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The first 150 words of the full text of this article appear below. Key points
1. Introduction
2. Differences between exemption and recognition
3. SEC's cross-border regulatory efforts: Rule 15a-6 and mutual recognition
Broker–dealer registration Rule 15a-6 currently Proposed Rule 15a-6 amendments SEC mutual recognition efforts Access by exchanges Access by broker–dealers Disclosure requirements Exemptive process Enhanced enforcement MOU and supervisory MOU Other aspects of the Framework Scope
4. Limits to the SEC's exemptive and recognition efforts
Regulatory arbitrage Scope of market participants Scope of investors
5. Issues raised by the SEC's approach
Limits on scope of market participants under the Framework SEC efforts to prevent ‘Regulatory Arbitrage’
6. Need for a Framework
Expand mutual recognition efforts to include non-US issuers Enhanced enforcement protections Use all available tools—SIFMA/IIF Framework Benefits of a Framework approach
7. Conclusion
相似文献
- In regulating cross-border capital markets transactions,regulators are employing either an exemptive approach, or aunilateral or mutual recognition approach. The exemptive approachallows market participants wherever located to transact businessin the host countries without complying with local requirements.The recognition approach is limited to a particular market,but is more expansive in terms of access to host country investors.In regulating cross-border transactions, the SEC has traditionallyrelied on the exemptive approach, and has restricted participationto only the largest, most sophisticated US investors. Recently,it has moved to a mutual recognition approach with its agreementwith Australia, which allows a broader range of US investorsto conduct cross-border transactions with Australian exchangesand broker–dealers relying almost entirely on the adequacyof the Australian regulatory system. However, both its exemptiveapproach and mutual recognition approach deal only with secondarymarket transactions, not participation in offerings.
- While
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《Capital Markets Law Journal》2007,2(1):3-4
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《Capital Markets Law Journal》2006,1(1):3-5
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《Capital Markets Law Journal》2008,3(2):107-108
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《Jnl of Intellectual Property Law & Pract》2008,3(1):2-4
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The first 150 words of the full text of this article appear below. Key points
1. Introduction
2. US and EU perspectives on the regulation of foreign exchanges
The US view Regulation of stock exchanges Regulation of Alternative Trading Systems Regulation of foreign markets The Tradepoint release The Commodity futures trading commission's approach
The EU view
The Member State view
The US–EU conflict
Public statements US concerns European interests
3. Industry practices and the controversy over foreign trading screens
Order routing channels
- Remote trading screens allow investors to trade onexchanges located in other jurisdictions. The Securities andExchange Commission (‘SEC’) has generally prohibitedthe placement of foreign trading screens in the United Statesunless the associated exchange complies with US regulatory requirements.While the SEC defends its position as an essential investorprotection, European officials complain that SEC requirementsconstitute an unfair barrier to trade.
- This article arguesthat technological advances have largely mooted this contro-versy.Current requirements do not protect US investors as much asthe SEC claims nor do they inhibit competition as much as theSEC's critics assert.
- To the extent that alternative tradingmechanisms already give US investors de facto access to unregulatedforeign exchanges, the SEC may well choose to revisit its positionon foreign trading screens, particularly as US and Europeanfinancial markets become more integrated and disclosure requirementson both sides of
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