THE IRAN NUCLEAR NEGOTIATIONS: ONE YEAR ON

This article, written by the former British Ambassador to Iran, starts with an overview from an insider's perspective of the 15 years of diplomacy leading up to the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) regarding Iran's Nuclear capabilities. It discusses the merits of the plan and its prospects for the future. It examines the development of international economic engagement, and in particular argues that the western powers need to do far more to deliver an economic quid pro quo for Iran's nuclear concessions: if the situation is not appreciably better soon, it will be impossible for the US and its partners to argue credibly that they are not in breach of the JCPOA. The article concludes with a discussion of Iran's economic and political prospects in the light of the nuclear deal.     

IRAN’S STRUGGLE FOR STRATEGIC DOMINANCE IN A POST-ISIS IRAQ

Iran's influence and presence in Iraq have increased significantly in recent years. The collapse of the Saddam's dictatorship in 2003, after the US invasion, served to inflate Iran's influence in Iraq, particularly in the post-ISIS era. In this connection, Iran has used various means and tools to develop its strategy in Iraq. This article argues that Iran's current strategy in Iraq stems from a Realpolitik agenda rather than an ideological one, concerned more with political, economic, and security interests than pursuing revolutionary objectives per se. To this end, Tehran has largely relied on long-established relationships with several pro-Iranian political parties and militia groups. These relationships are often couched in religious ideological terms as a foundation and justification for its future strategy in post-ISIS Iraq. The questions that this paper will address are the following: what was Iran's role in defeating ISIS in Iraq? How has Tehran benefitted from its long-term relationships with Iraqi political parties and militia groups? What are the Iranian sources of power in Iraq and how do they help Iran gain strategic dominance in Iraq?     

US Covert Operations toward Iran,February–November 1979: Was the CIA Trying to Overthrow the Islamic Regime?

This article examines US covert operations toward Iran from February until November 1979. It focuses especially on whether the CIA was trying to undermine or overthrow Iran's nascent Islamic regime, as many Iranians believed. The article details the extensive covert contacts the CIA and other US personnel established in this period with Iranian officials and various Iranian opposition factions. Its main conclusion is that US officials established these contacts for the purpose of gathering intelligence about the rapidly changing situation in Iran, rather than to undermine the Islamic regime. Indeed, US personnel never encouraged these Iranian contacts to plot against the regime and often explicitly discouraged them from doing so.     

Iran's Nuclear Program and the Israeli-Iranian Rivalry in the Post Revolutionary Era

The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran led to a set of major shifts in the Middle East and an anti-Israeli stance became a central approach of the revolutionaries. Up to 1979, however, Tel Aviv had a close relationship with Tehran whose enmity with its Arab neighbours was anchored in a historical struggle for regional supremacy. Israel has remained an enemy of Islam and the Muslims for the revolutionary leaders and as Iran's power grew Israel's anxiety increased accordingly. A new division of power in the region and Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons led to a direct rivalry between Iran and Israel and consequently many Israelis have come to regard Iran and its nuclear program as an existential threat to Israel that has to be halted. This article explores the roots of enmity between these two countries, scrutinizes the threats of a nuclear armed Iran for Israel and attempts to determine what kind of measures might work to convince Iran to renounce its nuclear program. The article has four sections with the first section covering the history of the relations and the origins of hostility between Iran and Israel. The second section provides a brief overview of how the division of regional power led to direct rivalry between Tehran and Tel Aviv. The third section details Iran's nuclear program and examines its threats to Israel and the last section covers the current sanctions debate over what type of measures might work to compel Iran to renounce its nuclear weapons.     

Constructive Partner or Menacing Threat? Analyzing China's Role in the Iranian Nuclear Program

Abstract

This article examines contrasting paradigms of China's foreign policy in the context of China's role in the Iranian nuclear program. In contrast to revisionist and status quo paradigms, which view China as either a menacing threat or a constructive partner of the United States, this article advances a reformist paradigm that presents China as neither a follower nor an opponent of US policies. Rather, the reformist paradigm suggests that although China has placed a premium on its relations with Washington, it has also pursued stealthily obstructive policies in Iran that have enabled it to garner substantial narrow gains at the expense of compromising the US agenda in the region. The author calls this grand strategy opportunistic pragmatism.     

