Human Rights – Human Bodies? Some Reflections on Corporate Human Rights Distortion,The Legal Subject, Embodiment and Human Rights Theory

This paper responds to the subversion of international human rights discourse by corporations. It begins by placing such subversion in three contexts: the ascendance of human rights as the dominant discourse of contemporary moral and political life; the emerging challenges to human rights posed by other-than-natural-human entities; and ambiguity in the relationship between the legal subject and the human being. The author suggests that in order to resist corporate human rights distortion it is important to reclaim the language of the human for the natural human being, despite complex philosophical and definitional challenges attending the designation of the term ‘human.’ The author suggests that by re-attending to the implications of human embodiment for human rights theory it might be possible to re-invigorate the protective potential of human rights for vulnerable human beings and communities against powerful disembodied legal persons (corporations).     

政治文明建设与民主、法治、宪政、人权

修改宪法写入政治文明建设及国家尊重和保障人权条款,标志着我国社会主义民主、法治、宪政、人权事业进入一个新的建设时期。本文论述了对我国政治文明建设的理解及其与民主、法治、宪政、人权的关系,并对存在的问题作出了分析。     

Human Flourishing, Human Dignity, and Human Rights

Rather than treating them as discrete and incommensurable ideas, we sketch some connections between human flourishing and human dignity, and link them to human rights. We contend that the metaphor of flourishing provides an illuminating aspirational framework for thinking about human development and obligations, and that the idea of human dignity is a critical element within that discussion. We conclude with some suggestions as to how these conceptions of human dignity and human flourishing might underpin and inform appeals to human rights.     

文化多样性的主权、人权与私权分析

文化传统保护与文化发展选择是国家文化主权的基本内容;保护文化多样性的权利和自由属于基本人权的范畴;知识产权对文化创造参与者的支持和激励具有重要意义。《文化多样性公约》以主权和人权作为文化多样性保护的基本举措,并以对艺术家的知识产权保护作为补充措施,由此构建了一个保护文化多样性的多元权利形态。     

The Logics of Supranational Human Rights Litigation,Official Acknowledgment,and Human Rights Reform: The Southeast Turkey Cases before the European Court of Human Rights, 1996–2006

This article examines the domestic impact of supranational human rights litigation on acknowledgment of state violence in the context of macroprocesses of global governance. The article's argument is that the impact of supranational human rights litigation on the process of acknowledgment must be seen through counternarratives on state violence. The article undertakes a detailed textual analysis of the truth claims and denial strategies that emerged from the European Court of Human Rights proceedings on state violence during Turkey's struggle against the armed group the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). It assesses these in the context of the human rights reforms that were created following pressure from European-level governance processes. The article argues that attention must be paid to agency in acknowledgment and truth-telling processes, and points to the limits of technical-bureaucratic forms of human rights reform interventions in the context of state violence.     

Raz on Rights: Human Rights,Fundamental Rights,and Balancing

After clarifying the outlines of Raz's interest theory of rights and its relationship to aspects of the principles theory of rights, I consider how his recent observations on human rights manage to fit (or fail to fit) into the interest theory. I then address two questions. First, I elaborate on Raz's definition of morally fundamental rights, arguing that he is right in claiming that there are no such rights. I then show that the interest theory accommodates the notion that rights may take qualitative precedence over conflicting considerations—a question that has become increasingly relevant in light of recent writing on rights.     

论环境权的人权属性

对于环境权的属性问题一直是法学界争论的一个焦点 ,可谓众说纷纭 ,莫衷一是。从权利本原的角度入手 ,阐述目前我国研究权利特别是环境权的范式存在的误区 ,提出应从唯物主义的立场揭示环境权的自然权利属性。同时 ,对人权的历史发展中概念、性质、主体和内容的变化进行剖析 ,推断出环境权符合人权的构成要件 ,在精神实质与价值内涵上与人权存在固有的联系 ,是一项人类社会生存与发展不可或缺的基本人权。     

Interpreting the Political Theory in the Practice of Human Rights

In this discussion of The Heart of Human Rights, I support Allen Buchanan’s pursuit of a theory-in-practice methodology for interpreting the foundations and meaning of international legal human rights from within the practice. Following my use of that methodology, I recharacterize the theory of rights revealed by this methodology as political not moral. I clarify the import of this interpretation of international legal human rights for two problems that trouble Buchanan: (1) whether the scope of ‘basic equal status’ is a global or an ‘intrasocial’ standard and (2) whether there is a ‘proliferation’ of rights that risks undermining the legitimacy of international legal human rights. I argue that the scope of basic equal status is global and that the practice of making what he calls ‘new’ rights claims is part of the practice of human rights.     

The Political Offender Exception in International Extradition Law: Terrorism Versus Human Rights

The political offense exception in the law of international extradition is one of the issues over which the justifiability of terrorist violence is being debated. The evolution of the political offender exception is sketched and the provisions of the 1986 Supplementary Treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom, which effectively eliminated the political offender exception for violent offenders, are outlined. The debate over the merits of the Treaty then is summarized. A concluding analysis suggests that limited violence is justified in defense of democracy and fundamental human rights and that the political offender exception should be interpreted so as to promote these values.     

