Conceptions of the good,rivalry, and liberal neutrality

Liberal neutrality is assumed to pertain to rival conceptions of the good. The nature of the rivalry between conceptions of the good is pivotal to the coherence, scope and realisation of liberal neutrality. Yet, liberal theorists have said very little about rivalry. This paper attempts to fill this gap by reviewing three conceptions of rivalry: incompatibility rivalry, intra-domain rivalry and state power rivalry. I argue that state power rivalry is the morally relevant conception of rivalry, and that it has significant implications for the scope and realisation of liberal neutrality. I conclude that in the light of state power rivalry, the only feasible liberal neutral state is a very minimal one.     

Metaphysics Postponed: Liberalism, Pluralism, and Neutrality

Many recent liberal theorists have argued that state neutrality is supported by a metaphysical thesis about value, namely pluralism , which asserts that there are some conceptions of the good life which neither form a hierarchy nor represent versions of a single good. It is however doubtful whether neutrality is supported by pluralism; indeed, it may in some cases be precluded by it. Arguments for pluralism can, in many cases, be reconciled with a monistic metaphysics of value, and pluralism itself fails to support neutrality. This is particularly true of traditional liberal policy positions such as religious toleration and opposition to censorship, where attention to diverse conceptions of the good may favour, or demand, non–neutral policies. The political problems which neutrality addresses arise before we accept the metaphysical 'truth' of pluralism, and often remain even if the parties to a political conflict have false conceptions of value. A sharp question for the pluralist neutralist is why conflicting conceptions of the political cannot themselves feature in plural conceptions of the good life. Dispensing with pluralism may not, however, be enough to rescue neutrality, since the disputes which neutrality was designed to deal with may not be resolvable neutrally; and more particularly, some of the traditional liberal policies may be incapable of neutral justification. If so, liberals may find a more traditional form of non–neutral liberalism more attractive.     

Neutrality of what?

In what sense should a liberal state be neutral between the conceptions of the good held by its citizens? Traditionally, liberals have provided two different answers to this question. Some have adopted a conception of neutrality of justification, while others a conception of neutrality of effects. Recently, Alan Patten has defended an alternative, novel and sophisticated, conception of neutrality – neutrality of treatment. In this article I assess whether neutrality of treatment is, in fact, a superior conception of neutrality. I try to show that neutrality of treatment suffers from the very same weaknesses that Patten attributes to its alternatives and that, overall, neutrality of justification, properly construed, provides a more promising account of both the sense in which a state ought to be neutral and of the object of neutrality. Finally, I argue for a broader account of the normative bases of liberal neutrality than the one proposed by Patten. This account includes, beyond considerations of fairness, a relational principle of equal standing.     

Contractualism and Liberal Neutrality: A Defence

The most influential contemporary defences of liberal neutrality are premised on a contractual view of political legitimacy. For contractualists, perfectionist principles of justice are illegitimate because they cannot be the object of reasonable agreement among free and equal citizens. Several critics have challenged this connection between contractualism and neutrality by suggesting that the epistemic arguments commonly offered in its favour are self-defeating. This paper examines three recent expressions of this claim – those of Simon Caney, Simon Clarke and Joseph Chan – and finds that none of them succeeds. They fail because they mistake an ethical claim about how states should respond to disagreement for an epistemic one that explains why such a response is needed.     

Dispositional neutrality and minority rights

Alan Patten defends a novel principle of neutrality according to which the state must accommodate all conceptions of the good equally. This principle rests on the claim that the state must be equally responsive to the interests of all citizens. I introduce a competing principle – neutrality of disposition – according to which the state must be disposed to treat citizens with different conceptions of the good alike in relevantly similar situations. The requirement of the equal responsiveness of the state is neutral between these two conceptions of neutrality. Moreover, neutrality of disposition, unlike neutrality of treatment, is compatible with a plausible luck egalitarian view of cultural justice according to which justice requires the state to be more accommodating of some conceptions of the good than of others in situations where not being so will result in members of minority cultures being worse off than others through no responsibility of their own.     

Citizenship,justice and indigenous group‐specific rights—citizenship and indigenous Australia

Indigenous Australians and those supporting the cause of Aboriginal justice have used the language of citizenship rights to demand redress for indigenous peoples’ relative disadvantage. In doing so they make an appeal to rights of full participatory citizenship which have their roots in T.H. Marshall's writings. Liberal political theory, however, has resisted conceptions of citizenship which entail rights of assistance from the state: rights to welfare are more readily conceived of as charitable acts towards those members of a society unable to care for themselves. Unless the assumptions implicit in liberal conceptions of citizenship are challenged, demands for positive citizenship rights may re‐enforce stereotypes of Aboriginal inferiority. Drawing on Will Kymlicka's recent work, this article critically examines liberal conceptions of citizenship, welfare and demands for indigenous group‐specific rights as they may apply to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander citizenship.     

