Presidents,Supreme Court justices,and racial equality cases: 1954–1984

This research assesses the policy success of presidents since Eisenhower in their appointments to the U.S. Supreme Court in racial equality cases from 1954–1984. The research examines presidential preferences in a much more detailed and sensitive manner than previous research. While past research has used presidential party as a measure of the policy preferences of presidents, we examine policy preferences in a very direct manner. Specifically, the preferences of presidents on racial equality issues are gauged by their public policy statements. These statements serve to tap the degree of liberalness, the level of attention, and the level of concern with judicial actions in racial equality matters. The results demonstrate that presidents have been much more successful in appointing like-minded justices than is suggested by the existing literature. In addition, it is shown that prior judicial experience is not related to presidential success. This is discussed in terms of the perennial debate over the political control of the Supreme Court and the congruence of Court policy making with majoritarian values.     

The Conditional Nature of Presidential Responsiveness to Public Opinion

How does public opinion affect presidential policymaking? We address this issue by testing a diverse set of hypotheses with data concerning a set of individual policies across time. In particular, the data revolve around presidential budgetary proposals on a set of major policy issues for which there are recurring surveys on citizens' preferences over spending. The analysis suggests that presidents are more responsive to mass opinion on issues that are familiar to citizens in their everyday lives. Also, for reelection‐seeking presidents, responsiveness is shown to depend upon two key political factors. First, presidents are more responsive to public opinion when the next election is imminent. Second, the effect of presidential popularity is nonmonotonic; presidents with average approval ratings are most likely to adopt policy positions congruent with public opinion, whereas presidents with approval ratings that are significantly above or below average have the greatest propensity to take unpopular positions.     

Comparable Preference Estimates across Time and Institutions for the Court, Congress, and Presidency

Empirically oriented scholars often struggle with how to measure preferences across time and institutional contexts. This article characterizes these difficulties and provides a measurement approach that incorporates information that bridges time and institutions in a Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo approach to ideal point measurement. The resulting preference estimates for presidents, senators, representatives, and Supreme Court justices are comparable across time and institutions. These estimates are useful in a variety of important research projects, including research on statutory interpretation, executive influence on the Supreme Court, and Senate influence on court appointments.     

Executive capacity to control legislatures and presidential choice of cabinet ministers in East Asian democracies

How do presidents in new democracies choose cabinet ministers to accomplish their policy goals? Contrary to existing studies explaining the partisan composition of the cabinet with institutional characteristics, such as formal authority, we argue that the broader political context surrounding the president's ability to control the legislature can affect cabinet partisanship. By analyzing original data on cabinet formation in all presidential systems in East Asia since democratization, we find that when presidents are more likely to be dominant in executive–legislative relations, they have less concern about legislative support and more leeway to focus on policy performance by appointing nonpartisan cabinet members. This analysis suggests that understanding cabinet partisanship requires a view of cabinet appointments as a trade‐off between securing legislative support and managing policy performance, and the scope of this compromise depends on the strength of the president vis‐à‐vis the legislature.     

Comparing Competing Theories on the Causes of Mandate Perceptions

The discussion of presidential mandates is as certain as a presidential election itself. Journalists inevitably discuss whether the president-elect has a popular mandate. Because they see elections as too complex to allow the public to send a unitary signal, political scientists are more skeptical of mandates. Mandates, however, have received new attention by scholars asking whether perceptions of mandate arise and lead representatives to act as if voters sent a policy directive. Two explanations have emerged to account for why elected officials might react to such perceptions. One focuses on the president's strategic decision to declare a mandate, the second on how members of Congress read signals of changing preferences in the electorate from their own election results. We test these competing views to see which more accurately explains how members of Congress act in support of a perceived mandate. The results indicate that members respond more to messages about changing preferences than to the president's mandate declaration .     

