Selling to Both Sides: The Effects of Major Conventional Weapons Transfers on Civil War Severity and Duration

Civil wars are primarily fought with small and light arms, but the availability of major conventional weapons to states and rebels can alter the nature of the war being fought. This study explores the impact of major conventional weapons transfers on civil war severity and duration. By using a recipient based approach to arms transfers, I find rebel acquisition of major conventional weapons from international sources leads to conflict escalation and deadlier conflicts. State importation of major conventional weapons is associated with longer conflicts. These findings provide researchers a means to account for rebel capabilities in civil war research and policy makers insight to limit the destructiveness of civil wars.     

The Role of Intra-Religious Conflicts in Intrastate Wars

Many civil wars are fought between members of different religious communities. It seems plausible to focus on these communities’ interrelations to identify the causal factors responsible for the escalating effects that religion can have in such conflicts. A closer look, however, reveals that processes within religious communities can be crucial in influencing the role religions play in intrastate wars. Within single communities, factions of religious elites compete for material and dogmatic supremacy. Such intra-religious conflicts can motivate religious elites to search for support from political allies to prevail over their religious rivals. In return, they legitimize their political patrons’ claims for political power and their violent campaigns against members of other religious communities. Thus, intra-religious conflicts can effectively contribute to the religious escalation of intrastate wars between different religious communities. This argument is exemplified with reference to conflicts in Thailand, The Philippines, and Iraq.     

The Probability of War, 1816–1992

What factors increase the probability that a pair of states might go to war is the focus of this study. Six hypotheses, derived from the steps to war explanation, are tested by comparing pairs of states that go to war with each other at least once in their history (from 1816 to 1992) with those that do not. It is found that as two states take the various steps to war that have been posited, the higher their probability of going to war. States whose relations are dominated by territorial disputes have a higher probability of having had a war if both sides have had outside allies, have had recurring territorial disputes, have been engaged in an enduring rivalry, and have had an arms race. As each of these factors becomes present, the probability of war progressively increases. Pairs of states whose relations are dominated by nonterritorial disputes also have their probability of war increased if these factors are present, but at a lower level. Of the various factors that increase the probability of war, outside politically relevant alliances seem to have the weakest impact.     

State Building, Interstate and Intrastate Rivalry: A Study of Post-Colonial Developing Country Extractive Efforts, 1975–2000

This paper seeks to understand the relationship between state building, interstate and intrastate rivalry. Previous studies of state building have focused primarily on the European experience, with selective application to cases in the developing world. Prior studies of interstate rivalry have focused primarily on their effects on interstate relations. This paper seeks to expand the domain of both literatures. First, the paper investigates the applicability of the predatory theory of the state, derived from the European experience, in the context of the postcolonial developing world. Second, the paper expands interstate rivalry research to an examination of the effects of both interstate and intrastate rivals on domestic politics. In particular, the literature derived from the European experience considers decisions about fiscal policy as central to the process of state building and survival. Therefore, this paper examines the effects of internal and external rivals on extractive capacity in the context of state development in sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, and Asia from 1975 to 2000. A series of pooled, cross-sectional time-series analyses suggest that external and internal rivals increase the extractive capacity of the state in a manner similar to the experience of early modern Europe.     

Territorial nationalism in spatial rivalries: An institutionalist account of the argentine‐chilean rivalry

The rivalry concept explored in the conflict literature during the past decade offers considerable potential for theory building in international relations. This paper explores one possible avenue to this end by applying insights from historical institutionalism to a case of spatial rivalry in order to explain many of the findings from the quantitative literature. As I demonstrate in this paper, the focus on issues is a good start at explaining rivalry, yet it masks important underlying domestic processes that initiate, maintain, and terminate rivalries. I explain how the “issue” of territory came to be fused with national identity in the case of Argentina‐Chile resulting in a history of conflict and classification as an enduring rivalry. I draw on this case to argue that territorial nationalism may explain why seemingly disparate territorial conflicts separated by time and space can be considered linked to form a spatial rivalry.     

