Does Authoritarianism Breed Corruption? Reconsidering the Relationship Between Authoritarian Governance and Corrupt Exchanges in Bureaucracies

This article advocates for ethnographic and historical study of the political roots of corruption. Focusing on informal economies of Belarusian universities, it reexamines two theoretical propositions about corruption in autocracies. The first proposition is that authoritarianism breeds bureaucratic corruption; the second is that autocrats grant disloyal subjects corruption opportunities in exchange for political compliance. Using qualitative data, the author finds that autocracies can generate favorable as well as unfavorable preconditions for bureaucratic corruption. The author argues that lenient autocratic governance, characterized by organizational decoupling, creates favorable conditions for bureaucratic corruption. In contrast, consolidated autocracy, defined by rigid organizational controls, is unfavorable to such corruption. The author also concludes that in autocracies, disloyal populations may be cut off from rather than granted opportunities for bureaucratic corruption. These findings suggest that the relationship between autocratic governance and corruption is more complex than current studies are able to reveal due to their methodological limitations.     

On the dark side of the code: organizational challenges to an effective anti-corruption strategy

Corporations have been fighting for decades to eliminate corruption. However, despite the proliferation of compliance programs and a recurrent surge of interest in business ethics, commercial bribery prevails as a “rational choice strategy” for economic success and thus is widely regarded as the result of immoral choices of greedy individuals. This article reports on a modus operandi study concerning corruption within a large industrial corporation (Siemens AG). Results highlight the fact that neither consistent anti-corruption norms nor severe formal sanctions were able to deter certain employees from deviant behavior in this landmark case of structural corruption. Sociologists and business economists have both pointed to the organizational culture that provides an explanation for this paradox. The author compares three diverging hypotheses: (1) private gain, (2) cognitive normalization, and (3) organizational cultures, and concludes that the structural causes of corrupt practices fit the definition of ‘useful illegality’ (Luhmann). To a large extent, this old sociological concept resembles the criminological idea of corporate crime, but it emphasizes the cultural factors that undermine management’s preventive strategies, and thus holds the promise of theoretical progress. Implications that emerge from the case analysis for the social control of corporate bribe payers are discussed. The discussion reveals why challenges to successful anti-corruption efforts persist at the organizational level.     

Network subversion: The contrasting effects of multiple networks on bribery in South Korea

This paper is based on the premise that corrupt uses of public, civic networks ostensibly built and legitimated for their altruistic purposes can be a source of network subversion and corruption. Open, public, civic networks of South Korea seem to be systemic and organizational facilitators of criminality instead of assumptions of criminality being related only to closed, criminal cultures or anomie. We test whether increasing participation in the major social networks of Korean civic life – networks based on geography (common ancestral hometown), family (extended kinship), and education (alumni) – are associated with increasing penchants for self-admitted criminal collusion, in this case, bribery. We argue that due to relational association or within-network favoritism the increase in multiple networks per individual generates increasing social capital of access, information, and trust which may be subverted toward some form of private criminal collusion.     

行贿意愿差异与大湾区廉政合作治理:基于A市与香港的比较研究

粤港澳大湾区各城市在社会环境上的差异,既是廉政建设区域间合作的挑战,也是机遇。在不同的社会背景下,人们对腐败的认知和接受程度不同,这在很大程度上通过行贿意愿的差异呈现。因此,了解社会环境对行贿意愿的影响,不仅有助于制定行之有效的廉政治理策略,也凸显不同地区之间信息交流和治理合作的重要性。那么,在不同的社会场景下,人们的行贿意愿会有怎样的差异?受到哪些社会环境因素的影响?行贿意愿差异的比较研究对廉政合作治理具有什么理论和政策涵义?新制度主义理论为回答这些问题提供了有益的启发。2019年在香港与大湾区A城市所作的问卷调查为不同地区相异的社会条件下的行贿意愿差异提供了分析依据。研究结果表明,在行贿场景所预示的社会条件发生变化时,市民行贿的意愿也随之变化。这种变化受到制度环境因素和社会环境因素两方面的影响。因此,在香港与大湾区其他城市社会条件不尽相同、而经济和社会交往又不断增加的情况下,如何抑制跨境贿赂是廉政合作治理必须面对的重要问题。     

贪污贿赂犯罪案件诉讼程序的反思与重构

贪污贿赂犯罪作为权力型职务犯罪，越来越具有高智能性、高隐秘性的特点。现行刑诉法所规定的诉讼程序是在特定历史条件下仅为普通刑事犯罪所设计，并没有考虑到贪污贿赂犯罪案件的特殊性而赋予相应的特殊诉讼程序，已不能满足当前贪污贿赂犯罪侦查与审判工作的需要。规定贪污贿赂犯罪案件特殊诉讼程序，是检察机关职务犯罪侦查权合理配置与运行的重要内容。随着社会发展和科技进步，国家应权衡利弊得失，有必要对贪污贿赂犯罪案件的诉讼程序在立法上进行修改完善和在制度上进行科学构建。     