Taking It to the Next Level: The Elevation of District Court Judges to the U.S. Courts of Appeals

We address an important aspect of judicial careers: the elevation of judges from the U.S. District Courts to the Courts of Appeals. We argue that the likelihood of a judge being elevated is a function of informational cues and signals regarding the nature of the judge and the judge's compatibility with presidential preferences. We also expect norms involving the intersection between geography and Senate politics to affect a judge's elevation chances. Using data on district court judges appointed between 1946 and 1995, we find that the likelihood of a judge being elevated is a function of the judge's ideological compatibility with the president, the judge's previous ABA rating, and Senate norms involving state "ownership" of appeals court seats. Blunt indicators of policy preferences trump direct signals when presidents decide whom to elevate, leaving judges little control over their career prospects and thus less incentive to slant their decisions in the direction of the president's preferences.     

Old Times There Are Not Forgotten: Race and Partisan Realignment in the Contemporary South

Our focus is the regional political realignment that has occurred among whites over the past four decades. We hypothesize that the South's shift to the Republican party has been driven to a significant degree by racial conservatism in addition to a harmonizing of partisanship with general ideological conservatism. General Social Survey and National Election Studies data from the 1970s to the present indicate that whites residing in the old Confederacy continue to display more racial antagonism and ideological conservatism than non-Southern whites. Racial conservatism has become linked more closely to presidential voting and party identification over time in the white South, while its impact has remained constant elsewhere. This stronger association between racial antagonism and partisanship in the South compared to other regions cannot be explained by regional differences in nonracial ideology or nonracial policy preferences, or by the effects of those variables on partisanship.     

Portugal's semi-presidentialism (re)considered: An assessment of the president's role in the policy process, 1976–2006

This article analyses the policy-making role of Portugal's heads of state in the period 1976–2006. Not only is Portugal rarely studied in the English language comparative literature, but there is no consensus concerning the proper definition of the country's system of government, whether it is semi-presidential or parliamentary. This article presents new data on the Portuguese president's role in the following areas: cabinet appointment and dismissal; parliamentary dissolution; ministerial appointments; referral of legislative bills to judicial review; veto powers; and agenda-setting through going-public tactics. It is concluded that the president's role in the policy process has never been irrelevant. While the 1982 constitutional reform did eliminate the possibility of undisguised presidential government, presidents have continued to be important in policy making, particularly due to use of their veto and dissolution powers. Therefore, the article argues that Portugal has remained solidly semi-presidential.     

Measuring the ideological preferences of U.S. presidents: A proposed (extremely simple) method

Several observations can be made concerning the data presented in the preceding tables. First, as one might expect, not all Democratic or Republican presidents are alike. As shown in Table 3, John Kennedy has a higher cumulative pro-ADA rating than does Lyndon Johnson than does Jimmy Carter. On the Republican side, Dwight Eisenhower comes in at roughly the middle of the ADA liberal/conservative ideological spectrum and considerably to the left of both Ronald Reagan and George Bush.Second, while there appear to be significant differences between the ideological preferences of presidents from the same party, the correlation between a president's annual or cumulative pro-ADA percentage and a dummy variable reflecting the party of the president (Democrats equal unity, Republicans equal zero) is still fairly high. For example, the correlation between the nine post-World War II presidents' cumulative pro-ADA percentages (Table 3) and a party dummy variable is 0.93. The correlation between presidents' annual pro-ADA percentages (Table 2) and a party dummy variable is 0.87. Thus, while a dummy variable reflecting the party of a president may not be the most preferred measure of presidents' ideological preferences, such a variable may be a reasonably accurate substitute for the pro-ADA percentages reported in Tables 2 and 3.     

Presidential Press Conferences over Time

Scholars have debated whether the president's public activities are a function of political and economic factors (presidency-centered variables) or individual presidents and their administration's tendencies (president-centered variables). This article examines one of the only quantitative studies that assesses the influence of these variables on presidential press conferences over time. I replicate this study (Hager and Sullivan 1994) and find the authors' conclusions to be misleading. I then present methodologically correct analyses that show—consistent with the qualitative evidence—that the behavior of individual presidents offers the best explanation of press conferences over time.     

