ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY,EXTERNAL REGULATION AND PUBLIC SERVICE PERFORMANCE

We test the separate and joint effects of strategy and regulation on public service performance. Strategy is measured as the extent to which service providers are prospectors, defenders and reactors. Regulation is assessed on the basis of the number of inspection events and service managers’ perceptions of the supportiveness of regulators. We find that, controlling for prior performance and the level of service expenditure, prospecting is a more successful strategy than defending or reacting. In addition, inspection events generally disrupt the relationship between strategy and performance, but regulation that is supportive reinforces this relationship. The evidence suggests that the impact of organizational strategies in the public sector is contingent on the characteristics of regulatory regimes.     

MECHANISMS AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM: ITALIAN CASES OF BETTER REGULATION AND DIGITALIZATION

This article applies a processual approach to the explanation of administrative reform in Italy over fifteen years. By carrying out a comparison between better regulation and digitalization policies it shows that the oscillation in the level of implementation over time and across policies can be explained by the intensity and direction of spillover and certification mechanisms and that in turn these mechanisms are activated by design features and contextual factors at different levels of analysis.     

REGULATION AS SOCIAL POLICY: HOME EVICTIONS AND REPOSSESSIONS IN THE UK AND SWEDEN

This article asks how the UK and Sweden regulate, prevent, or mitigate the consequences of mortgage‐related household eviction and repossession. Contrary to initial expectations, the findings show a growth and diversity in both regulation and social spending in the UK intended to address this social issue; something that has not occurred in Sweden. In the UK's liberal ‘regulatory welfare regime’, the aim is to prevent the eviction and repossession of vulnerable borrowers who have defaulted on their housing loan. In the Swedish social democratic ‘regulatory welfare regime’, effort focuses instead on minimizing the risk of default before it occurs rather than after the fact. These findings offer a more nuanced understanding of the relations between regulation and welfare more generally, demonstrating that regulation may be used as a form of social policy once the welfare state has failed, as a safety net of last resort.     

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION: INTERESTS, IDEOLOGY, VOTERS, AND THE UK REGULATION OF RAILWAYS ACT 1844

Government regulation of the railways in the United Kingdom dates back to the 1840s. Between 1840 and 1844 three regulatory Acts were passed, and a system of government inspection set up which has remained substantially unaltered to the present day. The principal Act, that of 1844, contained controversial powers of rate-capping, state purchase of railways, and detailed price and quantity regulation. It is still frequently held that the Victorian era marked the triumph of laissez-faire and that W. E. Gladstone, the promoter of the 1844 Act, was one of its leading spokesmen. The article therefore explores why regulation occurred at all and why it took the forms it did. Gladstone's actions are evaluated in relation to the standard hypotheses about the origins of regulation. Hypotheses on the motives of MPS voting for and against regulation are tested using the Aydelotte dataset which contains very full personal and ideological data on the Mps of the Parliament of 1841–7.     

BETTER REGULATION IN EUROPE: BETWEEN PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AND REGULATORY REFORM

Can the European regulatory state be managed? The European Union (EU) and its member states have looked at better regulation as a possible answer to this difficult question. This emerging public policy presents challenges to scholars of public management and administrative reforms, but also opportunities. In this conceptual article, we start from the problems created by the value‐laden discourse used by policy‐makers in this area, and provide a definition and a framework that are suitable for empirical/explanatory research. We then show how public administration scholars could usefully bring better regulation into their research agendas. To be more specific, we situate better regulation in the context of the academic debates on the New Public Management, the political control of bureaucracies, evidence‐based policy, and the regulatory state in Europe.     

DEFYING THE COMMISSION: CREATIVE COMPLIANCE AND RESPECT FOR THE RULE OF LAW IN THE EU

This article investigates how and to what extent member states comply with EU obligations in terms of process and outcome. The aim is to demonstrate how norm‐conform behaviour unfolds, or fails to unfold, in an interaction between a member state and the European Commission. The empirical focus is on recent rule of law crises in France, Hungary and Romania. The argument is that member states engage in symbolic and/or creative compliance, designed to create the appearance of norm‐conform behaviour without giving up their original objectives. The cases illustrate that creative and symbolic compliance strategies may be successfully employed by member states because they enable the Commission to disengage from conflicts it judges too costly and yet maintain its credibility, and are conditioned by the visibility of failure to change facts on the ground. The implication is that, at times, not only is compliance symbolic, but also to some extent is enforcement.     

