Science and the climate change regime

Given rapidly increasing losses from extreme climate events, the world community already has a common interest in action to mitigate and adapt to climate change. However, this common interest is not well served through continued promotion of either mandatory (legally-binding) policies or do nothing policies by various participants in the regime established by the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change. The common interest would be better served by a third way, comprised of voluntary no regrets policies that are commensurate with the limited political power of the regime and already have succeeded on small scales in reducing vulnerabilities to extreme climate events and in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Both mandatory and do nothing policies, as well as the regime itself, have depended upon scientists for political support in the past. But scientists might better serve the common interest of the world community through support of a third way in the future.     

Taming chance: Risk and the quantification of uncertainty

The quantification of uncertainty through probability is central to definitions of risk used in environmental policy analysis. This essay explores the translation of unquantified uncertainty into probability and the expression of allied philosophical problems in the practice of environmental risk and decision analysis. First we look at means used in science for handling uncertainty associated with some major risks and which are not well represented through probability. Saving the science without quantified probability is addressed through the role of probabilistic events in risk analysis, suggesting the need to expand the scope of risk analysis to include some types of unquantified reasoning about adverse events. Next we look at uses of subjective probability and decision analysis to overcome problems of unquantified uncertainty in science, where we argue that a constructive conception of probability judgments, based in the foundations of decision analysis, provides the most useful approach for such methods. A theme throughout is the role of intellectual control implicit in our efforts to tame change through the representation of uncertainty through probability.     

Flexible responsiveness and military strategy: The case of the Israeli army

The mode of operation and military strategy of the Israeli army provide an example of an effective utilization of the potential military advantage of a relatively modernized society over a less modernized rival. The Israeli command communication and control system is characterized by a built in operational flexibility in attaining its objectives.Each component formation has the capacity for on the spot utilization of feedbacks in responding to emergent situations while coordination is ensured by optional headquarters control. The effect of superior flexible responsiveness is maximized by the adoption of military strategies which are likely to result in increasing the complexity and uncertainty of battlefield conditions such as blitzkrieg and indirect approach. The rationalle of such a strategic approach lies in the assumption that, given the approximately zero sum characteristics of warfare, the more flexible of two rival military command systems is likely to benefit from an extra pressure put on both.     

Between science and politics: assessing the risks of dioxins in Canada and the United States

Conclusions The history of U.S. and Canadian risk assessments for dioxin is an increasingly familiar tale of debates within the scientific community played out in the political arena. Uncertainty among scientists creates the possibility of large disparities between different governments' policies. However, the pattern of differences that emerges reflects the context in which science policy decisions are made within each agency and within each country. The political environment has implications not just for how mandated science is received, but for how it is conducted.Many features of the dioxin case are consistent with observations by others. In the cases of formaldehyde, alachlor, alar, and amaranth, EPA relied on mathematical models to assess the risks of potential carcinogens, while Health and Welfare Canada relied on the more traditional safety factor approach.³⁵ This body of evidence is suggestive of national styles of transscience. Features of the U.S. style include explicit rationales for regulatory decisions, reliance on consistent and explicit risk assessment principles, and public debate over scientific aspects of public policy. The Canadian style is exemplified by closed decisionmaking, case-by-case review, and the absence of public discussion of the scientific basis for government decisions.The differences between FDA and EPA in this case study suggest an important caveat, however. The U.S. style is most clearly reflected in the implementation of the non-discretionary environmental, health and safety statutes passed by the U.S. Congress since 1970. More closed and traditional styles of regulatory decisionmaking may survive within the U.S. as vestiges of a more deferential past.Even less than pure science, trans-science is not a universal enterprise. When scientists do reach agreement, it can be a powerful force that can even overcome political and national differences (Haas, 1989). However, when science is uncertain, as is typically the case in assessing the risks of toxic chemicals, there is more room for political factors to shape the way different countries interpret science in making policy decisions.     

