Malaysia 13th General Election: A short note on Malaysia's continuing battle with ethnic politics

Malaysia's Barisan Nasional (a coalition of mainly ethnic-based parties) secured a narrow win in the country's recent election. Reacting to the dismal result, Malaysia's Prime Minister Najib Abdul Razak blamed his party's losses on the “Chinese Tsunami”, which he described as the overwhelming support of Chinese voters for the opposition party – the Pakatan Rakyat (PR). This note believes that the debates on “Chinese Tsunami” highlight a larger imperative; Malaysians' constant struggle with race relations and what constitutes the character of Malaysia's political economy. Improving Malaysia's ethnic relations in the next five years remains daunting. The BN's weaker mandate and the PR's eagerness to assume leadership threatens to recycle more populist policies that can do more damage to Malaysia's ethnic relations.     

Setting the record straight: A note on sophisticated voting under Borda's method

The purpose of this note is to correct some inaccuracies in the literature regarding sophisticated voting under Borda's method. It is shown that if a single candidate must be elected and voters vote sophisticatedly under Borda's method, then: (1) Contrary to both Black's (1976) and Ludwin's (1978) claims, a voter's undominated voting strategy may require him not to give top ranking to his most preferred candidate; (2) Contrary to Black's (1976) claim, an undominated strategy may be such that all candidates except the most preferred one are ranked last; (3) Whereas a candidate who constitutes the true bottom preference of an absolute majority of the voters will never be elected if voters vote sincerely, this candidate may be elected if voters vote strategically; (4) The election of a candidate who constitutes the true top preference of an absolute majority of the voters is not systematic: ceteris paribus this candidate may be definitely elected when voters vote sincerely but not when they vote strategically, as well as vice versa.     

Organizational termination and policy continuation: Closing the Oklahoma Public Training Schools

Can termination occur withboth a bang and a whimper? This article examines the termination of Oklahoma's State Training Schools for dependent and neglected children and the continuation of the policy of institutionalization and detention through the use of admission to psychiatric hospitals and treatment centers. This case study is discussed in light of Peter deLeon's model of termination and Herbert Kaufman's theory of organizational evolution, and demonstrates the resiliency of public policy, even in the face of organizational termination.     

Budget-maximizing governmental agencies: An empirical test

Niskanen's theory of government budgeting, involving powerful agencies interested in maximizing their budgets through bargaining with a weak, poorly informed governmental ‘Sponsor’, has received wide recognition. This paper presents the first direct empirical tests of Niskanen's ideas. One implication of Niskanen's model of budgeting is that the demand for public services will appear to be elastic. Niskanen's model also implies restrictions on the elasticity of the derived demand for labor in the public sector. Neither set of predictions is supported by existing empirical research on government activity.     

The impact of women above the political glass ceiling: Evidence from a Norwegian executive gender quota reform

Women have historically been underrepresented in democratic assemblies, particularly in top positions with executive powers. Most gender quota reforms address this by mandating a more equal gender representation on election lists. In contrast, a 1992 legislative reform in Norway required parties' candidate lists for the local executive board to comprise at least 40% politicians of each gender. This legal change was not only exogenously imposed by a higher-level government, but also generated distinct quota-induced constraints across Norwegian municipalities. We exploit the resulting variation in ‘quota shocks’ using a difference-in-differences design to identify the quota's effect on women's political representation as well as local public policies. We find that more women enter the executive board after the reform, though spill-overs on women's representation in the local council and on the probability of a female mayor or top administrator are weak. We also find no consistent evidence for shifts in public policies due to increased representation of women in positions with executive powers.     

Social welfare functions when preferences are convex,strictly monotonic,and continuous

The paper shows that if the class of admissible preference orderings is restricted in a manner appropriate for economic and political models, then Arrow's impossibility theorem for social welfare functions continues to be valid. Specifically if the space of alternatives is R ₊ ⁿ , n ≥ 3, where each dimension represents a different public good and if each person's preferences are restricted to be convex, continuous, and strictly monotonic, then no social welfare function exists that satisfies unanimity, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and nondictatorship.     

Vote-earning strategies in flexible list systems: Seats at the price of unity

In theory, flexible list systems are a compromise between closed-list and open-list proportional representation. A party's list of candidates can be reordered by voters if the number of votes cast for an individual candidate exceeds some quota. Because these barriers to reordering are rarely overcome, these systems are often characterized as basically closed-list systems. Paradoxically, in many cases, candidates are increasingly earning individual-level preference votes. Using data from Slovakia, we show that incumbents cultivate personal reputations because parties reward preference vote earning candidates with better pre-election list positions in the future. Ironically, the party's vote-earning strategy comes at a price, as incumbents use voting against the party on the chamber floor to generate the reputations that garner preference votes.     