The Political Rights of Anti-Liberal-Democratic Groups

The purpose of this paper is to consider whether it is permissible for a liberal democratic state to deny anti-liberal-democratic citizens and groups the right to run for parliament. My answer to this question is twofold. On the one hand, I will argue that it is, in principle, permissible for liberal democratic states to deny anti-liberal-democratic citizens and groups the right to run for parliament. On the other hand, I will argue that it is rarely wise (or prudent) for ripe democracies to exclude anti-liberal-democrats from parliamentary elections. There are at least two reasons for this. The first is related to the inherent stability of just institutions. The second is that exclusion can lead to group polarization and enclave deliberation that can engender political extremism and impair processes of interpersonal and intrapersonal deliberation in liberal democracies.     

Approaching Human Rights Law Philosophically: Reflections on Allen Buchanan,The Heart of Human Rights

Law and Philosophy - I begin by summarizing some of the main features of Buchanan’s account. I argue next that his account gets no support from defeating his envisaged opponent, the Mirroring...     

The Indivisibility of Human Rights

This article defends a novel, normative conception of the indivisibility of human rights. Human rights are indivisible because normative commitment to one mutually entails normative commitment to another. The normative conception enables us to defend three important theoretical and practical corollaries. First, as a conceptual thesis normative indivisibility lets us see how human rights constitute a unified system not liable to the typical counter-examples to indivisibility as mutual indispensability. Second, as a dialectical thesis, normative indivisibility can support linkage arguments in defense of controversial human rights. And third, as a political thesis, normative indivisibility can show why the political thesis of indivisibility means that states lack discretion to ‘pick and choose’ which human rights to implement.     

Hegel, Human Rights, and Particularism

Hegel's political philosophy gives prominence to the theme that human beings have a need for recognition of those qualities, characteristics, and attributes that make them distinctive. Hegel thus speaks to the question whether human rights law should recognize and accommodate the nuances of individual make-up. Likewise, he speaks to the question whether human rights law should be applied in ways that are sensitive to the cultural contexts in which it operates. But Hegel's political philosophy evaluates norms and practices within particular cultures by reference to the higher-order and universal criterion of abstract right. In light of this point and the inadequacies of political philosophy that privileges local norms and practices, a third approach to the protection of human rights is canvassed. This approach prioritizes neither universal nor local norms. Its aim is to ensure that both human rights and the cultures in which they are applied are taken seriously.     

The Mythology of Human Rights

Abstract. A special legal status is accorded to human rights within Western liberal democracies: They enjoy a priority over other human goods and are not subjected to the majoritarian principle. The underlying assumption—the idea that there are some human values that deserve special protection—implies the need for both a normative and a conceptual justification. This paper claims that neither can be provided. The normative justification is needed to support the priority of human rights over other human goods and to rank and balance conflicting human rights, but it can't be provided because of the fact of pervasive value pluralism, the fact that human values are many, incompatible and incommensurable. The conceptual justification is needed to avoid arbitrariness in the interpretation of human rights at the adjudication stage. Such a justification is impossible, however, as the concept of human rights, and the concepts used to justify them and to solve their conflicts are “essentially contested concepts.” The paper concludes that, provided that the interpretation of human rights presupposes value judgements and political choices, the special legal status accorded to human rights is not justified.     

人权的革命与革命中的人权——对罗伯斯比尔人权观的重新解读

本文在介绍了罗伯斯比尔关于人权的基本观点后,分析了罗伯斯比尔人权观中存在的内在矛盾,并结合法国大革命的历史背景着重探讨了导致罗伯斯比尔人权理想和人权实践形成巨大差距的原因。本文认为造成罗伯斯比尔人权观的悲剧既与其思想中存在的民粹主义和道德理想主义密切相关,也与那时的人权是一种人权革命后的人权和革命中的人权这一事实有着极为重要的关系。     

The Law Lords and Human Rights

This article presents an empirical analysis of the impact of the Human Rights Act on the House of Lords. Drawing on a database of judgments from 1994 to 2007, changes in judgment‐giving behaviour are identified by charting patterns of agreement and dissent across different categories of case. Voting records are also examined in order to identify whether significant differences exist between individual Law Lords in their approach to human rights cases.     

以基本权利为核心的贸易与人权一元论——评彼德斯曼对贸易与人权关系的理论建构

贸易与人权的关系问题是贸易关联问题研究的重要组成部分。与从国际贸易法和人权法的二元规范关系角度进行探讨有所不同,彼德斯曼的WTO权利宪法论以内涵扩张的基本权利为核心,将其建构为贸易权与其他人权在权利谱系中的一元关系问题。这种一元论依托于实质意义的立宪意义上的宪法观念,即宪法的最优异特征是确认和保障公民的基本权利。一元论在理论上的不足,显现在贸易权的宪法性质不明、公共利益条款的扩大解释自相矛盾、WTO实质宪法的基础规范缺位以及权利谱系欠缺发展权等4个方面。目前在多边贸易体制的国际层面,贸易权与其说是一种基本权利,毋宁说是一种基本权的制度保障。