding the Votes on the EU Constitutional Treaty in Four EU Member States

This article uses post-referendum Flash-Eurobarometer surveys to analyse empirically voter attitudes towards the EU Constitution in four member states. The theoretical model used incorporates first and second order variables for voting to ascertain whether the outcome of the vote was a reflection of either first or second order voting behaviour. It is hypothesised that the cleavage politics over integration in the European arena had a major impact on the four votes, as captured by three first order variables: ‘Europhile’ and ‘Constitution-phile’ attitudes and ‘Egocentric Europeanness’, respectively. The quantitative analyses – controlling for a number of dimensions – strongly supports the hypothesis when compared with a model using solely second order party identification variables. These findings establish that how voters understood the EU polity, in particular whether membership is beneficial to one's own country, was a crucial factor in all the referendums. Implications for future research include the need to discover the cues or proxies influencing first order voting within domestic politics.