POWER, STRATEGY AND GAMES: ECONOMIC REGULATION OF A PRIVATIZED UTILITY

This article rejects conventional 'rational actor' models of economic regulation in favour of a focus on processes of resource exchange and dependence. Using a case-study of Yorkshire Water it identifies the membership and structure of the regulatory arena, the resources available to regulatory actors, the 'rules of the game', and the strategies adopted by regulator and regulated. It highlights the structurally privileged position of investors in water regulation and concludes that decision-making excludes customer interests; decisions are made by professional actors on the basis of co-operation and consensus; the regulator is relatively weak and depends on companies compliance to maintain its own legitimacy; and large companies have a great range of strategic options in pursuit of regulatory advantage.     

EU LEGISLATION AND NATIONAL REGULATION: UNCERTAIN STEPS TOWARDS A EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY

The EU with its supranational powers is a unique institution. Contrary to other international organizations, it can make laws that are binding to its member governments as well as to their citizens and enterprises. However, reviewing the literature, we find little consensus as to its true role as a lawmaker. This article and the articles that follow in this symposium remedy this empirical deficiency. The present article presents a comprehensive analysis of the scope of binding EU regulation. The EU is presented as an important lawmaker. It has, with considerable effectiveness, been able to overcome recurrent crises that have often called its very viability into question. But the same analysis also reveals that the EU, in spite of several treaty reforms expanding its responsibilities into new policy areas, remains a predominantly economic regulator. Finally, EU lawmaking is to an increasing extent delegated to the European Commission, dedicated to the de facto task of maintaining the internal market. Although this article and the articles that follow it cover the present, and refer to the European Union (EU), the EU, since its creation in the 1950s, has changed its official name several times.     

LAW,LEGITIMACY, AND EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE. FUNCTIONAL PARTICIPATION IN SOCIAL REGULATION

LAW, LEGITIMACY, AND EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE. FUNCTIONAL PARTICIPATION IN SOCIAL REGULATION
Stijn Smismans
Oxford University Press, 2004, 519 pp., £60 (hb) ISBN: 0199270309     

REGULATION BY COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS

Executive Order 12291 requires that all US federal executive agency regulations should pass a cost-benefit test before promulgation. The Reagan Administration's procedures for implementing the Order are described and the strengths and problems of using cost-benefit analysis to restrain and reform regulation are examined. The article then goes on to examine the feasibility of introducing a similar cost-benefit approach in Britain. It is concluded that, apart from the inherent practical and administrative difficulties of using cost-benefit, its introduction would pose special problems. Radical changes would have to be made in British central administration, in judicial training and attitudes and in regulatory law if cost-benefit testing was to be used in anything other than an ad hoc form.     

INDEPENDENT REGULATORY BODIES AND IMPOSSIBLE JOBS: THE FAILURE OF GERMAN PUBLIC SERVICE BROADCASTING REGULATION

This case study takes the rise and fall of licence fee indexation within German public service regulation as an example and traces mechanisms of re‐politicization of independent regulatory agencies (IRAs). According to the evidence, agency contestation is likely when: (1) administrative cultures result in incoherencies in institutional design; (2) IRAs deal with redistribution; (3) conflicts about principles of regulation persist; (4) IRAs pursue one particular regulatory ideology; (5) controversial regulatory output is highly visible; and (6) affected interests are not given a say. The article points to the relevance of new regulatory technologies that are likely to embody regulatory bias. Moreover, it seems that successful contestation of IRAs requires the conjunction of escalating factors. Nevertheless, such contestation might not result in a return to old modes of command and control.     

STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT IN PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION: CONNECTING TECHNICAL EXPERTISE AND LAY KNOWLEDGE IN RISK MONITORING

The exclusive position of scientific expertise in pharmaceutical regulation is being increasingly challenged. Several authors suggest that lay knowledge could play a role in governing risks. We use the literature to develop ideal‐typical regulatory arrangements with low and high lay stakeholder involvement: a technocratic and a democratic arrangement. We propose that a more technocratic arrangement will yield a better process and output performance while a more democratic arrangement will result in more stakeholder satisfaction. These propositions are explored through two case studies of pharmaceutical regulation in the Netherlands: in pandemic influenza and in HIV. Our study shows equivalent process and output performances but we found indications that the democratic approach results in more stakeholder satisfaction. We conclude that in pharmaceutical regulation, there is no a priori reason to limit involvement to experts: in situations of fundamental uncertainty, democratic monitoring of pharmaceutical risks can contribute to the system's robustness.     

ASSESSING POLICY DIVERGENCE: HOW TO INVESTIGATE THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN A LAW AND A CORRESPONDING REGULATION

Policy designs are selected to achieve specific policy outcomes. The policy process, however, contains multiple junctures when a policy's design may diverge from its original intents. Despite this fact, few theoretically valid and methodologically reliable approaches exist to assess policy divergence as it occurs during the policy process. This article presents a method for assessing policy divergence during implementation with a comparative analysis of a legislative law and corresponding regulation. The case analysed is US organic food policy in the 1990 Organic Foods Production Act and 2002 National Organic Program regulation. The article draws theoretical leverage from Mazmanian and Sabatier's implementation framework and methodological leverage from the institutional analysis and development framework. The analysis indicates that the designs of both policies are fairly robust with relatively minor divergence. The conclusion discusses the gains and challenges in developing a comparative approach to studying policy designs and assessing policy divergence.     

THE CONDITIONS FOR HEALTH AND SOCIAL CARE POLICY: ROUTINES AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE DUTCH CASE OF NEED ASSESSMENT

By focusing on institutions (rules for action) and routines (patterned behaviour) our intention is to contribute to the understanding of government policy and its outcomes in health and social care. We analysed data to show how the relationship between a new idea for a routine and new rules from the government on the one hand, and existing rules and routines in society on the other, as well as the interaction between rule makers and rule takers (i.e. those who are governed by those rules), have an impact on the change or maintenance of routines. The data concern the case of government policy for need assessment (that is, assessment of needs) in The Netherlands. As our discussion will show, even a national government, however, is not able to completely impose its will on other agents in order to change existing routines. The concept of ‘negotiated order’ helps us to understand why. In the case reported here, the Dutch government and the home care agencies had to exercise give and take, the outcome being a suboptimal result for both.     

PUBLIC VALUE CREATION BY CROSS‐SECTOR COLLABORATIONS: A FRAMEWORK AND CHALLENGES OF ASSESSMENT

This article proposes ways to assess the public value that cross‐sector collaborations produce. It introduces a framework featuring three dimensions of public value – democratic accountability, procedural legitimacy, and substantive outcomes – that reflect distinct priorities and concerns for public administration. Utilizing examples from research on a multi‐year cross‐sector collaboration in the transportation field, we illustrate the framework's application and identify techniques and challenges for assessing the collaborative creation of public value. The article concludes with questions and propositions to guide future research.     

POLITICAL PRESSURES,ORGANIZATIONAL IDENTITY,AND ATTENTION TO TASKS: ILLUSTRATIONS FROM PRE‐CRISIS FINANCIAL REGULATION

Regulatory agencies, like most public organizations, typically operate with multiple tasks and goals, which requires them to prioritize some tasks over others. Such prioritization, while essential, engenders a risk of bureaucratic oversight of significant material problems. Despite the ubiquity and importance of these concerns, our understanding of agencies' allocation of attention across tasks is limited. This article develops a model of agencies' allocation of attention across tasks, which involves an interaction between external public and political pressures and agencies' distinct organizational identities. A brief comparison between two cases of pre‐crisis financial regulation illustrates the proposed model. The two cases suggest that the British Financial Services Authority's and the Israeli Supervisor of Banks' distinct identities conditioned their responses to similarly vigorous pressures to devote more attention to firms' alleged mistreatment of their customers, with important implications for these regulators' attention to firms' capitalization and liquidity.