Origin, Operation, and Significance: The Federalism of William H. Riker

William Riker transformed the study of federalism by advancingboth a methodological approach and numerous substantive propositions.Methodologically, he introduced students of federalism to thescientific approach of positive political science, illustratingthe development of "testable and tested generalizations." Substantively,he explained the origins of federal systems as a bargain amongpolitical leaders with expansionist and militaristic concerns.He argued that the United States was a politically centralizedfederal system from its founding. He linked the degree of centralizationin federal systems to the degree of centralization among theirpolitical parties. Despite all his work, though, Riker ultimatelydismissed federalism as a minor institution having little impacton policy outcomes.     

The Banner of Upright Swiss Liberty

The liberty of the Swiss has not been sufficiently appreciated,by Europeans, by federalists, and even by foreign lovers ofliberty who chose to live there, such as Gibbon. In his Bannerof the Upright Seven, Gottfried Keller of Zürich uncoversthe basis of Swiss federalism, displays the liberty it promotes,savors the well-being it provides, and yet shows how it woulddestroy it if its basis were forgotten. And he does so festively.     

Montesquieu on Federalism and Anglo-Gothic Constitutionalism

The common perception that Montesquieu is not a major theoristof federalism is due both to the peripheral nature of his accountof confederate republics and his praise of the unitary BritishConstitution in the Spirit of the Laws. This study challengesthis view by arguing that, despite his endorsement of the separationof powers, Montesquieu had serious reservations about England'shighly centralized system of parliamentary sovereignty. Moreover,his most significant reflections on federalism were not containedin his brief treatment of confederate republics, but ratherin his lengthy consideration of Gothic constitutionalism. Iconclude that Montesquieu's complex constitutional theory involvestwo distinct dimensions including both the separation of powersexemplified in England and the federal principles in the decentralizedGothic system of medieval France.     

Daniel J. Elazar: Comparative Federalism and Post-Statism

Daniel J. Elazar made an enormous contribution to the comparativestudy of federalism both by his encouragement of internationalcollaboration among scholars and by the prolific number of hewrote or edited and articles he produced which analyzed theconceptual foundations for federalism internationally. An importantcontribution was the distinction he drew between as a broadgeneric term and the variety of its specific forms such as federations,confederations, federacies. A dominant theme in his recent workwas the notion that in the contemporary world, we seeing a paradigmshift from a world of nation-states to a world of reduced statesovereignty and constitutionalized linkages of a federal orconfederal character.     

The Forgotten Doctrine of Enumerated Powers

Professor Diamond's essay is an elaboration of his remarks ata Woodrow Wilson Center evening dialogue on the question "HowShould Authority, Responsibility, and Resources be AllocatedAmong the Levels of Our Federal System?" Though he appears atfirst to confine his observations to that particular two-hourdiscussion, it soon becomes clear that his interest ranges morebroadly to "much of the contemporary public discussion of federalism."His concern is that the traditional concept—indeed, theconstitutional—basis of this discussion has been severelyeroded (Ed.).     

Federalism, the Bush Administration, and the Transformation of American Conservatism

Most recent Republican presidents have proposed signature federalisminitiatives intended to devolve power or sort out federal andstate functions. The Bush administration has not propoundedan explicit federalism policy of this sort, but its approachto federalism can be gleaned from analyzing presidential advocacyof legislation and constitutional amendments, fiscal policies,administrative actions, and judicial policies. What emergesfrom this analysis is an administration that has been surprisinglydismissive of federalism concerns and frequently an agent ofcentralization. In one sense, Bush is merely the latest in astring of presidents who have sacrificed federalism considerationsto specific policy goals when the two have come in conflict.However, the administration's behavior is somewhat surprising,given the president's background as a governor and the factthat he has been the first Republican president to enjoy Republicancontrol of Congress since 1954. Our explanation for the Bushapproach begins with the president's lack of any philosophicalcommitment to federalism and explores the changing status offederalism concerns within conservative ideology. Any explanationfor the Bush approach should account for this shifting politicaldynamic, which has seen Republicans in recent years become increasinglysupportive of exerting federal authority on behalf of theireconomic and social objectives, encouraging Democrats at timesto become more supportive of state authority.     