Holy Trinities,Rivalry Termination,and Conflict

In this article we attempt to correct a number of gaps in the current literature on strategic rivalry. First, we argue that liberal and realist theories of conflict and cooperation have been generally ignored by scholars engaged in rivalry research. Secondly, we argue that current rivalry research fails to disentangle termination processes from conflict within rivalries, mainly due to problems with common operationalizations of rivalry. To bridge these gaps, we test the effects of liberal variables-manifested in the Kantian tripod (democracy, interdependence, and IGO membership)-and what we more loosely term the realist tripod (bipolarity, shared threat, and capability balance) on both rivalry termination and the probability that rivals will engage in a militarized conflict. We conduct this test utilizing a new data set of strategic rivalries compiled by Thompson (1999, 2001) which corrects the tautological operationalization of rivalry commonly used in rivalry research when conflict is the dependent variable. Overall, our results paint a variegated picture, underscoring the importance of rivalry as a special class of dyadic relationship. While realist variables better explain rivalry termination, the direction is opposite that predicted by some realist hypotheses; among liberal variables, only democracy is a robust predictor of both termination and conflict.     

Victims and new wars

Interpretations of ‘new wars’ are contradictory. While some stress the asymmetry of intentions, strategies, and capabilities of antagonists, others emphasize the identity of warring parties in sharing the same space of political violence. Introducing elements of a political anthropology of victimhood, this paper suggests that the polarity in new wars is driven by self-representations of collective victimhood. Modes of total warfare in the twentieth century shifted the moral centre of gravity towards representations of humanity as a transcendent victim. The universalist sacred of protecting humanity as a victim, however, masks the polarity between antagonists who legitimize aggression by defensive propositions in the name of suffered victimhood. On the one hand, moral justifications of revenge for victimhood support claims for the asymmetry of polarity. On the other hand, this asymmetry of proliferating victims conceals an ongoing symmetry of rivalry. Ultimately, the focus on political agency and on moral justifications maintains the illusion that the other is the aggressor. A new moral economy requires acknowledging the deep interdependence of rivals. The aggressor has always been aggressed. If the moral core of warfare is in the de-humanization of the enemy, possible paths of reconciliation require the moral recognition of the enemy's same humanity.     

The Short‐Term Effects of Mediation on Low‐Intensity Civil Wars

International diplomacy, to the extent it is effective, should not only prevent escalation of low‐intensity conflict, but should also facilitate de‐escalation. This article focuses on the short‐term effects of managing low‐intensity civil wars through third‐party mediation. Specifically, we compare the efficacy of third party‐mediated direct (face‐to‐face) and indirect talks in low‐intensity civil wars from 1993 to 2004 using the Managing Intrastate Low‐Intensity Conflict data set. We argue that a focus on short‐term success is valid because of the relationship among mediation, short‐term success, humanitarian aid access, and peacebuilding. We also assess the roles of mediator identity, mediation strategy (behavior focus versus incompatibility focus), peace agreements, war type, per capita gross domestic product, level of democracy, and conflict duration. Our overarching finding is that direct forms of mediation in which all parties meet face to face were the most likely to yield short‐term success in the sample of civil wars that we analyzed.     

A Streetcar Named Sarajevo: Catalysts, Multiple Causation Chains, and Rivalry Structures

"Streetcar" interpretations of world politics emphasize the significance of contingent catalysts vis-a(c)-vis structural variables and multiple, nonlinear chains of causation, among other things. Ultimately, though, it is difficult to evaluate the significance of catalysts in the absence of systematic data on war precipitants that would allow one to compare the effects of catalysts and other factors. More concrete but under conceptualized is the explanatory payoff associated with examining nonlinear interactions among multiple rivalries in bringing about wars that spread more widely than anticipated. World War I is a good case in point. A very large number of interstate rivalries contributed in various ways and over a number of years to the outbreak of a world war that no one sought precisely in the way in which it emerged. Focusing on the structure of their interactions also facilitates the synthesis of a number of alternative interpretations of why World War I began. Examining the effects of interconnected and "ripe" rivalry fields in other major power war contexts should prove to be equally beneficial.     

Determinants of Foreign Aid: Rivalry and Domestic Instability

Foreign aid is usually seen as a form of international cooperation. Thus, the expectation is that states engaged in international rivalry with one another should be unlikely to provide each other aid. However, they do provide their enemies aid. We consider how situations of uncertainty influence aid transfers between states. We argue that states may provide each other aid to limit uncertainty from potential regime changes that could lead to war. Such uncertainty is particularly bad for rivals who are prone to militarized conflict. We find that rivals may provide one another foreign aid when one of the countries is experiencing regime-threatening levels of domestic instability. We compare these results to the behavior of nonrivals and find that: Rivals are likely to provide their enemies aid in times of uncertainty; rivals are no less likely to give aid to each other than are nonrivals; and rivals provide more aid during times of instability than do nonrivals.     

