Indo-Japanese Strategic Partnership and Power Transition in Asia

As the U.S.-led security order in Asia gradually comes under stress, regional powers such as India and Japan are formulating a strategic partnership to hedge against the vulnerabilities accruing out of the unfolding power transition in Asia. China’s unprecedented economic and military rise coupled with America’s perceived relative decline is drawing New Delhi and Tokyo into a strategic embrace. To insure their interests in this era of great power transition, New Delhi and Tokyo are keen to hedge against America’s possible failure in containing China’s growing assertiveness in Asia. This hedging strategy is evident in their growing strategic partnership which consists of a triple hedge: increasing bilateral defense partnership against fears of American retrenchment; economic engagement against an over-dependence on China; and a multilateral hedge against China’s growing influence in international and regional institutions. However, for Asia’s two prominent middle powers, transforming these nascent attempts into an effective strategic response to Asia’s current power transition would also require cooperation in the nuclear domain, an area where their policies continue to diverge.     

Regionalism in Asia as Disguised Multilateralism: A Critical Analysis of the East Asia Summit and the Trans-Pacific Partnership

Revolving around the concept of ‘Community’ or ‘community’, debate on an Asian region has ostensibly pitted those who proposed an entity limited to East Asia (China, Japan, South Korea and the ten countries of the Association of South East Asian Nations, ASEAN) against those who proposed a much wider region embracing India, North (and, perhaps, South) America, as well as Australasia. Previously these two conceptualisations possessed their eponymous translation in the East Asian Economic Caucus (reincarnated as ASEAN+3) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. However, with the creation in 2005 of the East Asian Summit to include India, Australia and New Zealand and, above all, its 2011 enlargement to include the United States and Russia, the contrast between the two conceptualisations of an Asian region has become confused. In order to explain this development, this article suggests that the language of ‘region’ or ‘community’ is a discursive smokescreen disguising changes in approaches to multilateralism. An examination of the East Asia Summit, contrasting it with another recent regional project, the Trans Pacific Partnership, suggests that the actors involved are seeking to ensure the primacy of individual nation states in intergovernmental multilateral relations.     

The power triangle in the Indian Ocean: China,India and the United States

The Indian Ocean is increasingly becoming the point of focus in assessing Asia's future security challenges. As both India and China are building up their naval presence in the Indian Ocean and as China's stakes in the region (protecting its maritime trade) interact with India's aspirations (being the regional dominant power and security provider), tensions are likely to rise. The United States has an established role in the Indian Ocean, and its approach to the contestation between Indian and Chinese interests may play a key role in limiting frictions. These developments have led many analysts to foresee the emergence of a balance of power system in the Indian Ocean region and East Asia which would be comparable to that of nineteenth-century Europe. In presenting the interplay between the three major stakeholders in the Indian Ocean, this paper aims to outline the implications of a balance of power system in the Indian Ocean region and demonstrate that it may not guarantee peace and stability, but, with regard to Organski's ‘power transition’ theory, could lead to quite the contrary.     

The European defence plans: Filling the transatlantic gaps

The geographic proximity of Central Asia to Russia, China, the Caucasus and the Caspian region, as well as to the Middle East, makes this oil and gas-producing region a crucial and ever-developing player in regional and global energy markets. The method by which Central Asian producers choose to develop their hydrocarbon resources and export infrastructure will have significant implications for the plans for diversification of oil and gas supplies of Europe, China and India, as well as for Russia's energy exports to Europe. It is still too early to tell whether the economic and political incentives are strong enough to promote cooperation between the various actors or whether the energy interests of these key external powers are so diverse as to clash in Central Asia.     