Postmodern policy analysis: Discourse and identity in welfare policy

Postmodern inquiry into the discursive construction of identity has the potential to make a distinctive, democratizing contribution to public policy analysis. More so than conventional approaches, a postmodern policy analysis offers the opportunity to interrogate assumptions about identity embedded in the analysis and making of public policy, thereby enabling us to rethink and resist questionable distinctions that privilege some identities at the expense of others. Public policy analysis can benefit from postmodernism's emphasis on how discourse constructs identity. A review of postmodernism and postmodern approaches to interrogating identity is followed by an exercise in postmodern policy analysis. Social welfare policy in contemporary postindustrial America is shown to participate in the construction and maintenance of identity in ways that affect not just the allocation of public benefits, but also economic opportunities outside of the state. Mired in old, invidious distinctions (e.g., independent/dependent, contract/charity, family/promiscuity), welfare policy discourse today helps to recreate the problems of yesterday, particularly as a critical factor in reproducing women's poverty.     

Subformal warning systems in the species Homo politicus

A political activist needs to pick up early warning signals that something is happening which might require his attention. The something could be an emergent danger or opportunity. An ideal-typical warning system is postulated to account for what is believed to be the extraordinary infrequency of activists being caught off guard under most routine conditions. Such a system would ideally meet four criteria: rapidity, comprehensiveness, validity, and selectivity. The postulated system rests on what Anthony Downs has called subformal communications channels among individuals and groups interrelated by principles of specialization and the division of labor.I am very grateful to Janice Holve for her valuable assistance in gathering data and in helping to sharpen my ideas. In the early stages of this project, Gene Bretton helped conduct a review of the literature. Aaron Wildavsky, David Kirp, Marcel Teitler, and Jack Citrin read and commented on various drafts. Financial support from the National Institute of Mental Health is also gratefully acknowledged.     

Interest groups and the regulation of pesticides: Congress,coalitions, and closure

This article is essentially a rejoinder to Christopher Bosso's piece, Transforming Adversaries Into Collaborators: Interest groups and the regulation of chemical pesticides, which appeared in this journal (21: 3–22). The case of pesticides regulation is re-examined and some new insights are offered. At the center of Bosso's argument is the contention that Congress is passive. John Kingdon's agenda/alternative distinction is utilized to arrive at an alternative way to think about the role of Congress in today's permeable pressure system.     

Ideas,interest and institutions in policy change: Transformation of India's agricultural strategy in the mid-1960s

Over the last ten years, policy change in the third world has become a matter of considerable intellectual and practical importance. For the theoretically inclined, how one explains changes in the behavior of the state is the main issue. Both Marxian and liberal orthodoxies had a tendency to read off state behavior from the power relationships at the level of the society, though differing in the way they conceptualized power. The return of institutional and state-centric explanations over the last decade has attempted to reverse this bias by looking more closely at the power struggles within the state institutions. For the practically inclined, the powerful intellectual rationale behind so many policy recommendations has often been puzzlingly lost in the maze of politics. What interests impede the implementation of good ideas, what institutions block getting policies right - these are some of the key questions on the agenda of international development institutions. Responding to these varied concerns, this paper analyzes a particularly successful case of policy change. While most of third world was still experimenting with land reforms and cooperatives as the ways to develop agriculture, India in the mid-1960s switched to producer price incentives and investments in new technology, a change that is widely believed to have turned India from a food-deficit to a food-surplus country. The focus is on how ideas, interests and institutions interacted to produce the change.     