Killing Time: The World Politics of Civil War Duration, 1820–1992

Policymakers often trumpet the potential for third parties to stop the killing associated with civil wars, yet third parties as strategic actors also have incentives to encourage longer civil wars. We argue that in order to assess the influence of third parties on civil war duration, it is necessary to consider the interdependent nature of third party interventions as they are distributed across the set of civil war combatants. We also argue that it is important to consider the geopolitical context in which civil wars occur, rather than focusing solely on characteristics internal to these conflicts. To test our hypotheses about the impact of third parties and geopolitical factors on civil war duration, we rely on event history analysis and a sample of 152 civil wars for the period 1820–1992. We find empirical support for the idea that extremely long civil wars correspond to the equitable distribution of third party interventions—stalemates prolong wars. The analysis also indicates that separatist civil wars and ongoing civil wars in states proximate to the civil war state result in civil wars of longer duration. Finally, we find that when third parties raise the stakes of the conflict by engaging in the use of militarized force against the civil war state, the duration of these conflicts is reduced. In general, our analysis underscores the importance of modeling the interdependent and dynamic aspects of third party intervention as well as the world politics of civil wars when forecasting their duration and formulating policy.     

The liberian civil war: new war/old war?

The Liberian civil war has been portrayed as a primary example of ‘new wars’, drawing attention both to the economic motives and the global character of the conflict. However, to focus excessively on material explanations and greed-inspired motivations of actors may lead to one-sided explanations of conflict. This article suggests that there is little ‘new’ about the Liberian war. Rather, it can best be understood as a violent expression of the tendencies, organisation and attitudes towards identity, society and class that have underpinned Liberia since its formation in the 19th century. The ‘new war’ literature helps us to understand one important dimension of the Liberian conflict. However, too much emphasis on this dimension may also lead scholars and policy-makers to neglect the ideational aspect of conflict. These are of immense importance to a full understanding of civil war and its dynamics.     

Toward a Theory of Weakness Politics: Does Weakness Rule the World?

This article argues that the debate on “new wars” and “post-Westphalian” wars and conflicts misses a crucial dimension, that of the importance of weakness in the relations between states as well as between states and non-state entities. Most analyses of war examine power relationships between states as if power were an essential determinant of success or failure in war. Recent wars, however, show that weakness can in fact become a strength, that inequality is not so much a problem as an advantage. The author suggests the need to rename and re-problematise “new wars” as “new international conflicts” (NICs), for otherwise we miss the fundamental reasons why “powers” are often defeated, or at least held at bay by the “weakness” of their adversaries. Suggestions will also be made about how to potentially resolve such unequal conflicts and wars.     

Post-civil war democratization: promotion of democracy in post-civil war states, 1946–2005

Post-civil war democratization is a critical element of building sustainable peace in post-civil war states. Yet studies of democratic transition and survival suggest that the post-civil war environment is not hospitable to either the transition toward or the survival of democracy. This inhospitality may be due to the fact that post-civil war environments are contentious. After a civil war, the former protagonists fear for their security and also want to protect their political and economic interests. The central argument of this study is that former rivals can agree to a transition toward democracy to the extent that a stable balance of power exists between the government and rebel groups; a balance that eliminates the sort of security dilemma that would encourage one or both parties to resume armed conflict. Such a balance should ensure access to political power and economic resources. This study identifies factors that contribute to the establishment of a balance of power between former protagonists and factors that affect its stability. The presence of these factors should affect the decision of former protagonists on whether or not they can achieve their political and economic interests if they agree to a transition toward democracy once the civil war ends. Based on this theoretical argument, I have derived empirically testable hypotheses. In the survival analysis performed, I find support for the theoretical arguments. The findings of this study have some policy implications.     

The Location and Purpose of Wars Around the World: A New Global Dataset, 1816–2001

A critical question in the quantitative study of war is how to choose appropriate units of analysis. While most studies link wars to the sovereign states that fight them, several authors have recently offered alternative perspectives, focusing on the the properties of rebel organizations and armies or tracking events in fine-grained geographic spaces. We contribute to these developments by introducing a new dataset of wars fought from 1816–2001 on fixed territorial units of observation that conform to the grid of states in 2001. Compared to standard datasets, we expand the geographic purview to include states not recognized by the international system. We provide location codes that identify the territories on which conflicts are fought, which is especially important for the analysis of imperial wars and colonial rebellions. We also introduce a new typology of wars based upon the aims of warring parties rather than their status in the state system. This dataset is uniquely suited to explore new questions that cannot be addressed with other datasets. To illustrate, we test an institutionalist theory of war and show empirically that the types of wars fought in a territory depend on whether it is governed as a modern nation-state, an imperial dependency, or the center of an empire.     

