The Puzzle of Personalist Performance: Iraqi Battlefield Effectiveness in the Iran-Iraq War

Saddam's Iraq has become a cliché in the study of military effectiveness—the quintessentially coup-proofed, personalist dictatorship, unable to generate fighting power commensurate with its resources. But evidence from the later years of the Iran-Iraq War actually suggests that the Iraqi military could be quite effective on the battlefield. What explains this puzzling instance of effectiveness, which existing theories predict should not have occurred? Recently declassified documents and new histories of the war show that the Iraqi improvements stemmed from changes in Saddam's perceptions of the threat environment, which resulted in significant shifts in his policies with respect to promotions, training, command arrangements, and information management in the military. Threat perceptions and related changes in these practices also help explain Iraq's return to ineffectiveness after the war, as evident in 1991 and 2003. These findings, conceived as a theory development exercise, suggest that arguments linking regime type and coup-ridden civil-military relations to military performance need to take into account the threat perceptions that drive autocratic leaders’ policies toward their militaries. After discussing how to define and measure battlefield effectiveness, the article reviews Saddam's changes and their effects; addresses alternative explanations for the improvement in Iraqi effectiveness; and explains how further research based on this initial exercise could generate a better understanding of the observed variation in states’ battlefield effectiveness, including variation within and across autocratic regimes.     

An Autocracy at War: Explaining Egypt's Military Effectiveness, 1967 and 1973

In the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Egypt shocked the world with its atrocious performance in battle, only to stun the world again with its remarkable military turnaround in the October 1973 war. Existing studies, which emphasize culture, social structure, and regime type, have a difficult time explaining why this single autocratic state, in such a short period of time, exhibited such extremes in its military competence. None can explain both why Egypt performed so poorly in 1967 and improved so significantly in 1973. Other explanations such as military strategy and learning explain the puzzle in part, but they alone cannot account for the outcome. This article presents a theory that accounts for the divergence in effectiveness, focusing on underlying differences in the fabric of the autocratic regime. It argues that changes in the balance of civil-military power in the state—born from more fundamental differences in domestic politics in the autocracy—shaped three areas of military activity critical to military effectiveness: strategic assessment, command, and control, and leadership. In developing this argument, the article both contributes to growing scholarship on the sources of states' military effectiveness and explains why Egypt's performance varied so significantly in these historically consequential wars.     

Misreading Islam in Iraq: Secular Misconceptions and British Foreign Policy

Though British foreign policy toward Iraq was officially separate from counterterrorism strategy, ideas about the “global war on terror” circulated in both policy milieus. This article deploys the concept of the security imaginary, adding insights from Pierre Bourdieu's notion of the habitus, to explore why this was the case. The British security imaginary, as structured by a secular social landscape coming to terms with “radical Islamism,” was beholden to a series of problematic assumptions about religio-politics. This article focuses on British perceptions of the Islamist Jaish al-Mehdi militia between 2003 and 2004. Beyond the Iraq example, this historical incident suggests intimate connections between the experience of domestic secularity and warfare.     

We Cannot Go On: Disruptive Innovation and the First World War Royal Navy

Insights from Disruptive Innovation theory (DI) are often used in the formulation, implementation, and evaluation of national security policy. DI explains why successful companies are sometimes defeated by new competitors with relatively unsophisticated products. Although DI is highly influential in the business literature, its applicability to military doctrine has not been persuasively shown. Proposed here is a more abstract and general version of DI, which improves its foundations, adapts it to militaries, and suggests a framework for the reliable identification of disruptive innovations. This new theory is tested by examining the Royal Navy before and during World War I and evaluating how well it explains the Royal Navy's success at developing Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) to protect the battlefleet from submarine attacks and the near failure at implementing convoy tactics to protect merchant shipping. This generalized version of DI successfully explains several key features of the case.     

