Transforming Analysis: The Intelligence Community's Best Kept Secret

This article argues that analytic practices and processes within the US intelligence community have undergone far more fundamental reform than the public or scholarly communities recognize. It identifies the dimensions of this ‘Analytic Transformation’ and explains the reasons for optimism about the future.     

The 9/11 Terrorist Attacks: A Failure of Policy Not Strategic Intelligence Analysis

Abstract

The 9/11 terrorist attacks have been intensively examined as both tactical and strategic intelligence failures but less attention has been paid to the policy failures which preceded them. Perhaps this is due to the presumption that intelligence analysis influences decision-making as a precursor to and foundation for policy. This assumption about the influence of analysis on decision deserves a much closer examination. The 9/11 terrorist attacks provide a good case to study for greater understanding of the influence, or lack of influence, that intelligence analysis has on decision-making. Specifically, the 9/11 Commission Report identifies as a significant failure the lack of a National Intelligence Estimate on the terrorist threat between 1998 and 2001, and implies that if one had been produced it might have helped enable decision-makers to prevent the 9/11 attacks. In other words, a failure of strategic intelligence analysis lay at the foundation of the failure to prevent 9/11. But was this really the case? This article takes a closer look at the case of the missing National Intelligence Estimate by first evaluating what decision-makers knew about the threat prior to the 9/11 attacks, the policies they were implementing at the time, and the extent to which the hypothetical National Intelligence Estimate described by the 9/11 Commission would have mattered in terms of influencing their judgement and policy for the better. It concludes that the 9/11 terrorist attacks were more a failure of policy than strategic intelligence analysis.     

The secret service department: a British Intelligence Bureau in mid-Victorian London,September 1867 to April 1868

In December 1867 the Earl of Derby's government established a ‘Secret Service Department’ in London to extend Dublin Castle's anti- Fenian intelligence network to England and to contend with the perceived threat posed by domestic and international secret societies. This secret detective force – an early English intelligence bureau – lasted only until April 1868, but its disbandment reflected practical and administrative difficulties rather than a pervading prejudice towards spying. Indeed, the motivations for founding the department and the actions of those involved suggest that long before the establishment of the Special Branch in the 1880s, need rather than principle determined official actions in regard to political espionage.     

Security,Not Defence,Strategic, Not Habit: Restructuring the Political Arrangements for Policy Making on Britain's Role in the World

The Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition government has committed itself to a Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDR) in 2010. The government and the country face very hard choices to bring United Kingdom defence and security policy back from the brink of bankruptcy—both financial and strategic (Gow). To succeed, it must overcome the failings of the past (Chisnall, Dorman, Rees) and take a truly open and radical look at all aspects of policy and process—including the Trident independent nuclear deterrent (Allen), relations with Europe (Witney) and the importance of cyber‐issues in the future security context (Fisher). It must get strategic concepts right to provide flexibility with credibility (Stone). It must deliver ‘what the military wants’: true strategic prioritisation, radical defence acquisition reform, and credible balancing of resources and commitments (Kiszley). The scale of the challenge facing the United Kingdom in—and beyond—the 2010 SDR is why The Political Quarterly convened a workshop early in 2010 involving MPs, practitioners, retired military personnel, journalists, commentators, business people and academics, and publishes these associated papers. Most of all, to overcome the failings of the past, there must be a radical move beyond the welcome first steps of the Cameron–Clegg government to introduce a National Security Council and a National Security Advisor, to reconfigure relationships within government, across departments and with Parliament to have a government figure of accountability and responsibility—a Secretary of State for Security Policy, primus inter pares with other Secretaries of State—to make sense of the questions needing to be asked and answered (Gearson and Gow).     

The Singapore Mutiny (1915) and the Genesis of Political Intelligence in Singapore

This paper describes how political intelligence evolved in Singapore and the establishment for the first time of a political intelligence bureau, the forerunner of the Singapore Police Special Branch and the present-day Internal Security Department (ISD). It is an example of British imperial practice as the early roots of intelligence in Singapore owed much to the experience gained earlier in British India in dealing with intelligence matters. The establishment of an intelligence bureau in Singapore came about as a direct result of the Singapore Mutiny (15 February 1915), and in the following year the newly-established bureau was renamed the Criminal Intelligence Department and absorbed into the Straits Settlements Police. In September 1933, it became the Singapore Special Branch, the forerunner of present-day Singapore's Internal Security Department.     

