Reinventing the Governance of Public Finances in Remote Indigenous Australia

The economies of remote Indigenous settlements are dominated by public finances. The current system of governing public finance is highly saturated, fragmented and centralised, and this has a corrosive effect on local governance capability. The political accountability of leaders to their constituents is weakened in favour of an administrative accountability ‘upwards’ to higher authorities. New Public Management reforms have promoted administrative deconcentration, over political devolution, and this has been accompanied by an influx of public servants, Non‐Government Organisations (NGOs) and private contractors, and a decline in Indigenous organisations and local government. The end result in many settlements is a marked disengagement of Indigenous people in their own governance. There is evidence of considerable political capabilities existing within local government electorates. Decentralised financing arrangements can be used to catalyse these capabilities and then address deficits in administrative and technical performance.     

Does Decentralization Improve Perceptions of Accountability? Attitudinal Evidence from Colombia

Decentralization is argued to create incentives for local and regional politicians to be more responsive and accountable to their constituents, but few studies have directly tested this claim. We use survey data from Colombia to examine individual‐level evaluations of the degree to which decentralization prompts citizens to view department government as more accountable. We estimate the effect of administrative, fiscal, and political decentralization, controlling for participation, political knowledge, confidence in government, education, and income on perceptions of accountability. Our results indicate that administrative and fiscal decentralization improve perceptions of accountability, while political decentralization does not.     

Putting the Cart before the Horse: Accountability or Performance?

Conventional wisdom argues that a good set of performance measures builds accountability and that improved accountability generates better productivity in the organisation. By way of an analysis of a case study in one inland Chinese county, this article shows that the assumed relationship between performance and accountability is more rhetoric than real. In practice, the implementation of performance measurement in local China leads to an accountability paradox, in which enhanced accountability tends to hinder the improvement of government productivity. The implementation of the Chinese target-based responsibility system risks boosting the short term accountability of public employees while undermining the long term productivity of government agencies. With the deepening of China's market-oriented reform, this choice appears to put the cart before the horse.     

Accountability for Performance in Local Government

The nature of accountability for performance in the public sector is explored in this paper by attempting to answer three questions: (1) How important is accountability for performance? (2) Which of the stakeholders consider themselves accountable for organisational performance, including contracts? (3) Does information asymmetry between stakeholders in regard to performance information affect accountability? This paper reports on research undertaken in Victorian local government based on the responses to a questionnaire by councillors and tier one and two managers. The results of the survey indicate that there is an understanding of accountability for performance, that both managers and councillors are considered to be accountable for performance but that information asymmetry and accountability relationships are problematic.     

Using Local Government Corporate Plans in Victoria

The Victorian state government has required local governments to publish their corporate plans and this paper explores the information provided by their corporate plans. These plans demonstrate diversity in the form and content, but several themes emerge. First, despite the purpose of corporate plans being to demonstrate accountability to the local community, the lack of performance targets reduces the usefulness of these plans for accountability purposes. It also explores objectives which are of major importance to the sector, such as local economic development, which is an issue difficult to control in the local area, being largely determined by federal and state policy. Other important objectives include financial and asset management together with emphases on the local community and accountability, issues which were the drivers of the state government's reform agenda. This article assists those who want to enhance the practice of corporate (strategic) planning in local government.     

Program Budgeting and Accountability in Local Government

Much has been written about program budgeting and its relevance to improved efficiency and effectiveness. However, there is little discussion about the relationship between the use of program budgeting and accountability. While, organisations using program budgeting focus on the issues of performance, the accountability of management to an elected body, such as a local council has been given little attention. In this article three questions are posed: (1) Is the performance information available to enable councillors to form a judgment about management's performance?; (2) Is management involved in determining issues of policy, such as objectives, programs and performance measurement?; and (3) Are councillors confronted by a greater volume of budgetary documentation but with no increase in time to consider it? The results show that program budgeting does not always enhance accountability in local government.     

Decentralization in Kerala: Panchayat government discretion and accountability

Kerala is regarded as one of the most decentralized states in India. Through a ‘big bang’ approach, Kerala implemented a significant fiscal decentralization program and then built the capacity of its local governments. We employ a diagnostic framework to analyze its local government discretion and accountability in political, administrative and fiscal domains. We find that Kerala's local governments have a very high degree of discretionary power accompanied by a high degree of accountability towards citizens. But the areas of administrative accountability and financial management need to be strengthened. Also there may have been excessive focus and investment on social accountability mechanisms at the cost of local government discretion and formal public sector accountability mechanisms. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Local government decision‐making—citizen participation and local accountability: some evidence from Kenya and Uganda

