Problems of transnational policymaking: Environmental policy in the European Community

Abstract. Environmental protection is inherently a cross-border issue, which might be thought to create opportunities for transnational regulation. This has significant potential consequences for European integration. However, two contrasting trends can be identified. On the one hand, the increasing magnitude of environmental problems, along with growing public and elite awareness of these issues, are generating responses which put the European Community at the centre of a process of 'regulation'. It is intended that this role should grow in the twin contexts of the Single Market and of increasing interaction with Eastern Europe with its vast pollution problems. On the other hand, however, the kind of 'political' policy intervention which environmental protection requires has not really developed. EC environmental policies have thus far been rather weak in both formulation and, especially, implementation, and even existing gains are likely to come under increasing pressure from the trend towards economic deregulation characteristic of the Single European Market project. Probably the most significant impact of Community efforts in the environmental field has been to encourage the convergence and strengthening of national regulation among member states, more than to create distinct European policy processes and institutions.     

Corporate interests and public affairs: organised business–government relations in EU member states

The internationalisation of economic and political affairs changes the way in which business interests are brought to bear on public policy. This is a global phenomenon but can, in particular, be observed in Europe. The construction of the European Union, the development of the Single Market and the build‐up of the policy institutions to go with it, together change business–government relations profoundly. This paper answers the question of how organised business interests relate to government agencies and political institutions. By using the example of trade associations in the Netherlands and Germany, the paper shows that, despite the internationalisation of public affairs in Europe, the national political level remains strategically important for the representation of business interests. The paper thus argues that changes in European business–government relations are institutionally embedded at both the European and the national level. The implication for future research is that much of the dynamics of economic and political internationalisation materialises within the domestic arrangements of interest politics. Copyright © 2004 Henry Stewart Publications     

Corporate interests and public affairs: organised business–government relations in EU member states

The internationalisation of economic and political affairs changes the way in which business interests are brought to bear on public policy. This is a global phenomenon but can, in particular, be observed in Europe. The construction of the European Union, the development of the Single Market and the build‐up of the policy institutions to go with it, together change business–government relations profoundly. This paper answers the question of how organised business interests relate to government agencies and political institutions. By using the example of trade associations in the Netherlands and Germany, the paper shows that, despite the internationalisation of public affairs in Europe, the national political level remains strategically important for the representation of business interests. The paper thus argues that changes in European business–government relations are institutionally embedded at both the European and the national level. The implication for future research is that much of the dynamics of economic and political internationalisation materialises within the domestic arrangements of interest politics. Copyright © 2004 Henry Stewart Publications     

A Bonfire of the Regulations,or Business as Usual? The UK Labour Market and the Political Economy of Brexit

Employment and labour market regulation initially appeared as one of the solid red lines in the UK's renegotiation of the country's place in the EU. The basic argument is that the UK's more deregulated labour market would sit uneasily in the more organised models, based on statutory instruments or collective bargaining, found on the continent. While there is a legitimate problem here, EU employment regulations appear manageable from the point of view of business, while unions see them as important tools for socially responsible economic restructuring. Most of UK employment case law is now deeply entangled with EU law; labour market regulations have, on the whole, become part of the way of doing business in the Single Market; and a simple cost–benefit analysis appears impossible because some costs are not quantifiable and the costs of others are reduced when taken as a bundle. Labour unions agree that transposition of European law needs to be done taking into account local sensitivities, while internationally oriented companies do not see EU regulations on the whole as detrimental to business. Importantly, though, the costs and benefits of EU employment regulations are not symmetrically distributed across different companies: large companies are better able to reap the rewards and accommodate the costs of operating in the Single Market than smaller companies.     

Codetermination and the market for corporate control in the European Community

In the process of European integration the member states have agreed to transfer substantial jurisdiction in the areas of economic and monetary policy to the European Community. In industrial relations, however, they have refused to make similar concessions. Despite its numerous attempts the Commission of the EC has not as yet been able to secure the political consensus necessary for a European model of employees' participation and codetermination. In the context of the Single European Market the national systems of codetermination are destined to play a decreasing role. With the continuing development of the single market and its interlocking business structures across national borders, regulations on codetermination that extend only up to such borders and no further can be expected to lose in significane. This paper traces the history of codetermination in the European Community. It also analyses the reasons why the various directives and regulations drafted by the EC Commission since 1967 have been rejected by the Council of Ministers.     

