伊朗核问题的大国博弈及其影响

由于特朗普政府单方面退出伊朗核问题全面协议并重启对伊强硬政策,伊朗局势在短暂平稳两年后再度升温。当前,域内外大国围绕伊朗问题激烈交锋,远超出伊朗核问题本身。地缘政治竞争构成大国博弈的中心议题,而这反映了"后美国时代"新的中东地缘政治秩序。这场博弈不仅关系到伊朗核问题全面协议的存废,也关系到海湾地区的稳定和中东地区安全秩序的重建。当前背景下,伊朗核问题的解决既取决于美伊之间的博弈,也与国际社会能否制定一个地区性集体安全解决方案密切相关。     

伊朗核问题的症结与中国的立场

近两年来,伊朗与美欧在"伊核问题"上的斗争愈演愈烈,造成海湾地区阴云密布,局势空前紧张."伊核问题"现已成为重大的国际政治斗争的焦点问题,牵动着世界主要大国的互动关系,其发展趋势将直接对中东海湾地区安全局势的发展、世界和平与发展的走向产生重大影响.     

从波斯帝国到伊斯兰共和国——地区变局下的伊朗政治体制透视

<正>经过长达12年的马拉松式谈判,7月14日,安理会五大常任理事国加德国与伊朗终于就全面解决伊核问题达成协议,消息传出后伊朗国内一片欢腾。随着悬挂在伊朗头顶的达摩克利斯之剑被移除,这个中东大国也有望走出三十余年来的发展困境,迎来其历史进程中的新篇章。     

美反伊政治与伊核问题前景

伊朗核问题和美伊关系进展,尽管更多涉及国际政治,但其重要障碍之一则是美国国内政治。除了内贾德执政的强硬伊朗时期,自霍梅尼逝世后至今的整个美伊关系更多是受美国和以色列国内政治的影响。这在2013年伊朗政治生态转向温和、伊核问题取得重大进展的背景下体现得尤其明显。以鲁哈尼当选伊朗总统、伊核第一阶段协议的签署和落实为标志,伊核问题和美伊关系显现出积极发展的态势。但这一积极进展却引发美国内反伊政治力量的更大反弹,来自美国商务部的新制裁方案和美国国内对更多制裁的激烈讨论,说明基于伊朗人质危机的反伊民意和犹太人团体的反伊游说仍是中短期内美国内反伊政治的主要来源。就现有趋势判断,反伊政治未必能够阻止第一阶段协议的落实和最终签署全面协议,但的确会成为美国取消对伊主要制裁的障碍。如果制裁不能取消,伊核问题的解决和美伊关系缓和将不具备持续下去的条件。在这一背景下,中国一方面需要继续为推动伊核问题的解决以及美伊关系适度缓和作出积极贡献,另一方面也需在发展与伊朗经济合作时持谨慎态度,特别是要充分虑及美国制裁所造成的长期消极影响。     

媒体

美国《华盛顿季刊》06/07冬季号美国对伊朗的双赢战略以往美国对伊朗的战略都没能真正推动其实现对伊政策的核心目标,布什政府目前采取的政策也不能带来希望经济制裁不能被其他大国认同,而且会遭到伊朗民众的怨恨;军事打击     

欧盟对伊朗核问题的政策困境

近年来，中东地区的热点问题此起彼伏，伊拉克战争的硝烟未尽，伊朗核问题又浮出水面。欧盟积极介入伊朗核问题的谈判进程，意在掌握中东和平进程的主导权。大国和伊朗间日趋激烈的政治博弈，使伊朗核问题大有一发牵动全局之势。欧盟对伊朗外交政策的摇摆不定，伊朗政府的强硬核立场，使得欧盟的斡旋能力大打折扣，欧盟在外交上面临进退两难的尴尬处境。     

伊朗:在抗争中寻求外交突破

伊朗曾是美国在海湾地区的重要盟友。1979年伊朗伊斯兰革命之后美伊关系迅速交恶。美国视伊朗为“无赖国家”、支持恐怖主义的国家、邪恶轴心国家，伊朗也同样视美国为最大的敌人和“大恶魔”。1980年美伊断交后，美国开始对伊朗进行经济制裁。伊朗核问题突显后，美对伊朗政策日趋强硬，不仅扩大了对伊制裁范围，还以武力相威胁。面对美国等西方国家的重压，伊朗在抗争中寻求外交突破。     

伊朗：频打核计划牌，谋求“积极安全”