The current fashion for decentralisation is built on the assumption that it will result in decisions that reflect local needs and priorities. Yet representative democracy, through periodic elections, is a crude mechanism for establishing these needs and priorities. Most local government systems offer few other opportunities for citizens to participate, particularly for the poor, and few mechanisms of accountability. This article reviews the literature relating local level decision‐making, citizen participation and accountability. It then presents the findings of a study of decision‐making about the use of resources in a sample of municipal governments in Kenya and Uganda. Local governments in Kenya have traditionally offered minimal scope for citizen participation or accountability, but this is beginning to change, mainly as a result of performance conditions applied through the recently introduced Local Authorities Transfer Fund (LATF), together with an increasingly active civil society. In Uganda, which has undergone a radical decentralisation, there is much greater scope for citizen participation at the local level but there are still many of the same problems of local accountability as in Kenya. The article reviews some of the examples of, and reasons for, good (and bad) practice. It concludes that factors like committed local leadership, central monitoring of performance, articulate civil society organisations and the availability of information are critical. But even with these, there is no guarantee that decentralised decision‐making will be inclusive of the poor. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Local government discretion and accountability in Burkina Faso

Burkina Faso opted for a progressive approach to decentralization reforms, aiming at building local government capacity first before transferring responsibilities. We employ a diagnostic framework to analyze local government discretion and accountability in Burkina Faso. We find that local governments have a very low degree of discretionary power accompanied with weak accountability towards citizens at all levels. In the political and administrative spheres, the center plays a dominant role in local government affairs leaving little space for discretion. In the fiscal sphere, taxing powers are restricted, while transfers are insufficient and unpredictable, making local financial management extremely difficult. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Citizen Involvement and Performance Management in Special-Purpose Governments

Performance management and citizen participation are being used by local governments to improve government accountability and responsiveness. In some cases, local governments are integrating these two trends. One area of local government in which this trend has not been assessed is special districts. This paper uses data from a study of nine special districts in the state of Texas to fill this void. To assess citizen participation in performance management among the districts, we interviewed district managers, analyzed minutes from governing board meetings, and conducted citizen focus groups in three regions of the state. Our findings suggest that although districts may not yet be in tune with the latest performance management trends, they are making efforts to engage citizens in other ways. We recommend ways that districts can build on these experiences and more effectively incorporate citizens in the development, analysis, and reporting of performance measures.     

Effects of deregulation and performance on government accountability: Role of trust in Korea,Japan, and the United States

Public administration has been struggling to address the balance between conflicting government values. Trust in the study is employed as nodal value to reconcile modern management dilemma concerning conflicting relationships between performance and accountability and between discretion and accountability. Using 2012 International Social Survey Program data, this paper analyzed the moderator and mediator role of government trust among discretion, performance, and accountability in cases of South Korea, Japan, and the United States. This study used factor analysis and ordinary least square multiple regression analysis. The statistical results partially confirmed the hypotheses regarding the mediating and moderating role of trust: (a) the moderating effect of the trust on the relationship between performance and accountability in South Korea; (b) the moderating impact of the trust on the relationship between deregulation and accountability in Japan; and (c) when governments work well, it leads to high level of trust, in turn followed by high accountability in the United States and Japan.     

Four years of the Ghana district assemblies in operation: Decentralization,democratization and administrative performance

Ghana's District Assemblies were created in 1989 as ‘integrated’ decentralised authorities, combining oversight of deconcentrated line Ministries with the revenue powers and functions of devolved democratic local government. The frequently invoked but little studied relationships among democratisation, decentralisation and changes in the performance of government institutions are analysed on the basis of two case-study Districts, defining performance as output effectiveness, responsiveness and process acceptability. Although development output did increase after democratisation, it remained inadequate and did not show any significantly closer responsiveness to popular needs. This was mainly because local accountability was undermined by continuing central control over staffing and finances, the clash with national policies of retrenchment and the continued power of central government agents. The communal, non-party basis of representation also had a perverse effect on the ability of elected representatives to enhance the legitimacy of local taxation, particularly as the system embodied an unresolved contradiction between notions of community based self-help and representative district government. One of the lessons of the Ghanaian experience is that genuine local autonomy in an agreed area-the basic condition for effective accountability-is better based on more modest, local-level authorities, leaving larger, expensive functions as well as supervision of a deconcentrated civil service to more powerful regional administrations.     

The Challenge of Strengthening Nonprofits and Civil Society

The Winter Commission Report was centrally concerned with improving the performance of state and local governments. Since the issuance of the commission’s report in 1993, the delivery of services by state and local government has been substantially changed by the growing role of nonprofit organizations in providing public services and representing citizen interests. As a result, state and local governments and nonprofit agencies are faced with complex governance challenges. The central argument of this paper is that despite the dramatic changes in the relationship between government and nonprofit organizations in recent years, the key tenets of the Winter Commission report—the need for improved training and education, greater transparency and accountability, more emphasis on performance, and improved citizen engagement—remain deeply relevant in improving the governance of the public services in an increasingly complex policy process and service delivery system at the state and local levels.     