Ever Closer Cooperation? The Limits of the ‘Norwegian Method’ of European Integration

The 'No' majorities in two referendums on European Community/Union (EC/EU) membership have set clear formal limits to Norway's participation in European integration. However, pro-EU parliamentary majorities have tended to produce governments that seek as close cooperation with the EU as possible. This involves a kind of quasi-membership of the EU, particularly in the light of cooperation beyond the limits of the European Economic Area (EEA). The result has been a 'Norwegian method' of European integration that combines access to the Single Market with efforts to 'purchase' participation in other policy areas and adapt to changing EU policies, legislation and treaties. Given the supranational character of the EU's Single Market rules, this kind of quasi-membership goes considerably further than non-members' participation in most other international organisations. Although the EEA system has worked to the parties' satisfaction, Norway's efforts to keep up with a changing Single Market, maintain the institutions in the face of treaty change and enlargement, and accommodate new developments pertaining to the EU's second and third pillars represent considerable challenges to the Norwegian method of integration.     

The social dimension of the Single European Market: National versus transnational regulation

Abstract. Labour market regulation in the 1980s was subject to transnational pressures for deregulation, especially in the form of 'flexibilisation'. The 'Single European Market' project (SEM) promises further development in this direction. At the same time, proposals for a 'Social Charter' are meant to introduce a European level of regulation to counteract the SEM's potential destabilizing consequences. However, regulatory disputes and pressures contrary to convergence are likely to be intensified by the SEM. Still further uncertainty will be created by changes in Eastern Europe, as well as by greater opportunities for cross-border production shifts. Neoliberal and neocorporatist variants of the 'competition state' will be increasingly at odds at both state and Community level, with the future of 'social Europe' at stake. To the extent that market integration means a globalisation of the European economy, it may effectively disintegrate its component parts, dividing those which have more solid foundations for growth - the well-regulated, high pay/high productivity areas - from those which do not. The market logic of the Single European Market programme will manifestly contradict the efforts of the Community to avoid this future.     

The increasingly difficult art of comparative European politics

Abstract. Those writing textbooks on comparative European politics, or the cross–national study of European democracies, have a number of key choices to make. They must decide whether to cover Western Europe as well as Central and Eastern Europe; whether to focus on a limited number or a broad range of countries; whether to include the EU in the analysis or exclude it; whether to adopt a thematic or a country–by–country approach; whether to survey events or test a broader argument; and whether to focus on the politics of institutions and representation or to include more social and economic–oriented concerns as well. The evidence from the most recently published texts in this area is that different writers make different choices. Moreover, the context within which European politics now operates also suggests that their choices are becoming increasingly difficult ones to make.     

Perspectives,practices and prospects of public affairs in Central and Eastern Europe: a lobbying future anchored in an institutional context

‘Public Affairs’ is not a term most people in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) will recognise and associate with interest representation and lobbying as ways of linking business, society and government. The term may be seen as a euphemism for corruption-inspired ‘lobbying’, an artificial and confusing umbrella term or a public relations creation. It is a term in transition for a subject in transition in a part of Europe in transition. Even as part of the European Union, CEE is still different, in transition, finding its own feet like a phoenix arising from the ashes of 50 years of communism, but slowly, in bursts, réculer pour mieux sauter and very different from country to country. Which are the features and values of the 50 years of communism that will disappear, fast more slowly, which ones will linger on? What are the institutions in CEE countries that public affairs will have to deal with, and what is the view on transparency and transparency regulation in CEE? To add understanding, values, cultural differences, institutional context and other factors affecting the public affairs environment are examined. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Party government in Central Eastern European democracies: A data collection (1990–2003)

Abstract.  This article provides a systematic comparative overview of party governments in 11 Central Eastern European countries. The review is based on the compilation of a cross-national data set on post-communist party governments from 1990 to 2003. The presentation of the data is organised in the same way as the party government data for Western democracies presented by Woldendorp et al. in 1998. Thus, the data provide empirical grounds for further comparative research on party governments in Central Eastern European countries, as well as among Central Eastern and Western Europe.     

Eastward Enlargement of the European Union and the Identity of Europe

The constitution of a European demos with a collective identity is one of the preconditions for adjusting the legitimacy problem of the European Union (EU). The analysis attempts to clarify empirically whether there is sufficient commonality regarding Europeans' political value orientations to substantiate a collective identity. Particularly in view of the European Union's eastward enlargement, the question arises whether widespread cultural heterogeneity in Europe allows the formation of a European demos at all. In Europe we can identify a West-East axis of political value orientations. Democratic attitudes decrease the further to the East while at the same time there is an increase in etatist orientations. Thresholds can be observed which distinguish Western European countries on the one hand and Central and Eastern European countries on the other. Within the group of Central and Eastern Europe a further distinction can be made between the three Slavic republics of the former Soviet Union and the rest of the countries. These findings support Huntington's theory of civilisations.     