伊朗核问题是当今国际社会的热点问题。自伊核问题升温以来，美国一直主张采取强制制裁方式迫使伊朗弃核，而伊朗毫不示弱，以强硬态度应对，并多次举行大规模军演示威。     

伊朗军情军力评析

围绕伊朗核问题，美伊之间的战争之弦紧绷着。美国不时发出对伊动武的言论，甚至直接调兵遣将摆出动武架势。伊朗也不甘示弱，不仅发表在核问题上的强硬立场和政策主张，而且还通过频繁的军事演习、阅兵活动以及官方声明等形式，展示伊军实力和最新的武器装备研发成果。毋庸置疑，美国拥有当今世界最强的军事实力：那么，伊朗的军事实力到底如何？一旦美伊开战，结果会是怎样的呢？     

战机、炸弹均已到位,24年后"巴比伦行动"重演? 空军司令扬言轰炸伊朗核设施--透视以色列突击伊朗核设施计划

伊朗核问题的由来伊朗的核计划开始于20世纪50年代后期。当时伊朗巴列维王朝与美国及西方国家关系密切,核技术大部分从这些国家引进。1974年伊朗开始修建核电站等核能利用项目。1988年两伊战争结束后,伊朗开始经济重建,恢复和发展核能源成为一个重要议题。1992年伊俄签署《和平利用核能协议》。1995 年初,伊俄签署俄罗斯为伊朗建造4座商业用轻水核反应堆的合同。俄罗斯从1995年10 月开始帮助伊朗在布什尔建设两座核电站以及俄为伊核电站运转提供核燃料。     

美欧军事干预利比亚对伊朗核问题的影响探析

美欧军事干预利比亚对伊朗核问题将产生如下主要影响：伊朗在核问题上的立场将更加强硬;伊朗在核问题上所遭受的现行国际经济制裁的效力将减弱;美欧将更难对伊朗在核问题上施加新的有实际意义的压力。尽管如此,美欧将会在民主、人权问题上对伊朗施加更大压力,从而间接影响伊朗核问题。     

The Iran nuclear deal: winning a little,losing a lot

Iran’s nuclear programme had for more than a decade become a controversial issue between Iran and the West; it had even threatened to develop into a military confrontation between Teheran and its arch adversary, Washington. The issue was finally resolved in an agreement, after more than a year of negotiations, between the two sides in Geneva in July 2015. This was hailed as a ‘breakthrough’ and a ‘win-win’ for both parties. It is argued here that the nuclear deal has made Iran’s nuclear programme almost inoperable, and pointed out that many members of Congress are vehemently against the deal; the next administration may not honour it or may revise it. The high costs of sanctions against Iran to the sanctioning countries are also examined, with a comparison made between the meagre concessions that Iran will get and the huge concessions that the West will receive under the deal. Furthermore, Iran has acceded to very intrusive inspection of some of its military sites. It is contended that, if the Iranians hope the agreement will soon bring about the resolution of other thorny regional and international issues that exist between Teheran and Washington, they are very likely to be disappointed.     

Iran's nuclear programme and the west

Judged by the media reports and statements by US officials in recent months, the USA is seriously considering, or at least thinking about, taking military action against Iran, if it refuses to forgo its legal right to enrich uranium for its nuclear energy programme, which Washington claims is a cover for making nuclear weapons. Iran denies the allegation. The effects of such an attack on Iranian society and the political ramifications beyond Iran's borders are discussed and analysed here. The irony of the present dispute between the West and Iran is that, for three decades up to the Iranian revolution in 1979, the Europeans and Americans helped, in fact earnestly encouraged, Iran in the development of its nuclear programme. The article explains the reasons for the failure of talks between Iran and the European trio to resolve the issue. It argues that, even if the question of Iran's nuclear programme were resolved, the 27-year conflict between the two countries would be unlikely to end in the near future. For Washington the name of the game is ‘regime change’ in Iran, either through military means or through fomenting internal chaos, hoping for implosion. But considering the political and military difficulties that Washington is experiencing in Afghanistan and Iraq, achieving either of these options is highly problematic.     

American culpability: the Bush Administration and the Iranian nuclear impasse

Drawing on the memoirs of Hassan Rowhani, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator (2003–2005) and newly elected president, this paper considers the impact of the Bush Administration's Iran policy on the internal politics of the Islamic Republic and the dynamics of its nuclear negotiation strategy. It argues that the administration had a detrimental effect on international nuclear negotiations with Iran and should be considered at least partially responsible for the current nuclear impasse. Identifying three key areas, it focuses on the administration's rejection of constructive engagement with the relatively moderate government of President Mohammad Khatami; the negative influence of the USA during Iran's nuclear negotiations with the EU3; and the administration's refusal to provide the Iranians with confidence-building incentives, or countenance unconditional nuclear talks, despite a policy change in Washington that was ostensibly multilateralist and gave the impression of directly engaging with the Iranians.     