Promise and peril

The size of the federal budget tells only one part of the tale of government's presence in the market economy. The enormous amounts of non-tax dollars government requires to be spent on regulation – estimated at $647 billion per year – powerfully argue for some sort of regulatory scorekeeping. Regulatory costs are equivalent to over one-third of the level of government spending. A regulatory budget can be an effective tool both for spurring reform and monitoring regulatory activity.At bottom, today's rulemaking process is plagued by the fact that agency bureaucrats are not accountable to voters. And Congress – though responsible for the underlying statutes that usually propel those unanswerable agencies – nevertheless can conveniently blame agencies for regulatory excesses. Indeed, Americans live under a regime of Regulation Without Representation.A regulatory budget could promote greater accountability by limiting the regulatory costs agencies could impose on the private sector. Congress could either specify a limit on compliance costs for each newly enacted law or reauthorization of existing law, or Congress could enact a more ambitious full-scale budget paralleling the fiscal budget, a riskier approach. A comprehensive budget would require Congress to divide to a total budget among agencies. Agencies' responsibility would be to rank hazards serially, from most to least severe, and address them within their budget constraint. In either version of a regulatory budget, any agency desiring to exceed its budget would need to seek congressional approval.Regulatory costs imposed on the private sector by federal agencies can never be precisely measured, and a budget cannot achieve absolute precision. Nonetheless, a regulatory budget is a valuable tool. The real innovation of regulatory budgeting is its potential to impose the consequences of regulatory decisionmaking on agencies rather than on the regulated parties alone. Agencies that today rarely admit a rule provides negligible benefit would be forced to compete for the right to regulate. While agencies would be free to regulate as unwisely as they do now, the consequences could be transfer of the squandered budgetary allocation to a rival agency that saves more lives.Budgeting could fundamentally change incentives. Under a budget, adopting a costly, but marginally beneficial, regulation will suddenly be irrational. Congress would weigh an agency's claimed benefits against alternative means of protecting public health and safety, giving agencies incentives to compete and expose one another's bogus benefits. Budgeting could encourage greater recognition of the fact that some risks are far more remote than those we undertake daily. In the long run, a regulatory budget would force agencies to compete with one another on the most important bottom line of all: that their least-effective rules save more lives per dollar spent (or correct some alleged market imperfection better) than those of other agencies.There are clear benefits to regulatory budgeting, but there are also pitfalls. For instance, under a budget, agencies have incentives to underestimate compliance costs while regulated parties have the opposite incentive. Self-correcting techniques that may force opposing cost calculations to converge are only at the thought- experiment stage. However, limitations on the delegation of regulatory power and enhancing congressional accountability can help.Certain principles and antecedents can help ensure that a regulatory budgeting effort succeeds. Explicitly recognizing that an agency's basic impulse is to overstate the benefits of its activities, a budget would relieve agencies of benefit calculation responsibilities altogether. Agencies would concentrate on properly assessing only the costs of their initiatives. Since an agency must try to maximize benefits within its budget constraint or risk losing its budget allocation, it would be rational for agencies to monitor benefits, but Congress need not require it.Other ways to promote the success of a budget are to: establish an incremental rather than total budget; collect and summarize annual report card data on the numbers of regulations in each agency; establish a regulatory cost freeze; implement a Regulatory Reduction Commission; employ separate budgets for economic and environmental/social regulation; and control indirect costs by limiting the regulatory methods that most often generate them.A regulatory budget is not a magic device alone capable of reducing the current $647 billion regulatory burden. Yet a cautious one deserve consideration. Having good information is an aid in grappling with the regulatory state just as compiling the federal fiscal budget is indispensable to any effort to plan and control government spending.     

Food safety regulation: is the Delaney clause the problem or symptom?

The Delaney anticancer amendment to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 is a prominent example of zero risk legislation. The relevant clauses prohibit a finding of safety for any relevant substance found to induce cancer in humans or animals. It is argued that the Delaney approach to safety regulation is not only misguided, but that relaxation of the law - for example, to permit substances that pose insignificant cancer risks - would produce only marginal improvement in regulation. A major shift in regulation that permits some form of cost-benefit analysis is the only way to move toward rational policy choices.Professor of Economics, Rutgers University. I am grateful to William Ascher, Richard A. Merrill, and two referees for helpful comments on earlier drafts.     

Property rights and property wrongs: Why context matters in fisheries management

Like most wild living resources, fish present acomplex management challenge. Given the failure of command and control regulatory regimes to protect fisheries, scholars and practitioners have advocated the use of property rights to rectify the fisheries crisis. This meta analysis argues that property rights can be used constructively as a regulatory measure in the sustainable management of fisheries, and perhaps in other areas of resource management. However, the use of property rights to resolve resource problems is context dependent, and no single regulatory option or policy is appropriate for the multi-faceted and highly variable world of fisheries management. This paper characterizes and contrasts three regulatory regimes in fisheries management in the United States, while drawing from lessons learned worldwide about fisheries regulation. The paper defines the conditions where property rights might be used appropriately-property rights – as well as where property rights might be used inappropriately – property wrongs.     