The electoral consequences of the financial and economic crisis in Europe

The electoral consequences of the Great Recession are analysed in this article by combining insights from economic voting theories and the literature on party system change. Taking cues from these two theoretical perspectives, the impact of the Great Recession on the stability and change of Western, Central and Eastern European party systems is assessed. The article starts from the premise that, in order to fully assess the impact of the contemporary crisis, classic economic voting hypotheses focused on incumbent parties need to be combined with accounts of long‐term party system change provided by realignment and dealignment theories. The empirical analysis draws on an original dataset of election results and economic and political indicators in 30 European democracies. The results indicate that during the Great Recession economic strain was associated with sizable losses for incumbent parties and an increasing destabilisation of Western European party systems, while its impact was significantly weaker in Central and Eastern European countries, where political rather than economic failures appeared to be more relevant. In line with the realignment perspective, the results also reveal that in Western Europe populist radical right, radical left and non‐mainstream parties benefited the most from the economic hardship, while support for mainstream parties decreased further.     

Review Essay International Organizations and Institutional Change in Central and Eastern Europe

Books reviewed: Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, eds. The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe.
Wade Jacoby. The Enlargement of the European Union and NATO: Ordering from the Menu in Central Europe.
James Hughes, Gwendolyn Sasse, and Claire Gordon. Europeanization and Regionalization in the EU's Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe: The Myth of Conditionality.
Reviewed by JOHN A. SCHERPEREEL     

‘Fear and loathing across party lines’ (also) in Europe: Affective polarisation in European party systems

Several scholars in the United States have recently addressed an increased partisan animosity between Democrats and Republicans, and have termed this phenomenon ‘affective polarisation’. This surge in partisan affective polarisation is perceived to be highly problematic, as it has been found to have a negative impact on the functioning of the party system and even society at large. The aim of this article is to study the concept of affective polarisation in European party systems. It introduces the Affective Polarisation Index (API) that allows for measuring and comparing levels of affective polarisation also in multiparty systems. This novel measure is applied to 22 European democracies and the United States between 2005 and 2016. The results indicate that affective polarisation is acutely present in European party systems, as partisans are often extremely hostile towards competing parties. The most affectively polarised countries are in Central Eastern and Southern Europe where the degree of affective polarisation is notably higher than it is in the United States, while Northwestern European countries are more moderate in terms of partisan feelings. Further analysis reveals that affective polarisation is significantly correlated with ideological polarisation, but the relationship between the two appears to be conditional: in some Western European political systems ideological polarisation does not lead itself to strong interparty hostility, while in Central Eastern Europe a high degree of affective polarisation can be present even in ideologically centrist party structures. These findings validate the claim that ideological and affective polarisation are two distinct aspects of polarisation, and that the latter also merits additional attention.     

Adapting Danish Interests to European Integration

When Denmark became a member of the European Community in 1973, political institutions as well as private business had to and did in fact make adaptations to the new and unaccustomed political environment. With the exception of the Common Market Committee of Folkelinget , however, the Danish polity did not change much with regard to the EC until the late 1980s when the Community gained new momentum. Now, traditionally corporatist patterns of decision-making are adapting to a European polity much more complex and pluralist by nature. Political and administrative institutions are developing new ways of influencing EC policies, though their lobbying activities still remain basically ad hoc and reactive. As to private interests, agriculture occupies a unique position with its long tradition of aggressive lobbying, while lobbying by manufacturing companies is still in the making. However, an overall weakening of national corporatist patterns of decision-making in response to the integration process, which one might perhaps have expected, has not taken place. Rather, we observe a strengthening. Thus, our case poses questions as to the relevance of existing corporatist notions for an understanding of the general nature of the policy-making process in the Community and the prospects for interest organizational centralization at the European level.     

Is there a demand for autocracies in Europe? Comparing the attitudes of Hungarian and Italian university students toward liberal democratic values inspired by János Kornai

Public Choice - In the European Union right-wing and left-wing populist parties are increasingly becoming stronger. Meanwhile in Central and Eastern Europe autocracies are emerging and becoming...     