Representing the People: Laclau as a Theorist of Representation

Going beyond conventional conceptions of political representation, Ernesto Laclau takes representation to be a general category and not just limited to formal political institutions, and he takes representation to be performative in that it also brings about what is represented. This article examines the implications of this conceptualization of representation for Laclau’s theory of populism. Laclau takes populism to be exemplary of his conception of representation because populism is a discourse that brings into being what it claims to represent: the people. This is important for current debates about populism and the crisis of democratic institutions, whether domestic or international. I show how our conceptions of representation inform how we think about populism and liberal democracy, and specifically about populism as a threat to liberal democracy at the domestic or global level. I show this in the context of a reading of Jan-Werner Müller’s influential critique of populism.     

Engaging the reluctant taxpayer

Abstract

A commitment to political neutrality means that citizens have a legitimate complaint when the coercive power of the state is used to advance some particular conception of how it is good to live. In this paper I investigate how to address this complaint in the case of public funding for the arts. There are two promising ways to justify public arts spending. First, as Thomas Nagel argues, the arts are a source of intrinsic values and so command our respect. I reject this argument because intrinsic values are not automatically political values. Second, Ronald Dworkin argues that access to the arts is required to fully participate in social life. This argument draws a connection between the arts and citizenship and so fares better in establishing a political justification for the arts. However, Dworkin relies on the special value of high art relative to popular art, which undermines the neutrality of his argument. I show that a justification can be given that does not depend on the high value of the arts. I develop an account that shows how the arts can support just relations between citizens. This account is in keeping with a liberal commitment to neutrality.     

Liberal Justification: A Typology

Contemporary liberalism exhibits a broad agreement among its proponents as to its content but widespread disagreement on what fundamental values justify its principles. This paper provides a typology of ways in which liberals approach the task of justifying liberalism. It sets out a four-fold typology for categorising different liberal theories by distinguishing between the various reasons why liberals reject or accept neutrality. Such a typology is helpful in showing exactly how and where liberal theories differ in their approaches to the issues of justification, neutrality and pluralism, and in showing where their strengths and weaknesses lie.     

Neutrality,autonomy, and power

This paper critically examines Alan Patten’s theory of neutrality of treatment. It argues that the theory assumes an inadequate conception of personal autonomy, which undermines its plausibility. However, I suggest that the theory can resolve the problem by developing and reinterpreting its conception of autonomy and introducing an additional strategy for addressing the power imbalances that result from the market-based interactions between individuals and their conceptions of the good.     

Unequal but fair? Cultural recognition and self-government rights

This review of Patten’s Equal Recognition suggests that minority rights can be grounded either in cultural accommodation rights or collective self-government rights. I defend four propositions: (1) individuals’ interests in membership in political communities cannot be reduced to their interests in being able to pursue their own conceptions of the good; (2) liberal states do not have to extend neutrality as equal treatment to self-government claims that intersect with their own jurisdiction; (3) claims for the establishment of public languages and territorial autonomy need to be justified on the basis of self-government rights rather than on grounds of equal treatment of cultural identities; (4) as a condition for their admission, immigrants can be expected to waive collective self-government rights rather than cultural protection rights.     

Defending broad neutrality

ABSTRACT

This paper interrogates Cécile Laborde’s account of the proper role of religion in the liberal state. It begins by examining Laborde’s claims that prevailing liberals are not committed to broad neutrality about the good, but rather only restricted neutrality about the good—and that they are right to do so. It argues against Laborde on both exegetical and substantive grounds. It then turns to Laborde’s minimalist conception of secularism, according to which the state must be justifiable, inclusive, and limited, and it argues that it is not sufficiently demanding. Finally, it argues that the classical liberal presumption of skepticism toward religious establishment is warranted.     

Liberals, Democrats and the Agenda of Politics

Democrats sometimes wonder why liberalism, as a theory which values choice, should seek to restrict democratic choices by limiting the political agenda. This article tries to answer this question by emphasizing a value which is common to liberal and democratic arguments: that as far as possible states should rest on persuasion rather than compulsion. On this basis, it is argued that personal and political choice situations are not analogous, that not all the arguments for personal freedom are exhausted by the arguments for fair democratic procedure, that it is not irrational to fear that one might be in an unpersuaded minority, and that even democratic political outcomes cannot be substituted for personal conclusions. Some democratic theories do not accept the value assumed here: but they pay too high a price.     