Growth controls: policy analysis for the second generation

The 1970s spawned a first generation of growth controls which featured explicit (or implicit) restrictions on residential housing construction. These restrictions were typically implemented in small, affluent, and predominantly white suburban communities. Policy analysis responded by focusing almost singlemindedly on how such supply-side restrictions might increase housing prices and drive out the poor. The 1980s and 1990s have, however, given birth to a more comprehensive second generation of controls which many major cities and metropolitan areas are considering. This generation ties commercial and industrial as well as residential development to the reduction of the negative externalities and congestion costs associated with growth. To fully evaluate this second generation, policy analysis must take into account not only housing price effects and the rate of job creation but also the full range of amenity effects associated with differing rates of growth and attendant levels of traffic congestion, air pollution, and other public bads. We develop a framework for such second generation growth control analysis using San Diego as an example.     

The lessons of learning: Reconciling theories of policy learning and policy change

Several different explanations of policy change based on notions of learning have emerged in the policy literature to challenge conventional conflict-oriented theories. These include notions of political-learning developed by Heclo, policy-oriented learning developed by Sabatier, lesson-drawing analyzed by Rose, social learning discussed by Hall and government learning identified by Etheredge. These different concepts identify different actors and different effects with each different type of learning. Some elements of these theories are compatible, while others are not. This article examines each approach in terms of who learns, what they learn, and the effects of learning on subsequent policies. The conclusion is that three distinct types of learning have often been incorrectly juxtaposed. Certain conceptual, theoretical and methodological difficulties attend any attempt to attribute policy change to policy learning, but this does not detract from the important reorientation of policy analysis that this approach represents.     

Positivist beliefs among policy professionals: An empirical investigation

A group of scholars argue that mainstream policy analysis ispositivistic in its theory and practice. This paper reports the resultsof an e-mail survey that was conducted to investigate the extent,dimensions, and determinants of positivist beliefs among policyprofessionals. The survey results show that policy professionals aremore positivistic in their abstract beliefs and less so in their beliefsabout the role of politics and analysis in the policy process.Educational background is the most important factor determining beliefs:The economists and mathematicians/scientists are most positivistic intheir beliefs, while political scientists are least positivistic. Also,practitioners take more positivistic positions than academics. Overall,the largest percentage of the respondents see the postpositivistfacilitator role as the proper role for policy analysts,but there is also a significant percentage of those who prefer thepositivist problem solver role.     

The dynamics of financial globalization: Technology,market structure,and policy response

The development of increasingly transnationalized (globalized) financial markets raises several key issues for the analysis of politics, public policy, and the national state. This article suggests that financial globalization increasingly constrains policymakers and circumscribes the policy capacity of the state. After looking briefly at a range of approaches to the process of financial globalization itself, the author suggests that technological change is the main independent variable, by reducing transaction costs and dramatically increasing the price sensitivity of financial markets across borders, while at the same time making possible a range of economies of scale. These very developments have a knock-on effect throughout the domestic and international economies. They in turn make obsolescent the political economies of scale — the governance structures — which have characterized economic policy in modern nation-states, undermining the capacity of the state to produce public goods. At the same time, globalized financial markets interact with rapidly changing interest group structures and divided state structures, especially through regulatory arbitrage. Without the development of transnational regimes capable of regulating global financial markets, the structural basis of the national state itself is being undermined, and Polanyi's Great Transformation is over.     

Single-issue voting: Elite-mass linkages

In this paper we consider the abortion and E.R.A. issues as examples of single-issue politics, as well as the nature of single-issue politics in general. We argue that many single issues are what others have called easy issues but that hard-issue voting as well as easy-issue voting may be occurring on both issues. We test this hypothesis using both mass and elite data sets. Our findings suggest that political activists may be cuing the masses into a pattern of single-issue voting, and hence keeping the battle over abortion and the E.R.A. intense.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1981 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, September 3–6, 1981.     

