Democratization,International Knowledge Institutions,and Global Governance

The central problem of democracy has long been theorized as how to place appropriate constraints on the responsible exercise of power. Today, this problem is most acute in global governance. This article examines the rapid rise in the creation of international knowledge institutions, arguing that these institutions reflect a growing effort by nations and publics to assert democratic constraints on the on the global exercise of power through their ability to structure processes of reasoning and deliberation in global society. Specifically, the article argues for the need to attend carefully to processes of knowledge‐making in international institutions, including the roles of international institutions in setting standards for the exercise of reasoning, their contributions to the making of global kinds through their work in classifying and reclassifying the objects of international discourse, and through their roles in opening up and constraining participation in international deliberation. The article concludes that the construction and deployment of policy‐relevant knowledge are a significant source of power in their own right in global governance that need to be subject to their own democratic critique.     

Rule-takers,rule-makers,or rule-promoters? Turkey and Mexico's role as rising middle powers in global economic governance

Rising middle powers play increasingly active international roles, yet so far we lack systematic analyses of their aspirations and impact on global economic governance. This paper addresses this gap. I argue that the role that rising middle powers assume in global economic governance depends on the degree of alignment of their regulatory preferences with those of established powers, and on the strength of their regulatory institutions. If their preferences are aligned and they develop high regulatory capacity in an issue area, they will aspire to promote existing global rules in their own region. They will engage in regional rule-promotion because of growing economic ties to their region, and also because their regulatory agencies are socialized into these rules within transgovernmental networks. I explore these arguments empirically through case studies of two rising middle powers, Turkey and Mexico, in the global governance of competition law and policy.     

国家与国际组织互动关系的“委托-代理”解释框架

在百年未有之大变局叠加新型冠状病毒肺炎疫情的冲击下,作为全球治理主干的众多国际组织面临着深度调整。在这一背景下,厘清主权国家与国际组织的互动机理,深入研究并思考中国应如何主动介入和引导国际组织的变革,已经成为具有重要战略价值的课题。与长期以来主导国际组织研究的主流国际政治理论不同,源于经济学的“委托-代理”理论为分析成员国与国际组织之间的复杂关系和互动逻辑提供了启发性视角。在国家与国际组织复杂的“委托-代理”模型下,国际组织的行为与政策偏好将综合取决于成员国、成员国在国际组织内部的代表、国际组织的秘书处和行政首长等主要行为体在国际组织的决策过程中处于什么位置以及能够施加多大影响。这为我们更全面地认识国际组织,提升我国在国际组织中的影响力与话语权带来了启示。     

The Institutionalization of Private Governance: How Business and Nonprofit Organizations Agree on Transnational Rules

This article assesses the recent trend of cooperation among antagonistic private actors that results in the creation and implementation of issue-specific transnational norms and rules and the subsequent shift from public to private forms of governance. Many political scientists agree that authority also exists outside of formal political structures. Private actors increasingly begin to make their own rules and standards that acquire authority beyond the international system. This observation is often referred to as private transnational governance as opposed to public or international governance. Although the concept of private governance gains prominence in academic debates, it is not clear how private governance on the global scale is constructed and maintained or what specific or general conditions are necessary for private governance to emerge. Based on the review of common theoretical propositions, this article develops an integrated model along which the necessary conditions for the emergence of private governance can be assessed and understood. As most research has hitherto focused on institutionalized cooperation between business actors (self-regulation), this article takes a closer look at those transnational systems of rule that result out of the enhanced cooperation between profit and nonprofit actors (coregulation).     

Power transitions and global trade governance: The impact of a rising China on the export credit regime

The existing liberal international economic order was constructed during the era of American hegemony and has been heavily shaped by US power. How is the rise of China affecting global economic governance? This article analyzes the case of export credit, which has long been considered a highly effective international regulatory regime and an important component of global trade governance. I show that the rise of China is profoundly altering the landscape of export credit and undermining its governance arrangements. State-backed export credit is a key tool of China's development strategy, yet I argue that an explosion in China's use of export credit is eroding the efficacy of existing international rules intended to prevent a competitive spiral of state subsidization via export credit. The case of export credit highlights a fundamental tension between liberal institutions of global governance and the development objectives of emerging powers.     

