Network subversion: The contrasting effects of multiple networks on bribery in South Korea

This paper is based on the premise that corrupt uses of public, civic networks ostensibly built and legitimated for their altruistic purposes can be a source of network subversion and corruption. Open, public, civic networks of South Korea seem to be systemic and organizational facilitators of criminality instead of assumptions of criminality being related only to closed, criminal cultures or anomie. We test whether increasing participation in the major social networks of Korean civic life – networks based on geography (common ancestral hometown), family (extended kinship), and education (alumni) – are associated with increasing penchants for self-admitted criminal collusion, in this case, bribery. We argue that due to relational association or within-network favoritism the increase in multiple networks per individual generates increasing social capital of access, information, and trust which may be subverted toward some form of private criminal collusion.     

Corruption in Public Procurement: Finding the Right Indicators

Red flags are widely used to minimize the risk of various forms of economic misconduct, among which corruption in public procurement. Drawing on criminal investigations, the literature has developed several indicators of corruption in public procurements and has put them forward as viable risk indicators. But are they genuinely viable, if only corrupt procurements are analysed? Using a dataset of 192 public procurements — with 96 cases where corruption was detected and 96 cases where corruption was not detected — this paper addresses the identification of significant risk indicators of corruption. We find that only some indicators significantly relate to corruption and that eight of them (e.g. large tenders, lack of transparency and collusion of bidders) can best predict the occurrence of corruption in public procurements. With this paper we successfully tap into one of the most vulnerable areas of criminological research — selecting the right sample — and consequently, our results can help increase the detection of corruption, increase investigation effectiveness and minimize corruption opportunities.     

Japan,Korea, the Philippines,China: four syndromes of corruption

Both generalizations about “Asian corruption”, and claims about greater or lesser amounts of corruption, tend to overlook the many variations existing among and within Asian societies, and among the corruption problems they experience. I suggest that deeper influences in social, political and economic development, and contrasting institutional settings, create four distinctive syndromes of corruption, each with its own set of implications for relationships between wealth and power. Japan is an example of “influence markets” in which private interests buy or rent influence over relatively specific policy outcomes within a strong state. Korea is a case of “elite cartels”, in which collusion and corrupt incentives enable several kinds of elites to cooperate in governing, enriching themselves, and resisting rising political competition. The Philippines is marked by “oligarchs and clans”, with powerful families and their entourages plundering a weak state in a climate of uncertainty and insecurity. China experiences “official mogul” corruption, in which officials abuse state power with impunity, although that process is becoming increasingly fragmented. The four syndromes may help us understand why corruption and rapid growth have coexisted in some, but not all, Asian states for long periods of time, and may also help us understand why some of those states will adapt to new global realities only with some difficulty. They also show how “consensus”-driven reforms emanating from the west may not only be ineffective, but may actually make matters worse.     

Corruption and NIC development: A case study of South Korea

The debate on corruption and economic performance has swung from one position to the other over the decades. During the 1960s the school of thought associated with modernisation theory argued corruption was often positively correlated with economic growth. (Huntington, 1968; Leff, 1964) Subsequently corruption came to be viewed as inimical to growth by undermining the basis of stable, rational public policies and allocation through markets (Rose-Ackerman, 1978; Theobald, 1990), the situation in which it is still largely viewed today, particularly following the “corruption eruption” of the 1990s (Alam, 1989; Leiken, 1997; Naim, 1995). East Asian countries stand as important case studies of the role of corruption in industrialisation: this article focuses on South Korea. Firstly corruption coexisted with development. Secondly corruption in South Korea was at different times functional, detrimental, irrelevant and relevant, but always present during rapid industrialisation. This is not of course to argue corruption fuelled growth nor to recommend it as a plausible policy option for developing or transitional economies, since it is evident that in many cases corruption is harmful to growth. This article seeks to understand the role corruption played in Korean economic development to better understand the phenomenon of corruption itself. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Political parties and corruption: Ten hypotheses on five vicious circles

Strong political parties and genuine competition among them feature in many anti-corruption strategies, but in practice the relationships between corruption and political parties are much more complex than is generally recognized. This article explores and illustrates ten hypotheses about those connections, drawing in detail upon Italian, Japanese, and other cases for evidence. These connections extend well beyond amounts and trends of corruption to include the motivations of party members and supporters, internal problems of party organizations, and links between parties and state institutions. Major concerns included party bureaucratization, membership, and resources; electoral volatility; party fragmentation; collusion among parties; and party influence in public administration. These hypotheses will be best understood, and tested, comparatively, but in so doing we need to look not only at basic causes of corruption but also at ways in which parties and other institutions reproduce the conditions that sustain it.     

