A distributive N-amendment game with endogenous agenda formation

In this paper I analyze a 3-person voting game in which players sequentially choose amendments to a bill and then vote sophisticatedly on the resulting agenda. This game differs from previous work on endogenous agenda formation in that the number of items on the agenda is not fixed. Players keep making proposals until they can do no better. I find that there is a nonempty set of minimax equilibrium outcomes to the game, and that this set contains the simple von Neumann–Morgenstern stable set.     

Analyzing Greens in power: Setting the agenda

Abstract.  What are the key questions that political scientists investigating Green parties in government have to address? What are the possible contributions of a variety of theories and approaches to the explanation of the Green governmental experience, in a cross-national context? The international experience with Green party governmental participation is reviewed, followed by a discussion of past work and future challenges to explain Green parties' entry into government, their performance in government, the impact of government on them, and the conditions for their survival in or exit from government.     

The new agenda of the ACLU

He is author of The Politics of the American Civil Liberties Unionpublished by Transaction. This article is adapted from a delivery the author made to the Washington Legal Foundation; research was supported by a grant from J. M. Foundation.     

Toward a positive theory of coalition formation and endogenous instrumental choice in global pollution control

The paper analyzes the coalition formation process in a global emission game with asymmetric countries where the number of signatories, the abatement target and the policy instrument are chosen simultaneously. Exemplarily, a uniform emission reduction quota and an effluent charge are considered. Stability is analyzed in a supergame framework by applying the concept of coalition-proofness. The analysis also considers the impact of impatient agents, restricted and simple punishment profiles. Two main results may be mentioned: First, paradoxically, IEAs achieve only little (if signed at all) if the externality problem is distinct. Second, our model helps to explain the frequent appearance of emission quotas in international pollution control despite the recommendations by economists to use market-based instruments like effluent charges.     

Voter perceptions of agenda power and attribution of responsibility for economic performance

In two recent experiments (one in the lab and one over the internet) concerning collective decision making we determined that individuals mainly assign responsibility to the decision maker with agenda power and with the largest vote share (Duch et al., 2012). We found rather weak evidence that responsibility is assigned to decision makers with veto power or allocated proportional to weighted voting power. Our conjecture then is that individuals in our online experiment who recognized the importance of proposal power in the embedded experiment will be those more likely to exercise an economic vote for the Conservative PM Party (since they are the agenda setter in the governing coalition) and for the opposition Labour Party. The conjecture is confirmed. Essentially, the data show that economic voting at the individual level is confined to individuals who understand the value of proposal power. This in turn suggests that the economic vote itself is motivated by a coherent attempt to punish or reward parties that actually deserve it in the specific sense that they were mostly responsible for choosing the policies that were implemented. Further, the strong reliance on proposal power as the workhorse of this mechanism of accountability, tells us that simple heuristics can do a lot of the work that cold rationality and complex calculation have done in much of the previous discussion of economic voting.     

A model of candidate location with endogenous valence

This work gives a theoretical explanation for the increase in campaign spending and party polarization in U.S. politics. I assume that the effectiveness of persuasive advertising, and of costly valence campaigning in general, positively depends on the share of nonpartisan voters. A decline in the number of partisan voters in a constituency results in greater campaign spending by the candidates. If the voters are risk-averse, the candidates who maximize their expected office rents minus the cost of campaigning will choose divergent policy platforms strategically in order to reduce the costs of subsequent campaign spending. The degree of policy divergence positively depends on the share of nonpartisan voters for a broad class of voter disutility and candidate cost of valence functions.     

论大学内部权力结构的形成机制

大学内部权力结构的研究渐渐引人关注，本文通过封中外大学权力理论谱系的分析，重新建耩了基于社会契约论和权力让渡理论的大学内部权力结构。大学内部的行政权力主要来源于学术权力、市场权力和政府权力（政党权力）的让渡，这些权力通过政治上的博弈最终形成一股合力，支配大学组织行政职权体系的构成和运行；而大学行政权力属于衍生权力，它是对这股政治合力的执行，其具体表现为行政职权。     

Policy termination in mental health: The hidden agenda

Three policy termination objectives can be analyzed in the field of mental health: the move to phase-down, and in some instances close, large state institutions for the mentally disabled; the elimination in some states of indefinite involuntary commitment procedures; and the attempt to transfer responsibility for the provision of direct services from the state level to local government and/or private providers of care. Initiatives in these areas have come from the executive, the legislature, consumer organizations, and most recently from the public interest law community through the use of litigation. Termination in this field, however, has met with increasing resistance because of the failure in many instances to pair these objectives with positive program development. In some states, the result has been the dismantling of one system without the commitment of resources necessary to encourage the development of an alternative system.     

The economically active population in the 1980 census. Critical commentaries and a proposal for adjustment

The authors first discuss inconsistencies in census data concerning the economically active population of Mexico, especially in the 1980 census. They then give their reasons for believing that correction of these inconsistencies is necessary. Finally, they present their proposals for adjusting the census data to rectify these inconsistencies.     

Persuasion,power and the conversational model

Several lines of study in the humanities and social sciences have drawn on the systematic analysis of the craft of persuasion given by texts in the rhetorical tradition. This review considers the usefulness of this tradition to a critical approach to relations between discourse and power. The books under review use rhetoric in literary study, in social psychology, and in studies of argument in a variety of social sciences, with varying degrees of success. I argue that rhetoric cannot provide a general methodology or basis for a political critique, but is can be useful if studies take into account the institutions in which discourse takes place, the conflicts constituting these institutions, and the excluded participants. Judging from the books under review, applications of the rhetorical tradition work best when they remain close to the practical problems of persuasion in a specific situation.     

The challenge ahead: the state agenda for the coming years

The mid-1990s promise to be extremely challenging years as state leaders and institutions struggle to bring accountability and predictability back into their political systems. Faced with continuing budgets troubles, increasing demands for services and a shift of responsibility from the federal to the state level, the American states will be hard pressed to satisfy constituent needs or improve state services. However, the tough times may result in long-term improvement in state government, as administrators streamline agencies, legislators trim inefficient or redundant programs and state leaders generally seek new and cost effective solutions to social and economic problems.     

National interest versus the common good: The Presidency in European Council agenda setting

The European Council is an institution which brings together the Heads of State, or Governments of the European Union (EU) Member States. For the Presidency, preparing the agenda of European Council meetings involves a tension between loyalties. Existing research is divided over the question whether the Presidency pushes its domestic policy agenda on the EU level. Using empirical data on the Conclusions of European Council meetings, and national executive speeches presented annually in five Member States, this article investigates the relationship between the policy agendas of the EU and its constituent countries. It tests whether national issue attention of the Presidency holder dominates the European Council agenda. The findings suggest that having the Presidency does not provide a de facto institutional advantage for agenda setting power for any of the countries in the sample. The analysis points out that normative and political constrains limit the leeway of presiding Member States to push for domestic agenda preferences in the European Council.     

Connecting models of the individual and policy change processes: a research agenda

Policy Sciences - This article proposes that closer attention to models of the individual provides substantial theoretical and empirical leverage to policy studies scholars. Capturing the nuances...