“天安号”事件与国际危机管理

2010年3月26日发生在朝鲜半岛西部海域的韩国“天安号”反潜护卫舰爆炸沉没事件，韩国政府认定为朝鲜攻击所致。韩国对事件的认定有着明显的政治主导意识和政治倾向，企图使朝韩危机从双边扩大为地区多边甚至超地区的国际危机演化，这将为美国谋求扩展在东亚的战略利益提供机会。国际危机管理是国家在维护国际安全稳定中经常面对的课题，如果美韩坚持把实现自身的战略利益作为危机管理的目标，朝鲜半岛危机则始终存在继续升级的危险。     

Rage of Honor: Entente Indignation and the Lost Chance for Peace in the First World War

Why the First World War ended in 1918 and not earlier remains a major puzzle. We propose a new theory that emphasizes how honor prolongs wars beyond what rationalist theories can explain. It argues that when honor is insulted, an affronted actor will strive to punish the offender. Absent an apology, the pursuit of a satisfactory punishment leads the affronted belligerent to ignore unfavorable battlefield information, hold logically irreconcilable beliefs, process information in emotional terms, and obsess over status. We predict that wars of prevention and territorial occupation are most likely to elicit honor considerations. We test our argument against an obscure episode in the war where Germany and the United States made peace overtures in December 1916. We demonstrate that honor concerns made Entente decision makers see German aggression as an affront to their honor that only the destruction of Germany's political regime could redress.     

“中间地带”:和谐世界的枢纽

地缘政治学说发端于西方国家对地区和全球权力的争夺。在这种学说的发展过程中,著名的地缘政治学者麦金德提出了"心脏地带"理论,斯皮克曼提出了"边缘地带"理论,其间还有二次世界大战时期德国的"生存空间"理论。在西方大国眼中,上述地区都是各自在世界权力竞技场中获得主动地位所必须加以控制的地区,从而导致了大国之间激烈的和长期的地缘政治斗争,世界性的战争和不稳定多由此而生。在笔者看来,这些或在地理上处在大国之间,或在政治上处在大国的强烈关注之下的"被争夺"地区应被称为"中间地带"。"中间地带"是国际政治中的力量凹陷地区,其产生的原因、展示出来的特征以及呈现出的意义都对认识国际政治和国际关系的内在本质具有独特的重要性。     

Aftershocks: Postwar Leadership Survival, Rivalry, and Regime Dynamics

Under what conditions are leaders replaced after a war? Past research has reported that the outcome of the war and regime type affect postwar leadership tenure. Yet, this does not exhaust the conditions that could potentially influence political survival. In this article, I reexamine the links between regime type and leadership replacement after a war. I show that past research has failed to account for the dynamics of political leadership, and in the process has misrepresented the evidence supporting previous theories. I then show, using event history techniques, that both internal and external factors can alter leadership trajectories after a war. Specifically, war outcomes significantly affect the job security of a leader outside of international rivalry, but have less of an effect within rivalry. Additionally, relaxing various assumptions concerning the relationship between leadership survival and regime type leads to a richer understanding of the process of postwar leadership turnover. Finally, several propositions concerning the interaction between regime type and the costs of war are not supported in this analysis.     

Democratization after Civil Wars – Key Problems and Experiences

Democratization and peace-building in post-civil war situations are closely interlinked. To analyse the difficulties of post-war democratization, and especially democratization as attempted by external and international actors, this article deals with the problem in several stages: first, it will provide a brief overview of the recent discourse on the topic, to place the discussion into the political and academic context. Second, it will focus on the reasons for and the types of civil wars, and the actors involved, because these provide the starting points of any attempt of post-war democratization and will determine the conditions for success and failure. Third, the key structural problems for post-civil war democratization will be explored, including ethnic fragmentation, followed by a brief analysis of the specific role, opportunities and limits of external actors in democratization. Finally, we will try to formulate a few hypotheses and conclusions to help explain the limited success of external democracy building in post-war societies, concentrating on the cases of Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The account concludes that without the necessary preconditions for democratization in post-conflict societies, external attempts will be of little success. Among the key requirements is the need for a strong and organized social base for democratization to build on. On the other hand, contradictions in the policies of intervening powers are a major hindrance.