Party politics and the survival of central bank governors

Legally independent central banks leave elected politicians with little direct control over monetary policy. The most important indirect channel of influence for governments thus consists in appointing ‘responsive’ central bank officials and removing ‘hostile’ ones. This premise is tested by examining the effect of partisan ties between central bank governors and governments or presidents in 30 European democracies between 1945 and 2012. Drawing on an original dataset containing information on the party affiliations of 195 governors, event history models are employed to show that affiliation with a party represented in the executive (the government or the presidency) has a large and significant positive effect on governor survival. However, affiliation with an opposition party only increases governors' hazards during the first four years of their term, suggesting that the impact of the party label may be overridden as more reliable information about a governor becomes available.     

The Contextual Causes of Issue and Party Voting in American Presidential Elections

This paper analyzes the influence of the two most commonly examined causes of presidential vote choice, policy preferences and party identification. The focus is on change across elections in order to assess how the effects of issues and partisanship respond to the larger political context in which voters make their decisions. In contrast to party centric views of politics, I find little direct responsiveness to party issue contrast and substantial influence of candidate issue contrast. Further, I find that leading hypotheses for the “resurgence in partisanship” are not consistent with some important facts suggesting that the explanation remains elusive.     

Aggressive Foreign Policy Marketing: Public Response to Reagan's 1983 Address on Lebanon and Grenada

Building public support for the use of force has become a primary preoccupation for presidents in the post-Vietnam era. Rather than let popular opposition to military actions fester, they pay special attention to public opinion and they attempt to orchestrate these actions in a way that enhances mass support. These strategies and tactics are often aggressive in nature, involving prime-time television appearances, high-profile speaking tours, and a concerted effort by the president's foreign policy advisors to echo the messages delivered by the commander-in-chief. The effect of these actions has been the subject of past research. Unlike other studies of the effects of presidential speeches (Ragsdale, 1984, 1987; Brace and Hinckley, 1992), this one focuses on changes in substantive policy opinion, as opposed to changes in presidential approval. A before/after survey design that incorporates a control group that was not exposed to Ronald Reagan's October 27, 1983 speech on the use of U.S. troops in Lebanon and Grenada reveals that public support for each of these policies increased following the speech. It also reveals that support increased more for Grenada than for Lebanon. The result is consistent with findings by Jentleson (1992) that support is more likely to follow the use of troops to repel a state's violation of another's sovereignty than the use of troops to resolve a political conflict internal to a single sovereign state.     

Strong feelings: Emotional responses to presidents

Although rational models of political behavior prevail in research on public approval of presidents, an emotions model is proposed to consider whether it actually predicts approval as well as, if not better than, the existing rational models. The emotions model is tested for Presidents Carter and Reagan using the American National Election Studies from 1980 to 1986. The model is compared with two rational models: one, an events and conditions model, suggests that people's prospective and retrospective views of their own financial circumstances and the economy dictate their approval of presidential performance; a second, an issue proximity model, proposes that the closeness (or distance) people perceive between their views on key issues and those of the president affects their approval of the president's job. Across numerous tests, the results indicate that the emotions model outperforms either of the rational models. In addition, a multivariate analysis combining rational and emotional indicators shows the strength of the emotions variables. The study concludes that political science research must more fully consider rational and emotional explanations of political behavior.     

Federalism, the Bush Administration, and the Transformation of American Conservatism

Most recent Republican presidents have proposed signature federalisminitiatives intended to devolve power or sort out federal andstate functions. The Bush administration has not propoundedan explicit federalism policy of this sort, but its approachto federalism can be gleaned from analyzing presidential advocacyof legislation and constitutional amendments, fiscal policies,administrative actions, and judicial policies. What emergesfrom this analysis is an administration that has been surprisinglydismissive of federalism concerns and frequently an agent ofcentralization. In one sense, Bush is merely the latest in astring of presidents who have sacrificed federalism considerationsto specific policy goals when the two have come in conflict.However, the administration's behavior is somewhat surprising,given the president's background as a governor and the factthat he has been the first Republican president to enjoy Republicancontrol of Congress since 1954. Our explanation for the Bushapproach begins with the president's lack of any philosophicalcommitment to federalism and explores the changing status offederalism concerns within conservative ideology. Any explanationfor the Bush approach should account for this shifting politicaldynamic, which has seen Republicans in recent years become increasinglysupportive of exerting federal authority on behalf of theireconomic and social objectives, encouraging Democrats at timesto become more supportive of state authority.     

