The calculus of voting: An empirical test

Abstract. According to the rational choice model, the calculus of voting takes the form of the equation R = BP − C, where the net rewards for voting (R) are a function of the instrumental benefits from the preferred outcome compared to others (B) and the probability (P) of casting the decisive vote that secures these benefits, minus the costs of becoming informed and going to the polls (C). Here, we provide a systematic test of this model. The analysis relies on two surveys, conducted during the 1995 Quebec referendum and the 1996 British Columbia provincial election, in which very specific questions measured each element of the model. As well, this study incorporates two other factors that can affect the propensity to vote — Respondents' level of political interest and their sense of duty. We find that B, P, and C each matter, but only among those with a relatively weak sense of duty. The feeling that one has a moral obligation to vote is the most powerful motivation to go to the polls. We conclude that the rational choice model is useful, but only in explaining behaviour at the margins of this important norm.     

Inequality and voting among deprived ethnic groups: evidence from India

ABSTRACT

What are the conditions that determine the electoral success of parties that champion deprived ethnic groups? What is the impact of within-group inequality on this outcome? Existing arguments focus on the role of institutions or the relationship between ethnicity and other social cleavages. This paper contributes to the second approach by studying the impact of within-group as well as between-group inequality on ethnic voting. We use elections to state legislatures within India to control for institutional and historical factors that may influence ethnic voting. Using data from the National Sample Survey, we calculate inequality in consumption expenditure. We show that high within-group economic inequality among deprived ethnic groups hinders the electoral success of parties that champion these groups, whereas high between-group economic inequality has the opposite effect. Our findings also identify a potential causal mechanism (preference heterogeneity) that might link within-group inequality to ethnic voting.     

Proportional representation: An empirical evaluation of single-stage,non-ranked voting procedures

Rapoport, Felsenthal and Maoz (1988) have proposed three alternative methods to discern the fair proportion of seats that a party in a representative assembly ought to receive as a function of voters' preference orderings. All three methods assume that the ratio between the number of voters preferring party i over j to the number of voters preferring party j over i can be tested for consistency, and, if sufficiently consistent, can be appropriately scaled to discover the proportion of seats each party ought to receive. Using these methods as standards, we use exit-poll data gathered during the 1985 elections to the general convention of the Israeli General Federation of Labor (Histadrut) to examine the extent to which plurality- and approval-voting procedures provide a fair allocation of seats. The findings indicate that: (a) all three methods yield sufficiently consistent matrices of preference ratios; (b) the plurality- and the approval-voting procedures yielded significantly different proportional representations; (c) the proposed proportion of seats according to the three aggregation methods fall midway between the proportion of seats that the plurality and the approval procedures allocate. We discuss practical implications of these findings. Requests for reprints should be sent to: Professor Amnon Rapoport, Department of Psychology, University of North Carolina, Davie Hall 013A, Chapel Hill, NC 27514.     

Endogenous economic voting: evidence from the 1997 British election

Using panel surveys conducted in Great Britain before and after the 1997 general election, we examine the relationship between voting behavior and post-election economic perceptions. Drawing on psychological theories of attitude formation, we argue that those who voted for Labour and the Liberal Democrats perceived the past state of the British economy under the Tory government more negatively than they had prior to casting their ballot in the 1997 election. Similarly, we posit that Labour supporters would view the future state of the national economy under Labour more positively than they had before the election. This indicates that, contrary to many assumptions in the economic voting literature, voting behavior influences evaluations of the economy as voters seek to reduce inconsistencies between their vote choice and evaluations of the economy by bringing their attitudes in line with the vote they cast in the election. It also means that voters’ post-election economic perceptions are, at least in part, influenced by and thus endogenous to their vote choice. This finding has two major implications: first, cross-sectional models of economic voting are likely to overestimate the effect of economic perceptions on the vote. Second, the endogeneity of economic perceptions may compromise the quality of economic voting as a mechanism for democratic accountability.     

Religious market structure and democratic performance: Clientelism

Is there a connection between government intervention in religious competition and partisan clientelism in democratic systems? Drawing on the economics of religion, we argue that alongside commonly examined population-level religious processes (religious diversity), state-level religious processes (government regulation of competition in the religious market) affect institutional performance in electoral democracies. Linking comparative indicators of religion-state relations with measures of partisan clientelism, statistical analysis suggests that uncompetitive religious markets, such as those where a dominant religion is sponsored by the state, create incentives, infrastructures and opportunities that favour clientelism. The study emphasises the importance of light-touch regulation of religion not merely as a normative principle narrowly related to religious freedom, but also as a potential remedy that can enhance the quality of political institutions.     

