Invading Europe: The British army and its preparations for the Normandy campaign, 1942-44

Some scholars claim that collective security always fails. This article analyses a case where it succeeded. When Belgians rebelled against Dutch rule in the early 1830s, all five great powers agreed no fewer than four times to threaten or to use force against one or both sides. Why? Drawing extensively on diplomatic correspondence from Austrian, German and Russian archives, I show that the Concert of Europe functioned as a security regime, helping the powers to agree. Great power consensus broke down when Britain and France imposed a peace settlement on the Dutch in 1832. Yet the Belgian case—like Iraq's 1991 expulsion from Kuwait—shows that collective security can sometimes succeed against cross-border aggression.     

Sir George Clerk and the struggle for British influence in central Europe, 1919-26

During the Great War, Sir George Clerk was a senior Foreign Office official, strongly sympathetic to the cause of the 'oppressed nationalities' of Austria-Hungary and the liberal ideals associated with the journal, The New Europe. In 1919 he was granted a unique opportunity to shape the face of the New Europe when he embarked on his mission to Hungary. As British minister to Czechoslovakia in the early 1920s, Clerk harnessed his idealism for the Czechs to his ambition to make Prague a centre of British influence and power in central Europe. Though this policy ultimately failed, Clerk showed a greater rapport and sympathy for the Czechs than any of his successors.     

Separated by the Atlantic: The British and de Gaulle, 1958-1967

The British and French held divergent views from the late 1940s on relations with the United States and on the development of European integration. Differences between the two countries caused particular strain once General Charles de Gaulle returned to power in 1958. The clash that ensued between British and French policies towards the Atlantic Alliance and Europe during his presidency is the subject of this article. It suggests that while the British were unable to overcome de Gaulle's resistance to their membership of the EEC, Britain's fortunes in Europe were nevertheless improved by the Wilson government's response to de Gaulle's actions in the Atlantic Alliance.     

The British official mind and the Lausanne conference, 1922-23

From the collapse of the Ottoman empire in 1918 until the Lausanne Conference in 1923 Britain attempted to establish itself as the dominant power in the Aegean, largely in order to control its strengths. This would see the British occupation of Constantinople, the collapse of Allied cooperation, the Chanak crisis, and the final resolution at Lausanne.     

Heirs of the King-Makers: The British Embassy in Athens, 1951-61

This article examines the role and position of the British Embassy in Athens, as a test case of a diplomatic mission facing strains because of a bitter regional dispute, the Cyprus crisis. In the mid-1950s Whitehall decided that the retention of Cyprus was necessary for British policy in the Middle East, even at the cost of sacrificing relations with Greece. Thus the Embassy's recommendations were constantly being ignored in Whitehall, while its relations with the Greek authorities were growing worse. After 1957, the new Ambassador, Sir Roger Allen, focused on British cultural influence and on Britain's role in tying Greece more solidly to the West. The 1959 Cyprus settlement and the 1961 visit of the Greek Prime Minister to London marked the most important successes of this more flexible approach.     

British and Italian Imperial Rivalry in the Mediterranean, 1912-14: The Case of Egypt

Although it is known that serious imperial rivalry between Britain and Italy in the Mediterranean only began in the Fascist period, this article argues that Italian expansionism had already begun to pose a threat to British interests in the Mediterranean in 1912 following Italy's colonization of Libya. While the Italian state was still militarily and financially weak at this time, an Italian private financial institution, the Banco di Roma, engaged in a number of ventures in Egypt that led to complications in state-to-state relations. The article shows that the seeds of Anglo-Italian antagonism were sown in the hostile climate of the Egyptian-Libyan border through a series of incidents in the period between 1912 and 1914.     

The peripatetic career structure of the British diplomatic establishment, 1919-39

The first part of this article examines the development of the career structure of the British diplomatic establishment after the reforms of 1919-20, arguing that the peripatetic career identified with the prewar Diplomatic Service became increasingly common for all members of the new amalgamated service between the two world wars. The average length of posting to an overseas mission or one of the geographical departments in London seldom exceeded three years or so. The second part of the article then speculates on the impact of the peripatetic career on the effectiveness of the British diplomatic establishment, suggesting that it had both postive and negative impacts.     

The peripatetic career structure of the British diplomatic establishment, 1919-39

The first part of this article examines the development of the career structure of the British diplomatic establishment after the reforms of 1919-20, arguing that the peripatetic career identified with the prewar Diplomatic Service became increasingly common for all members of the new amalgamated service between the two world wars. The average length of posting to an overseas mission or one of the geographical departments in London seldom exceeded three years or so. The second part of the article then speculates on the impact of the peripatetic career on the effectiveness of the British diplomatic establishment, suggesting that it had both postive and negative impacts.     

The virtues of specialization: British and American diplomatic reporting on Russia, 1921-39

While important changes were made to the organization of the British diplomatic establishment in the years after 1918, most senior officials remained committed to the ethos of the 'generalist'. In the United States, by contrast, significant efforts were made to inculcate the virtues of professionalism and specialization among members of the Foreign Service. This paper examines the way in which members of the American and British diplomatic establishments monitored developments in the USSR during the interwar years. It concludes that US diplomats were no better than their British counterparts at interpreting developments in Soviet Russia, despite the fact that they were generally better trained to carry out their duties.     

Eisenhower, the British and the security of Hong Kong, 1953-60

This article is an examination of Hong Kong's importance within British-American security arrangements in the Far East during the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower. Archival evidence indicates that the Eisenhower Administration accepted a greater deal of commitment to the defence of Hong Kong during the 1950s — a period of significant hostility between the United States and the People's Republic of China. To understand this policy evolution in the broader context, this study evaluates the differences in British and American attitudes towards China during the 1950s and the effect of this on US policy towards Hong Kong.