Why Are they Silent?

A frustrating feature in the Chinese higher educational landscape is the ubiquitous and appalling lack of student responsiveness in the classroom. Most of the explanations that have been provided for the causes of the unilateralism in the classroom discourse of Chinese higher education have placed under scrutiny various factors, from personal traits of students, such as shyness, to Confucianism. All these explanations attribute this unilateralism to, if not blame it on, the same external factor: the cultural specificity of Chinese college student. Whereas it is right to narrow the search for the causes down to the domain of culture, it does not really make much sense to simply single out parts of the Chinese culture for explanations. Instead of dwelling on specific components of the Chinese culture, the present article proposes drawing the attention to a certain functional mechanism within the culture: self-construal, which is also manifested in other cultures. It argues that the students’ minimum discourse performance in Chinese university classrooms can be understood as a result of their semi-conscious act of internal modeling, which entails confirming and reinforcing their identities based on evaluations of the situation and conforming to certain social norms that are prevalent in school. The self-construal in Chinese university classrooms perfectly reflects a kind of power imbalance between the teacher and students, which has a profound shaping force upon the students in their modeling of self-identity in regard to that of the teacher and is not conducive to students’ overall development, as it inhibits critical thinking and real academic innovation.     

Why should we care about competition?

Abstract

Most people believe that competitive institutions are morally acceptable, but that there are limits: a friendly competition is one thing; a life or death struggle is another. How should we think about the moral limits on competition? I argue that the limits stem from the value of human sociability, and in particular from the noninstrumental value of a form of social connectedness that I call ‘mutual affirmation.’ I contrast this idea with Rawls’s account of social union and stability. Finally, I show how these ideas provide the basis for a powerful argument in favour of social provisions for public goods: for example, a strong public health care system moderates the stakes in labour market competition, preventing the competition from descending into a life or death struggle.     

Why does government produce national defense?

Economists argue that government produces national defense because it is a public good, and markets fail to produce public goods optimally. This argument has two shortcomings. First, it relies on different assumptions of individual behavior in the private and public sectors. Second, it assumes that government has a comparative advantage in the production of public goods, despite evidence to the contrary. Employing the standard assumption of self-interested behavior for both private sector and public sector individuals, government has an incentive to produce national defense because by doing so it is protecting its source of income: its tax base. Incidentally, citizens benefit from the exchange of protection for tribute because their assets are protected.     

Why Is the Estate Tax so Controversial?

There are some social issues whose significance for society nobody would seriously question but which nevertheless receive only scarce attention in sociological research. One of these is the bequest of private wealth from one generation to the next. It is currently estimated that about 550 billion dollars are transferred annually in the United States, amounting to more than 4% of the American gross national product (Havens and Schervish 1999). Not only is this a huge amount of wealth that changes ownership, but the bequest of wealth speaks to some of the core questions of sociological scholarship.

Why do corporations contribute to the Nature Conservancy?

Treating corporate contributions as purchases of valuable inputs, we hypothesize that firms for which genetic diversity, advertizing, and reputations of environmental responsibility are more valuable and firms for which the cost of contributing is less will be more likely contributors to the Nature Conservancy. These hypotheses are supported by logit estimations which find firms in industries where biological inputs are important, firms with high advertizing expenditures, firms in industries with high costs of meeting environmental regulations, and large firms are more likely to contribute and so become Corporate Associates of the Nature Conservancy.     

Why Do Experienced Challengers Do Better than Amateurs?

Politically experienced challengers are more successful in seeking political office than amateurs. The relationship is found so regularly that political experience has become the standard ex ante indicator of challenger quality in studies of American elections. Despite this, little work has investigated why experienced challengers are so successful. Many scholars attribute the relationship to inherent differences between experienced challengers and amateurs: experienced challengers have stronger electoral skills and greater access to material resources. I argue that these differences play a role, but an indirect one. Rather, experienced challengers are lead by both their resource advantage and the high amount of risk they are exposed to in seeking office to run in races in which their party has a good chance of winning. Thus, the direct cause of the experienced challengers’ success is self-selection into winnable races. Empirical analysis supports the self-selection model over a model in which resources directly lead to success.

Why do people vote? An experiment in rationality

The study presents the findings of an experiment conducted during the 1993 Canadian fedeal election campaign. Students in two universities were exposed to a ten-minute presentation about the rational model of voting and the ‘paradox’ that so many people vote when it is apparently irrational on a cost-benefit basis. Our data indicate that exposure to the presentation decreased turnout in the election by seven percentage points. This result contributes to the debate abut the effect of rational-choice models on real political behavior. More important, the experimental panel data permit the presentation's effect to be decomposed, and this helps explain why people do vote. In this study, turnout was reduced mainly because the presentation diminished the respondents' sense of duty, an effect that was indirect, because there was no reference in the presentation to such motives. Framing the voting act in rational-choice terms induced some students to reconsider whether they should feel obliged to vote.     

Why decentralize decision making? English local actors' viewpoints

Decentralized decision making has created restructuring from larger to smaller administrative units, but in many places, strays little from existing arrangements. Moves toward decentralization from central government to city‐regions, and in some areas, below city‐region scale to neighborhoods, reflect a mandate for reform. What is the nature and extent of desired reforms? Using an institutionalist lens, homogeneity and heterogeneity in local narratives about possible future reform can be surfaced. This article emphasizes the importance of understanding the role of local actors' narratives in shaping decentralized institutions. This article uses the findings from a Q‐methodology study to identify and interrogate distinctive local viewpoints on attempts to decentralize decision making in England. In a systematic empirical analysis, local actors' narratives were largely in favor of relatively minor modifications to the status quo. The findings question a conflation of decentralization with participation in decision making.     

