Delegation to civil servants in parliamentary democracies

Abstract. This article reviews institutional arrangements that cabinet ministers and other political actors employ to influence civil servant behavior in parliamentary democracies. I then discuss how unlike other theories of bureaucratic structure, the principal–agent framework can be employed to generate testable hypotheses about systematic cross–national variation in delegation instruments. I also offer an empirical illustration of the approach, one that examines the relationship between cabinet turnover and delegation strategies on health policy. The analysis underlines the need to be cautious about making claims concerning the impact of political factors (like cabinet instability) and institutional factors (like cabinet decision–making rules) on delegation outcomes without first examining how these factors influence delegation strategies themselves.     

Ideas, Inheritances, and the Dynamics of Budgetary Change

Long the lifeblood of public administration, budgeting in the United States acquired a new importance during the 1980s and 1990s because of the fiscalization of the policy debate. But how much has American national budgeting really changed? This article examines the evolution of federal budgeting over the past half-century, exploring such developments as the massive growth of entitlements, congressional budget reform, and the protracted battle over the budget deficit. It finds that year-to-year changes in budget results have been relatively small even while budgetary rules and procedures have experienced sweeping change. At the same time, the composition of federal spending has undergone a quiet revolution. The traditional concept of budgetary incrementalism offers an incomplete explanation for these dynamics. To make sense of them, the article focuses on two key factors: the impact of policy inheritances, and the role of actors' causal and normative beliefs. These factors shape the ideational and material context within which boundedly rational actors negotiate decisions. The tension between changes in ideas and entrenched budgetary commitments has often served to stimulate institutional reform.     

From individual preferences to group decisions in foreign policy decision making: The Dutch Council of Ministers

Abstract. This article describes the process of the aggregation of individual ministerial preferences into group decisions in a national cabinet, on the basis of a sample of crucial Dutch foreign policy decisions as described in the minutes of the council of ministers. The results of the study show that decisions in the cabinet were mainly made according to the norms of this group, which were consensus and the non-interference of ministers in issues not concerning their department. Consensus turned out to be of secondary importance as compared with noninterference; key ministers could push through decisions by majority rule if they had consensus among themselves. Since specialists mostly made the decisions, the task of non-specialist ministers was mainly to function as approvers or disapprovers, though they did make some minor contributions in cases of disagreement among the specialists. When there was agreement among the specialists they followed a process resembling the analytic model, i. e. one based on consideration of the consequences. However, when there was disagreement between specialists, they engaged in a cybernetic decision process, reviewing sequentially a large number of options, neglecting the consequences and striving for a consensus option such as incremental action, which would frequently be the result of a compromise.     

Portfolio Budgeting in the Australian Portfolios-Principles and Practice

In the mid-eighties Australia implemented a budgeting system that is similar in its principles to the U.S. PAYGO rule and the now defunct Policy and Expenditure Management System of Canada. Termed as portfolio budgeting, it seeks to encourage greater ministerial participation (a ministry comprising a number of related departments) in the portfolio budget process. It obligates portfolio ministers to offer offsetting savings for funding new policies. Ministers have to thereby set new policy priorities so that only the most deserving new policies obtain funding through the savings identified. Additionally, portfolio budgeting requires ministers to prioritize their ongoing programs so that budget allocation to these programs reflects ministerial priorities. The article examines the practice of portfolio budgeting in the Australian portfolios in light of these objectives. The article suggests that portfolio budgeting has caused greater ministerial involvement in budgetary management. However, there has been little significant change in budget decision making at the portfolio level. The state of play of portfolio budgeting at the national budget process (cabinet and the Department of Finance) offered little incentive to portfolios to provide offsetting savings for new policy proposals. And, the appropriation structure and the organizational and political dynamics impeded ministers from allocating and reallocating their budgets (operating expenditure or running costs) for ongoing programs along ministerial priorities.     