The Iran-Israel Conflict: An Ultra-Ideological Explanation

Iran's enmity with Israel is ideological in the first place and strategic in the second. Iran intends through anti-Israel actions and messaging to internally mobilize its populace and, externally, to claim the leadership of the Muslim world and strike a balance against a regional nuclear power. This article uses a critique based on constructivism and realism to reveal how Iran's confrontation with Israel has evolved historically from “identity-ideological” to “politico-strategic.” I argue that Iran's adoption of this approach without taking its internal and external capacities into consideration has ironically bolstered the Israeli far right, increased global sympathies for Israel, escalated Iranophobia, aligned conservative Arab states with Israel, and marginalized the issue of Palestine. To preserve its national interests and regional security, Iran needs to overcome this politico-historical stage and replace conflict with competition.     

THE AMERICAN RESPONSE TO PAKISTANI AND IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: A STUDY IN PARADOX

This article explores the paradox in the reaction of the United States to the two different proliferation cases: Pakistan's proliferation and Iran's weaponization effort. The article tries to find answer to the following key question; why the United States, as one of the guardians of the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) which would prefer to see a region that is entirely free of weapons of mass destruction, ultimately has accepted Pakistan's proliferation, while imposed considerable amount of pressure to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

The paper posits that number of factors explain such differences; first, and at the theoretical level, Pakistan was never considered an “irrational” and “messianic” state like Iran, but regarded as a country with a certain degree of cold-war type nuclear rationality. Second and at the applied level, while Pakistan was a US ally with not having a history of challenging the United States, Iran has been considered enemy and a threat toward the US interest.

Third, while Pakistan's nuclear arsenal was viewed as a defensive mean against overwhelming strength of India, Iran's possible nuclear arsenal considered to be for offensive uses against the United States and Israel. The fourth factor pertains to the consequences of proliferation, which is what happens when Iran's neighboring countries may feel threatened by Iranian nuclear weapon and proceed to develop their own arsenal. Fifth factor deals with the possible Iran's temptation to give some nuclear material to a terror group in which made the United States serious in preventing Iran's weaponization. Last but not least, Israel was not involved to pressure and agitate against Pakistan, while it was applied a tremendous pressure against Iran to prevent it from achieving nuclear weapons.     

Democracy Promotion versus Engagement with Iran

US President Barack Obama has tried two very distinct policy options in dealing with Iran. The engagement policy was designed to make a break with the past experience and re-start US-Iran relations on a positive footing. This approach was consistent with the advice offered to the new administration by Iran analysts and leaders of non-governmental organisations. The implication of the engagement policy, however, was sidelining the US commitment to democracy and human rights in Iran. This policy could offer little to the budding reform movement in 2009. The alternative policy of containment was not beneficial to the reform movement either. The policy shift at the end of 2009 was a response to Iran's failure to comply with the requirements of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The containment policy, manifested in the fourth round of UN-imposed sanctions on Iran, has led to a further entrenching of the hard-liners in the regime and intolerance of internal dissent.     

Bargain and Barter: China's Oil Trade with Iran

The US withdrawal from the nuclear deal and its ratcheting up of sanctions aimed to cut Iran's oil revenues virtually to zero by reducing trade between Tehran and its top foreign customers, especially China. This article examines the dynamics of the Sino-Iranian oil business and finds that the Chinese have never terminated their imports; instead, when Beijing cannot deal with Tehran directly, it continues the flow through subterranean methods. This practice holds some benefits for both sides, but the Iranian economy has become highly dependent on bartering with the East Asian power: exporting crude and receiving part of the revenues in Chinese goods and services. The two countries have vowed to keep up the oil trade, as sanctions have led Iran toward a growing economic and technological orientation toward the East.     

