The coalitions of 1989–90 in Greece: Inter‐party relations and democratic consolidation

The Greek coalitions of 1989–90 were unusual by comparative European standards, given their political composition and ideological span. But, above all, they were significant as an historical departure in Greek politics, however much political expediency lay behind their formation. Coalitions are as such almost unknown in postwar Greece, and one‐party government has been the rule since the return to democracy in 1974. Even more significant was the inclusion of the Communist Left in the governments of 1989–90 in view of the polarised state of Greek politics since 1974 and historical memories of the Civil War. Drawing on lessons from coalition theory, the formation and maintenance of these two governments are discussed. While their policy achievements were limited, the governments of 1989—90 allowed Greece to overcome the crisis of the PASOK government and the scandals of 1988–89 and they made way for a second alternation in power. On balance, therefore, they are likely to have contributed to the ongoing process of democratic consolidation in Greece.     

The German grand coalition of 2005–09 and party system change: Catalyst or continuity?

Two times in the last fifty years grand coalitions have altered traditionally bi-polar patterns of German electoral competition, changing the electoral context by making it difficult for voters to endorse anti-incumbent alternatives. How have voters reacted under these circumstances, and were their responses different because of the weakening of partisan attachments in the forty years between the two grand coalitions? This study explores these questions by examining voter behavior in German state elections under the federal grand coalitions of 1966–69 and 2005–09, comparing voters’ responses with long-term trends in German party system development. The second grand coalition saw a continuation of trends in declining turnout and increasing electoral volatility, but in contrast to the first grand coalition there was no surge in support for far-right parties. Such a change may be the result of differences between the party systems in the two period, with voters in unified Germany having many more options for expressing discontent.     

New politics and party systems: The emergence of a new type of party?

Building upon theories of new politics, this article suggests an ideal‐typical model of New Politics parties that integrates all important aspects of a political party: organisation, ideology, membership and electorate. It is then demonstrated that for Germany, Sweden, and Austria such a model is necessary in order to distinguish between conservative or centrist ‘Green’ formations and parties that are genuine products of the ‘new politics’.     

The ‘party‐state’ in Greece and the fall of Papandreou

Revelations of corruption and of maladministration have forced a re‐examination of some of the basic characteristics of the Greek party‐state and party system. The purpose of this article is to examine how the controversies ‐ ‘scandals’ ‐ arose, and to assess their consequences for political development in Greece in the light of the June 1989 national elections. The elections may prove critical for the evolution of the State and the party system.     

Conditions of success and political problems of a ‘media‐mediated personality‐party’: The case of Forza Italia

The emergence of Forza Italia should not be exclusively reduced to specific Italian conditions. This article attempts to explain the development and establishment of Forza Italia as part of a general change of politics in a modern, highly media‐oriented western society. The type of party represented by Forza Italia can be defined as a ‘media‐mediated personality‐party’. With regard to its structural organisation, it presents itself as an answer to tendencies of differentiation, individualisation and consumerisation in modern society. The leading organisational principle is not inner‐party democracy but inter‐party capability to compete. This model of organisation is seen as functional for a marketing‐based, media‐orientated political strategy. It represents a challenge for the type of democratic, mass‐membership party in western Europe. The 1996 elections in Italy, however, have also pointed out the limits of the model of the media‐mediated personality‐party.     

Candidate and party affective polarization in U.S. presidential elections: The person-negativity bias?

We investigate the degree of affective polarization in presidential election years toward the two major parties and their nominees. Notwithstanding studies which show that individuating information about an out-group member can generate a person-positivity bias, we demonstrate a person-negativity bias directed at out-party candidates at least for some. We motivate and test two hypotheses: first, we expect more sophisticated partisans to display a greater difference in their feelings towards specific candidates compared to evaluations of the parties themselves; second, we anticipate sophisticated partisans will exhibit a person-negativity bias toward out-party candidates and a person-positivity bias toward in-party candidates. The results accentuate the conditional nature of the person-positivity bias and shed light on how political sophistication is linked to affective polarization.     

The politics of opposition and European integration in Scandinavia: Is Euro‐scepticism a government‐opposition dynamic?

Scandinavian party competition has incorporated divisions over European integration to a greater degree than most West European party systems, but with considerable variation in Norway, Sweden and Denmark. From a comparative politics perspective this raises questions about the relatively high salience of Euro‐scepticism in Scandinavian politics, the differences between the three cases and changes over time. The central argument in this article is that Europeanisation of party politics ‐ the translation of issues related to European integration into domestic party politics ‐ is driven by the dynamics of long‐ and short‐term government‐opposition competition, and the key driver of change is party strategy. Whether at the centre or extremes of the party system, Euro‐scepticism is a product of party competition — and is, both in its origins and development, ‘the politics of opposition ‘.     