The resources of corruption: Some reflections from the Italian Case

This article focuses on the resources used in corrupt exchanges and the complex network of actors involved. The empirical analysis is drawn from research into the Italian case, and is based on judicial investigations, a newspaper-based data bank, and interviews. Defining corruption as a market for political rent, the analysis focuses on the “commodities” which flow from the public to the private sectors (in particular, influence over political decisions and information) and those which flow in the opposite direction (such as bribes, influence on the mass media etc.). Resources which corrupt agents use to reduce the costs of “producing” corrupt services are also explored as well as the risks involved in hidden exchange. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

<Emphasis Type="Bold">A</Emphasis>nti-corruption agencies: between empowerment and irrelevance

The anti-corruption activity of the 1990s is characterized by the rise of new players, such as specialized anti-corruption bodies. Anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) are public bodies of a durable nature, with a specific mission to fight corruption and reducing the opportunity structures propitious for its occurrence in society through preventive and/or repressive measures. Independently of their format and powers, ACAs encounter various constraints to their mandate, which explains the meagre results obtained by some of them. This introductory paper tries to understand the rise, future, and implications of this new kind of “integrity warrior” and to locate them in the evolving doctrine of corruption control. The objective of this edited volume is to re-launch the debate on ACAs as the most innovative feature of the anti-corruption movement of the last two decades.     

From clean up to FICAC: Anti-corruption in Fiji’s post coup politics

The leaders of Fiji’s 2006 military coup launched a ‘cleanup campaign’ and set up an Independent Commission Against Corruption. So far it has brought court cases against about 24 people. Among them is the former Prime Minister, who was charged with corruption for his role in institutions designed to promote the economic interests of indigenous Fijians (who constitute about 56% of the population). The article considers what counts as ‘corruption’ in these Affirmative Action policies: a so-called ‘Agriculture Scam’, which distributed farm implements free to Fijian farmers; a company called Fijian Holdings, which received concessional finance from the government; and a Native Land Trust Board, which collects rent on behalf of indigenous landowners. It concludes that army and popular opinion in Fiji hold conceptions of corruption that are much broader than the offences set out in the country’s penal code, and which the new ICAC is attempting to enforce.     

Layers of decision: Linking social definitions of corruption and willingness to take action

The literature available about social definitions of corruption is surprisingly discrete from that which addresses the issue of whistleblowing or the reporting of crime and corruption. The current study, however, empirically links the two. A survey of more than 1300 public sector employees was undertaken to explore: i) how and why public sector employees define some behaviours as corrupt; ii) factors which may hinder public sector employees taking action about corruption which they may observe at work; and iii) the link between i) and ii). The study found that within the New South Wales (NSW) public sector, views about what constitutes corruption are diverse and that this has a significant, though not exclusive, impact upon the action respondents said they would take in response to workplace corruption. The study discusses other factors which also impact upon the stated decision not to take action about corruption and suggests some possible courses of action for addressing these factors.The research upon which this paper is based formed part of the research program of the Independent Commission Against Corruption.     

Organizational corruption by public hospitals in China

This article studies the rise of organizational corruption by public hospitals in China since the 1990s and its impacts. Organizational corruption refers to the exploitation of public authority by a government agency for its monetary or material gains. This article argues that a combination of three major factors contributed to the rise of organizational corruption by public hospitals. First, the Chinese government substantially reduced its financial commitment to the health sector since the mid-1980s. To compensate for the retrenchment of government health outlays, public hospitals are authorized to earn revenue, keep and use all budgetary surpluses. This policy provided numerous opportunities and incentives for hospitals to engage in corruption. The second factor concerns the excessive and chaotic development of the pharmaceutical sector. Intense competition has prompted many drug firms to offer bribes to public hospitals so that their products would be purchased. Finally, the state regulatory infrastructure has failed to check the spread of corrupt practices. The study raised two broader implications. First, it highlights the pitfall of retrenchment of government outlays and the subsequent policy of allowing state agencies to generate, retain and use the revenue, in the absence of an effective regulatory infrastructure. Second, the prevalence of organizational corruption indicates that the nature of public hospitals in China has been transformed. Instead of providing efficient, safe and affordable treatment for patients, many public hospitals have engaged in predatory behavior that is harmful to patients’ health.     