Post‐ministerial occupation in advanced industrial democracies: Ambition,individual resources and institutional opportunity structures

The post‐office occupation of former cabinet members remains basically unexplored in both single‐case and comparative studies. Is being a minister just a career tout court, or does serving in executive office facilitate movement to other positions? This article sheds new light on this question by advancing the theoretical development and empirical understanding of the various types of post‐ministerial occupation. The analysis takes into account ex‐ministers’ ambition, political capital resources and the institutional opportunity structures that might well affect both ambition and individual resources. Additionally, given that access to executive office is profoundly gendered, the article addresses the central question of whether post‐ministerial occupations similarly present differential patterns for women and men. The empirical results of a cross‐national comparison of 23 advanced industrial democracies show that, for most departing ministers, serving in executive office is indeed a stepping stone to other positions. Post‐office trajectories are not only shaped by ex‐ministers’ political capital resources such as seniority, party office, policy expertise and type of portfolio held while in cabinet, but also by different institutional factors that present country‐specific combinations. Specifically, systemic variables shape the relevance of political capital resources and affect how ambition is constructed and towards which goals. Strong gendered post‐office patterns are not found, although some intriguing gender differences are observed.     

Women's Work? The Distribution and Prestige of Portfolios in the Canadian Provinces

Historically not only have women cabinet ministers in Western democracies been few in number, but they have generally been limited to "women's ministries" such as education, health, social services, and culture. This article systematically investigates the responsibilities and prestige of portfolios that women cabinet ministers in the ten Canadian provinces have held over a 21-year period, 1976–1997, an era in which their share of cabinet positions rose from less than 4% to almost 25%. Although still concentrated in traditional women's ministries, they have diversified the portfolios they hold. Using a tri-fold classification of portfolios into (1) important, (2) middle range, and (3) junior positions, we find that women increasingly have achieved more prestigious portfolios, perhaps a reflection of the reduced number of cabinet positions in the 1990s and more concerted attempts to promote women. But the law of increasing disproportion still exists, at least in overall terms of the relative prestige of cabinet positions.     

Sex,gender, and promotion in executive office: Cabinet careers in the world of Westminster

This article provides the first analysis of gendered promotion issues for cabinet ministers using most-similar systems design for three “Westminster-style” governments: Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. Using individual-level data and controlling for biographical, institutional, and country effects we find, in common with earlier literature, that women are more likely to be given less prestigious cabinet posts and be assigned to “feminine” portfolio. Using both sequence and event history analysis, we see the careers of men and women starkly diverge. We find that women are less likely to be promoted than men but find no relationship between prestigious portfolio and promotion. However, feminine portfolio assignments decrease the promotion prospects for women yet increase them for men.     

The Evolution of Budgetary Institutions in Estonia: A Path Full of Puzzles?

This article examines the evolution of budgetary institutions in Estonia between 1993 and 2008, with a main focus on rules governing the preparation, adoption, and implementation of the state budget. It discusses the initial choice of budgetary institutions in 1993 and subsequent developments in the light of theoretical propositions put forth by the fiscal governance literature. The case of Estonia poses a number of puzzles, and the article seeks to explain the institutional choices in Estonia: Why did the coalition government opt for a delegation mode of fiscal governance in 1993? Why has the preparation phase of the budget process evolved toward a contracts approach from 1994 onward, while the adoption phase has moved closer to a delegation mode? The article demonstrates that alongside government type, institutional choices can be influenced by lesson‐drawing from history, examples of other countries, and negative experiences gained in legislative budget process.     

Cabinet structure and fiscal policy outcomes

A central explanation of fiscal performance focuses on the structure of the cabinet. However, the partisan context of cabinet decisions remains under‐explored, the findings are based on small samples and the variables of interest are often poorly operationalised. Using a new dataset of spending ministers and partisan fragmentation in the cabinets of 58 countries between 1975 and 1998, this study finds a strong positive association between the number of spending ministers and budget deficits and expenditures, as well as weaker evidence that these effects increase with partisan fragmentation.     

Duty calls but not for all: The policy involvement of cabinet ministers during crisis

During a crisis, the public expects the government to handle the situation. In parliamentary democracies, these expectations are directed to the cabinet and its ministers. Cabinet ministers are expected to be highly involved in policy making under their jurisdiction and in general. During periods of politics as usual, ministers differ in their policy involvement. This paper asks whether that changes during a crisis. Based on an analysis of cabinet ministers in Israel during the first wave of the COVID19 crisis, this paper finds that ministers’ policy involvement during a crisis is relatively low. Most ministers are little involved in issues outside their jurisdiction. Ministers less central to the crisis management are also little involved in issues under their jurisdiction. Ministers central to the crisis management are highly involved in introducing decisions on issues under their jurisdiction, but not necessarily in other aspects of policy making. These findings have implications for issues of accountability and trust.     