Performance Federalism and Local Democracy: Theory and Evidence from School Tax Referenda

Federal governments are increasingly employing empirical measures of lower‐level government performance to ensure that provincial and local jurisdictions pursue national policy goals. We call this burgeoning phenomenon “performance federalism” and argue that it can distort democratic accountability in lower‐level elections. We estimate the impact of a widely publicized federal indicator of local school district performance—one that we show does not allow voters to draw valid inferences about the quality of local educational institutions—on voter support for school tax levies in a U.S. state uniquely appropriate for this analysis. The results indicate that a signal of poor district performance increases the probability of levy failure, a substantively large and robust effect that disproportionately affects impoverished communities. The analysis employs a number of identification strategies and tests for multiple behavioral mechanisms to support the causal interpretation of these findings.     

The Government's Plans for Decentralisation and Localism: A Progress Report

This article assesses progress on the coalition government's ambitious agenda for decentralisation and localism against six actions set out in the government's own guide to decentralisation. It critically examines the government's case that the previous government's centralised approach failed. The six actions cover reducing bureaucracy, community empowerment, more local control of public funding, provider diversification, more public scrutiny and stronger local accountability. The paper concludes that accountability is the most challenging and that progress is hampered by tensions between the actions and between government departments. It argues that the government needs a clearer, shared vision for localism going forward.     

Politics of E‐Government: E‐Government and the Political Control of Bureaucracy

This case study reports an innovative e‐government experiment by a local government in Seoul, South Korea—Gangnam‐gu. A new local political leadership in Gangnam made strategic use of e‐government applications to exert greater political control over the local civil service bureaucracy. The authors find that e‐government applications possess political properties that can be applied effectively by the political leadership as instruments to improve control over the government bureaucracy as well as to enhance essential government accountability and transparency. The political circumstances underlying e‐government development as well as its impact on local government are reported, along with key variables associated with this innovation and directions for future research.     

The Partisan Origins of Economic Perceptions in a Weak Party System: Evidence from South Korea

Political Behavior - While political accountability requires that voters can form an accurate picture of government performance, public evaluations of government performance in established...     

WHAT SHAPES CITIZENS' EVALUATIONS OF THEIR PUBLIC OFFICIALS' ACCOUNTABILITY? EVIDENCE FROM LOCAL ETHIOPIA

In this article, we study which institutional factors shape citizens' views of the local accountability of their public officials. Our departing assumption is that evaluations of local accountability reflect not only citizens' poltical attitudes and beliefs but also whether local institutions contribute to an environment of mutual trust, accountability and ultimately democratic legitimacy. Combining public opinion data from a large‐N citizen survey (N = 10 651) with contextual information for 63 local governments in Ethiopia, we look at access to information, participatory planning and the publicness of basic services as potential predictors of citizens' evaluations of local public officials. Our findings suggest that local context matters. Jurisdictions that provide access to information on political decision making are perceived to have more accountable officials. Moreover, when local governments provide public fora that facilitate citizens' stakes in local planning processes, it positively affects citizens' evaluations of the accountability of their officials. Our study adds to the empirical literatrure by showing that establishing local institutions that can foster citizen–government relations at the local level through inclusive processes is crucial for improving public perceptions of accountability. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

From Measurement to Management: Breaking through the Barriers to State and Local Performance

The Winter Commission’s aspirations for improvement of governance at the state and local level resulted in proposals to modernize public institutions and systems to remove the barriers on executive and managerial authority to act. Improving government performance and accountability to citizens requires leadership to empower employees by reducing rules, increasing discretion, and rewarding innovation. The performance measurement movement and its related performance management movement are public management trends of wide influence in state and local government that are both an adjunct to, and a reflection of those aspirations. Case studies of cities that have sought to develop and use performance measurement and engage citizens demonstrate great potential to improve governance and manage for results that citizens want. But even exemplary jurisdictions face challenges using evidence‐based, data‐driven performance management approaches. Promoting best practice requires better scholarship to understand the determinants of successful implementation, adoption, and use of performance measurement. The outcomes of performance management systems are generally unmeasured and little is known about their cost effectiveness or endurance over time. The promise is there, but our expectations should be tempered.     

The Impact of Funding Modalities on the Performance of Indigenous Organisations

Governments’ choice of funding modality can produce powerful incentives for organisations to perform in preferred ways, but it can also divert limited resources, narrow accountability, and undermine capability. Through literature review and interviews, the research explored the international literature on public finance management in developing country contexts, and compared this to case studies of Indigenous organisations. The situation in Australia was found to differ in three ways: (1) performance indicators are imposed, rather than negotiated; (2) few existing public funding modalities reward performance or provide incentives; and (3) funding arrangements do not generally require receiving organisations to be accountable to their constituents. Stability and durability of funding modalities, and clarity in functions and jurisdictional boundaries, were also found to positively influence performance. Further research is required to design new performance frameworks that build around the organisation, rather than the grant, with indicators of governance capability and downward accountability to constituents.