New populist parties in Western Europe

This article addresses the electoral success of far right political parties in West European party systems and suggests that there is a new type of party ‐ the New Populist. Differentiating between neo‐fascism and the New Populism is instructive in two senses. First, it reveals that the current wave of comparative electoral success is more associated with the New Populism than neo‐fascism. Second, it demonstrates that there are certain parallels between the New Politics and the New Populism thereby suggesting that changes in the contemporary far right may well be telling indicators of changes in West European societies that are deeper set than a simple resurgence of racist and anti‐immigrant sentiment.     

The politics of opposition and European integration in Scandinavia: Is Euro‐scepticism a government‐opposition dynamic?

Scandinavian party competition has incorporated divisions over European integration to a greater degree than most West European party systems, but with considerable variation in Norway, Sweden and Denmark. From a comparative politics perspective this raises questions about the relatively high salience of Euro‐scepticism in Scandinavian politics, the differences between the three cases and changes over time. The central argument in this article is that Europeanisation of party politics ‐ the translation of issues related to European integration into domestic party politics ‐ is driven by the dynamics of long‐ and short‐term government‐opposition competition, and the key driver of change is party strategy. Whether at the centre or extremes of the party system, Euro‐scepticism is a product of party competition — and is, both in its origins and development, ‘the politics of opposition ‘.     

Genscher and what lies behind ‘Genscherism’

This article analyses the factors which have contributed to West Germany's decision to oppose the modernisation of short‐range nuclear missilesin 1989 and focuses on the likely impact Hans‐Dietrich Genscher had on this decision. By considering both West German domestic conditions (value changes, mass perceptions of détente, and party‐political consensus on Ostpolitik) and external factors (changing superpower relations, reforms in Eastern Europe, and European Community progress), it is argued that Genscher is neither the single architect of, nor the sole influence on, West Germany's security policy‐making.     

How iron is the iron law of oligarchy?

Abstract. Probably the most famous dictum about parties' internal structures is Robert Michels' 'iron law of oligarchy'. Over the past two decades, however, the societal context within which parties are embedded has begun to change which may alter the psychological premise upon which Michels' law is based. More specifically, we hypothesize that New Politics proponents within established parties are disproportionately likely to rely on cues from local party branches, instead of leadership cues, in forming issue positions on intra-party controversies. Accordingly, this paper analyzes the influence of New Politics issues on the leadership-constituency views of party delegates within fifty-two West European parties. In addition, we analyze the relative contribution of party ideology and party structures to the evolution of mean party support for NP policies and constituency orientations. The data base for this paper is a unique study of convention delegates conducted in all major West European parties, and a study of party characteristics. We find that New Politics supporters, especially within socialist parties, are predisposed to emphasize the representation of their local party constituency, in case the views of local party branches and a party's national leadership clash. We assess the implications of this research for parties and party theories, especially Michels' law.     

Whatever happened to Italian communism? Explaining the dissolution of the largest communist party in the West

This article attempts to explain why the largest and most successful communist party in the West (the Italian Communist Party) has been the first to dissolve itself under the apparent impact of the revolutions in Eastern Europe. It does so by utilising and comparing four possible approaches to the study of West European Communist parties: ideological, electoral, strategic and ‘internal‐external’ approaches. The first three approaches are outlined and their limitations indicated before a more detailed exposition and application of the fourth approach is made as offering the most adequate framework to explain of one the most significant developments in Italian politics and West European communism.     

On party attachment in Western Europe and the utility of eurobarometer data

An analysis of 25 Eurobarometer surveys conducted between 1974 and 1988 in each of the European Community member‐countries shows that there is no single trend discernible throughout Western Europe. Although levels of party attachment are decreasing in most member‐states, four different patterns have emerged, and they closely relate to more general developments in the respective party systems. These patterns are: strong dealignment (Ireland); peripheral dealignment (United Kingdom and Italy); post‐realignment (Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Greece, Belgium); and stable alignment (West Germany).     

State of the Field

Although scholars of West European politics have long debated whether the region's highly institutionalised party systems were becoming de‐aligned and electorally unstable, the political fallout from the post‐2008 financial crisis has lent a new sense of urgency to the debate. The threats posed to party systems by economic crises are hardly unique to Europe, however. The Latin American experience with the debt crisis of the 1980s and 1990s suggests that party system upheaval was not simply a function of retrospective economic voting during the period of crisis. It was also attributable to programmatically de‐aligning policy responses to crises – namely the ‘bait‐and‐switch’ imposition of austerity and adjustment measures by labour‐based, left‐leaning parties that were traditional champions of statist and redistributive policies. Such patterns of reform made it difficult for party systems to channel societal resistance to market orthodoxy in the post‐adjustment era, setting the stage for convulsive ‘reactive sequences’ when such resistance arose outside and against mainstream parties through varied forms of social and electoral protest, typically on the left flank. This article explores the political fallout from the European and Latin American economic crises from a comparative perspective, arguing that it is essential to think beyond the short‐term political dynamics of crisis management to consider the longer‐term institutional legacies and fragilities of the different political alignments forged around crisis‐induced policy reforms.     