《联合国反腐败公约》视野下的受贿罪

受贿罪是我国刑法中的一个重点罪名,也是刑事司法实践中一种多发性的腐败犯罪。本文以受贿罪的犯罪构成为线索,以《联合国反腐败公约》为视角,提出刑法规定应该扩大我国受贿罪犯罪主体的范围,扩大"贿赂"的范围,取消"为他人谋取利益"这一犯罪构成要件。     

反贪工作与贯彻宽严相济刑事政策

作为一种基本的刑事法律指导方针,宽严相济刑事政策在我国的刑事立法、司法实践活动中早有体现;但是,在司法实务过程中,以数额为主导确定定罪量刑幅度法定刑的规定,存在诸多法律或技术上的障碍和困惑,以及对贪污贿赂犯罪处理上宽严失衡客观情况的存在,都给全面贯彻宽严相济刑事政策造成了困惑和尴尬,因此,完善关于贪污贿赂犯罪的刑罚规范,并修改程序法以提高侦查机关依法打击贪污贿赂犯罪能力,将反腐败斗争纳入法治化轨道,同时完善反贪工作中运用宽严相济刑事政策的相关工作机制,成为贯彻宽严相济刑事政策的主要途径。     

On Her Majesty's Commercial Service: Bribery,Public Officials and the UK Intelligence Services

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职务犯罪死刑存废的理性思考

我国《刑法》为职务犯罪配置了死刑,司法实践中也有贪官被执行了极刑,然而我国职务犯罪的犯罪率却连年攀高,所以这不得不使我们反思我国职务犯罪死刑的设置对于控制职务犯罪的作用。首先从职务犯罪的概念界定谈起,进而从职务犯罪发生的内外因等角度论述我国废除职务犯罪的必要性,并进而就我国目前在未废除职务犯罪的死刑这一现实情况下,探讨如何严格控制职务犯罪的死刑。最后,就未来逐步废除职务犯罪死刑的路径进行具体的设计。     

Corruption in a non-corrupt country: what does corruption look like in Finland?

ABSTRACT

Finland is usually considered a country where corruption is rare, and this impression is reinforced by the good results that it has achieved in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). The present study describes and assesses Finnish bribery legislation, as well as a number of recent judgments handed down by Finnish courts. The legislation is quite fragmented, consisting of some nine sections in three different chapters of the Criminal Code. The bribery cases heard by the Supreme Court mainly deal with quite small-scale bribery, such as where a public official has accepted restaurant services, trips or other benefits from private companies. However, in the last few years, the courts have also had to consider some larger-scale instances of bribery, where persons working for Finnish companies have been suspected of bribing foreign public officials. The article also takes up match-fixing and election funding and their connections to bribery.     

贪污贿赂犯罪的数额问题研究

刑法规定的数额标准与司法实践不相适应的问题、影响刑罚轻重的数额等级划分不合理的问题及犯罪的数额起点问题是困扰我国刑事立法与司法实践的重大问题之一,我国贪污贿赂犯罪的数额起点应当进一步降低乃至取消而不是提高。贪污贿赂犯罪刑罚的数额等级应当进一步细分,情节规定应当具体化。贪污贿赂犯罪的数额法定是十分必要的,不能因为与司法实践脱节而否认其合理性。完善我国现行刑法贪污贿赂犯罪应当沿着数字化、具体化方向发展,凡是可以量化的一定要量化,基于我国的国情需要最大限度地减少模糊性、不确定性。     

THE GENDERING OF VIOLENT DELINQUENCY*

This article addresses two issues that have received little attention in empirical research-the mechanisms explaining variation in violent delinquency within gender and variation in levels of violence across gender, or the gender gap. Toward these ends, the article synthesizes arguments from differential association theory, feminist theory, and gender studies. The outcome is a theoretical model of gender and violent delinquency that focuses on the interplay between structural positions and cultural processes. The theoretical model includes a core construct of differential association theory-the learning of definitions favorable to violence-as well as arguments about cultural definitions or meanings of gender and gender differences in the role of familial controls and peer influence, which are derived from feminist theory and gender studies. It then examines how these cultural processes are conditioned by structural positions. One of the key arguments is that the violent delinquency of females is controlled through rather subtle, indirect mechanisms, while the violence of males is controlled in more direct, overt ways. The results of the empirical analysis support the the-oretical arguments, contribute to the limited understanding of the variation in violent offending among females, and explain the sources of the gender gap in violent delinquency. The article thereby allows greater understanding of the broader phenomenon of juvenile violence.     

TESTING CONTROL THEORY AND DIFFERENTIAL ASSOCIATION: A REANALYSIS OF THE RICHMOND YOUTH PROJECT DATA*

In what has become a classic work in the field, Matsueda (1982) tested control theory against differential association theory using Hirschi's (1969) Richmond Youth Project data. Matsueda found that measures of “definitions favorable to law violation” entirely mediated the effect of his social control measures and friends' delinquency, and concluded that differential association theory was supported over control theory. We note several problems with Matsueda's specification of control theory, and we reanalyze the Richmond data including measures of commitment to conventional goals and several attachment to parents variables that Matsueda excluded. We also propose and test a new method of measuring the social bond, conceptualizing the social bond as a second-order latent construct. In contrast with Matsueda's findings, we find that the social bond and friends' delinquency retain important direct effects on delinquency, and that these effects are greater than those of definitions. Thus, our results are more supportive of control theory than differential association theory.     