From rule-taker to rule-promoting regulatory state: South Korea in the nearly-global competition regime

When rapid economic growth catapults a country within a few years from the margins of the global economy to middle power status, does global regulatory governance need to brace for a challenge to the status quo? To answer this question, we extend the power transition theory of global economic governance to middle powers: A rising middle power should be expected to challenge the international regulatory status quo only if increasing issue-specific strength of its regulatory state coincides with preferences that diverge from the preferences of the established powers, which are enshrined in the status quo. We examine this argument empirically, focusing on South Korea in the realm of competition law and policy. We find that South Korea, a non-participant in the international competition regime until the 1980s, developed in the 1990s substantial regulatory capacity and capability and thus “spoiler potential.” At the same time, however, its policy preferences converged upon the norms and practices established by the United States and the European Union, albeit with some distinct elements. Under these conditions, we expect a transition from rule-taker to rule-promoter. We find that South Korea has indeed in recent years begun to actively promote well-established competition law and policy norms and practices – supplemented by its distinct elements – through technical assistance programs, as well as various bilateral channels and multilateral institutions. The findings suggest that the power transition theory of global economic governance is usefully applicable to middle powers, too.     

Even clubs can’t do without legitimacy: Why the anti‐money laundering blacklist was suspended

This article uses the case of anti‐money laundering regulation to investigate international club organisations’ efforts to secure compliance with their rules. As these rules can hardly claim much legitimacy, one would expect that they are complied with only if the club organisation uses side‐payments or coercion. Indeed, the Financial Action Task Force against Money‐Laundering (FATF), the international standard setter in that field, has used blacklisting to force non‐members into compliance. But although it had greatly improved compliance, the blacklist was suspended again after a short period of time. Why? This article argues that this was due to allegations of the blacklist being illegitimate. The FATF reacted by withdrawing the blacklist and also by engaging in various legitimatory practices, because even club organisations need legitimacy if they want to achieve results. Only if the rules are considered legitimate, will there be actual, and not just formal compliance. Hence this article denies the existence of a dilemma between legitimacy and effectiveness (the conventional view), suggesting that only legitimate rules can be effective.     

Enlargement,Institution-Building and the EU's Administrative Capacity Requirement

Does the EU governance of the Central and Eastern European candidate states unleash a process of Europeanisation? It is argued here that the current enlargement has generated its own mode of governance, characterised by asymmetry and conditionality. Enlargement governance has recently focused on developing administrative capacity or 'institution-building', defined as the creation of institutions necessary for the adoption and implementation of the acquis communautaire. This article examines horizontal administrative reform and attempts to define the conditions determining the success or failure of the EU's efforts in institution-building. The absence of common EU rules and norms, and the variation of domestic preferences about administrative reform, lead to varying degrees of success in administrative institution-building.     

The Impact of Funding Modalities on the Performance of Indigenous Organisations

Governments’ choice of funding modality can produce powerful incentives for organisations to perform in preferred ways, but it can also divert limited resources, narrow accountability, and undermine capability. Through literature review and interviews, the research explored the international literature on public finance management in developing country contexts, and compared this to case studies of Indigenous organisations. The situation in Australia was found to differ in three ways: (1) performance indicators are imposed, rather than negotiated; (2) few existing public funding modalities reward performance or provide incentives; and (3) funding arrangements do not generally require receiving organisations to be accountable to their constituents. Stability and durability of funding modalities, and clarity in functions and jurisdictional boundaries, were also found to positively influence performance. Further research is required to design new performance frameworks that build around the organisation, rather than the grant, with indicators of governance capability and downward accountability to constituents.     

Representation,Participation or Deliberation? Democratic Responses to the Environmental Challenge

The environmental question poses four challenges to democracy: global justice, intergenerational justice, the value of non-human species and technocratic decision-making. This article discusses these challenges in the light of three values or dimensions of democratic theory: representativity, participation and deliberation. It is found that even, if participation and deliberation by a broad set of actors are crucial to integrate democratic decision-making and environmental concern, there is also a need for representative institutions at all levels of society. The democracy–environment relation is not just about values and ideas. It also requires global, international, regional, national and local institutions armed with power resources.     

