THE DETERMINATION OF ANTITRUST LIABILITY IN UNITED STATES v. MICROSOFT: THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE USED TO PROVE ITS CASE

This paper considers the empirical evidence used by the Departmentof Justice in the U.S. v. Microsoft antitrust case to provethat Microsoft engaged in exclusionary (and anticompetitive)actions in the browser market as part of its efforts to maintainits dominance of the personal computer operating system market.This evidence deserves special consideration because the DistrictCourt made the unusual decision to rely on the empirical evidencepresented by the Department of Justice rather than the empiricalevidence presented by Microsoft. This decision was unusual becauseMicrosoft's evidence had a strong presumption of validity asit was based on data that Microsoft collected and used in theordinary course of its business. Furthermore, no market participantsused the Department of Justice-sponsored data in any meaningfulway. Although it is impossible to determine with any certaintywhy the District Court ruled the way it did, I conclude thatthere were two driving forces in the court's decision. The Departmentof Justice identified serious flaws in Microsoft's data, makingit unreliable for the purposes for which Microsoft was usingit in the trial. The Department of Justice was also able toshow that no such flaws affected the data it sponsored and indeed,on many points, that data was more consistent with the testimonyof Microsoft executives than the data sponsored by Microsoft.     

MINORITY THREAT AND POLICE STRENGTH FROM 1980 TO 2000: A FIXED‐EFFECTS ANALYSIS OF NONLINEAR AND INTERACTIVE EFFECTS IN LARGE U.S. CITIES*

Many studies have assessed threat theory by investigating the relationships between the size of minority populations and police strength. Yet these investigations analyzed older data with cross‐sectional designs. This study uses a fixed‐effects panel design to detect nonlinear and interactive relationships between minority presence and the per capita number of police in large U.S. cities in the last three census years. The findings show that the relationship between racial threat and the population‐corrected number of police officers has recently become considerably stronger. In accord with theoretically based expectations, tests for interactions show that segregated cities with larger African American populations have smaller departments. The coefficients on another interaction effect suggest that racial segregation leads to reductions in police strength in the South perhaps because officers are less likely to intervene in residentially isolated black neighborhoods in this region.