Occupational safety and health in Poland in the 1990s: A regulatory system adapting to societal transformation

The societal transformation underway in Poland createda fundamental challenge to the occupational health and safety system, as the ideological and administrative principles on which it was founded vanished along with the communist-dominated regime. This paper examines the regulatory reform in Poland during the 1990s: its structural elements, implementation record and future prospects. Drawing on five case studies of privatized firms, a mailed questionnaire, and policy and institutional analysis, we find that Poland had considerable success in developing an effective regulatory system for managing occupational health hazards in privatized sector while also achieving considerable socioeconomic progress. The fundamental legitimacy of the regulators and regulatory process, the availability of information about firms and regulatory intents, and the capacity for case-specific decision making, are among the key explanatory factors. The case-specific implementation in Poland is consistent with models advocated by several authors in relation to other industrialized European economies (termed variously as negotiated compliance, tit-for-tat, cooperation-deterrence), despite a uniquely Polish context related to the continuing legacy of the communist era. The study also shows how in Poland a good fit between regulatory institutions and policies on the one hand, and their social context on the other hand, contributes to the effectiveness of the regulatory system.     

Beyond the Running Tally: Partisan Bias in Political Perceptions

I examine the impact of long-term partisan loyalties on perceptions of specific political figures and events. In contrast to the notion of partisanship as a simple running tally of political assessments, I show that party identification is a pervasive dynamic force shaping citizens' perceptions of, and reactions to, the political world. My analysis employs panel data to isolate the impact of partisan bias in the context of a Bayesian model of opinion change; I also present more straightforward evidence of contrasts in Democrats' and Republicans' perceptions of objective politically relevant events. I conclude that partisan bias in political perceptions plays a crucial role in perpetuating and reinforcing sharp differences in opinion between Democrats and Republicans. This conclusion handsomely validates the emphasis placed by the authors of The American Voter on the role of enduring partisan commitments in shaping attitudes toward political objects.     

Getting into the action

Using policy sciences in the federal government to create better public programs requires the right climate for analysis plus a good set of tactics for analysts to follow. The ideal climate includes close association between analysts and highest authorities, strong support from the top, the existence of expanding budgets and promising discontinuities—unusual events when the opportunity becomes ripe for dynamic change. Effective tactics for the policy science practitioner include staying in the real conversations where decisions are made, spreading the credit for findings, acquiring allies to support positions, winning early battles to prove their worth, and inviting intensive internal reviews. Suggestions on staffing and on choosing likely subjects so analysis can reap benefits, along with a list of dangers to avoid, conclude the paper. The points are illustrated with actual examples in the federal agencies.From an address to the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Boston, Massachusetts, December 28, 1969.     

A tale of two policies: The politics of climate forecasting and drought relief in Ceará, Brazil

This paper evaluates the use of climate-based information in drought mitigation in Ceará, Northeast Brazil. It examines two policies – a seed-distribution program (Hora de Plantar) and the Emergency Drought-Relief Program – that use climate information produced by FUNCEME (Cearás Foundation for Meteorological and Hydrological Resources) to implement drought planning. It argues that, in politically charged policy-making environments, the use of climate forecast information may go beyond its problem-solving function to influence broader issues of accountability and democratization. In Cearás politically charged environment, technocrats rely on scientific information about climate to insulate policy-making from both political meddling and public accountability. However, insulation afforded by the use of climate information has played different roles in the policy areas examined in this study. While in drought emergency-relief planning the use of climate information critically contributed to the democratization of policy implementation, in agricultural planning, it worked towards further insulating decision-making from public accountability and client participation. Thus, the use of climate information is context-dependent, that is, the distribution of costs and benefits associated with information use in policymaking depends on the social, political, and cultural context in which information producers and users work. Moreover, climate information can be used in ways – positive or negative – significantly different from the use that information producers intended.