Why does bureaucratic corruption occur in the EU?

Why does bureaucratic corruption occur in the EU system? Several examples suggest that bureaucratic corruption exists and that the Commission’s anti-fraud agency, OLAF, is not a fully independent authority. We thus develop a novel interpretation of the principal-supervisor-agent model to cope with non-independent anti-fraud units. This model shows that corruption is likely to occur when the expected value to the client from bribing the agent is larger than the expected value to the principal of truth-telling by the supervisor. Overall, this analysis points to the risks of flawed incentives and the lack of institutional independence among principal, agent, supervisor and client. Our main policy recommendations as a result of these findings are that OLAF should be placed outside the Commission, and that whistleblowers should receive adequate protection.     

Why is there no Radical Right Party in Ireland?

The rise of the radical or extreme right parties in Europe – parties usually noted for strong, sometimes racist anti-immigrant ideologies – has attracted a great deal of attention in political science. Ireland, despite having some conditions favourable to the growth of such a party has no radical right party. This paper argues that that this is because the ‘space’ usually occupied by such parties – for young, poor people disaffected by economic change – is taken up by Sinn Féin, which though it has similarities to radical right parties, differs markedly in its attitudes to immigrants. It goes on to explain the special circumstances that prevent nationalist parties in Ireland from presenting overtly anti-immigrant platforms. The focus on anti-immigration and liberal economic policies for such parties may mean that other parties with strong resemblances are excluded from studies they might usefully be included.     

Why so few acting whistleblowers? Impacts of institutional anticorruption

Despite strong whistleblowing intention, very few truly act to blow the whistle. Building on a random sample of local citizens with citywide anticorruption performance indicators, this study investigated the linkages between institutional anticorruption and citizens' whistleblowing acts, both directly and indirectly via situational settings (i.e., corruption incidence and corruptive climate). The findings confirmed the impacts of varying anticorruption practices and detected both direct and indirect trajectories. More judicial convictions against senior officials directly reduced citizens' subsequent whistleblowing acts, but also indirectly invited more as they signaled more ensuing corruption incidence, with overall effects toward reduced whistleblowing. More citywide public whistleblowing incentivized more individual whistleblowing subsequently; yet, such effects were canceled out as such practices also deterred ensuing corruption incidence and indirectly reduced citizens' acts. The total effects explained why there were so few acting whistleblowers. The study concludes with discussion of research findings and potential policy implications.     

Why cooperate with others? Demystifying China's trilateral aid cooperation

This article examines China's motivations for trilateral aid cooperation in the context of its seemingly assertive diplomacy in recent years. Previously known for its preference for bilateral aid delivery, China, however, is increasingly conducting trilateral cooperation with western donor states and UN agencies. By employing constructivism and cognitive learning theories, this paper focuses on two perspectives: China's calculation of national interests and international engagement, and is structured around two case studies: UNDP's advisory role for China on development cooperation, and China–US trilateral aid cooperation. It argues that strategically, China is putting growing emphasis on its identity as a growing great power in the development sector, using trilateral cooperation to build its global image. Technically, China's four-decade long external engagement has promoted changes in its ideas about aid cooperation, thus reinforcing its desire for cognitive learning to improve its aid performance.     

Why are the affluent better represented around the world?

Scholars have discovered remarkable inequalities in who gets represented in electoral democracies. Around the world, the preferences of the rich tend to be better represented than those of the less well-off. In this paper, we use the most comprehensive comparative dataset of unequal representation available to answer why the poor are underrepresented. By leveraging variation over time and across countries, we study which factors explain why representation is more unequal in some places than in others. We compile a number of covariates examined in previous studies and use machine learning to describe which mechanisms best explain the data. Globally, we find that economic conditions and good governance are most important in determining the extent of unequal representation, and we find little support for hypotheses related to political institutions, interest groups or political behaviour, such as turnout. These results provide the first broadly comparative explanations for unequal representation.     

Why is it so hard to help central city schools?

Many states have implemented educational grant systems designed to provide more aid to school districts that are, by some standard, in greater need. Nevertheless, many if not most central city school systems continue to produce poor educational outcomes, as measured, for example, by test scores and dropout rates. Using data from New York State, this article asks why existing aid formulas fail to provide the assistance that central city school districts need to bring their educational outcomes up to reasonable standards. Two principal explanations are explored: the failure of existing aid programs to recognize the high cost of providing education in central cities and the possibility that aid simply makes central cities less efficient without raising educational outcomes. The article presents aid programs that account for costs, but shows that these revised programs will do little to help central cities without at least one politically unpopular provision, namely a large state budget or a high required local property tax rate. The article also estimates the extent to which increased aid to central cities leads to their less efficient operation, thereby undermining the objective of improved educational outcomes for central city students. The article concludes by listing the steps that a state can take to help central city schools and by discussing the yet unresolved problems that arise in helping these districts.     

Quangos—Why Bother Counting Them When Whitehall Can't?

‘Mindless’ empiricism rules in British central government, bolstered by the use of prerogative powers and the absence of any ‘court of appeal’ to insist on definitions and uniformities. This gives arguments about quangos—arm's‐length bodies—a surreal quality. The Cameron coalition has created many new quangos, while claiming a cull. Unless and until Whitehall acquires, or is forced to acquire, better habits of mind, it may be a waste of time for academics and reformers to prepare taxonomies and call for more administrative rationality.