Keeping Friends Close and Enemies Closer: Classical Realist Statecraft and Economic Exchange in U.S. Interwar Strategy

This article addresses the relationship between economic exchange and grand strategy and explains why rival states exchange with each other. The theoretical debate among realists is defined, while a novel, yet classical, realist exchange theory is proffered and evaluated against the record of U.S.-Japanese exchange, 1918–41. In this particular case, the origins of Japan's oil dependency on the United States are detailed for the first time as is the U.S. policy toward Britain and the Netherlands that created this dependency. The article finds U.S. strategic coordination of Japan's economic vulnerabilities and their use advanced U.S. grand strategy leading into WWII. The article concludes that the July 1941 U.S. oil embargo against Japan was purposeful and the product of a larger policy arc from the early post-WWI period.     

A Bear in the Woods? Threat Framing and the Marketplace of Values

To many scholars, the Bush administration's ability to convince a majority of the public to favor war with Iraq represents a dangerous failure of the marketplace of ideas. A healthy marketplace, they argue, would have produced a more robust debate over the administration's justifications for war, revealing their weakness. In this paper I argue that these scholars have based their arguments on a poorly specified model of the marketplace of ideas and that Iraq does not represent a failure of the marketplace. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the strength of the marketplace lies not in its ability to move the nation toward truth via debate and deliberation, but in its tendency to divide the public into countervailing factions based on competing sets of values and competing frames of the issues at hand. I develop this argument first by elaborating a model of the “marketplace of values” and redefining threat inflation as a process of efforts to frame security issues for the public. I test my model first against public opinion data regarding American threat perceptions and then use it to explain the Bush administration's successes and failures in building and maintaining public support for the war in Iraq.     

The Effect of Security Alliances on Exchange-Rate Regime Choices

Because an exchange-rate arrangement by nature involves more than one country and because it has various economic and political implications, it is affected inevitably by interstate political relations. Most previous research explains the exchange-rate regime choice as a function of individual country attributes, ignoring the role of interstate political relations and the anchor-currency choice. In this paper, I examine how security alliances influence a country's choices over the flexible-fixed regime and the anchor currency. Alliances increase the ex ante attractiveness of pegging to one's ally, because security ties can reduce concerns over relative gains, motivate active collaboration by the anchor-currency ally to defend the regime, and signal to the currency market the durability of the regime. Hence, a country is biased toward pegging to its ally, relative to either pegging to a nonally or choosing the flexible regime. I test the argument for both the Bretton Woods and the post- Bretton Woods periods. I find that alliance ties affect both the anchor currency and the flexible-fixed regime choices, as expected. But these effects appear to function through the defense-pact alliance alone and are most pronounced for the developing countries.     

The Dilemma of Nuclear Disarmament: The Case of North Korea

ABSTRACT

The Hanoi summit between the US and North Korea failed not because of North Korea’s brinkmanship strategy or its miscalculation of the US position on the denuclearisation talks, but because of a fundamental issue: a dilemma of how much to yield in giving up its military capabilities to expedite the lifting of sanctions. The leadership in Pyongyang has concerns about the ‘deliverability’ of its promises to its domestic audience to ensure deterrence capabilities and economic recovery. The two-level game model explains why both sides keep minimising the range of options for the negotiations, increasing the risk that the talks will break down.     

Assessing the historical turn in IR: an anatomy of second wave historical sociology

This article reassesses what is at stake in the historical turn in international relations (IR) and the attendant debate between the Second Wave of neo-Weberian historical sociology (WHS) and Political Marxism (PM). Firstly, it endeavours to recast what is at stake in the ‘historical turn’ in IR: the critique of reification and chronocentrism. Secondly, it examines WHS's argument against reductionism in the light of Weber's own work. We show how the Weberian dualism between the politics and the economics inhibits its capacity to complete its project of historicizing IR. Finally, it explains why recent Weberian's defence of multicausalism creates even more obstacles on the road towards an ontologically consistent historical turn.     

The imperial moment: A European view This article is based on developments up through June 9, 2003, the date it was submitted for publication

This article will first review the essential characteristics of the old exceptionalism in US foreign policy, then compare it with the specific features of the new strategy of the Bush administration and finally address the challenges and risks that this enterprise entails. The article provides an analysis of realist and liberal critiques of the Bush administration's foreign policy in terms of both objectives and results. It concludes that the war in Iraq constituted a truly imperial moment in US history. Preventive war is a flawed strategy, which runs against US principles in world affairs and against its security interests in the current international environment. For this reason, Bush's imperial policy will not last. The author writes here in a personal capacity, and not in the name of the European Union Institute for Security Studies.     