Security dilemmas of nuclear-armed Pakistan

Pakistan's security environment has deteriorated through its adoption of a declared nuclear weapons posture in May 1998. Internal fissures have widened along regional and sectarian lines as the Pakistani economy falters, unable to sustain even limited external sanctions following decades of internal mismanagement. Tensions with India have also increased as Pakistan's security managers adopt interventionist policies, based on a misplaced belief in the deterrent value of nuclear weapons. The international community, in particular, the USA's failure to reverse South Asian nuclear proliferation, has emboldened Indian advocates of nuclear deployment. If India deploys nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, Pakistan will follow suit. Operation-ready nuclear weapons will increase the prospects of an India - Pakistan conflict that could assume a nuclear dimension. Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability will not prevent an Indian conventional attack nor will the presence of nuclear weapons deter an Indian accidental, unauthorised or preventive nuclear attack. Changed domestic and external priorities alone can buttress Pakistani security.     

Iran and Turkey: not quite enemies but less than friends

The rise and subsequent erosion of friendly relations between Iran and Turkey was a result of their regional ambitions. While Turkey had long seen its secular system as presenting an alternative to Iran’s Islamic ideology, the alignment of their regional interests facilitated a rapport between the two states in the first decade of the twenty-first century. However, the Arab Spring proved divisive for this relationship as each state sought to advocate its model of government and secure a leadership role in the Arab world. The war in Syria widened the divide, as Iran’s long-standing support for the Bashar al-Assad regime could not be reconciled with Turkey’s desire to see President Assad out of office. Using a close reading of Persian and Turkish sources, the authors will analyse the Iran–Turkey divide, focusing specifically on how the Iranians have portrayed it as a clash of civilisations, citing Turkey’s so-called ‘neo-Ottoman’ ambitions as the primary cause.     

Designing a secure Iraq: a US policy prescription

The third Western attempt at regime construction in Iraq is now underway. Western plans to rebuild the Iraqi state will fail again if they ignore the real roots of Iraqi insecurity: its geopolitical weakness. The preoccupation with designing a new constitution ignores the historical evidence of the 1930s and 1950s that it is bound to fail. Surrounded by far larger powers such as Turkey and Iran, Iraq desperately needs long‐term commitments of arms and allies. While de‐garrisoning is a vital part of the regional peace puzzle, an insecure Iraq destabilises politics in Baghdad and fuels arms competitions. Thus the USA and UK must intercede on Iraq's behalf and help to resolve the long‐standing disputes over the unfair division of the Shatt al‐Arab with Iran, and access to sea arrangements with Kuwait. If Iraq is permitted to drift away a decade after reconstruction, its regime will again fall.     

Sanctions Will Only Bolster Iranian Regime

As the US prepares new sanctions to stop Iran form obtaining a nuclear weapon, the partisans of popular sovereignty in the “green movement” continue to battle with the partisans of divine sovereignty fortified by the Revolutionary Guards. What does the “green movement” want? Will the regime be successful in crushing it? Will sanctions only bolster the clerical/military alliance instead weaken it? The first president of the Islamic Republic of Iran and several top reformist scholars address these issues.     

Will Iran Look More Like Turkey,Or Turkey Like Iran?

istanbul —The effort to forge new forms of non‐Western modernity in the Muslim world has pushed Iran into sometimes bloody civil strife while Turkey swirls with persistent rumors of military plots against the Islamist‐rooted government. The great historical question is whether, in the years to come, Iran will look more like Turkey, or Turkey like Iran?     

The Kurds in Iran: balancing national and ethnic identity in a securitised environment

The Kurdish population in Iran feels disenfranchised and excluded from the political system. Based on an original survey of Iranian Kurds, it is revealed that Kurds lack trust and confidence in the central government and do not exhibit any emotional connection with Iranian identity or the Islamic Republic of Iran. Overwhelmingly, survey respondents put their Kurdish identity and affiliations as the primary point of reference. This emotional and political disconnect with Iran poses a serious challenge to the incumbent regime. It is an affront to the official rhetoric of ethnic unity and Iranian solidarity that is reinforced by Islamic principles under the Islamic Republic of Iran. This has led the incumbent regime to opt for a security response to a clearly political challenge. However, as the survey data in this research reveals, the securitisation of Iran’s response to its Kurdish population is only widening the gap, and aggravating the situation. The securitised approach to Kurdish aspirations for inclusion and acceptance is a counterproductive strategy with significant risks for the Islamic Republic of Iran.