Three cheers for liberal modesty

ABSTRACT

Many liberals have been immodest in postulating that their own progressive, secular liberalism is the only one that can be justified in public reason. In Liberalism’s Religion, I articulate a more modest theory of liberalism and religion. While I personally endorse progressive secular liberalism, I argue that it is only one of the reasonable conceptions of liberal justice. This liberal modesty has profound, hitherto unnoticed implications for (i) the role of religious arguments in the public sphere, (ii) the legitimacy of religious establishment, and (iii) the justifiability of religious exemptions. In this article, I defend these three claims by providing replies to my critics.     

When the Earth Belonged to All: the Land Question in Eighteenth-century Justifications of Private Property

Liberal conceptions of property rights are commonly associated with the idea of absolute, exclusive individual ownership. This article aims to show that, and why land constituted a special problem for eighteenth-century justifications of private property. Kant and Adam Smith are taken as the major exponents of eighteenth-century liberalism—of its natural-rights basis and its utilitarian orientation respectively. Their arguments against the still-existing feudal encumbrances, that is,'collective' forms of landownership, reveal a fundamental tension between libertarian and egalitarian premisses in liberal theory. The vindication of full individual ownership rests crucially upon the right to equal liberty —to an initial equality of starting chances. Yet this assumption of a substantive equality becomes an empty phrase to the extent that the idea of society's original common entitlement to natural resources loses all practical, political meaning.     

Liberal Democracy: One Form or Many?

This article examines whether there are significant differences between liberal democracies which warrant them being classified as different forms of democracy. The article begins by outlining six features of liberal democracy which are crucial in understanding how this type of government works. The subsequent section examines the origins of liberal democracy and considers the relevance of arguments derived from American 'exceptionalism'. Attention is then focused on liberal democratic governments today - by reference to Lijphart's distinction between 'majoritarian' and 'consensus' democracies. Finally, the article looks at whether the form of liberal democracy is changed substantially when it is transplanted into a cultural context different from the one in which it originated. The general conclusion is that there is no case for identifying different forms of liberal democracy.     

Responsibility, Luck, and the 'Equality of What?' Debate

Ronald Dworkin's recently published book, Sovereign Virtue (hereafter SV), appeals to arguments that are popular within, and ideas that are fundamental to, liberal egalitarianism. These arguments and ideas need to be distinguished and unpacked. The purpose of this paper is partly to do this and to cast doubt on the adequacy of various moves made by Dworkin. In addition, and more importantly I argue that the analysis of the 'equality of what?' debate reveals a tension at the heart of contemporary liberal egalitarianism between the Kantian aspiration to eliminate luck and the contemporary aspiration to do political philosophy without metaphysics.     

Accommodating toleration: on Balint’s classical liberal response to the multiculturalism challenge

ABSTRACT

Peter Balint identifies three challenges to toleration, one of which is the multiculturalism challenge. This is the charge that liberal toleration fails to accommodate minorities adequately, which requires positive recognition rather than negative toleration. I discuss his response to the multiculturalism challenge and its connection to a classical liberal view of toleration. This involves Balint’s claim that liberal neutrality should be understood as reflective and ‘difference-sensitive’, which should be realised by the state being ‘hands-off’ in the sense of withdrawing support for privileged ways of life. I argue that Balint’s classical liberal view that the state needs to be ‘hands-off’ is in need of specification and that it does not fit well with his claim that neutrality needs to be reflective and difference-sensitive.     

The battlefield of ideas: the legitimation of political violence in Northern Ireland

Abstract. Northern Ireland has suffered consistently from the effects of political violence since the late 1960s. This article argues that anyone who engages in political violence seeks legitimation for his acts and it assesses the attempts by Republicans and Loyalists in Northern Ireland to legitimate their violence. The legitimation of both Loyalist and Republican violence is shown to consist of arguments drawn from a wide range of theoretical traditions by no means confined to Northern Ireland. Republicans draw upon nationalism, Catholicism and Marxism whilst Loyalists make use of contractarian ideas and Protestant theology. Both sides have been relatively successful in persuading potential supporters of the legitimacy of their activities. The article concludes by analysing weaknesses in each attempt at legitimation and by indicating how the diversity of the rival packages may prove counterproductive in the long run. The capacity of each group to generate the additional support needed to achieve its ends is seriously doubted.