Social identity and coethnic voting in the Middle East: Experimental evidence from Qatar

What explains widespread coethnic voting in the Middle East? The prevailing understanding revolves around clientelism: the view that MENA citizens support coethnic parties and candidates in order to most easily or effectively extract resources from the patrimonial state. Previous research has thus neglected non-economic explanations of ethnic-based preferences and outcomes in MENA elections, including social biases long identified in other settings. This study presents findings from a conjoint survey experiment in Qatar, where symbolic elections lack distributional implications. Consistent with expectations derived from social identity theory, results reveal strong favoritism of cosectarian candidates, whereas objective candidate qualifications do not affect voter preferences. Bias is especially strong in a policy domain – promoting religious values – that prompts respondents to consider the candidate’s ethnic identity. Findings offer clear evidence that ethnic-based voting in Qatar and likely elsewhere is not merely epiphenomenal but can reflect actual preferences for members of social in-groups.     

Voter Buying: Shaping the Electorate through Clientelism

Studies of clientelism typically assume that political machines distribute rewards to persuade or mobilize the existing electorate. We argue that rewards not only influence actions of the electorate, but can also shape its composition. Across the world, machines employ “voter buying” to import outsiders into their districts. Voter buying demonstrates how clientelism can underpin electoral fraud, and it offers an explanation of why machines deliver rewards when they cannot monitor vote choices. Our analyses suggest that voter buying dramatically influences municipal elections in Brazil. A regression discontinuity design suggests that voter audits—which undermined voter buying—decreased the electorate by 12 percentage points and reduced the likelihood of mayoral reelection by 18 percentage points. Consistent with voter buying, these effects are significantly greater in municipalities with large voter inflows, and where neighboring municipalities had large voter outflows. Findings are robust to an alternative research design using a different data set.     

Varieties of Clientelism: Machine Politics during Elections

Although many studies of clientelism focus exclusively on vote buying, political machines often employ diverse portfolios of strategies. We provide a theoretical framework and formal model to explain how and why machines mix four clientelist strategies during elections: vote buying, turnout buying, abstention buying, and double persuasion. Machines tailor their portfolios to the political preferences and voting costs of the electorate. They also adapt their mix to at least five contextual factors: compulsory voting, ballot secrecy, political salience, machine support, and political polarization. Our analysis yields numerous insights, such as why the introduction of compulsory voting may increase vote buying, and why enhanced ballot secrecy may increase turnout buying and abstention buying. Evidence from various countries is consistent with our predictions and suggests the need for empirical studies to pay closer attention to the ways in which machines combine clientelist strategies.     

Analytical thinking,prosocial voting,and intergroup competition: experimental evidence from China

Public Choice - We investigate whether and how analytical thinking affects Muslims’ prosocial voting towards in-group (fellow Muslims) and out-group (Han Chinese) members. We conduct an...     

Empirical evidence of paradoxes of voting in Dutch elections

In this paper we analyze four national elections held in 1982, 1986, 1989 and 1994 in the Netherlands on the occurrence of the Condorcet paradox. In addition, we investigate these elections on the occurrence of three so-called majority-plurality paradoxes. The first paradox states that a party having a majority over another party may receive less seats. The second states that a Condorcet winner may not receive the largest number of seats and even may not receive a seat at all. The third says that the majority relation may be the reverse of the ranking of parties in terms of numbers of seats.     

Some empirical evidence on rent-seeking

We tested for the capture of net gains by winners in rent-seeking competitions, using the most prominent announcements of government favors in the Canadian economy over a twelve-year period. Stockholders' returns were not significantly different from zero. One possible explanation is that government assists firms only when assistance creates political gains. Refusing to transfer economic rents to firms maximmizes the resources available to serve political purposes. This kind of behavior by government officials would imply that government has market power, which is consistent with several well-known theories of government.     

Class voting and the differential role of political values: evidence from 12 West-European countries

Influential theories of class voting assume that the phenomenon occurs because classes hold different political values, which in turn affect their party preference. However, we do not know how important this mechanism is. Hence, this article uses high-quality survey data from 12 Western European countries to study the association between class and voting. The results suggest that political values – including non-economic values – play a central role in accounting for this association, although substantial class differences persist even when holding political values constant. I furthermore argue that the relevance of this mechanism should vary by party family. Political values should account for class voting to the extent that parties give the voters clear signals on issues of relevance to the value orientations. As such, party behaviour not only affects the level of class voting, but the very nature of the link between class and voting. This article contributes first by testing one of the most important theories of the mechanisms behind class voting, and second by demonstrating how the parties’ behaviour affects this mechanism.