Women,Federalism and Women Friendly Policies

Australian women activists have never been enthusiastic about federalism because of its reputation as a system that restricts the scope of government and obstructs the path of progressive social change. Like their sisters in other countries, women's groups have sought collectivist solutions to economic and social problems. In the last couple of decades, however, orthodox ideas about the restrictive impact of federalism have been questioned. A revisionist view has emerged, which holds that the system sometimes facilitates the adoption of innovative policies and may lead to an expansion of the role of government. The revisionist perspective raises the question of whether women's groups have been wise to oppose federalism. This article examines relevant Canadian and Australian studies in order to test the validity of orthodox and revisionist perspectives and to draw conclusions about appropriate feminist approaches to federalism. The evidence is mixed. The main argument of this article is that, to the extent that we can distinguish its independent effect, federalism sometimes obstructs policy development and sometimes facilitates it. There are serious methodological problems involved in trying to isolate the impact of the federal variable from the many factors that influence policy, making generalisations precarious. Experience, therefore, offers little guidance to women's groups seeking to decide whether to support centralised or decentralised decision‐making structures. However, this study concludes that in the context of present Australian federal arrangements, women are more likely to achieve their aims when the Commonwealth government takes action, either alone or in cooperation with sub‐national jurisdictions.     

Changing your political mind: The impact of a metaphor on citizens’ representations and preferences for federalism

Federalism is often presented through metaphors, but little is known about the impact of such metaphors. Two experiments were conducted in Belgium presenting federalism as Tetris – with control and treatment groups – in order to grasp the influence of this metaphor. The first experiment reveals that being exposed to text with the Tetris metaphor influences respondents’ representations of federalism towards a more institutional representation and towards more regional autonomy. The second experiment confirms the importance of the text, and more specifically of the metaphor, if political knowledge is taken into account. Respondents with a lower level of political knowledge are those who are influenced by the metaphor, whereas respondents with a higher level are not. Therefore, framing the future of Belgian federalism using the metaphor of Tetris does matter: it affects both individuals’ representations of the federalization process and, consequently, their preferences vis-à-vis the institutional future of the country.     

Nixon and the Jews

ABSTRACT

In public the 37th President of the United States did not express hostility or disparagement, or show any signs of religious prejudice towards Jews. But inside the White House, Richard M. Nixon's remarks were often scurrilous. His antisemitism was not casual; it was close to compulsive. And it could be coupled with other seething grievances, for example, towards liberals, radicals, the media, Blacks and Italian-Americans. Yet Nixon controlled his antisemitism. It had no adverse effect on Jewish life, either at home or abroad. The malice that he nurtured remained unmobilized. Apart from a few limited personnel instances (mostly but not completely ignored by Nixon's underlings), it is impossible to connect private resentment to public policy, probably because the barriers to the expression of antisemitism in the United States have been so high. The ugliness of his utterances in the Oval Office revealed his character, but did not extend outward to shape the processes of governance. A disconnect can therefore be discerned between what he felt and how he acted. Most American Jews voted for Nixon's Democratic opponents in 1968 and 1972. But even Jews who voted against him, even those who loathed him, have often acknowledged that Nixon's policies fortified the security of Israel; and he was proud of his support for the Jewish state during the Yom Kippur War. What betrayed Nixon, and what forced him to resign the presidency, was his decision to instal a secret taping system in the Oval Office. When the tapes were played in 1974, he showed himself to be conspiring to obstruct justice. In subsequent years, further exposure of the tapes revealed the extent and intensity of Nixon's antipathy to Jews. The expletives that had to be deleted did much to besmirch the dignity of the office. But such was the stigma the political culture attached to antisemitism that, had his bigotry become public before 1968, Nixon's career would have been over.     

Federalism and Competing Values In The Reagan Administration

Ronald Reagan has made revitalizing federalism a central componentof his domestic agenda. Although this goal has sometimes complementedhis other policy aims, this article focuses on cases where conflictshave arisen between the president's devolutionary goals andother primary objectives of his administration, such as deregulatingthe private sector and reducing domestic expenditures. Judgedfrom this perspective, policies supportive of federalism, asdefined by the president, have fared less well in his administration.After a series of brief case studies analyzing such policy decisions,the implications for the future of federalism are discussed.     