经济外交与中国—东盟区域合作:内涵、实践与效用

经济外交是中国—东盟自由贸易区建成后中国与东盟共同获取"正和"经济利益、化解地区内矛盾的一种新途径。本文从中国对东盟经济外交的实践着手,分析其对提升区域合作层次、构建中国和谐周边的作用,并探索性地指出中国在对东盟实施经济外交过程中几个值得关注的问题。     

Fostering Security in Southeastern Europe: A Role for the EAPC

China’s regional policy is mainly centred on its efforts to forge a friendly, stable and prosperous neighbourhood. To achieve this end, China has developed an approach combining both partnership bilateralism and tailored regional multilateralism. By and large, China does not consider its neighbourhood as a whole and has been very cautious and hesitant to engage in overarching ‘region-building’. China has relied mostly on soft (attractive) use of power, particularly economic power, supported by cultural and assurance diplomacy, even though diplomatic and economic coercion have been exercised occasionally. China has once again become the biggest economy in Asia. Yet, neither the new power configuration in Asia nor China’s own ambitions point to a return to the old ‘Middle Kingdom’ with China holding a dominant position in its neighbourhood. China will most probably continue to see itself as a self-restrained regional power in the foreseeable future.     

Global interactions of China and India: Divergent paths of trade?

This article explores the global positions of China and India in merchandise trade. It first compares the integration models of China and India and, thereafter, examines the core factors that drive their trading relationships. With respect to their global trading partners, there are considerable differences in the influence of economic drivers of trade for China and India. Combined larger markets, similar consumer preferences, similar factor endowments and linguistic links enhance global exports from China. Alternatively, smaller market size, discrepancy in consumer demands, dissimilar factor endowments and combined stocks of foreign direct investments drive India’s global trade. The findings suggest that differences in the structure and demand of China vis-a-vis India dictate the divergence in the profile of their trade determinants. Such divergence in trade drivers, however, dissipates when taking into account Chinese and Indian partnerships on a regional basis – with East Asia, Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Latin America, European Union (EU), and Africa.     

Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and Balancing in East Asia

Realists agree that great powers balance the military power of rising powers, but there is little agreement regarding secondary-state responses to rising powers. First, there are differences regarding whether secondary states balance or accommodate rising powers. Second, there are differences among realists regarding the distinct roles of economic and military factors in secondary-state alignment policies. Third, some scholars argue that state alignments are not necessarily determined by realist variables, but can reflect preferences shaped by intentions, historical experiences, or cultural influences. This paper addresses these issues in balance-of-power theory. Its empirical focus is the impact of the rise of China on secondary-state alignments in East Asia. After examining the complex mix of China's military and economic reach in East Asia, it concludes that secondary-state behavior is sensitive to local variation in the great power capabilities and that secondary states tend to accommodate rather than balance rising powers. It further concludes that economic capabilities alone are insufficient to generate accommodation, so that the political-economy literature should reexamine cases of apparent secondary-state accommodation to economic dependency, sensitive to the presence of military vulnerability on the part these secondary states to proximate great powers. These conclusions suggest that there is nothing sui generis or culturally-determined in East Asian international politics and that realism can explain alignment behavior among East Asian states as well as it does among European states. Research on East Asia's response to China's rise that is sensitive to intra-regional variations in U.S. and Chinese military and economic capabilities also challenges assumptions of an emerging Chinese regional hegemony or of a costly region-wide U.S.-China competition.     

India’s role during the 1956 Suez Crisis: Between peacemaking and postcolonial solidarity

ABSTRACT

The 1956 Suez conflict was not inevitable. The involvement of an impartial third party had offered an exit ramp for the main protagonists. Largely forgotten today, India strove to reconcile the interests of the Westerns powers with Arab nationalism. Displaying creativity and perseverance in attempting to arrest the sudden deterioration in security in its extended neighborhood, India’s unceasing but responsible support for a weaker Arab state in the backdrop of determined Western coercion is a useful illustration for contemporary policymakers who are attempting to craft a sustainable approach towards a tumultuous West Asia. Using previously unused archival documents, this paper adds to the small literature on India’s involvement in this crisis by offering the first detailed account of India’s attempt to prevent the outbreak of hostilities in those fateful months of 1956. By doing so, this article also reveals interesting facets of India’s approach to conflict management and regional stability in the 1950s, a role that was predicated on not just promoting strategic restraint between antagonistic states but also enabling conflict resolution options that preserved the vital interests of competing actors.     