Protecting integrity at the local level: the role of anticorruption and public management networks

This article argues that anti-corruption agencies at the local-level have been successful in a way that can be evaluated and emulated. A related contention is that corruption control is most effective when the central public integrity agency is part of both a local anticorruption network and a local public management network. Quite reasonably, the international anti-corruption project has focused most time and energy on advocating and assessing efforts made to ensure public integrity at the national level. Baseline studies by scholars and supra-national integrity nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) identify the form of corruption control (if any) adopted by the central government. Key considerations in assessing the status of national anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) are the ones mentioned in the introduction to this special issue: political independence, scope of authority, investigatory powers, position in the national legal/political network, durability, and use of effectiveness measures. Similar taxonomies are deployed by OLAF, Transparency International, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and by scholars on corruption control.     

Minimising corruption: Applying lessons from the crime prevention literature

This article explores how the criminology literature, particularly the literature on crime prevention, might supplement current efforts to minimise corruption. It seeks to identify and apply approaches to offenders and offending to the problem of minimising corruption. In summary, this article demonstrates that the crime prevention literature does have a number of applications for those interested in minimising corruption. In general terms, this literature advocates, amongst other things, taking an informed approach to corruption minimisation by developing an understanding of the process of engaging in corrupt conduct. Exploring the offender's perspective and considering different types of corruption separately are two strategies suggested to facilitate understanding the factors which underlie corrupt conduct. In this way those seeking to minimise corruption would be better placed to identify how and where to intervene to optimise the likelihood of prevention and hence be able to tailor prevention techniques to individual types of corruption. Six specific lessons from the crime prevention literature and their applications are illustrated in this article. This current article is intended to promote discussion of potential strategies for combating corruption by the growing numbers of people interested in this challenge. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Bureaucrats’ corruption and competition in public administration

Competition in public administration is often advocated as a solution to bureaucrats’ corruption. However, there are no well developed analyses of how competition could succeed and the issue of its detailed design has not been carefully addressed so far. In this paper, we put forward a series of models that help understand what competition in public administration can actually accomplish. We distinguish two different shapes that corruption may take: bribery and extortion, and we demonstrate, under the usual assumption of asymmetric information as to the honesty of the bureaucrats, that while competition is effective in fighting extortion it exacerbates bribery. Given that corruption normally manifests itself simultaneously under the two different shapes, an anti-corruption policy based upon competition is bound to face a serious trade-off: trying to curb one of them through competition implies making the other worse. This result holds, with some differences, under exogenous and endogenous bureaucrats’ “honesty”. The dual aspect of corruption is probably one of the most serious—and so far largely neglected—obstacles to any effective anti-corruption policy.     

Defying institutional failure: learning from the experiences of anti-corruption agencies in four Asian countries

This article compares the effectiveness of the anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) in four Asian countries: the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) in Singapore, the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in Hong Kong, the National Counter Corruption Commission (NCCC) in Thailand, and the Korea Independent Commission Against Corruption (KICAC). The CPIB and ICAC are more effective than the NCCC and KICAC because of the political will of the governments in Singapore and Hong Kong and the more favourable policy contexts of these two city-states. The lack of political will in curbing corruption in Thailand and South Korea is reflected in the fact that the NCCC and KICAC are not as well staffed or funded than the CPIB and ICAC. Moreover, the KICAC is the weakest of the four ACAs as it does not have the power to investigate corruption cases. The policy contexts of Thailand and South Korea are less favourable because of their larger populations and land area, and lower GDP per capita. To avoid institutional failure, ACAs must be supported by their governments in terms of the provision of adequate personnel and budget. They must also be able to investigate all cases of corruption without any political interference. The example of the KICAC shows the futility of establishing an ACA without the ability to investigate corruption cases.     