Analysing ‘Successor Parties': The Case of the True Finns

Whilst the ‘successor party’ (SP) has a well-established place in the literature on post-communist Eastern and Central Europe, occasional references to its West European counterpart have tended to use the term loosely and not separate it out from other varieties of new party. Focusing on the question, ‘where do parties come from?’ – that is, the process of party origination – this article makes a case for viewing the SP as a distinct genus in the West European party hemisphere. The SP is defined as a party which is nominally and legally a new entity that takes the place of, and fills at least some of the political space vacated by, a single, defunct party of origin. The mortality of the ‘original party’ is a sine qua non. SPs emerge with a clear political inheritance. What this is and how they interpret and respond to the inheritance makes the case for their systematic study. The paper also asks, ‘where do new parties go to?’ (how do they evolve?). The question of party change in SPs is analysed by reference to the True Finns.     

The Italian state: no longer Catholic,no longer Christian

The constant appearance of highly detailed studies of parties in the different West European countries creates the need for a theory which summarises their major findings and relates them to each other. Such a theory needs to be general in form, but existing formulations (for example, minimal‐winning criteria for government formation) are limited to one aspect of government and are theoretically inadequate. A general theory covering all major aspects of democratic party government (formation, distribution of ministries, reshuffles, policy formation and termination) is proposed and its fit with existing findings illustrated.     

The Recruitment of Women Cabinet Ministers in the Canadian Provinces

Although there have been several studies of women in legislatures in Canada, a cabinet position is a much stronger position from which to wield power in an executive-centered and party-disciplined parliamentary system. In the past decade, the increase of women's share of legislative seats, for majority parties as well as others, has led to more women being appointed to cabinet portfolios. This article utilizes data from the ten Canadian provinces over an 18-year period, from 1976 to 1994, to assess patterns of such appointments by province, party, percentage of women in the governing party, and percentage of women in the legislature. The proportion of women in the governing party far outweighs other variables in its impact on the percentage of women in the cabinet, in contrast to a previous study of West European cabinets which found that more women in the legislature was of greater importance. Although a high level of multicollinearity indicates caution in attempting to distinguish between the impact of these two variables, the differences in these studies may be due to Canadian provinces having single-party majority governments while West European cabinets are often coalitions.     

Going green: Explaining issue competition on the environment

This study addresses the dynamics of the issue space in multiparty systems by examining to what extent, and under what conditions, parties respond to the issue ownership of other parties on the green issue. To understand why some issues become part and parcel of the political agenda in multiparty systems, it is crucial not only to examine the strategies of issue entrepreneurs, but also the responses of other parties. It is argued that the extent to which other parties respond to, rather than ignore, the issue mobilisation of green parties depends on two factors: how much of an electoral threat the green party poses to a specific party; and the extent to which the political and economic context makes the green issue a potential vote winner. To analyse the evolution of the green issue, a time‐series cross‐section analysis is conducted using data from the Comparative Manifestos Project for 19 West European countries from 1980–2010. The findings have important implications for understanding issue evolution in multiparty systems and how and why the dynamics of party competition on the green issue vary across time and space.     

A touchstone of dissent: Euroscepticism in contemporary Western European party systems

Abstract. With the recent acceleration of the integration process of the European Union there has been a rise in political parties expressing either scepticism or outright criticism of the nature of the integration process. Using a four–fold differentiation between single issue, protest, established parties and factions within parties, the first part of the article presents an overview of Euroscepticism within EU member states and Norway. This reveals the diversity of sources of Euroscepticism both in ideology and in the types of parties that are Eurosceptical but with a preponderance of protest parties taking Eurosceptical positions. The second part of the article is an attempt to map Euroscepticism in West European party systems through a consideration of ideology and party position in the party system. The conclusions are that Euroscepticism is mainly limited to parties on the periphery of their party system and is often there used as an issue that differentiates those parties from the more established parties which are only likely to express Euroscepticism through factions. Party based Euroscepticism is therefore both largely dependent on domestic contextual factors and a useful issue to map emergent domestic political constellations.     

Consideration and Choice: Analyzing Party Choice in the Swedish European Election 2014

For a long time the question of to what extent party choice in the European Parliament (EP) elections is primarily dependent on voters’ orientations towards the European Union (EU) or just a mere reflection of orientations towards issues and actors in national politics has been debated. By combining insights from individual‐level models of party choice in second‐order elections with theories of sequential decision making this article investigates if, how and at what stages in the decision process attitudes to European integration matters for party choice. In line with previous work on first and second decision rule criteria in EP elections, this article develops and tests hypotheses about how voters’ orientations work at different stages of the voter decision process. The findings, based on Swedish data from a probability‐based three‐wave Internet campaign panel, indicate that many voters are in fact considering more than one party to vote for in the beginning of the election campaign. As expected, left‐right orientations function as a main decision rule with respect to which parties voters even consider voting for, while proximity on the European integration dimension mainly matters as a second decision rule in the final stage of the decision process. Using a sequential model with consideration and choice stages, the article reveals a much larger complimentary effect of EU proximity on party choice than has generally been found in previous research. This serves as a distinct contribution to the emerging research field of individual party choice in second‐order elections.     