The Pivot between Containment,Engagement, and Restraint: President Obama’s Conflicted Grand Strategy in Asia

This article examines the formulation and implementation of American grand strategy under the Obama administration, and how the “pivot to Asia” functions within this strategic context. It argues that President Obama attempts to secure continued American hegemony through a combination of cooperative engagement and restraint. This exposes a fundamental dilemma at the heart of America’s rebalancing: increased engagement with US allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific is fueling political, economic, and military competition with China. Sequestration and questions over American strategic coherence and consistency are simultaneously undermining the credibility of the pivot, both at home and abroad. The article concludes that this dilemma makes it unlikely for the pivot to succeed in its stated aims, unless the United States re-emphasizes cooperative engagement with China.     

Thermidor in the Islamic republic of Iran: the rise of Muhammad Khatami

The following paper traces the course of elite factionalism in the Islamic Republic of Iran from the Islamic Republic Party's solidification of power beginning in 1981 to the present. With the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, Iran has entered a period of economic and political Thermidor. Throughout the early part of his administration, President Rafsanjani engaged in a policy of rapproachment with conservative clerical factions. Thus the Rafsanjani era (1989–1997) was marked by a fundamental shift within the regime from the left to the right. Recently, there has been a falling out between centre groups and the right and this has resulted in the election of a moderate, Muhammad Khatami, to the presidency. A number of questions remain: What are the factors that facilitated Khatami's victory? And does this spell doom for Iran's conservative wing and mean an end to Thermidor?     

Muhammad Reza Pahlavi and the Bahrain Question, 1968–1970

This paper examines the role of Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, the late Shah of Iran, in the secret Anglo-Iranian negotiations over Bahrain from January 1968 to March 1970. Despite a clear strategic imperative for abandoning Iran's claim to Bahrain in the wake of the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf, the Shah feared that such an act would be seen by the Iranian public as collusion with the British to surrender Iranian territory, thereby further eroding the Pahlavi monarchy's precarious legitimacy. Drawing on British official papers and Iranian oral histories and memoirs, this paper explores for the first time the story of these secret negotiations and the extent to which the Shah's diplomacy was constrained by domestic considerations.     

A battle of principles: South Africa's relations with Iran

This paper provides a detailed case study and theoretical explanation for one of the least appreciated bilateral relationships of democratic South Africa. It analyses South Africa's post-apartheid relations with Iran as a case study to illustrate and discuss the contradictory principles that appear to guide South Africa's foreign policy. South Africa's tempered reaction to Iran's nuclear programme is in contradiction with its non-proliferation stance, but can be understood by looking into the ideology of the ruling African National Congress.     

Iran and the SCO: The Quest For Legitimacy and Regime Preservation

At the 2021 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit, the Russian- and Chinese-led bloc announced the approval of Iran's longstanding bid for membership. Iran has viewed its involvement in the organization as a means of bolstering external legitimacy, fostering security-oriented regionalism, and promoting the transition toward the so-called multipolar world order. The SCO has served as a regime-preservation network by providing Iran with a source of solidarity against external pressure. Tehran's commitment to the normative order, sustained by the SCO's discourse of noninterference, sovereignty, and countering the “three evils”—terrorism, extremism, and separatism—has galvanized the organization's role as a common front against the imposition of liberal norms and challenges to regime security.     

“Making the Crooked Straight”: China's Grand Strategy of “Peaceful Rise” and its Central Asian Dimension

Abstract

This article argues that China's foreign policy since 1991 has been guided by the evolution of a grand strategy of “peaceful rise” that seeks to ensure China's smooth transition to great power status. Moreover, it suggests that a strategic preoccupation with Central Asia has become an important expression of this grand strategy. Framing these arguments is a third overarching one that postulates that China's foreign policy in Central Asia is not only intimately related to the strategy of “peaceful rise” but also to a particular, historically and geopolitically informed narrative of China's “Inner Asian” power.     