喀什师范学院,新疆喀什844000

贿选是当前严重危害政治民主的腐败现象。现行法律中将贿选视为破坏选举罪的行为方式之一,然而,贿选的社会危害性远不是破坏选举罪所能涵盖的。贿选与贿赂罪在罪质上具有同一性,在行为方式上具有相似性,为切实发挥法律对贿选的遏止作用,建议单独设置选举贿赂罪,并将其归之于贿赂罪这一类罪名中。     

人际关系视角中的腐败犯罪窝案现象分析

从人际关系角度解释当前腐败犯罪窝案现象意义重大。中国传统社会人际关系之形成有其自身的规律,这就使得传统社会人际关系具有一定的本土化特征,这些特征在当前的政治生活中依然发生着作用,已经成为引发腐败犯罪窝案的重要社会因素。官场内生腐败论和腐败铁三角论是学界关于腐败犯罪窝案生成机制的解释理论。从人际关系角度分析腐败犯罪窝案现象,可以发现其有两方面特点:一是权力监督难以发挥作用;二是犯罪暗数高。相应地,应该采取两方面措施预防腐败犯罪窝案的发生:一是借助网络平台、鼓励民众反腐;二是增加刑罚的严厉性、提高腐败犯罪成本。     

Bureaucrats’ corruption and competition in public administration

Competition in public administration is often advocated as a solution to bureaucrats’ corruption. However, there are no well developed analyses of how competition could succeed and the issue of its detailed design has not been carefully addressed so far. In this paper, we put forward a series of models that help understand what competition in public administration can actually accomplish. We distinguish two different shapes that corruption may take: bribery and extortion, and we demonstrate, under the usual assumption of asymmetric information as to the honesty of the bureaucrats, that while competition is effective in fighting extortion it exacerbates bribery. Given that corruption normally manifests itself simultaneously under the two different shapes, an anti-corruption policy based upon competition is bound to face a serious trade-off: trying to curb one of them through competition implies making the other worse. This result holds, with some differences, under exogenous and endogenous bureaucrats’ “honesty”. The dual aspect of corruption is probably one of the most serious—and so far largely neglected—obstacles to any effective anti-corruption policy.     

论我国贿赂犯罪体系的重构——以《联合国反腐败公约》为中心

贿赂犯罪体系是否协调、完善和科学,事关惩治和预防腐败犯罪的成败得失。我国已经正式成为《联合国反腐败公约》的缔约国,对照该《公约》的规定,我国的贿赂犯罪体系存在一定的不足。因此,在坚持科学性、系统性和可行性相统一的前提下,重构我国的贿赂犯罪体系,完善贿赂犯罪的相关规定,就显得现实和迫切。     

ADOLESCENT MARIJUANA AND ALCOHOL USE

Most tests of differential association theory focus on the basic relationships rather than the causal process specified by the theory. This study provides a more thorough test of Sutherland's differential association hypothesis by deriving and testing a causal model of alcohol and marijuana use among adolescents. The findings provide strong support for the causal process specified by differential association theory. However, two unexpected findings suggest that the theory may have to be modified to account for the differential impact of peer pressure, independent of internalized definitions, on individual behavior and for the differential impact of specific primary groups on the formation of individual definitions.     

对“明显低于或者高于市场价格”的解读——从一件受贿案谈起

交易型受贿中的"明显低于或者高于市场价格"在理论上理解不一,在实践中争议也较大。作为一种新型的受贿犯罪,交易型受贿采取表面合法的交易形式进行,具有隐蔽、复杂等特点。但其在本质上仍然具备受贿罪的共同特征即权钱交易。因此在判断"明显低于或者高于市场价格"时,应当围绕受贿罪权钱交易的本质展开,将合法的市场交易行为与交易型受贿区别开来。     

Between demand and supply: Bribery in international trade

The use of kickbacks and illicit payments to win foreign sales is eroding fair trade and undermining good governance around the world. While often seen as discrete acts by unscrupulous businesses, bribery in international trade is better seen as driven by push and pull forces larger than individual firms. Two hypotheses on the dynamics of transnational bribery are formulated and tested in this study. The demand-pull hypothesis views multinational corporations as victims of corruption in host countries and predicts a positive relationship between corruption in host countries and bribery by guest businesses. The supply-push hypothesis treats multinationals as proactive parties and proposes a positive relationship between pro-bribery conditions in exporting countries and the inclination of their multinationals to foreign bribery. Analysis of cross-national data yielded no support for the demand-pull hypothesis, but strong backing for the supply-push hypothesis. This finding validates the potential of effective bribery reduction through supply-side controls. Direct all correspondence to Hung-EnSung, The National Centeron Addiction and Sub-stance Abuseat Columbia University, 633 Third Avenue, 19th Floor, NewYork, NY 10017, USA.