Subnational participation in extra-national policy solutions: Kitakyushu City as an intermediate agent in policy coordination

The growing challenges of environment and sustainable development stretch across scales of geographic space and require action at multiple levels of jurisdictions, such as individual level, community level, national level, and global level. Multilevel governance and cross-scale coordination will open up opportunities for a variety of stakeholders to participate in decision-making. While potentially increasing the capacity of governance, the cross-scale and multilevel approaches may face a difficulty in policy coordination created by the plurality of stakeholders and be attended with organizational complexity. This article will examine the potential of subnational participation to make a policy choice, mediated by local governments, to be congruent with global strategies and national mandates in a consistent way. To this end, it will bring a new perspective to Kitakyushu City's experience in Japan as a heuristic test case study. My claim is that subnational actors occupy a strategic position to straddle the division between state and society, between the center and the periphery, and between the domestic and the foreign so they can act as an intermediate agent in reconnecting local action with national policy and turning global strategies into local action for problem solving.     

Norm subsidiarity and institutional cooperation: explaining the straits of Malacca anti-piracy regime

Abstract

Given competing interests among the three littoral states of Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, what explains the nature and timing of their cooperative arrangement in combating maritime piracy in the Straits of Malacca in the post-2004 period? This observation is especially puzzling because the material and strategic interests of these actors generally did not change during the time period that witnessed increased cooperation. We argue that key developments of the anti-piracy regime in the Straits of Malacca cannot be fully explained by rationalist approaches, which traditionally stresses material and national interests of states. By critically engaging constructivist approaches, this paper posits that Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia engaged in a process of norm subsidiarity. Through norm subsidiarity, relatively weak states get together to develop their own rules to prevent their exclusion or marginalization from institutions of global governance by more powerful actors. The littoral states engaged norm subsidiarity to resist extra-regional attempts to manage piracy in the Straits of Malacca. These extra-regional security proposals triggered a powerful regional cognitive prior, providing the impetus for an indigenous response, leading consequently to a collective cooperative effort to deal with the threat of piracy.     

Explaining Chief Executive Empowerment: EU Summitry and Domestic Institutional Change

One of the most prominent trends in the organisation of European parliamentary democracies is the empowerment of chief executives. This article submits that an important reason contributing to this development is summit decision-making in the European Union, which requires states to confer additional authority, discretion and resources on chief executives. The effects are long-term shifts in the domestic institutional balance of power between the executive and the legislature, as well as within the executive branch. The explanatory power of this argument is tested through a case study of chief executive empowerment in Sweden, as well as comparative qualitative evidence from a broader set of European states. The findings carry implications for research on the presidentialisation of politics, the domestic implications of international cooperation, and the Europeanisation of EU member countries.     

全球治理视阈下我国外交的应对方略

全球治理是应对全球化的一种反应,它的出现是对传统国际关系的挑战。全球治理已是不可逆转的历史趋势,它给中国的内政外交带来了难以估量的冲击和影响。我国外交必须制定出应对方略:坚持"发展中国家"的属性与定位,统筹协调好大国关系,打牢同发展中国家互信合作的基础,推进周边区域治理,开展好公共外交,善用并倚重各种全球治理平台,参与全球化,推进全球治理。     

Globalization and the future of the nation state

This article addresses the issue of whether the nation state has a future as a major locus of governance in an increasingly ‘globalized’ economic and social system. It begins by considering the development of the sovereign state and argues that international agreements between states were important in establishing the power of the state over society. It goes on to consider the changing capacities of the state in the modern world. Extreme versions of the 'globalization' thesis are then challenged, and it is argued that national-level economic processes remain central and that the international economy is far from ungovernable. Major nation states have a pivotal role to play in creating and sustaining such governance. However, their role is less than as autonomous national macro-economic managers, than as agencies that are representative of their populations and sources of legitimacy for new forms of governance. The central function of the nation state is that of distributing and rendering accountable powers of governance, upwards towards international agencies and trade blocs like the European Union, and downwards towards regional and other sub-national agencies of economic co-ordination and regulation.     