Organizational meanings of program evaluation

Program evaluation has to be understood as an organizational phenomenon: it is a way of understanding and evaluating action in and between organizations. But it rests on assumptions about organization which need to be challenged, and which have to be understood as a particular framing of organizational activity which will facilitate hierarchical control. Attention needs to be given to the way in which ‘evaluation’ are used to structure organizational activity. This raises significant questions about the relationship between the analysis of organizational activity and the activity itself. ‘Colonel Cargill envies you because of the splendid job you're doing on parades. He's afraid I was going to put you in charge of bomb patterns.’ Colonel Scheisskopf was all ears. ‘What are bomb patterns?’ ‘Bomb patterns?,’ General Peckem repeated, twinkling with self-satisfied good humor. ‘A bomb pattern is a term I dreamed up several weeks ago. It means nothing, but you'd be surprised at how rapidly it's caught on.’ Joseph Heller,Catch 22     

The (Un)predictability of Primaries with Many Candidates: Simulation Evidence

It is common to describe the dynamic processes that generateoutcomes in U.S. primaries as ``unstable'' or ``unpredictable''. In fact, the way we choose candidates may amount to alottery. This paper uses a simulation approach, assuming10,000 voters who vote according to a naive, deterministicproximity rule, but who choose party affiliationprobabilistically. The voters of each party then must choose between twosets of ten randomly chosen candidates, in ``closed'' primaries.Finally, the winners of the two nominations compete in thegeneral election, in which independent voters also participate.The key result of the simulations reported here isthe complete unpredictability of the outcomes of a sequence ofprimaries: the winner of the primary, or the party's nominee,varied as much as two standard deviations from the medianpartisan voter. The reason is that the median, or any othermeasure of the center of the distribution of voters, isof little value in predicting the outcome of multicandidateelections. These results suggest that who runs may havemore to do with who wins than any other consideration. If more than two parties or candidates are expected, then thevote-maximizing position is not close to your opponents, butwell away from them. (Tullock, 1967: 55).     

The demise of the last westminster system? Comments on the report of New Zealand's Royal Commission on the Electoral System

The New Zealand government set up a Royal Commission to consider the country's electoral system. It produced an unexpectedly radical Report, challenging some of the basic assumptions of the Westminster system under which New Zealand has been governed for 100 years. This article considers the wider implications of the Report, criticizing some of its assumptions, but accepting its basic analysis—a general philosophical dislike of the principle of concentrating power in the hands of the majority. It also explores the Report's treatment of alternative forms of proportional representation.     

Limitations of the spatial model

One approach to avoiding the implications of Arrow's paradox is to impose restrictions on the preferences of voters. A restriction often assumed in the literature is that voters' preferences can be represented by a choice among points in a space, where voters' preferences are convex. We claim that these assumptions will often be unjustified. Government must often address issues of externalities or public goods, which means that the possibility frontier will not be concave. This in turn means that voters' preferences over feasible policies will not be convex.     

Politicians,voters and democracy: The 2011 UK referendum on the Alternative Vote

At the 2010 UK election, Labour proposed a referendum on changing the House of Commons electoral system from single member plurality to the Alternative Vote. Subsequently, a coalition was formed between the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats, yet it was Labour's policy on electoral reform that was implemented. The paper explains why this proved to be politically convenient for Labour's opponents. At the same time, however, holding the referendum reflected an emergent de facto convention that significant constitutional change should only be introduced after it has secured popular endorsement. The paper assesses whether the dynamics of public opinion during the AV referendum suggests that voters' eventual decisions about constitutional questions reflect their views about the merits of the relevant arguments.     

How do coalition signals shape voting behavior? Revealing the mediating role of coalition expectations

Existing empirical research suggests that there are two mechanisms through which pre-electoral coalition signals shape voting behavior. According to these, coalition signals both shift the perceived ideological positions of parties and prime coalition considerations at the cost of party considerations. The work at hand is the first to test another possibility of how coalition signals affect voting. This coalition expectation mechanism claims that coalition signals affect voting decisions by changing voters' expectations about which coalitions are likely to form after the election. Moreover, this paper provides the first integrative overview of all three mechanisms that link coalition signals and individual voting behavior. Results from a survey experiment conducted during Sweden's 2018 general election suggest that the coalition expectation mechanism can indeed be at work. By showing how parties' pre-electoral coalition behavior enter a voter's decision calculus, the paper provides important insights for the literature on strategic voting theories in proportional systems.     

Rent-seeking contest when the prize increases with aggregate efforts

The objective of this article is to investigate contests in which efforts are productive. Tullock's standard rent-seeking model is extended by making the rent itself increase with the aggregate efforts. A positive externality is thereby introduced into the contest, because a contender's private effort in quest of the rent generates a benefit for other contenders. Coupled with a negative externality presented in the standard rent-seeking model, the net effect on the social efficiency of the contest is a priori ambiguous. It is shown that the extended contest generates socially wasteful, excessive aggregate efforts.     

