Measuring Corruption in Infrastructure: Evidence from Transition and Developing Countries

This paper examines what we can say about the extent and impact of corruption in infrastructure using existing evidence. There is evidence that most perceptions measures appear to be very weak proxies for the actual extent of corruption in the infrastructure sector, largely (but inaccurately) measuring petty rather than grand corruption. Survey evidence is more reliable, but limited as a tool for differentiating countries in terms of access to infrastructure finance or appropriate policy models. The paper suggests that a focus on bribe payments as the indicator of the costs of corruption in infrastructure may be misplaced.     

Including Older Adults in Development Goals: Is Subjective Wellbeing the Answer? A Case Study of Older South Africans

Measures of subjective wellbeing are gaining importance as indicators of overall societal progress, yet the majority of studies come from higher income countries. This paper explores the relationship between human development indicators and measures of subjective wellbeing among persons aged 50-plus in South Africa. Using the first nationally representative population-based study of older South Africans, WHO Study on global AGEing and adult health (WHO SAGE), this paper adds to a small but growing literature on subjective wellbeing in lower-income countries. Results indicate that education, socio-economic status and health are, in fact, correlated with measures of subjective wellbeing, but the relationships and strength of the relationships differ depending on the measure used to assess wellbeing.     

Notes on Contributors

In the 1990s, several public corruption scandals were uncovered in Sweden. This article focuses specifically on local corruption, and our purpose is to examine whether a case can be made that problems of public corruption in Swedish municipalities have increased. By applying instruments from the institutional rational choice framework, we reach the conclusion that there are indeed reasons to suspect that retrenchment initiatives and organisational reforms over the last two decades, often labelled ‘new public management’, have increased the risk of corruption. Although hard empirical data do not yet exist, the suspicion that public corruption in Swedish municipalities may have become an increasing problem cannot be disregarded. Hence, we conclude by calling for further empirical research in this field.     

Corruption in social relations: Bribe-taking,corruptibility, and corruption risks

This inquiry aims to investigate how the relational dynamics are imprinted on two critical dimensions of bribe-taking: corruptibility and corruption risks. Two treatments were randomly administered to 1400 subjects: single versus repeated interactions and strangers versus weak ties. The findings suggest that repeated interactions induce bigger bribe sizes, but also increase risks from whistleblowing and internal auditing. Weak ties mitigate bribe-taking willingness. Nevertheless, when coupled with repeated interactions, weak ties suppress the risks from whistleblowing, testifying the bifurcated effects. The tensions between corruptibility and corruption risks suggest that bribe-taking decisions are fraught with internal tensions, with the overall effects likely being a priori determined only in specific contexts. Such tensions are more intensified among true bureaucrats as they tend to claim bigger bribes and report more risks from internal auditing.     

Responsibility attribution for corruption scandals

ABSTRACT

This paper studies the effect of the type of government on responsibility attribution for corruption scandals. Most studies on corruption voting have assumed that voters punish all kinds of governments. This article challenges this assumption by distinguishing between two types of governments: single-party majority governments and minority/coalition governments. This hypothesis is tested using data from the 2011 Spanish local elections. Our findings reveal that the effect of coalition governments on corruption voting is not statistically different than majority ones. However, when we differentiate between welfare-enhancing and welfare decreasing corruption, we find that welfare-decreasing corruption has a clear negative effect on the electoral performance of the mayor’s party when it impacts single-party majority governments, but not when the mayor needs the support of other parties (minority or coalition governments).     

Corruption and Popular Support for Democracy and Government in Transitional Contexts: The Case of Kyrgyzstan

Abstract

Many studies have argued that corruption undermines perceived democratic legitimacy, trust in state institutions, and government support. However, few prior studies have included transitional or hybrid regimes in their analyses, or simultaneously examined multiple aspects of this relationship. Using focus groups and a nationally representative survey conducted throughout a tumultuous transitional period in Kyrgyzstan, we find evidence for our hypotheses that citizens with greater corruption concerns will be more pro-democratic when evaluating democracy or its institutional components in the abstract; yet, they distrust existing government institutions. Even in a hybrid regime lacking democratic experience, citizens exhibit attributes of distrusting democrats.     

What is the opposite of corruption?