从博弈到共赢：中印在中亚的竞争与合作

中亚以其独特的战略地位吸引了各大国的关注。中国和印度作为亚洲两个崛起中的大国，又是中亚的两个邻国，地缘和能源因素使两国与中亚联系在一起。本文阐述了中印两国在中亚的战略和能源博弈，并进一步分析了两国在这一地区竞争的可能性和合作的必要性，指出中印合作无论对两国的国家利益还是中亚的发展和稳定都是最佳的抉择。     

局部等级视角下的东亚安全秩序与中美战略竞争

东亚秩序转型是冷战后国际关系学界争论的重要问题。在回顾既有争论的基础上,本文尝试从局部等级视角切入,分析东亚安全秩序的性质及其转型动力。局部等级体系由体系唯一超级大国领导的地区安全等级与区域内自助国家共同构成。冷战结束以来,东亚地区呈现出典型的局部等级体系特征,并在中国持续崛起的过程中逐步形成了以战略对冲为主要行为模式的安全秩序。尽管当前美国对华政策的对抗性不断增强,但是在局部等级体系下中国坚持战略对冲不但可以有效缓解自身面临的崛起困境,而且有助于防止中美陷入美苏冷战式的集团对抗,以战略对冲为核心特征的东亚安全秩序也将因此得以延续。这些发现一定程度上深化了地区安全秩序和大国竞争的理论研究,同时也有助于中美两国更为有效地管控其在东亚地区的战略竞争。     

Navigating two Asias: how Washington deals with the Indo-Pacific’s rising powers

ABSTRACT

The United States has sought over the last two decades to facilitate India’s rise as a means of balancing against China’s ambitions. Notwithstanding the rich literature that has emerged on Sino-Indian dynamics and the U.S.-India-China triad, there has been remarkably little examination of the ways in which the United States navigates its relationships with these two rising powers. This study poses a simple question: to what extent has the United States’ pursuit of its interests with India meant that it has accepted trade-offs with respect to its interests with China? Drawing on government documents, interviews with current and former U.S. officials, and an array of case studies between 2005 and early 2019, this study argues first that the U.S. bureaucracy has long been structured in such a way as to heavily compartment policy decision-making related to South Asia and East Asia, respectively, and to produce a pronounced but largely explicable structural bias toward East Asia; second, that relatively few policy matters have arisen since 2005 that have forced the United States to consider meaningful trade-offs between its India and China equities; and third, that new challenges may arise for Washington as its deals with an increasingly inter-connected Indo-Pacific region, and manages the bureaucratic and policy implications of its renewed emphasis on great power competition.     

印度的“大国梦”与中国形象的媒体呈现——以《印度斯坦时报》涉华报道为例

中国在印度的大国诉求战略中扮演着非常重要又极为复杂的角色。那么印度媒体是如何在印度大国梦的框架中审视中国并呈现中国形象的？论文对印度的重要英文报《印度斯坦时报》的内容进行了分析，发现印度媒体既承认中国的发展现实，又担心中国崛起的国际影响，对中国的认知也受到了西方大国的影响。因此文章提出了向印度释放合作共赢信号，努力构建世界体系转型期的集体身份的建议，以跨越所谓的“安全困境”。     

China’s rise as a strategic challenge and opportunity: India’s China discourse and strategy

The simultaneous rise of China and India is one of the most important developments in contemporary world politics. Given their steadily growing power and aspirations and China’s more assertive posture in Asia, the management of China’s rise is one of the major challenges for India’s foreign policy. However, India is often said to have no guiding strategic framework for its China policy, which is seen as incoherent and reactive. This article, by contrast, shows that India has an evolving China strategy and that the alleged inconsistencies in India’s China policy are rather the result of an ambivalent image of China. Drawing on constructivism and discourse analysis, the article identifies the dominant perception of China in India’s foreign policy discourse and the resulting foreign policy strategy. In a next step, the article analyzes the China policy of the Congress-led UPA Government and investigates whether it conforms to the strategic policy frame of the dominant China discourse.     

当代中国国际关系学印度问题研究:回顾与思考

近年来,中国与印度的双边关系倍受世人瞩目,对印度的研究也成为中国学术界关注的主要议题.据不完全统计,20世纪90年代以来,中国国内学者出版的有关印度问题的专著超过20部,发表的文章近千篇,更有许多青年博士、硕士论文的选题也直接以印度问题为研究方向.     