Shattered expectations: Public responses to “out-of-character” presidential actions

Six alternative hypotheses about public responses to out-of-character presidential actions were tested in an experiment that manipulated both the president's preexisting policy position (a hawkish or a dovish stance in international affairs) and the nature of his action in an international crisis (hawkish versus dovish). In addition, subjects themselves were classified as hawks or doves. Approval of the president and of his response to the crisis was a complex function of the policy views of the subject and the consistency of the president's action with his past record. Doves supported presidents and actions that were compatible with their own dovish leanings but resented a dovish president who behaved hawkishly, generally confirming the view that similarity breeds attraction. By contrast, hawks were willing to tolerate dovish behavior if it was undertaken by a hawk, supporting the expectation that out-of-character actions are uniquely capable of disarming would-be opponents. For neither hawkish nor dovish presidents were these findings consistent with the waffling interpretation, which holds that inconsistency per se is downgraded. Compared to presidents whose actions were consistent with their previous beliefs, out-of-character presidents were preceived as more changeable, in both positive and negative senses; were believed to have disliked doing what they had done; and were judged to have been relatively uninfluenced by internal causes.     

Presidential Saber Rattling and the Economy

Saber rattling is a prominent tool of the U.S. president's foreign policy leadership. Yet there has been no study of how presidential saber rattling affects international or domestic political outcomes. This study evaluates how presidential saber rattling affects U.S. economic behavior and performance. Theoretically, the study demonstrates that presidential rhetoric affects the risks that economic actors are willing to take, as well as the consequences of these resulting behaviors for U.S. economic performance. Using monthly time series running from January 1978 through January 2005, vector autoregression methods are applied to show that increased presidential saber rattling produces increased perceptions of negative economic news, declining consumer confidence, lower personal consumption expenditures, less demand for money, and slower economic growth. More broadly, the study demonstrates an important linkage between the president's two most important roles: foreign and economic policy leadership. The president's foreign policy pronouncements not only impact other nations, but also affect domestic economic outcomes.     

Flying solo: Explaining single-party cabinets under minority presidentialism

In recent years, the comparative literature on presidential democracy has emphasised the role of coalitional politics in attenuating the ‘perils’ facing minority presidents. Yet since the beginning of the Third Wave of democratisation in 1974, a surprising number of minority presidents have eschewed cabinet coalitions (defined minimally as the awarding of at least one portfolio to a party other than the nominal party of the president). Unipartisan governments are observed just under half of the time. What explains the adoption of single-party cabinets by minority presidents? Cross-sectional time-series analysis is employed to address this question. Hypotheses are tested that relate to the size and distribution of the formateur (presidential) and largest non-formateur parties that make up the legislature; the nature of party linkages and ideological distance between the president and possible partisan allies; and the extent of reactive veto powers held by the president.     

The influence of presidential heads of state on government formation in European democracies: Empirical evidence

Theories of coalition politics have paid little attention to the role of presidential heads of state in the government-formation process. This article investigates the influence of presidents on the two most important features of government-formation outcomes: the identity of the party of the prime minister and the party composition of the coalition. Substantial evidence is found that presidents in European democracies have managed to induce their preferred governments from the potential alternatives. The results also suggest that parliament-selected presidents and popularly elected presidents have different mechanisms of influence on these outcomes. The investigation sheds new light on the government-formation process in semi-presidential as well as in pure parliamentary systems.     

Negative Issue Ownership

Existing research considers issue ownership to be a positive attribute of political parties, which are seen as ‘owning’ those policy areas where they are particularly competent and engaged. However, for some citizens a party may also be a negative issue owner if it has a particularly bad reputation for its handling of an issue. This article describes and explains aggregate and individual-level patterns of negative issue ownership using a survey-based measure of handling perceptions from the 2013 Austrian National Election Study (n = 3,266). Naming a particular party as a negative issue owner is affected by partisanship, but also by policy preferences and government performance evaluations. The effects of issue importance vary across issues. These findings lay the groundwork for more research on negative attributions of issue ownership and their empirical consequences on vote choice.