Corruption has turned out to be difficult to define and what should be counted as the opposite to corruption remains widely disputed. If the goal for a post-conflict society is not only to become democratic and prevent a return to violence but also to reduce systemic corruption, we need to know what it is that should be fought and how the opposite to systemic corruption should be conceptualised. To define the opposite to corruption, choices have to be made along four conceptual dimensions. These are universalism vs relativism, uni- vs multidimensionality, normative vs empirical and whether the definition should relate to political procedures or policy substance. As a result of this conceptual analysis, it is argued, a universal, one-dimensional, normative and procedural definition should be preferred. The suggested definition is that of impartiality as the basic norm for the implementation of laws and policies. This conceptual analysis ends with a discussion of why such a norm has historically and in the contemporary world been hard to achieve and why it is especially problematic in post-conflict societies.     

Institutions and Bribery in an Authoritarian State

Scholars have suggested that corruption could serve as a substitute for property-protecting institutions in developing countries, but very few empirical studies have been conducted to test this theory. Most existing studies on the determinants of corruption are cross-national, rely on perception-based measures, and focus on economic development, regime type, and market structure as explanatory variables. Little is known about why corruption occurs in an authoritarian state at the micro level. We theorize bribery as a bargaining process between a firm and a rent-maximizing public official, and we assume that graft-paying firms face different sets of rules and regulations, which govern firms' costs and benefits of bribing. We test the hypothesis that firms' bribes are determined by the rigor of their internal auditing control and the quality of property-protecting institutions. We use entertainment and travel costs directly observed in a large-scale firm-level survey in China as a proxy for corruption. Our study implies that firms operating in a weak property rights regime rely on political connections as a substitute for formal legal protection. The findings shed light on the literature on property rights, corruption, and East Asian development.     

Dangerous collusion: corruption as a collective venture in contemporary China

Echoing changing social environments, corruption has grown in sophistication and complexity. This paper focuses on the phenomenon of collective corruption. Collective corruption, a distinctive form of social interaction among people dominated by individual calculations and unorganized interests, takes place when collaboration becomes a powerful, necessary weapon in pursuing private gains. The danger of collusion in corrupt ventures is that as corruption gets well planned and skillfully coordinated in its collective form, it may become less forthright and therefore more difficult to detect, or more overt and increasingly legitimized as an appropriate form of economic intercourse.The term corruption tends to carry with it an image of secrecy and furtiveness that entails the involvement of the least possible number of individuals. Corruption, on the whole, is a clandestine exchange due to its illegal nature. Corruption takes place, for example, when a financial officer embezzles public funds for personal use, a school principal arranges “back-door” admissions for his relatives or friends, or a government official accepts bribes from his subordinates in exchange for favourable treatment. These practices are either conducted by a single person who seeks to enrich him/herself in an individualized manner or occur between two parties where a patron (usually an official) grants his/her client (whoever is willing and able to pay for it) desired preferential treatment in exchange for goods or services.Corruption, in reality, is more complex than its heuristically useful definition. Echoing changing social environments, corruption grows in sophistication and complexity in terms of causes, forms and characteristics. This paper studies the phenomenon of “collective corruption”, a concept derived from the author’s research in China where recent corruption cases show an alarming tendency for party and government officials to collude with each other, as well as with people outside the government, on a massively corrupt scale. The following are just a few examples of this kind of “dangerous collusion”:

• •In Hebei province, a collective embezzlement case involved at least seven high-ranking government officials, including the province’s executive deputy governor, bureau chief of transportation, director of the taxation department, and the party secretary of a major city.¹
• •A startling bribery case concerning the Minjiang Engineering Bureau of Fujian Province implicated 70% of its bureau-level officials, including the two most senior ones—the bureau director and the party chief.²
• •More than twenty bureau and departmental chiefs were involved in a case of land leasing fraud. Each of them accepted bribes of at least hundreds of thousands RMB.³
• •When a major corruption case of the East China Aviation Management Bureau was disclosed, seven section directors and one deputy bureau chief were found involved.⁴
• •More than a dozen officials at the Public Security Bureau in Qinghai Province were found guilty of corruption, including the bureau chief, deputy chief, deputy director of the province’s legal affairs office, and deputy general manager of a company affiliated with the bureau.⁵