The Value of Non-Governmental Intelligence: Widening the Field

In the UK, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) has a poor track record of predicting attack. In the US, official inquiries into 9/11 identified ‘a failure of imagination’ to conceive of a large scale threat to the American homeland. There is a long-standing literature on surprise attack which emphasizes that clues to predict attack often exist but are not pieced together by an intelligence sector which is not structured to look in the right direction. In a world of increasingly fragmented threats and weak signals, it is apparent that much of the challenge in intelligence work now lies not in collection but in managing requirements, setting priorities, and conducting incisive analysis based on the ability to imagine new threats. One solution to a failure of imagination is to widen the range of people who can contribute to the task. Non-Governmental analysis of security issues, whether by academia, civil society or the private sector, can help to identify emerging issues and set priorities. Whilst collection of secret intelligence may always remain the preserve of specialist Government agencies, the rest of the intelligence cycle can benefit from external contributions and open source intelligence. We argue that the process of setting intelligence requirements could be opened to a wider range of actors. In conflict environments, there may be particular value in an open process to identify what each side would need to know about the other to confidently seek peace.     

Intelligence studies: The emergence of the British school

Christopher Andrew and Jeremy Noakes (eds.), Intelligence and International Relations 1900–1945 (Exeter: University of Exeter Publications, 1987), pp.320; £10.00 (paperback).     

Glimpses into the Gems of American Intelligence: The President's Daily Brief and the National Intelligence Estimate

The two most prestigious products prepared by the US intelligence agencies for use by decision-makers in Washington, DC, are the President's Daily Brief and the National Intelligence Estimate. The Brief, an example of ‘current intelligence,’ adds value to what policy officials in Washington can learn about world affairs from the best newspapers, especially in the domains of foreign weaponry, activities within closed societies, and the machinations of terrorist organizations. The National Intelligence Estimate, an example of ‘research intelligence,’ has added value, too, on occasion, but has often been wrong. Each of these forms of intelligence has their critics, and the NIE in particular is frequently considered too long a document and too diluted in content. The production of NIEs has varied over the years since 1950, averaging twenty-three a year with a low of five (in 1976) and a high of fifty-six (in 1992).     

British Intelligence and the Mandate of Palestine: Threats to British National Security Immediately After the Second World War

Recently declassified Security Service (MI5) records reveal, for the first time, the full extent of the threat that Zionist terrorism posed to British national security immediately after the Second World War. It is well established within the historical literature that after 1945 Britain faced violent campaigns by Jewish terrorist groups in the Mandate of Palestine. Hitherto unacknowledged in the historiography, however, is the fact that the threat of Zionist terrorism extended from Palestine to Britain itself. This article studies the nature of the threat posed by Zionist terrorism within Britain after 1945, and explores the counter-terrorist measures that MI5 devised to meet it. Overall, as this article shows, MI5's concerns with Zionist terrorism after 1945 offer a striking new interpretation of the history of the early Cold War.     

Crisis management in colonial states: Intelligence and counter-insurgency in Morocco and Syria after the First World War

This article addresses fundamental questions about power in colonial states by analysing the role and performance of intelligence agencies in response to internal rebellion. What was the relationship between intelligence agencies and the coercive instruments of imperial power? How far did intelligence-gathering help to maintain state authority? And what role did intelligence agencies play as architects of colonial state formation? These questions are discussed here with reference to two French overseas dependencies that proved especially turbulent in the 1920s: the Moroccan protectorate and the Syrian mandate. It will be suggested that colonial rule in these locations was so heavily dependent on intelligence-gathering that both could be termed ‘intelligence states’.     

How (Not) to Form a Progressive Alliance: Lessons from the History of Left Cooperation

Britain’s political parties can be divided into two blocs: a ‘progressive bloc’ of parties on the left/centre‐left, and a ‘reactionary bloc’ of those on the right/centre‐right. In three of the last four general elections, the progressive bloc won an appreciably larger share of the popular vote than its reactionary rival. Yet its greater internal fragmentation has been repeatedly punished under first past the post, leading to what is now over a decade of Conservative‐led governments. This has prompted growing pressure to form a ‘progressive alliance’ between Labour, Liberal Democrats, Greens, and their Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish nationalist competitors. This article sheds a historical and international light on these demands, examining the difficulties other similar efforts at progressive cooperation have faced across the world. It considers how progressive alliances have previously sought to overcome geographical, ideological, and social divides between their constituent members, and draws some salutary lessons for British progressives today.     