Ambient accountability: intelligence services in Europe and the decline of state secrecy

Abstract

In the 1990s, judgments in the European Court of Human Rights concerning state surveillance forced many West European countries to introduce new parliamentary bodies and formal systems for accountability. Promising both greater transparency and lawful intelligence, these frameworks were then energetically rolled out to Central and Eastern Europe. Although officials boasted about their effectiveness, these formal accountability mechanisms have failed to identify serious abuses over the last decade. Moreover, the security regime in much of Central Europe still remains largely unreconstructed. The article argues that a robust culture of accountability cannot be conjured into existence merely by introducing new laws and regulations, or indeed by the increasing tide of media revelations about intelligence. However, it suggests that we are now seeing the rise of a more complex pattern of ‘ambient accountability’ which is at last challenging the secret state across Europe.     

Emerging regional security co‐operation in Europe and the Asia Pacific

European and Asian‐Pacific policymakers need to shift from policies based on competition to those based on co‐operation. If European and Asian‐Pacific states are successful in implementing and strengthening new security institutions on the basis of co‐operative behaviour designed to realize absolute gains, then conflict in these two regions may decrease and regional hegemonic competition may not materialize. It is argued that three key factors will determine the viability of any regional security framework. These are reciprocity in security relations, great power support for the security arrangements and reassurance. In this study's comparative evaluation of Europe and the Asia Pacific, the pursuit of absolute gains through a security regime appears to be a better alternative to relative gains strategies which serve to intensify security dilemmas.

In Europe, rules and norms for state behaviour are being extended throughout the continent through the gradual extension of the West European security institutions to Central and East European states. The NACC and the PfP offer to combine the stability of the North Atlantic Alliance with the principles of co‐operative security at a pan‐European level. In the Asia Pacific, the ASEAN Regional Forum represents a positive initial step towards greater security co‐operation among the ASEAN states and their neighbours, and the United States and China need to give the ARF their full support. The difference between the ARF and NACC and the PfP is that the former does not have a history of successful military collaboration behind it, nor a developed security agenda or structure similar to that now supporting the latter two.     

The European Commission: The Limits of Centralization and the Perils of Parliamentarization

The idea of an inevitable process of centralization in the European Community (EC)/European Union (EU) is a myth. Also, the metaphor of “creeping competences,” with its suggestion of a surreptitious but continuous growth of the powers of the Commission, can be misleading. It is true that the functional scope of EC/EU competences has steadily increased, but the nature of new competences has changed dramatically, as may be seen from the evolution of the methods of harmonization. The original emphasis on total harmonization, which gives the Community exclusive competence over a given policy area, has been largely replaced by more flexible but less “communitarian” methods such as optional and minimum harmonization, reference to nonbinding technical standards, and mutual recognition. Finally, the treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam explicitly excluded harmonization for most new competences. Thus, the expansion of the jurisdiction of the EC/EU has not automatically increased the powers of the Commission, but has actually weakened them in several respects. In addition, the progressive parliamentarization of the Commission risks compromising its credibility as an independent regulator, without necessarily enhancing its democratic legitimacy. Since the member states continue to oppose any centralization of regulatory powers, even in areas essential to the functioning of the internal market, the task of implementing Community policies should be entrusted to networks of independent national and European regulators, roughly modeled on the European System of Central Banks. The Commission would coordinate and monitor the activities of these networks in order to ensure the coherence of EC regulatory policies. More generally, it should bring its distinctive competence more clearly into focus by concentrating on the core business of ensuring the development and proper functioning of the single European market. This is a more modest role than that of the kernel of a future government of Europe, but it is essential to the credibility of the integration process and does not overstrain the limited financial and legitimacy resources available to the Commission.     

Hyperaccountability: Economic voting in Central and Eastern Europe

Are citizens in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe able to hold politicians accountable at elections? The inheritance of communism—disengaged citizens, economic flux, and inchoate party systems—might be expected to weaken accountability. Looking at the results of 34 elections in 10 Central and Eastern European countries, this paper finds instead a phenomenon that it calls hyperaccountability. Incumbents are held accountable for economic performance—particularly for unemployment—but this accountability distinguishes not between vote losses and gains, but between large and small losses. This result is significant in several respects. The evidence for economic voting restores some faith in the ability of voters to control their representatives in new democracies. The consistency of punishment in the region, however, may mitigate some of the benefits of economic voting. If incumbents know they will lose, then they may decide to enrich themselves when in power rather than produce good policies.