东北亚大国关系中第三方因素及地区安全共同治理

中日关系经济上的合作依存度与政治上的纷争摩擦常态化这一结构性的矛盾日趋显现.从更深层次上探究中日政治经济所处的这种分裂状态根源,从本质上讲背后蕴涵着东北亚大国关系中的域外因素:即美国的第三方因素,其对东北亚的和平稳定发挥着特殊作用.东北亚大国在地区的竞争摩擦时常较为突出,但中美日在东亚地区还是蕴涵着许多重大的共同利益.东北亚传统的"管制型"安全模式需向大国共同"治理型"模式转变趋向,意味着大国区域安全治理的权利、利益、责任的平等与分享,地区安全治理是在大国协作框架下的共同治理,应注重大国在地区安全事务中的关键作用.     

International Relations Theory and Minimum Deterrence

ABSTRACT

India’s government under Narendra Modi represents a return to single party rule. This paper investigates whether and why single party governments in India differ in their extremity of foreign policies from coalition governments. It particularly focuses on how different forms of government influence the saliency, contestation, and enactment of national conceptions about India’s global role. First, I situate India within the academic debate regarding coalitional governments and foreign policy. I suggest that one reason why India challenges scholars‘ assumption is the missing link between partisan conceptions of India’s global role and their institutional representation. Second, I propose a role theoretical approach and argue that the process of self-identification, consisting of ego and anticipated alter expectations, conditions a state’s role set and extreme foreign policy. It is hypothesized that the nature of contestation of national role conceptions varies between factions and fractions because of the nature of India’s party system, as well as the relative significance of external others for India’s identity. Third, I examine instances of role-taking in the field of nuclearization and Sino-Indian relations. Findings suggest that contested role conceptions during single-party rule caused more extreme variances in international role-taking, while coalition governments proved to induce more complementary role-taking processes.     

南中国海：印度制衡中国的新战略牌

近年来,印度因中印边界争端和中国快速崛起而对中国的恐惧感不断上升。为反制中国战略“威胁”,印度利用南海争端日趋复杂化之机,将南海作为遏阻中国扩大战略影响、牵制中国战略布局的新战略支点,通过加强与南海争端国和域外大国关系,强化自身在南海的实际存在等方式介入南海,使中国的周边地缘政治环境变得更加复杂,增加了中国维护南海权益的难度,对中国在东南亚和印度洋的战略利益形成了挑战。     

美国新中亚战略评析

美国公布新的中亚战略包含四方面调整,即将中亚地区视为独立的地缘政治板块、将阿富汗视为中亚一部分、明确将在中亚加强对俄罗斯和中国的遏制、重新界定美国在该地区的比较优势。新中亚战略的实施将会对中亚地区稳定和主要大国在该地区互动产生一定影响。但由于美国在实施该战略中投入力度有限、比较优势不明显,中亚国家不会轻易改变自身多元平衡外交政策、对阿富汗及其局势的认知与美有明显差异,以及美国在中亚地区的战略冒进可能引发大国反制,新战略的实施不会一帆风顺。     

A ‘pivot’ that never existed: America’s Asian strategy under Obama and Trump

This article argues that Donald Trump’s Asian strategy hardly marks a radical transformation from Barack Obama’s ‘pivot to Asia’. This is because the ‘pivot to Asia’ never really existed. Although Obama was successful in building legitimacy for the strategy through international norms, he failed to translate his lofty rhetoric into practice. Much of his original pivot components (building a constructive relationship with China, coordinating with Asian allies and multilateralism in the Association of South East Asian Nations and the Trans-Pacific Partnership) has either failed or did not live up to expectations. Donald Trump was adamant that the Asian pivot was a bad strategy and that he would not follow it. But although he completely discarded Obama’s legitimization of the rebalance (as Trump speaks pragmatically and does not care about international norms), in actuality he has followed many of Obama’s policies, and even improved on some of them. That being said, Trump’s ‘pivot actions’ appear to be erratic, pragmatic short-term actions rather than a meticulously planned long-term strategy similar to Obama’s rebalance (which did not materialize). Thus, while Obama failed to transform the pivot into an effective strategy, neither is Trump’s effectiveness backed by a coherent Asian strategy.