Haj Muhammad Hassan Amin al-Zarb: His World and His Philosophy of Life

This article will explore and analyze the life and times of Haj Muhammad Hassan Amin al-Zarb (1834–1898) who was a self-made man who went on to become Iran's first major entrepreneur and the richest man in Iran. He started life in poverty and obscurity and ended his days in wealth and prominence. His rise to social and economic importance was so meteoric that it became the stuff of legends blending the myth and the reality of his life. He was a visionary with progressive ideas beyond his time. His world view was formed partly by his experiences in childhood and early life but beyond that by his own perspicacity. His cosmos was governed by his devotion to and responsibility for his family both nuclear and extended, by his deep religious belief, by patriotism and by the ambition to succeed in business. The article will investigate all of the above.     

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization,trade, and the roles of Iran,India and Pakistan

This article seeks to explore the implications of Shanghai Cooperation Organization's (SCO) engagement with India, Pakistan and Iran. Not in terms of power-politics or as a counterbalance to the USA as this has been explored elsewhere, but what practical problems such an expanded organization could help solve, what opportunities it could realize, and how SCO's engagement in trade is a function of favourable political and bilateral developments in the region. It is argued here that the trade, infrastructure and energy sectors are of particular importance and that substantial potential gains could be realized if coordination is improved. Nevertheless, it is also recognized that China, Russia, Pakistan, India and Iran may have lower standards of democratic development and economic transparency than the West. What is the motivation behind the SCO's engagement with India, Pakistan and Iran? Should this engagement be conceived only in terms of balancing US unipolarity or are there legitimate concerns of increasing regional cooperation in Eurasia?     

The Civil Society Discourse in Iran

A survey of recent Iranian books and journal articles reveals four important characteristics about how writers and academics in Iran generally perceive the concept of civil society. First and foremost, the notion of 'civil society' has gone through a substantial process of indigenization. Secondly, those who theorize about the concept see a crucial role in it for the 'rule of law'. This implies, both directly and indirectly, a primary role for the State, 'coexisting in harmony' and functioning as an integral part of civil society. Thirdly, even Iran's secular theorists have not been able to fully evade the gravitational pull of Islam and its overwhelming role in Iranian culture and society. At the very least, they maintain that civil society is possible only after a 'proper' interpretation of Islam gains popular acceptance. Finally, these authors frequently mention the 'image' that non-Iranians have of the Iranian nation. The importance of this self-perception lies in its implications for how the élite literati articulates 'culture' and portrays it to the public and, in turn, to non-Iranians. Essentially, this appears to be where the most lasting consequences of the discovery of 'civil society' in Iran seem to lie: whereas the articulations of Iranian scholars and politicians appear to be little more than a native version of a global academic trend, they seem to have ignited a subtle process of cultural re-orientation and re-articulation under the rubric of religion and an institutionalized Islamic Republican State.     

Bringing Realism Back In: Explaining China's Strategic Behavior in the Asia-Pacific

This article argues that offensive realism is applicable to explain China's strategic behavior. Contrary to constructivist and liberal arguments, ideational and domestic factors are not the primary causes of China's strategic behavior. Instead, structural and material factors such as anarchy and the distribution of relative power significantly shape how China behaves in the Asia-Pacific. Furthermore, they have a larger impact relative to non-material/unit-level variables on China's policymaking. Available evidence strongly indicates that China's strategic behavior is driven by power maximizing calculation. China's grand strategy, its maritime ambition as well as naval modernization, and rapid growth rate of military expenditure all confirm the hypotheses of offensive realism.     

Iran and Regional Convergence in Eurasia

Regional convergence in Eurasia has been evolving since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Commonwealth of Independent States was Russia's initial attempt to forge a comprehensive regional integration. However, Russia gradually shifted its focus to economics, and this produced the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). This organization has concluded numerous cooperation agreements, even with countries outside the borders of Eurasia, raising questions about regional convergence. In addition, with the expansion of China's influence in Central Asia, there has been a shift in the role and scope of the EEU. Iran has concluded a preferential trade agreement with the EEU, including non-tariff measures and a list of commodities for which barriers have been reduced or cut to zero. The main question of this study is how Iran's presence in this organization will influence Eurasian convergence. We examine the opportunities for, and obstacles to, convergence through an analysis of the forces that can bind an institution like the EEU: cultural and ideological affinities; the hegemony of the most powerful actors; and the potential for solving common problems.