Hobbes and the prophet Samuel on leviathan government

Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan is one of the most important treatises in the history of political economy and has influenced writings on constitutional economics and public choice. In his treatise, Hobbes proposed the desirability of voluntary subjugation to an authoritarian ruler. Hobbes appealed to the authority of the prophet Samuel to make his case for Leviathan, a precedent that has remained unquestioned for some 350 years. Yet Samuel clearly warned against the dangers of appointing an all-powerful king. Hobbes’s argument in favor of Leviathan thus demands an authority other than Samuel.     

Hobbes on Democracy

Hobbes is often cited as a precursor of modern liberalism, both on the grounds of his individualism and of his endorsement of intellectual and moral autonomy. Yet Hobbes supports absolutist government rather than democracy. This is partly explained by his rejection of autonomy understood as self-government. But Hobbes's case against democracy is more comprehensive than this. This article considers Hobbes's case against democracy.     

Aristotle, Hobbes and Chimpanzees

The article is an exercise in the philosophical anthropology of politics. According to Aristotle, man is a political animal but not uniquely so, whereas, according to Hobbes, politics is artificial and the preserve of humans alone. Both Aristotle and Hobbes draw upon contemporary science. The dominant relevant science today is neo-Darwinism – humans are products of evolution and genetically closely related to the other primates. The argument that chimpanzees are political, thus putatively endorsing an Aristotelian rather than a Hobbesian perspective, is scrutinised. However, at best, chimpanzees are only metaphorically political. While this conclusion may weaken the Aristotelian position, it cannot of itself vindicate the Hobbesian one. The philosophical anthropological endeavour to investigate the relation between politics and human nature still has work to do.     

Equity and Political Economy in Thomas Hobbes

Thomas Hobbes is often viewed as a seminal figure in the development of the homo economicus philosophical anthropology central to the acquisitive, bourgeois morality of liberal modernity. The present study challenges this interpretation of Hobbes as an antecedent to free market ideology by arguing that his political economy presupposed a complex relation between contract, law, and social networks of credit informed by prudence and robust norms of equity. The normative claims of equity permeate Hobbes's holistic account of political economy and inform his vision of liberal statecraft that gave priority to prudential judgment against economic determinism, especially as Hobbes understood trade, taxation, allocation of resources, and the provision of social welfare. I will conclude by reflecting upon how Hobbes's political economy both reveals the internal diversity within the liberal intellectual tradition and can help us to better understand and critique contemporary liberal states and democratic theory.     

The Two Leviathans: R. G. Collingwood and Thomas Hobbes

In this article I draw upon the published and unpublished works of R. G. Collingwood in order to discern the relation between the Leviathan of Hobbes, and that of Collingwood. First, an attempt is made to explain why Hobbes became important for Collingwood, having had no special status in the writings of the latter prior to the composition of The New Leviathan . Secondly, two misconceptions of the ostensible relation between the two Leviathans will be exposed. Thirdly, the two Leviathans are compared at the level of general intent. It is argued that Collingwood never meant merely to update Leviathan in a piecemeal fashion, but instead formulated an entirely different criterion of conduct from that offered by Hobbes. Finally, some of the arguments of the two Leviathans are compared. Principally, Collingwood found Hobbes deficient in failing to provide an adequate account of the perpetual transition from the state of nature to civil life. One of the aims of Collingwood was to make good this deficiency.     

建构主义认识论与政治现代性的兴起——从霍布斯到康德

在近代哲学史上,霍布斯首次以认识论的建构主义瓦解了古典的超验实在论真理观,其后果在实践哲学中导致了对古典自然(法)的破坏性解释.继之,康德又在先验论层面深化了建构主义,并以“自由”概念对抗霍布斯的“自然”原则,但由于先验论的非历史性,“自然”(权利)和“自由”(道德)处于分裂和对抗的状态.康德晚期在目的论的框架内弥合这一分裂的失败表明,先验哲学并不能提供行之有效的制度保障克服现代性的危机.     

Democracy and epistemology: a reply to Talisse

According to Robert Talisse, ‘we have sufficient epistemological reasons to be democrats’, and these reasons support democracy even when we are tempted to doubt the legitimacy of democratic government. As epistemic agents, we care about the truth of our beliefs and have reasons to want to live in an environment conducive to forming and acting on true, rather than false, beliefs. Democracy, Talisse argues, is the best means to provide such an environment. Hence, he concludes that epistemic agency, correctly understood, supports the legitimacy of democracy. This reply highlights the interest, but also the difficulties, of this argument and, in particular, of its assumptions about epistemic agency, morality and democracy.     

Migration and justice: a reply to my critics

In this response to six critics, I begin by clarifying the sense in which my approach to the issue of immigration is ‘realistic’. I also explain why a realistic approach must place immigration in a nation-state context, although without treating it as primarily reparative for historic injustice. I suggest that it is implausible to regard global equality of opportunity, as opposed to global sufficiency, as setting limits to national self-determination. I then defend my use of the distinction between refugees and economic migrants to frame the discussion of immigration against the charge that all migrants are potentially vulnerable to the decisions of admitting states, since these may determine the fate of their life-projects. And I also defend the claim that, in the case of refugees, justice requires only that each state should discharge its fair share of the burden of admitting them; doing more than this would require popular consent. Finally, I consider the case of irregular migrants, and explain in what sense they have taken unfair advantage of other potential migrants; I defend offering a conditional amnesty to people in this category.