IMPLEMENTING POLICY-A BUREAUCRATIC POWER PERSPECTIVE

Abstract: This paper argues that theories of organisational power which are based on the concepts of dependence and uncertainty may constitute a useful approach for explaining the manner in which government policies come to be implemented. In the intra-organisational context, studies by Crozier and Hickson demonstrate that subgroups which can control sources of uncertainty and create dependencies rise to positions of relative power within the organisation and may use this position to bargain for increased organisational rewards. Subgroups within public sector organisations that achieve power in these terms may, as their organisational reward, seek to impose particular values on policy programs carried out by the organisation as a whole. Activities in the inter-organisational context may be viewed from a similar perspective. The work of J. D. Thompson indicates that organisations can possess positions of power relative to other organisations in their task environment. In the public sector such power may be used to influence the policy programs of dependent departments. The paper then suggests that in the public sector intra- and inter-organisational theories of power may be combined to explain how subgroups can evolve into organisations in their own right and, in so doing, succeed in considerably changing the stated direction of government policy. To show how such a situation can occur, a case study of the evolution of Queensland's institutes of technology is included. The paper concludes that theories of organisational power can be of value to policy implementation theorists but require some modification to accommodate the particular characteristics of the public sector environment.     

Power transitions and the rise of the regulatory state: Global market governance in flux

This special issue examines the consequences of the ongoing power transition in the world economy for global regulatory regimes, especially the variation in rising powers' transition from rule-takers to rule-makers in global markets. This introductory article presents the analytical framework for better understanding those consequences, the Power Transition Theory of Global Economic Governance (PTT-GEG), which extends the scope of traditional power transition theory to conflict and cooperation in the international political economy and global regulatory governance. PTT-GEG emphasizes variation in the institutional strength of the regulatory state as the key conduit through which the growing market size of the emergent economies gives their governments leverage in global regulatory regimes. Whether or not a particular rising power, for a particular regulatory issue, invests its resources in building a strong regulatory state, however, is a political choice, requiring an analysis of the interplay of domestic and international politics that fuels or inhibits the creation of regulatory capacity and capability. PTT-GEG further emphasizes variation in the extent to which rising powers' substantive, policy-specific preferences diverge from the established powers' preferences as enshrined in the regulatory status quo. Divergence should not be assumed as given. Distinct combinations of these two variables yield, for each regulatory regime, distinct theoretical expectations about how the power transition in the world economy will affect global economic governance, helping us identify the conditions under which rule-takers will become regime-transforming rule-makers, regime-undermining rule-breakers, resentful rule-fakers, or regime-strengthening rule-promoters, as well as the conditions under which they remain weakly regime-supporting rule-takers.     

Private authority and public policy interactions in global context: Governance spheres for problem solving

Private organizations play a growing role in governing global issues alongside traditional public actors such as states, international organizations, and subnational governments. What do we know about how private authority and public policy interact? What are the implications of answering this question for understanding support for, and effects of, policy development generally? The purpose of this article is to reflect on these questions by introducing, and reviewing, a special issue that challenges explicit claims, and implicit methodologies, that treat private and public governance realms as distinct and/or static. We do so by advancing a theoretical and conceptual framework with which to explore how the contributions to this special issue enhance an understanding about governance interactions across a range of empirical, sectoral, and regional domains. We specifically introduce the concept of governance spheres to capture the proliferation of issue domains denoted by highly fluid interactions across public and private governance boundaries.     

Politics by Number: Indicators as Social Pressure in International Relations

The ability to monitor state behavior has become a critical tool of international governance. Systematic monitoring allows for the creation of numerical indicators that can be used to rank, compare, and essentially censure states. This article argues that the ability to disseminate such numerical indicators widely and instantly constitutes an exercise of social power, with the potential to change important policy outputs. It explores this argument in the context of the United States’ efforts to combat trafficking in persons and find evidence that monitoring has important effects: Countries are more likely to criminalize human trafficking when they are included in the U.S. annual Trafficking in Persons Report, and countries that are placed on a “watch list” are also more likely to criminalize. These findings have broad implications for international governance and the exercise of soft power in the global information age.     

Regulating Finance: Who Rules,Whose Rules?

This project has embedded in it an explanation of the structural and relational power transmission process stemming from “micro-actions” in global financial relations. This paper is about domestic policy adaptation in international and domestic finance and how it occurs. The fundamental contention of this paper is that the way to understand power in global finance is to provide an answer to the question: Who makes the rules in finance—state actors or nonstate actors? The answer to this question is problematic in the IPE literature because of both the enormous influence of finance in the councils of the industrial democracies and the information asymmetries that favor power in finance. Finance, it is argued, has the determining influence on the rules governing its industry. The dependent variable in this analysis is the policy output—the regulation and liberalization decisions of states. The behaviors of the state and of other policy actors in the policy process are the independent variables.