The single‐issue party thesis: Extreme right parties and the immigration issue

This article examines the single‐issue party thesis for the specific case of contemporary extreme right parties (ERPs) and the immigration issue. I define the single‐issue party as (1) having an electorate with no particular social structure; (2) being supported predominantly on the basis of one single issue; (3) lacking an ideological programme; and (4) addressing only one all‐encompassing issue. On the basis of a comprehensive analysis of electoral studies and party literature the single‐issue party thesis is rejected on all counts. At best, immigration has been a catalyst for most ERPs in certain periods of time. Their ideology and broader programe will keep ERPs in the political arena for some time to come, even in the unlikely event that immigration would cease to be an important political issue.     

Are city elections unique? Perceptions of electoral cleavages and social sorting across levels of government

A long tradition of scholarship has argued that the cleavages that animate urban politics are distinct from those that structure regional or national politics. More recent scholarship has challenged this view, demonstrating the relevance of cleavages that apply at higher levels of government, such as partisanship and ideology, for urban elections. We contribute to this debate by investigating the perceptions of urban residents themselves. Using survey data from a major Canadian city, we use a novel survey question battery to compare how urban residents understand municipal and provincial electoral cleavages. We consider two questions that speak to the distinctiveness of local politics: (1) How do electors perceive coalitions of support at the two levels of government, and do perceptions of coalitions differ across levels? (2) How do perceptions compare to actual electoral coalitions at the two levels? We find little evidence to support the view that local electoral cleavages are unique.     

What’s a losing party to do? The calculus of contesting state legislative elections

Existing theories of contesting elections typically treat all potential challengers as identical while under-playing the importance of political parties and primary contests. We offer a theory addressing these issues based on how the various actors in the process define and evaluate the probability of winning an election and the value of the office being contested. We test our theory by estimating a model predicting which of three responses a party that loses a legislative race makes in the next cycle: nominating the same candidate, nominating a new candidate, or nominating no one. We find substantial empirical support for our theory.     

The social order of Chinese capitalism: socio-economic uncertainty,communist party rule and economic development, 1990–2000

China's financially repressed economy remains characterized by a distinctly resilient political structure (the Chinese Communist Party, CCP) that penetrates both increasingly rational ‘private’ (market) and ‘public’ (state) organizations. How are we to understand the financial system's role in this persistently illiberal yet marketizing political economy? This paper develops a theory of China's financial reform as the management of socio-economic uncertainty by the CCP. Since the early 1990s, the financial system has formed a locus of the CCP's capacity both to manage and to propagate socio-economic uncertainty through the path of reform. The unique path of financial reform in China should thus not be viewed solely in terms of ‘partial’ or ‘failed’ free-market reform, but rather as the product of a more concerted vision of how the financial system enabled a mode of economic growth that combined the drive for accumulation of capital with the distinctive legacies of China's post-1989 socio-political circumstances.     

The French elections of 2017: shaking the disease?

The results of the 2017 presidential and legislative elections represent an important shift in French politics. For the first time in the history of the 5th French Republic, the candidates of the two traditional governing parties were disqualified during the first round of the presidential elections. The duel between a centrist and a radical-right candidate in the second round of the elections constitutes an unprecedented configuration. Moreover, there was a record parliamentary renewal after the 2017 legislative elections, as well as a feminisation of the National Assembly with 38.8 per cent of women among the deputies. At the same time, abstention for the legislative elections reached a new record high. Overall, the results of the French elections in 2017 could point to major shifts in the party system, as well as to a renewal of the French political elite, and to an enduring malaise between French citizens and their political representatives.     

Bundesbank‐government relations in Germany in the 1990s: From GEMU to EMU

The Bundesbank's widely‐discussed independence ascribes it only discretionary power in the realm of monetary policy, but its influence can extend into other areas of economic policy. Since the government retains the initiative in these policy realms, the Bundesbank's influence consists of being able to mould the form rather than the direction of government policy. To exercise this influence, however, the Bundesbank must have public opinion on its side. An examination of the government‐Bundesbank relationship as it touched upon the cases of Economic and Monetary Union in Germany (1990) and Europe (1990–98) reveals the extent and limitations of the Bundesbank's influence over economic policy.     

The Italian party system in transition: The end of polarised pluralism?

This article examines Giovanni Sartori's polarised pluralist model and its application to the Italian party system. It suggests a more appropriate alternative method for testing the model's applicability to present‐day Italy. This modification, far from changing the model of polarised pluralism, improves its empirical usefulness. The suggestion then is put forward that Italy, rather than being an example par excellence of polarised pluralism, as Sartorisees it, is neither characterised by increased polarisation nor by centrifugal competition. Instead, Italy today witnesses the prevalence of depolarisation and centripetal electoral competition.