Media Coverage of Human Rights in the USA and UK: The Violations Still Will Not Be Televised (or Published)

This article analyzes American television and American and British print news coverage of human rights using a combination of manual and machine coding. The data reveal that television and print news cover very few human rights stories, that these stories are mostly international and not domestic, that even when human rights are covered, they are not covered in detail, and that human rights issues are more likely to be covered when they are not framed as human rights. This suggests that human rights is simply not a frame that journalists employ and provides support for government-leading-media theories of newsworthiness.     

Framing the Oxymoron: A New Paradigm for Intelligence Ethics

Despite some arguments to the contrary, I argue that because ethics benefit, rather than harm, the intelligence profession they should be considered an inherent part of intelligence studies. The literature largely presents intelligence ethics as a two-sided debate between teleologists and deontologists. I propose that ethical justifications should instead be considered along a progressive spectrum drawn from the work of moral psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg. Such a spectrum has numerous applications for gauging the moral arguments of individual practitioners of intelligence. I illustrate this using the dilemma of targeted political assassination – first in a hypothetical context, and finally using examples from the investigations of the 1975 Church Committee.     

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Politics in the Developing World

The proliferation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the developing, as well as the developed, world, has triggered an 'associational revolution'. Political scientists, however, have made a relatively minor contribution to the contemporary NGO literature which has evolved since the mid-1980s. This article examines some of the main political themes addressed in the NGO literature, as well as related themes in other political studies. NGOs, the article argues, make significant contributions to political life and to political change in developing countries, revealing a fertile, and hitherto neglected, research agenda.     

Anglo-American Intelligence and the Soviet War Scare: The Untold Story

Abstract

During the Soviet war scare of the 1980s, British intelligence shared vital information from KGB officer Oleg Gordievsky with its American partners. The US intelligence community, however, was suspicious of the message and the messenger, dismissing Soviet ‘war talk’ as disinformation. Some officials even believed that the British had tweaked their reports to influence US policy. President Ronald Reagan, however, on the advice of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, listened to Gordievsky rather than his intelligence advisors. The war scare had a profound influence on Reagan's thinking about nuclear war, Kremlin fears, and Soviet–American relations that led him to seek a new détente with Moscow and the end of the Cold War through diplomacy rather than confrontation.?Subsequent events and post-Cold War revelations vindicated Gordievsky. Reagan sought his advice on the eve of his first summit meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev and later expressed his gratitude during a private meeting in the Oval Office.     

中国古代的"四海"意识与艾儒略《四海总说》

中西交流是以地理知识的沟通揭启序幕的,但来华传教士所带来的西方地理新知识,往往难以一时被中国古代士人所接纳.其中诸多细节,体现了两种不同文化间的差异与冲突,例如中西关于"四海"的诠定.中国古代文献记载中的"四海"从传统的经史体系而来,是以中国为中心的天下意识.而在利玛窦、艾儒略等传教士的地图和著述中",四海"从西方的航海大发现而来,用来唤醒中国古代士人的世界意识.两者之间的冲突与矛盾,反映了中西交流的曲折历程.     

Congressional Supervision of America's Secret Agencies: The Experience and Legacy of the Church Committee

In 1947, the United States created a modern intelligence community to guard against another surprise attack like the one at Pearl Harbor. This community consists of 13 major agencies, among them the CIA and the FBI. Concealed from public view, they pose a significant challenge to the concept of government accountability in a democratic society. This article examines the failure of congressional lawmakers to hold the secret agencies accountable during the Cold War. Contrary to recent theoretical research on legislative oversight, which suggests reasons that accountability has been strong in the United States, this study finds that a weak system of legislative review has permitted a dangerous erosion of civil liberties. The study also explores the efforts of the Church Committee in 1975 to fashion new safeguards that would reduce the probability of further abuse of power by the intelligence community.