村干部挪用公款的样态分析——基于489起犯罪案件的法律社会学研究

现阶段,精准识别村干部挪用公款的现实样态,是有效治理村级腐败的重要前提。为此,运用内容分析、统计分析和案例解剖等方法,对中国裁判文书网中的村干部挪用公款犯罪案件展开法律社会学研究就显得十分必要。通过考察村干部挪用公款的两大核心犯罪要件发现,在目的用途上,以营利活动型案件和超期未还型案件为主,非法活动型案件较为少见;在具体对象与类别上,以征地补偿资金案件和扶贫等特定款物资金案件为主。另外,社会保险资金、农林业补贴资金、基建项目专项资金也会被村干部挪用。针对村级腐败尤其是村干部挪用公款问题,须以上述样态特征为基础对症下药。     

From paparazzi to hidden cameras: The aggressive side of a free and responsible press

This article examines the complex of cultural effects and possible legal responses in the wake of the Princess of Wales' death. To say that the paparazzi were complicit in her death is to forget that, in spite of their frequently invasive means of obtaining news, these were also the kind of journalists who were complicit in the public celebration of her life. Had the Hutchins Commission this tragedy to include in its deliberations about press responsibility, it likely would have stated its indignation and suggested Diana's death as more evidence that journalists be regulated. But this article argues that aggressive journalism, as with any other of the press' activities, is beholden to a balance of public interests. These interests include the need for the public to be both informed and protected from invasion of privacy or criminal conduct by any journalist.     

Corruption and local politics in Chile

This paper argues that the greater openness of Chilean politics to public scrutiny and the penetration of the locality by the market have made corruption a more visible phenomenon. Presenting empirical evidence collected for nearly fifty cases of allegations of municipal corruption, the paper explores the content, actors, directionality, levels of corruption and the links existing with the local political environment: partisan composition of councils, political affiliation of mayors and sources denouncing corruption. The conclusions suggest that although many accusations of corruption may correspond to particularistic claims comprehended in Chile's traditional system of political clientelism, a significant difference with the past is the inclusion of private business as a new component of an old network of political clientelism.This is a revised version of an exploratory paper delivered at the International Seminar El Estado y la prevención de la corrupción organized by the Institute of Political Science. The Catholic University of Chile with the support of the Presidential Commission on Public Ethics, held in Santiago de Chile, July 4–5, 1994. The opinions, findings and conclusions herewith included are the author's own responsibility and do not represent the official standing of any of the above mentioned institutions.     

Does Authoritarianism Breed Corruption? Reconsidering the Relationship Between Authoritarian Governance and Corrupt Exchanges in Bureaucracies

This article advocates for ethnographic and historical study of the political roots of corruption. Focusing on informal economies of Belarusian universities, it reexamines two theoretical propositions about corruption in autocracies. The first proposition is that authoritarianism breeds bureaucratic corruption; the second is that autocrats grant disloyal subjects corruption opportunities in exchange for political compliance. Using qualitative data, the author finds that autocracies can generate favorable as well as unfavorable preconditions for bureaucratic corruption. The author argues that lenient autocratic governance, characterized by organizational decoupling, creates favorable conditions for bureaucratic corruption. In contrast, consolidated autocracy, defined by rigid organizational controls, is unfavorable to such corruption. The author also concludes that in autocracies, disloyal populations may be cut off from rather than granted opportunities for bureaucratic corruption. These findings suggest that the relationship between autocratic governance and corruption is more complex than current studies are able to reveal due to their methodological limitations.     

公法理论的创新与研究范式的突破——对统一公法学的证成性阐释

本文是对统一公法学的证成性研究.全文以统一公法学的现有研究成果为基础,从理论标识、认识论和方法论三个方面来进行证成性的阐释与研究,解读其理论内涵与脉络.并且认为,作为一种认识论,统一公法学的理论标识已经确立,其理论体系基本形成,是一种原始性的理论创新;作为一种方法论,统一公法学具有了自己的研究进路,其研究视野非常独特,是一种全新的研究范式.全文旨在最终表明:统一公法学不仅是一种理论上的凝练,而且是一种方法论的指导.     

Filling the gap of formal institutions: the effects of Guanxi network on corruption in reform-era China

Corruption exists around the world and throughout the human history, but societies undergoing rapid modernization and institutional transition tend to be more susceptible to this problem. This article analyzes the corruption-facilitating roles of guanxi network under transition. It argues that when deficient political and economic institutions hamper the effective flow of information and resources and when fast structural changes generate uncertainty, people can resort to guanxi network, an informal institution, to overcome these difficulties and advance their private interests. Using empirical evidence from reform-era China, this article demonstrates how the communication, exchange, and normative functions of guanxi network enhance the opportunities, means, and incentives for public officials to engage in corruption, especially transactional corruption through particularistic ties.