Why bother campaigning? Campaign effectiveness in the 2009 European Parliament elections

This paper explores the effectiveness of European Parliament candidates' campaigns. We analyze the relationship between candidates' spending and their likelihood of success, controlling for a range of relevant co-varying factors. We then investigate whether the effects of electoral spending are conditioned by two variables: ballot design and incumbency. We find that, ceteris paribus, spending was positively related to a candidate's likelihood of electoral success in the 2009 campaign, though this effect is small in scale. We also reveal that the electorally positive effects of spending are observable across both 'party-centered' and ‘candidate-centered’ ballot structures, and that there is some evidence that incumbent spending is less effective than challenger spending.     

Rent seeking and market competition

This paper emphasizes that political behavior of interest groups is a result of economic calculation, and therefore is affected by the market conditions under which they operate. We develop a two-stage game to link political and market decision-making. We find that if unproductive rent-seekingdirectly contributes to rent-seekers' market operations, then their lobbying efforts will be excessive if the number of outsiders is relatively large, restrained if it is relatively small. If rent-seekingdirectly impairs rent-seekers' market operations, the above described behavior will be reversed. The analysis also reveals that as wasteful rent-seeking may increase rent-seeker's production cost, market competition shifts production from now less efficient rent-seekers to their non-rent-seeking rivals. Welfare gains from this shift may overshadow the direct waste of influence activities.     

Public responses to the presidential use of military force: A panel analysis

How do citizens respond to dramatic uses of military force? While we know a great deal about the conditions that driveaggregate changes in presidential popularity in response to a president's use of military force, we know surprisingly little about howindividuals respond to such events. What types of individuals operating under what types of conditions are more likely to support such actions? And to what extent does approval of the use of force affect subsequent changes, not only in presidential popularity, but also in more general foreign policy attitudes? We use panel survey data collected before and after the U.S. bombing of Libya in 1986 to investigate the individual-level dynamics of opinion change in response to this dramatic event. Because our study neatly brackets the Libyan air strikes, we are able to examine in some detail the antecedents and consequences of individuals' reactions to a president's use of military force. We find that watching President Reagan's dramatic televised speech had an unmistakable impact in moving respondents to support the bombing. We also find that support for the Libyan air strikes appeared to precipitate greater approval for a range of more “hard-line” military responses toward terrorism, thus creating opportunities for similar-or even broader—presidential initiatives in the future. Finally, because the bombing was the only significant event occurring between the waves of the panel, our quasi-experimental design ties approval of the bombing clearly to an upsurge in presidential approval. Implications for various perspectives on presidential leadership of public opinion in foreign affairs are discussed.     

Bribery and Public Debt Repudiation

In cases where policy makers accept ``bribes'' offered by organised lobbies or interestedparties, government decisions can be modelled as a first price menu auction. In this paper we adaptthis structure to model debt repudiation. We considera one-period model in which two generations, parents and children, are present, and debt titles are unevenlydistributed among parents. The government can repaythe debt by a combination of taxes on the children'sincome and on the outstanding debt. We excludeintergenerational conflicts, assuming that the parents'and children's objective is to maximise the utility ofthe family. In this perspective, families make offersthat relate monetary contributions to the taxstructures chosen by the government. On the hypothesisthat all interests are represented, we obtain theresult that the government is indifferent to the taxstructure.     

A Deeper Durkheimian Society for Haidt’s Righteous Minds

Jonathan Haidt’s The Righteous Mind is an advance in the empirical study of morality. He argues that liberals lose elections because they only appeal to the moral foundations of Care and Fairness, whereas conservatives can appeal to additional things that most people value - Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity. Haidt’s argument gets a bit muddled when he tries to incorporate the libertarians’ concern with Liberty into his scheme of moral foundations. This muddle can be resolved by seeing that all groups need Loyalty, Authority, and Fairness (re-described). Politics today is a debate about what is truly Sacred for society - the conservatives’ traditional sacred realm of family, religion, and nation-state, the libertarians’ sacred individual liberty, or the liberals’ sacred care for those who are harmed by society.     

Policymaking and policy analysis in Latin America—A return journey

This paper reviews and updates the conceptual approaches of the author's Journeys Towards Progress (1963). It focuses first on distinctions explaining differences in the path of policymaking and in its effectiveness. Distinctions are made between pressing and autonomously chosen policy problems, between privileged problems and neglected ones that must manage to “ride the coattails” of the former to receive attention, and between policy tasks that are tackled with more motivation than understanding and those with the opposite characteristic. Addressing then similarities in experience with policymaking, the paper first comments on fracasomania (the failure complex) and on the incapacity ever to be surprised at both consequences and determinants of under-development. Indirect and unanticipated effects of policies are illustrated through a Colombian example. A Concluding Lament suggests that the watch for side-effects must be unusually wide-angled in today's Latin America.