Edward Banfield on the Promise of Politics and the Limits of Federalism

Edward Banfield is generally considered to be a conservative,but this assumption is problematic. This essay examines hisviews on federalism and local politics in an attempt to betterunderstand his orientation. While he holds views on federalismand localism that are not liberal, by post-Second World WarAmerican standards, his lack of interest in constitutional rules,acceptance of national expansion, and lack of enthusiasm aboutlocal government put him at odds with mainstream conservatism.Ultimately, Banfield's suggestion that politics (local and national)can improve the character of human beings places him outsideboth conservatism and liberalism, and within an older tradition.     

Richard Weaver's Untraditional Case for Federalism

Although Richard M. Weaver's political writings do not offera systematic examination of federalism, they include a defenseof federalist arrangements. Because Weaver's federalism is centralto his conservatism, and because his argument for federalismdiffers from more common conservative defenses of federalismoffered in the twentieth century, his writings allow studentsof federalism to examine possible connections between federalismand conservative political thought.     

The State of American Federalism, 1994-1995

Federalism, as a concept and as a reality, received assistancefrom a variety of sources during 1994–1995. Opinion pollsrevealed a public strongly supportive of shifts in the balanceof power between federal and state governments. The new Republican-controlledCongress, bent on devolving authority to the states, busieditself with an ambitious legislative agenda. The DemocraticPresident pursued his principles of federalism and intergovernmentalrelations by supporting the unfunded mandates bill and by increasingthe use of the administrative waiver. The U.S. Supreme Courtbolstered federalism with its rulings in cases such as Lopez,a state challenge to the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act.The new mood in Washington, D.C. was complemented by state leadersanxious to take on the challenges of a rebalanced federal system     

Canadian Federalism: The Entanglement of Meech Lake and the Free Trade Agreement

In retrospect, 1988 may turn out to be a pivotal year in theevolution of Canadian federalism. The November general electionwas dominated by an intense national debate over the proposedFree Trade Agreement with the United States. Although the FreeTrade Agreement was seen to have important ramifications forCanadian federalism, coherent discussion of those ramificationsbecame blurred in the face of a much broader and emotionallypartisan debate. Concerns about the nature of Canadian federalismwere instead absorbed by, and in part displaced by, an emergingnational debate on the Meech Lake Constitutional Accord. TheAccord had been reached by the eleven first ministers in 1987,but by the end of 1988 it had yet to receive legislative ratificationin Manitoba and New Brunswick. In the aftermath of the 1988election, debates over free trade and the Accord have becomeprogressively entangled. While this entanglement did not alterthe outcome of the free trade debate, it has had important consequencesfor the Meech Lake Accord, and thus for the future of Canadianfederalism.     

American Federalism as American Exceptionalism

Americans paradoxically claim uniqueness for their politicalsystem, yet promote it as a model for others. This is especiallytrue of federalism, the clearest example of American exceptionalism.At its inception, American federalism was produced in an environmentclosely approximating what scholars have since distilled asoptimal conditions for fostering such a system. In other contexts,federalism has not flourished, because those preconditions areseldom approximated. Remarkably, American federalism has adjustedto meet drastically changed social, geographic, and politicalconditions, and the case for its continued adaptiveness andappropriateness remains strong. Although enclaved state differencesin economics and religion are no longer a reality, these andother differences are widespread especially on a regional basis.Even on a statewide basis, cultural mixes keep the country heterogeneous.The U.S. Constitution has been reinterpreted to permit rathermore nationalized control in accordance with this process ofeliminating differences. Indeed, this is to the point wherefederalism could become legally problematic, explaining theRehnquist court's recent decisions.     

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING POLICY AND FEDERALISM

There are widespread misperceptions about the way in which American federalism has worked in the past and is working now. One is the belief that since the 1930s, the federal government has engaged in many new activities. Another misperception is that liberals support centralization and conservatives, decentralization. Actually, most Americans tend to be pragmatic. The vitality of this American pragmatism is seen in state economic development policies. States have provided leadership in initiating new economic development programs in such areas as foreign trade and enterprise zones. Four major patterns in American federalism characterize the emergence and development of most of these programs: responsiveness, elitism, pluralism, and experimentation. Implications for employment and training policy are examined.     

