Local Government Structure and Public Expenditures

The ``Law of 1/n'' postulates a positive relationship betweenthe number of democratically electedrepresentative districts and governmentspending. Strong support for thisrelationship exists in legislatures in theUnited States (at both the state andnational level) and across countries. Fewstudies have examined this relationship atthe local level despite the fact that localgovernments operate under constraintssimilar to those faced by representativelegislatures. Using a sample of Georgiacounties we find the number of countycommissioners to be positively correlatedwith county government expenditures,indicating support for the Law of 1/nat the local level.     

地方政府组织结构的优化进路

信息化给当前社会带来巨大变革,需要地方政府根据新的时代背景和公共需求主动变革,建立更加高效、协作、开放的组织结构。优化地方政府组织结构,一是需要重构纵向层级,理顺管理关系,在纵向结构上精简层级、打破同构、下放权力;二是需要优化横向职能划分,建立多元协作关系,推行大部门、协同化、整体性的改革;三是需要发挥信息技术的支持作用,保障变革实施,破除信息壁垒,建立政务平台,开放数据信息。     

Strategy in Local Government

One aspect of the study of local government organization is the role of consultants and the models they have introduced in order to help the local government reorganize. One of these models is "strategy", and this article sets out to consider the implication for these organizations if "the logic of strategy" were to be implemented. A common denominator of all the local governments studied is that "strategy" does not function, and the question is why this is so. Two distinctly different explanations can be considered. One states that "strategy" is difficult and that the politicians and administrators will need time to adjust to new ways of working. The other explanation, which is applied here, focuses on whether local government as an institution can be reconciled with the demands and premises inherent in "strategic thinking". My conclusions arc negative. "Strategy" is a model from the private sector and more specifically from the competitive sector of society and it is not appropriate for wider use. In this article the arguments are restricted to local government, and do not necessarily apply to other types of public organization.     

Local Elections and Local Government Performance

Over the past couple of decades, the level of turnout in Norwegian local elections has shown a steady d. This decline is paralleled by a greater range of variation in turnout across Norwegian municipalities. Arguing from the perspective of rational utility-maximizing voters, the article examines to what extent such variations in the level of turnout may be accounted for by the policy performance of local authorities – in addition to certain structural features of the municipalities and local communities. Using aggregate data on turnout and measures of policy performance. the analysis testifies to the suggestion that policy exerts an influence in determining the level of turnout, indicating a turn in the direction of more rational voting behaviour as far as local elections arc concerned. It is also evident from the analysis that the appearance of smaller single-issue parties does have a mobilizing effect in local elections while the Downsian suggestion about the effect of party competition on turnout levels is not supported by the mule of the analysis.     

Urban Local Governments and the Flypaper Effect: Evidence from Maharashtra, India

This article examines decentralization in the state of Maharashtrain India, especially with respect to the functioning of itsurban local governments. Using panel data, the article specificallyinvestigates the flypaper effect of grants from the state governmentto urban local bodies. It also addresses the asymmetry hypothesis,which states that subnational governments respond differentlyto a reduction in grants than to an increase. Our results demonstratethe presence of the flypaper effect, but evidence regardingthe asymmetric response to a reduction in grants is ambiguous.     

Devolution and Local Government

Devolution was introduced amid a rhetoric of democratic renewaland promised the active engagement of local government. Localgovernment has responded in different ways in different partsof the United Kingdom. In Scotland and Wales local authoritieshave built on their advocacy of devolution before 1997 to realizea close partnership with devolved government. In London, too,local authorities have come to engage closely with regionalgovernment. In the rest of England local authorities were atbest ambivalent about the possibility of regional government,preferring to work in a national context with UK governmentinstitutions. Northern Ireland local government is parochialand appears suspicious of engagement with devolved government.These differences express some of the wider relationships ofthe component societies of the United Kingdom to the UK stateand have helped to embed continued centralized government inEngland.     

Budgeting for Contracting in Local Government

While the amount of contracting out seems to be leveling off, the number of larger, long‐term contracts seems to be increasing. Such contracts are generally not well described in local budgets. Recent efforts in some cities to shift to more outcome‐oriented performance budgeting should push toward more clarity in reporting on major contracts in the budget. This article examines how a handful of major cities handle contracts in their budgets—in some cities contracts are omitted from the budget or all merged into one budget line—and makes some suggestions for improvements.     

Accountability for Performance in Local Government

The nature of accountability for performance in the public sector is explored in this paper by attempting to answer three questions: (1) How important is accountability for performance? (2) Which of the stakeholders consider themselves accountable for organisational performance, including contracts? (3) Does information asymmetry between stakeholders in regard to performance information affect accountability? This paper reports on research undertaken in Victorian local government based on the responses to a questionnaire by councillors and tier one and two managers. The results of the survey indicate that there is an understanding of accountability for performance, that both managers and councillors are considered to be accountable for performance but that information asymmetry and accountability relationships are problematic.     

Bourgeois Theories of Local Government

This paper offers an historical analysis of the principles of local government organization that have been accepted in Britain and the United States. The central thesis is that these principles express an 'economist' conception of politics and the state. Local governments have been variously conceived—as business corporations, consumers' cooperatives, and institutions of the state—but in each case they have been assigned a restricted, essentially instrumental purpose. This purpose is connected to economic welfare, which, it is supposed, requires centralization of government. Thus the prevalent economist conceptions of local government condemn the local polity to a tenuous existence.