A Principles‐based Approach to the Barnett Formula1

This essay argues that the Barnett formula—which determines the block grant paid annually by the UK government to each of the Devolved Administrations of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland—be reformulated, guided by the following principles: fiscal equity, accountability, transparency, and flexibility. The rationale for change is that the current fiscal arrangements make little policy sense and may not be sustainable in a changing political and economic context. The formation of a grants commission to help develop data, calculate disparities, and provide public advice to the Chancellor of the Exchequer is also advocated.     

A puzzling effect of unemployment: A reply to Dülmer and Klein

Abstract.  Dülmer and Klein's comments on our article (see European Journal of Political Research 38: 63–94) fuels once more the discussion about the contextual effects of unemployment on the likelihood of voting for extreme right-wing parties. Unfortunately, the Dülmer and Klein do not properly evaluate their findings and misrepresent their own results. They do everything to suppress the negative effect of unemployment we previously also found, and miss an opportunity for in-depth research into the relationship between unemployment and extreme right-wing voting. They uncover an interesting effect of education varying according to the proportion of immigrants – something we previously ascertained for exclusionist attitudes, but not for voting behaviour.     

The alternative vote and interethnic moderation: A reply to Fraenkel and Grofman

The alternative vote (AV) is a preferential electoral system that tends to reward political moderation and compromise. Fraenkel and Grofman have modeled the likely effects of AV in severely divided societies, in order to impugn AV as a tool of interethnic accommodation. In this response, I show that Fraenkel and Grofman’s model is based on extreme assumptions that bear no relation to party and voter behavior in such societies. Models based on realistic assumptions about strategic behavior and cross-national experience with AV both demonstrate that AV generally provides centripetal incentives that can contribute to interethnic coalition-building and accommodation.     

Democracy and epistemology: a reply to Talisse

According to Robert Talisse, ‘we have sufficient epistemological reasons to be democrats’, and these reasons support democracy even when we are tempted to doubt the legitimacy of democratic government. As epistemic agents, we care about the truth of our beliefs and have reasons to want to live in an environment conducive to forming and acting on true, rather than false, beliefs. Democracy, Talisse argues, is the best means to provide such an environment. Hence, he concludes that epistemic agency, correctly understood, supports the legitimacy of democracy. This reply highlights the interest, but also the difficulties, of this argument and, in particular, of its assumptions about epistemic agency, morality and democracy.     

Choosing among signalling equilibria in lobbying games: A reply to Sloof

Randolph Sloof has written a comment on the lobbying-as-signalling model in Rasmusen (1993) in which he points out an equilibrium I missed and criticizes my emphasis on a particular separating equilibrium (see this issue). In this response, I discuss how to interpret multiple equilibria in games and how to interpret mixed strategy equilibria in which two types of player with identical incentives must pick different mixing probabilities.     

On Marx's theory of agricultural rent: A reply to Ben Fine

This article criticizes both the 'Marxist' and 'sociological' conceptualizations of money to be found in the recent debate between Fine, Lapavitsas and Zelizer in Economy and Society . They neglect important contributions to the theory of money, especially the 'credit' and 'state' theories of money in the social sciences. These emphasize, as did Keynes, the central theoretical importance of money of account . These approaches were banished from orthodox economics and lost to sociology in the post- Methodenstreit division of intellectual labour in the social sciences. Marxist economics has never properly addressed this monetary analysis. Although neglected, it is not obscure and informs the more widely known post-Keynesian theory of money. This article argues that these heterodox theories of money are essentially sociological in that they involve the conceptualization of money as abstract value constituted by the social relation of the 'promise to pay'.