These cases, and many more like them, testify to the fact that corruption in many instances takes the form of a collective undertaking. Why do people act collectively rather than singly in what is supposedly a secret exchange? How do they come to transcend or bypass institutional and legal boundaries in their collusion? To what extent does the collectivization of corruption alter the forms and characteristics of corruption, if not its very nature? What impact does collective corruption have on the overall efforts to curb corruption? This article tries to provide answers to these questions. It treats collective corruption as a distinctive form of social interaction among people dominated by individual calculations and a pursuit of personal interests. It extends the analysis of collective behavior to corruption and argues that an aggregation of individual pursuits of self-interest can yield similar claims and behavior patterns. Collective corruption serves as a good case to study how unorganized interests generate collective behavior and how collaboration becomes a powerful weapon in seeking private gains.This article opens with a definition of collective corruption. It then discusses the socio-economic and psychological roots of collective corruption and offers interpretative remarks on how and why collective corruption rapidly spreads in China. In so doing, it portrays the characteristics of collective corruption as a distinctive form of collective behavior. The findings of this article illustrate how corruption is evolving as its actors, forms, and characteristics actively respond to social and economic changes, especially under the construct of a hybrid of state socialism and capitalism in today’s China.     

Prosecuting high-level corruption in Eastern Europe

Do Eastern European courts effectively constrain politicians and uphold the rule of law? Criminal prosecution of grand (high-level) corruption can further the central principle of equal responsibility under the law by demonstrating that even powerful political actors have to submit to the laws of the land. This article introduces the Eastern European Corruption Prosecution Database, which contains entries for all cabinet ministers (927 in total) who served in a government that held office in one of seven post-Communist Eastern European countries since the late 1990s. The systematic data collection reveals that Bulgaria, Romania and Macedonia consistently indict more ministers than Croatia, the Czech Republic, and Poland; Slovakia has barely indicted anyone. We aim to start a research agenda by formulating hypotheses about which countries will see more corruption prosecutions and which ministers' characteristics would make them more likely to face the court. We use the database to begin testing these hypotheses and find some evidence for several associations. We find no strong evidence that EU conditionality or membership raises the profile of the grand corruption issue or leads to more indictments. Party politics seems to affect the frequency of corruption indictments more than the structure and behavior of legal institutions. Indictment rates are lower when a former Communist party controls the government and individual ministers from junior coalition partners are more vulnerable to indictment than other ministers. The existence of a specialized anti-corruption prosecution or a more independent judiciary do not seem to lead to the indictment of more ministers on corruption charges. Finally, we discuss avenues of future research that our database opens, both for the analysis of country-level and individual-level variation.     

Do Natural Disasters Open a Window of Opportunity for Corruption?

This study explores the link between natural disasters and corruption at the local government level. We examine whether a natural disaster affects official households more favourably than non-official households. We find that natural disasters decrease nonofficial household expenditures significantly, however, they have negligible effect on official household expenditures. Meanwhile, both kinds of households experience similar reduction in incomes, and have much the same disaster coping strategies. Together, the results imply that local officials may receive unobserved monetary compensation – we define as corruption – in the aftermath of natural disasters.     

Democratic consolidation in Central America: A qualitative comparative approach

An end to KKN-the Indonesian acronym for corruption, collusion and nepotism-is currently one of the demands of Indonesia's growing reform movement. This is not the first time corruption has been on the political agenda in Indonesia; indeed, Suharto came to power promising to end corruption. Tackling corruption, however, was not one of the priorities of the Suharto regime and under Suharto KKN thrived while protesting voices were silenced. This article examines the political, economic and cultural conditions which have allowed corruption to flourish in Indonesia and concludes by considering whether the new poltical mood in the country since the fall of Suharto offers hope for a new, more corruption-free Indonesia.     

Corruption and reforms: A case of Poland's medical sector

This study focuses on the effects of Poland's reforms in the period 1990–2005 on corruption in the health care system. In the last 15 years Poland has transformed its economy drastically, introducing market-oriented reforms into almost every aspect of its economy. In this study we consider how different reforms changed incentives and mechanisms facilitating corruption in the medical care sector. Our conclusion is that corruption in Poland's medical sector has worsened since the onset of the marketization reforms. We support this conclusion primarily by analyzing changes in incentives for corruption and the number of mechanisms facilitating it. In addition, where available, quantitative data are provided, though we recognize that numerical estimates of corruption are subject to substantial error. We focus on three major forms of corruption: patient payments to secure medical treatment or improve its quality, payments from industry (mostly pharmaceutical and medical equipment producers), and the use by physicians of free public facilities for private patients.     

Gift Giving and Corruption

When individuals exchange gifts, social bonds are strengthened and reciprocity is created. If the gift and the reciprocation both come from private resources, it is clearly a gift. If what is reciprocated after a gift is given comes from an organization, or is a government resource rather than from “one’s own pocket” then it is most likely a bribe. This study reviews the anthropological literature on gift giving and constructs a typology for examining the gift/bribe distinction in public administration. This classification helps distinguish analytically among different gift practices and clarify conceptual ambiguity of the terms gift and bribe.     