Crisis Accountability: Ministerial Resignations in Sweden

Accountability processes after crisis events sometimes entail harsh criticism from public and political players alike, forcing cabinet ministers to be on top of the political game and sometimes even resign. However, harsh accountability processes are just as likely to leave ministers undamaged. This article combines two existing theories that propose different factors to account for variation in outcomes: ministerial resignations as a consequence of cabinet formation and individual positions; or resignations as a result of blame management strategies involving individual actors within the cabinet and beyond. Ten crisis episodes in Sweden are analysed and compared. The findings suggest that individual political power bases and experience matter to how well blame management strategies can be employed, while the composition of the government gives structural constraints. The dynamic interplay and framing battle between incumbent decision makers, and external arenas and the skill with which individual ministers engage and frame responsibility, play a key role in determining their post‐crisis careers.     

Executive budget proposal,executive veto,legislative override,and uncertainty: A comparative analysis of the budgetary process

This study examines the roles of the executive budgetary proposal, the executive veto, the legislative override, and legislative uncertainty about the executive's preferences in determining the outcome of a budgetary process. A sequential model of the budgetary process with three institutional agents — a legislature, an appropriations committee, and an executive — is presented. To focus attention on the executive proposal, the veto, the override provision, and uncertainty, simplifying assumptions are made: (1) the appropriations committee has monopoly agenda power, and (2) there is a closed amendment control rule. In order to characterize sequential equilibria of various combinations of veto rules and override provisions, we examine a particular arrangement of agents' preferences and a two item budget. The results demonstrate that the final budget depends critically on the executive proposal, the executive veto rule, the override provision, and the uncertainty. We achieve three striking results. First, the executive proposal may be effective in reducing the frequency of the exercised veto. Second, for a given override provision, a movement from the item veto to the item reduction veto leaves the executive worse off in some cases. Third, with the same change in institutions, the government budget may increase.     

Policy positions and jobs in the government

Abstract.  This article conducts a theoretical and empirical analysis of the allocation of the full set of jobs – both cabinet and junior ministers – in the Prodi Government that formed after the Italian election of 1996. We first discuss theoretical arguments linking forecasts of government policy to the policy positions of both cabinet and junior ministers. We then estimate the policy positions of cabinet and junior ministers appointed to the Prodi cabinet, applying a new technique for computerized content analysis to the collected legislative speeches of each minister during the 1996–1997 parliamentary session. Having considered the face validity of these results, we then use them to explore to observable implications of the various theoretical approaches. We conclude that, in this case, there does appear to be systematic evidence linking both the allocation of government jobs and the evolution of spending patterns between departments to the policy positions of senior politicians.     

Do Legislatures Matter in Budgetary Reform?

A recurring problem in the implementation of budgetary reforms at the state level is whether and how to engage legislatures in the effort. This paper posits that legislatures are critical for effective implementation and that different legislative institutional arrangements may have differential effects on both legislative and agency implementation. Drawing on a multistate survey, the analysis shows that higher levels of legislative responsibility for budgeting as well as legislative engagement in oversight of performance information are significantly associated with increased use of performance measures in making budgetary decisions both at the legislative and agency levels.     

Institutional Change and Embeddedness: Caste and Gender in Financial Cooperatives in Rural India

ABSTRACT

This article examines the interaction between institutional change and caste and gender embeddedness. It develops a framework for understanding how this interaction takes place. The article presents data on the results of an effort by a non-profit development organization, the Cooperative Development Foundation (CDF), to promote women's cooperatives, grounded in the ideas of mutual self-help and equitable access to services, in rural Andhra Pradesh in India. Using a simple theoretical framework that highlights the multi-level nature of institutional change, and the potential for interactions with embeddedness at one level to affect interactions at other levels, the article presents data showing how particular institutional rules of the cooperatives interacted with caste and gender to shape the overall governance and service delivery practices of these new organizations. In particular, after failed attempts to integrate existing, male-dominated cooperatives with women, the CDF created gender-segregated cooperatives. Data from the women's cooperatives show the creation of mixed-caste organizations, with boards of directors that were fairly representative of their membership, but with presidents that were more likely to be from the higher-castes. Access to financial services shows little caste bias, though lending is through caste-based peer groups. The data suggest that the interaction of embeddedness and institutional change is a process contingent on: a) the strategy taken by the development organization towards embeddedness; b) the nature of the institutional change itself relative to the existing social structure; and c) the effects the interactions between institutional change and embeddedness at different levels have on each other.     

