The June 2015 legislative election in Turkey

The Republic of Turkey held its first presidential election, which employed a universal suffrage based on popular vote, on 10 August 2014. Unlike most of the countries organizing separate ballots for electing the president and the MPs, Turkey did not hold both elections on the same day. Instead, the subsequent parliamentary election would be held ten months later, i.e. on 7 June 2015. The reason behind this is not only due to the differences of the term lengths between parliament and the President (which are four and five years respectively), but also the peculiarity in the inclusion of a “presidential element” (a president elected by popular vote) into a political regime which must still be seen as a parliamentary system. This oddness arose from the political crisis in 2007.     

Choosing the least-worst government: The British general election of 2005

This article provides an overview of the British general election of 2005. It examines the major political issues that arose during the Blair government's second term in office and their impact on the governing Labour Party's electoral support. Despite voters' growing sense of weariness with Labour, the Conservative opposition failed to convince the electorate that it was a credible government-in-waiting. The result was that Labour was comfortably returned to office, though with a much-reduced majority. The Liberal Democrats profited from the unpopularity of the Iraq War, while minor parties won their highest ever tally of votes.     

The 2005 Danish general election: A phase of consolidation

On 18 January 2005, Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen called for a general election to be held on 8 February 2005, nine months before the deadline for the next election. Political themes are usually cited when calling Danish elections, but this time the calendar was used as an excuse: because of major reforms to the municipal structure, a significant amount of legislation had to be negotiated and settled in the spring, and it was unclear whether this could be done by June, thereby hindering an election in late spring; and an election in September could possibly overshadow the important elections to the new municipal councils (created as a result of the reform) in November. Nevertheless, favourable opinion polls undoubtedly also played a major role when the Prime Minister asked the Danes to renew and extend the mandate of his Liberal–Conservative (aka Venstre–Conservative) coalition government.     

Institutions and coalition formation: The German election of 2005

The German election of 2005 creates three puzzles for the literature on coalition formation. First, the election led to a rare event in German politics and in parliamentary systems more generally, a ‘grand coalition’ between the two largest parties. Second, a minority government, something which has never occurred in postwar Germany (except briefly as the result of the breakdown of a government coalition), was in fact one of the two most likely governments to form. Third, the parties of the left retained a comfortable majority in the Bundestag; however they did not form a coalition. The election of 2005 appears unique in German politics, but we argue that its outcome is easily understood using existing institutional theories of coalition formation. We examine party positions in two dimensions (economic and social) using computer-based word scoring of party manifestos. We demonstrate that the conditions for a SPD minority government were present in Germany due to its central location in the policy space. While the configuration of policy positions would thus have allowed the SPD to form a minority government, the role of the Federal President as a veto player could have prevented it from forming, and the presence of an opposition-controlled upper house would have decreased its effectiveness. The mere possibility of forming a minority government gave the SPD a bargaining advantage in the coalition negotiations with the CDU/CSU. We show that in the final portfolio allocation, the SPD received ministries which control approximately two-thirds of the federal budget.     

The undecided voters and the economy: Campaign heterogeneity in the 2005 British general election

Research and conventional wisdom suggest that undecided voters are especially prone to campaign persuasion. Little has been done, however, in the way of uncovering the decision pathways followed by these voters. In this paper we seek to assess the undecided voters’ alleged campaign susceptibility and, most importantly, to explore which campaign considerations inform their final voting decisions. Our central finding is that their behaviour is driven to a larger extent by economic performance and less by leadership or other valence evaluations. This finding has important implications for parties’ campaign strategies in an era where the ranks of undecided voters are steadily expanding from one election to the other.     

Norway: The 1981 election confirms trend to the right

The Storting election of 13 and 14 September 1981 resulted in a marked swing to the right, a trend which has been evident since the middle of the 1970s (Valen, 1976; Valen, 1978; Kristiansen & Holbæk Hansen, 1980). The socialist parties lost their majority in the Storting, and the Labour minority government which had been in power since 1973, resigned. After an unsuccessful attempt to form a coalition government between the three leading bourgeois parties, the Conservative party, the Agrarian Centre party and the Christian People's party, the Conservatives formed a minority government with parliamentary support from the two other parties.     

Non-Voluntary Return? The Politics of Return to Afghanistan

The forced removal of 35 Afghan nationals from the UK in April 2003 calls into question the viability of the government's voluntary repatriation schemes and undermines the voluntary nature of return programmes. This article draws on the results of research conducted in 2002 to explore the views of the Afghan community about return. We evaluate three motivations for promoting return programmes: justice-based arguments, where return is the 'end of the refugee cycle'; human capital explanations, which focus on individual decisions to reverse the effects of brain-drain; and burden-relieving explanations, where return is an alternative to repatriation. Our findings suggest that domestic interest based arguments, rather than those founded on the protection of human rights, are driving the policy-making agenda. Returns are portrayed as a means of relieving the burden on welfare services, and placating an increasingly anti-immigrant public opinion. As well as individuals forcibly removed from Britain, other Afghans are being urged to return by means of financial inducements, and sometimes under the threat of repatriation. In this context, we can discern a new category of 'non-voluntary' returns where individual choice has little real meaning.     

The determinants of election to the United Nations Security Council

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the foremost international body responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. Members vote on issues of global importance and consequently receive perks—election to the UNSC predicts, for instance, World Bank and IMF loans. But who gets elected to the UNSC? Addressing this question empirically is not straightforward as it requires a model that allows for discrete choices at the regional and international levels; the former nominates candidates while the latter ratifies them. Using an original multiple discrete choice model to analyze a dataset of 180 elections from 1970 to 2005, we find that UNSC election appears to derive from a compromise between the demands of populous countries to win election more frequently and a norm of giving each country its turn. We also find evidence that richer countries from the developing world win election more often, while involvement in warfare lowers election probability. By contrast, development aid does not predict election.