(Re‐)join the party! The effects of direct democracy on party membership in Europe

It has been argued that political parties are in decline. While they used to be responsible for connecting citizens to the state by translating their preferences into policies, they have increasingly become part of the state, acting as governors instead. While this perspective emphasises parties’ representative function, it is less clear what their role is in a more direct democratic context. Parties may gain support due to such context, but they may also be seen increasingly redundant in a situation where citizens can co‐decide directly. Focusing on party membership, this study tests these rival expectations on a panel of 16 West European democracies over the period 1980–2008 and finds that parties tend to have higher levels of party membership in a direct democratic context. The usage of referendums, however, does not contribute to this effect.     

The Populist Challenge

Populism has been on the rise for some time in Europe now, and its rise has been one of the key concerns of Peter Mair. He has linked it to the increasing erosion of the representative function of European party systems. The spectre that haunted him was ‘partyless democracy’, a democratic regime where parties had lost their representative function, which opened the door for unmediated populist protest. While largely sharing his interpretation of the overall structural trends giving rise to the populist challenges in Western Europe, the article is critical of the static character of his assessment. It suggests that there are three forms of ‘protest populism’, all of which may eventually end up transforming the West European party systems in the name of the new structuring conflicts that characterise contemporary European societies. In addition, it proposes to extend the scope of Peter’s argument to the less established democracies of Central and Eastern Europe.     

Factionalism in West European parties: A framework for analysis

This article provides a framework through which strains and conflicts in West European parties may be studied, and the circumstances of individual parties compared. The first section sets out a model of the dimensions of conflict, the second looks at some of the ‘static’ factors which determine the location of parties on these dimensions, and the third considers what dynamic implications there are for the model in recent changes in European party systems.     

Religion as Catalyst or Restraint of Radical Right Voting?

It is often found that religious people are underrepresented among the radical right electorate, despite radical right parties’ claim of being defenders of the Judeo-Christian society. This study investigates this paradoxical finding and examines to what extent two dimensions of religion – practice and belief – play a role in voting for a radical right party across seven West European countries. Using the European Values Study from 2008, it was found that religiously active people are indeed less likely to vote for a radical right party, because they tend to vote for a Christian party. However, the study challenges the common wisdom that religion alone is a restraint on radical right voting and shows that orthodox believers in three countries – Belgium, Norway and Switzerland – feel more threatened by the presence of immigrants and therefore are more likely than their mainstream counterparts to vote for a radical right party.     

Intra-Party Democracy and Party Responsiveness

This study examines whether parties respond to their supporters or to the median voter position. Party leaders require the support of the ‘selectorate’, which is defined as the group that has influence in party leadership selection. Inclusive parties, which rely on rank-and-file membership to select their leaders, will respond to their members. Exclusive parties, which rely on office-seeking members for leadership selection, will respond to the median voter position. Thus, intra-party institutions that (dis)enfranchise party members are crucial for understanding whether a party responds to their supporters (or to the median voter position). Using data from 1975–2003 for six West European countries, this article reports findings that inclusive parties respond to the mean party supporter position. While there is evidence that exclusive parties respond to the median voter position in two-party systems, this finding does not extend to multiparty systems. This study has implications for the understanding of intra-party institutions and political representation.     

Party convergence and vote switching: Explaining mainstream party decline across Europe

How can one explain the significant vote losses of mainstream parties across Europe in recent years? In this article, it is argued that mainstream party convergence is an important determinant of the recent political and electoral volatility in European party systems. More specifically, it is hypothesised that as mainstream parties converge on the left-right scale, voters will switch from supporting a mainstream party to a non-mainstream party in the next election as they look for an alternative that better represents their ideological views. To test these theoretical expectations, data is combined from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems and the Manifestos Project for nearly 15,000 vote choices of individual voters in 30 elections in 16 West and East European countries from 2001 until 2013. The findings have important implications for understanding the recent rise of non-mainstream parties, the changing nature of party systems and the increasing complexity of cabinet formation across Europe.     

In the Shadow of Brexit: The 2019 European Parliament Elections as First‐Order Polity Elections?

European Parliament (EP) elections have traditionally been described as ‘second‐order national elections' in which campaigns are fought by national parties on national issues. We argue that the 2019 elections should instead be considered ‘first‐order polity' elections. It is not EU‐level party politics or policy issues that are debated, but rather the legitimacy of the EU itself. Firstly, the EP elections have transformed into an EU ‘blame game' in which national governments are punished or rewarded over their stance on European integration. Secondly, the 2019 election was about the EU's fundamental values, not only with respect to multiculturalism, but also gender equality and LGBTQ rights. Finally, these first‐order polity elections are driven in large part by traditional news and social media platforms. While this is a long way from the patterns of the early EP elections, they still fail in fulfilling the function of holding MEPs and European party groupings adequately to account.