The Influence of EU Membership on Methods and Processes of Budgeting in Britain and France, 1970–1995

This article explores the impact European Union (EU) integration has had on methods and processes of budgeting in France and Britain from 1970 to 1995. It assesses whether convergence of budgetary institutions occurs and, if so, whether it is promoted by an obligation of compliance or by an hybridization effect. Compliance refers to changes in national budgetary institutions made compulsory by membership in the EU. Hybridization emphasizes that national and EU budgetary processes are increasingly interwoven and indivisible. Public budgeting is no longer purely national because part of the decision-making on national expenditure is made at the EU level and because the national budget is closely linked to the EU budget in financial and policy terms. Based on an institutional analysis, combined with elite interviewing, the article suggests that hybridization is a significant factor contributing to a convergence of budgetary practices in Britain and France. Underlying the argument is the fact that an increasingly important function of departmental actors involves negotiating with their EU counterparts at the EU level, in addition to the conventional budgetary game at the domestic level. Regarding compliance, there is an influence as testified by significant formal institutional convergence. However, compliance seems a less effective factor in influencing convergence than hybridization because it conveys a "negative" approach to convergence, based on enforcement and sanctions. The article suggests that the convergence of administrative systems is promoted by the growing similarity of administrative practices more than by the harmonization of rules.     

Presidentialisation in the Executive Sphere? Evidence from Norwegian Cabinets

Empowerment of state leaders has been apparent over the last decades in various parliamentary democracies. Signs of this development, often labelled ‘presidentialisation’, have been reported in the executive sphere also in Sweden and Denmark in recent years. Few accounts have been made of developments in Norway. This article studies Norwegian cabinets for the last 25 years in light of the so‐called ‘presidentalisation thesis’. The article finds no clear tendency of prime ministers appointing more weak and controllable ministers, or more frequently making reshuffles in cabinet, as one would expect from the presidentialisation thesis. However, the Prime Minister's Office has been clearly strengthened, suggesting that the prime ministers' ability to coordinate cabinet policy has increased.     

Newspapers and Budgeting: The Effects of Media Coverage on Local Expenditure Decisions

The media play an important role for the political agenda. It is less clear, however, how strong the media impact is on political decisions. This article pursues a different approach from the one commonly used in the media–policy research tradition. Instead of focusing on the relationship between the content of the media agenda and the political agenda, it is argued here that from a broader policy perspective, media pressure on the incumbents is a more relevant variable. Media pressure is measured as media competition and media coverage. Furthermore, the article investigates the effect of media variables on budgetary decisions in different spending areas, and compares the relationships between media pressure and policy under various economic, political and institutional conditions. This allows the authors to investigate which factors hinder and promote media influence on policy. The units of analysis are the Danish municipalities, which are similar political units with different newspaper coverage. Coverage by local newspapers is intense in some municipalities, but absent in others. As expected, the authors find that in municipalities with intensive coverage from local newspapers, local politicians do feel a stronger media pressure. However, when it comes to budgetary decisions, almost no observable effects of media pressure are found, either generally or in favourable political, economic or institutional settings.     

Executive capacity to control legislatures and presidential choice of cabinet ministers in East Asian democracies

How do presidents in new democracies choose cabinet ministers to accomplish their policy goals? Contrary to existing studies explaining the partisan composition of the cabinet with institutional characteristics, such as formal authority, we argue that the broader political context surrounding the president's ability to control the legislature can affect cabinet partisanship. By analyzing original data on cabinet formation in all presidential systems in East Asia since democratization, we find that when presidents are more likely to be dominant in executive–legislative relations, they have less concern about legislative support and more leeway to focus on policy performance by appointing nonpartisan cabinet members. This analysis suggests that understanding cabinet partisanship requires a view of cabinet appointments as a trade‐off between securing legislative support and managing policy performance, and the scope of this compromise depends on the strength of the president vis‐à‐vis the legislature.