Is Corruption Really Bad for Inequality? Evidence from Latin America

This article presents new evidence on the relationship between corruption and income inequality. Using a panel data methodology, we find that lower corruption is associated with higher income inequality in Latin America. This result is in contrast to other empirical studies but it makes sense in Latin America for a number of reasons. The finding of an inverse relationship between inequality and corruption suggests that institutional reform policies by themselves may be misguided.     

Anti-corruption or accountability? International efforts in post-conflict Liberia

This paper analyses anti-corruption efforts in post-conflict Liberia. It highlights citizens’ views on the definition of corruption and argues that, in the past, anti-corruption efforts have often focused on institution building and formal justice mechanisms without sufficient understanding of accountability dynamics on the ground. Anti-corruption approaches in Liberia have only nominally examined whether there is a shared understanding of what ‘corruption’ is and why it is regarded as a problem. The paper examines the social norms and perceptions that underlie understandings of the term corruption. It argues that the international community may have overlooked the fact that ‘corruption’ has become an all-encompassing term that masks a myriad of differing priorities and concerns. The authors posit that ‘accountability’ may be a more useful lens for those actors hoping to improve governance in these contexts.     

Women's parliamentary representation: are women more highly represented in (consolidated) democracies than in non-democracies?

Although there have been many studies that address the representation of women in parliament, there are few analyses that compare the current state of gender representation between democracies and non-democracies. Focusing on Africa, Central and South America, as well as Asia and the Pacific region, this paper evaluates whether democracies have more female deputies or whether female representation increases with the maturity of democracy. While controlling for the type of electoral system, quotas, women's participation in the workforce, a state's GDP, as well as its degree of corruption and Communist regime type, this cross-national analysis reveals that the variable democracy does not affect the representation of the genders in parliament. Women's parliamentary representation also does not increase with the maturity of democracy.     

Civil service management and corruption: What we know and what we don't

Numerous studies have linked a range of economic, social, and institutional variables with corruption in government. Yet, most of this literature overlooks the management of public officials themselves. This is a relevant omission: almost all corrupt exchanges involve public officials. This article reviews studies—36 in total—that do address civil service management and anti‐corruption. It finds that prior works assess a narrow set of civil service management structures. Meritocratic recruitment and, less robustly, pay levels have been associated with lower corruption. By contrast, robust evidence on how corruption relates to other established public personnel management areas—such as distinct pay structures (rather than levels), promotion, transfer, and job stability practices—is largely unavailable. The article thus calls for research assessing the effects of a broader set of civil service management practices to gain a deeper understanding of corruption, and how to curb it.     

Economic variables and rural‐urban migration: Some thoughts on the Todaro hypothesis

Using data from 433 firms operating along Uganda’s charcoal and timber supply chains, we investigate patterns of bribe payment and tax collection between supply chain actors and government officials responsible for collecting taxes and fees. We examine the factors associated with the presence and magnitude of bribe and tax payments using a series of bivariate probit and Tobit regression models. We find empirical support for a number of hypotheses related to payments, highlighting the role of queuing, capital-at-risk, favouritism, networks, and role in the supply chain. We also find that taxes crowd in bribery in the charcoal market.     

Seeing through African protest logics: a longitudinal review of continuity and change in protests in Ghana

Protests in Africa have a long history. Yet, for many years, western misconceptions in protest studies have hindered our understanding of the particularities and commonalities of African protests. In this study, we scrutinize the historical continuity and discontinuity of protests in Africa, using Ghana as a case. We situate a longitudinal analysis of protests in Ghana within the theoretical model of protest logics, using the institutional-analytical method. The study finds historical continuity largely in terms of proletarian (high cost of living, dispossession and inadequate infrastructure), republican (participatory governance and corruption) and corporatist (working conditions and unemployment) mobilisation themes in Ghana. These themes are underpinned by the processes of class struggle, accumulation by (urban) dispossession, neoliberalism, splintered urbanism, gentrification and corruption. The implication of this study is that contemporary protests in Africa would be influenced by issues such as high cost of living, participatory governance, erratic power supply, unemployment, poor road infrastructure and corruption. These issues should be prioritized in the agenda of African governments in order to avert spontaneous protests.