Michael Howard: The First Jewish Prime Minister?

Initially, Michael Howard seemed the saviour of the divided and disheartened Conservative party, reuniting it in the hope of victory at the next general election. Initially, also, he seemed a match for his fellow barrister, Tony Blair. Though successful at winning over Tory MPs, he was much less effective in relation to all those ex-Tory voters who deserted the party in 1997 and 2001. This failure was confirmed after less than nine months of his leadership, when his party polled poorly at the European elections of June 2004 (where a large slice of the anti-European vote went to UKIP) and came an ignominious third in the Parliamentary by-elections of July 2004. These results, combined with Howard's lacklustre response to the Butler Report, sapped Howard's personal ratings and reopened civil war within the Conservative party.     

How federalism influences welfare spending: Belgium federalism reform through the perspective of the synthetic control method

The question of whether and how federalism influences a country's welfare state has been a longstanding concern of political scientists. However, no agreement exists on exactly how, and under what conditions, federal structures impact the welfare state. This article examines this controversy. It concludes theoretically that the specific constellation of federal structures and distribution of powers need to be considered when theorising the effects of federalism on the welfare state. Using the case of Belgium and applying the synthetic control method, it is shown in the article that without the federalism reform of 1993, the country would have had further decreases in social spending rather than a consolidation of this spending in the years after 1993. In the case of Belgium, the combination of increased subnational spending autonomy in a still national financing system provided ideal conditions for a positive federalism effect on social spending to occur.     

Fragmented Welfare States: Federal Institutions and the Development of Social Policy

Despite political scientists' growing appreciation of the ways in which institutions influence political processes, the “new institutionalism” has so far had a limited impact on the comparative study of welfare state development. This article discusses some broad issues concerning institutions and public policy by exploring the implications of one set of institutions — those associated with federalism — for the politics of social policy. Federal institutions encourage three distinctive dynamics: they influence the policy preferences, strategies, and influence of social actors; they create important new institutional actors (the constituent units of the federation); and they generate predictable policymaking dilemmas associated with shared decision-making. Comparisons between social policy development in Canada and the United States are used to demonstrate that while federalism clearly matters, how it matters will depend on the characteristics of a particular federal system and the ways in which federal institutions interact with other important variables.     

How to not speak the ‘F‐word’: Federalism between mirage and imperative in the euro crisis

The recent financial and debt crisis has resuscitated the debate about European federalism – a theme that seemed not to have survived the painful constitutional adventure that ended with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. With the adoption of significant policy and institutional measures for tightening macroeconomic and budgetary coordination (including a constitutionally enshrined debt brake), the reforms of the monetary union have undisputedly brought the European Union further on the path towards an ever closer union. In an era where EU integration has been increasingly politicised, and Euroscepticism has been on the rise and exploited by anti‐system parties, national leaders have to face a political hiatus and respond to increased needs for symbolic and discursive legitimation of further federalisation. This is all the more crucial for French and German leaders who have brokered the main decisions during the crisis of the eurozone. Against this background, the purpose of this article is not to assess whether, or to what extent, the recent reforms of economic and monetary union have made the EU more federal. Rather, the purpose is to tackle the following puzzle: How have EU leaders legitimised the deepening of federal integration in a context where support for more European federalism is at its lowest? To elucidate this, a lexicographic discourse analysis is conducted based on all speeches held by the German Chancellor Merkel and the two French Presidents Sarkozy and Hollande, previous to, or after European summits from early 2010 until the spring of 2013. The findings indicate that federalism is both taboo and pervasive in French and German leaders' discourse. The paradox is barely apparent, though. While the ‘F‐word’ is rarely spoken aloud, two distinctive visions co‐exist in the French and German discourse. The coming of age of a political union through constitutional federalism is pictured as ineluctable, yet as a distant mirage out of reach of today's decision makers. At the same time, the deepening of functional federalism in order to cope with economic interdependence is a ubiquitous imperative that justifies further integration. The persisting gap between the constitutional and the functional vision of European federalism has crucial implications. Insofar as the Union is held responsible for not delivering successful economic policy, political leaders will fail to legitimise both functional and constitutional federalism.