Middleman in the Middle East: America's Flawed Approach to the ‘Peace Process’

President Bush professes optimism that an Arab-Israeli peace accord can be reached before he leaves office. Hamas, which presumably senses his urgency, has recently proposed a temporary truce with Israel in Gaza, with an option to extend it to the West Bank. This initiative is eerily reminiscent of Soviet behavior during the Cold War. Hamas essentially advocates a short-term period of peaceful coexistence to bide time while it strengthens its forces and lulls Israel into a false sense of security. If the United States accedes to this proposal or pressures Israel to do so, it will demonstrate once again the Cold War-style attitudes and perceptions that still characterize its approach to the “peace process.”     

The Moore thesis: what's left after 1989?

This article reconsiders the work of Barrington Moore and his critics on the historical emergence of democracy in the light of post-communist democratization. What are we to make of a region which violates Moore's dictum – “No bourgeoisie, no democracy”? Using the tools of comparative historical analysis, it makes sense of how democracy emerged in the region by developing a theory which both explains why this was possible and what social actors were essential to this outcome. With attention to patterns of social development in the region, the politics of elite alliance in the final phase of communism, the strength of civil society at extrication, and the role of the international system, it explains differences in regime outcomes across the region.     

Memory and forgetting: examining the treatment of traumatic historical memory in Grave of the Fireflies and The Wind Rises

Within Japanese popular culture, manga and anime have played a significant role in mediating responses to the outcome of the Pacific War. Miyazaki Hayao's (possibly) final feature-length film, The Wind Rises, has been an important addition to the preceding body of popular media ‘texts’ that raise such themes. This article aims to address the question of how far cinematic animation can reasonably be obliged to follow the kinds of historiographical concerns that inevitably arise when engaging with Japan's militarist past. To answer this question, considerable space is devoted to examining the historical context of what others have done in the post-war period and integrate that commentary into an analysis of how the works of Takahata Isao and Miyazaki Hayao fit amongst a succession of creative works that have been co-opted in the reshaping of historical perceptions of the Japanese at war amongst the Japanese themselves. This will also require some incidental discussion of methodological issues that arise when dealing with such cases as vehicles for understanding transformations in historical consciousness. Ultimately it is argued that Miyazaki does indeed make an important contribution to the commentary on the Japanese war experience, although it must, perhaps unavoidably, be on highly personal terms so far as The Wind Rises is concerned.     

Making and Mobilizing Moderates: Rhetorical Strategy,Political Networks,and Counterterrorism

Studies of counterterrorism have argued for the importance of bolstering, or “mobilizing,” moderates in the confrontation with violent extremists. Yet the literature has not elucidated when states seek to mobilize moderates and marginalize extremists, how they do so, or when they prove successful. The received wisdom is that states should cultivate and strengthen moderate allies by reaching out to them. This approach, however, fails to grasp the political challenges confronting potential moderates, whose priority is to build and retain legitimacy within their political community. Inspired by network approaches, we maintain that moderates can more easily emerge when their political interactions with the authorities are relatively sparse. We further argue that the state's strategies, including crucially its rhetorical moves, can bolster the moderates' local legitimacy. At times, this will entail not reaching out to moderates but isolating them. Before moderates can be mobilized, they must be made, and the state's criticism, more than its love, may do much to help moderate political forces emerge. This article explains why mobilizing moderates is critical, when it is difficult, and how authorities can nevertheless play a productive role in moderates' emergence. We establish our theoretical framework's plausibility by examining two cases—India's ultimately triumphant campaign against Sikh extremists and Spain's gradual marginalization of Basque extremists. We then suggest what lessons these campaigns against ethnonational terrorism hold for the so-called War on Terror.     

A Long War in the East: Doctrine,Diplomacy, and the Prospects for a Protracted Sino-American Conflict

Increasing diplomatic tension between China and the United States has led to concerns about military conflict, possibly including rapid nuclear escalation. Scholars have spent less time considering the opposite scenario: protracted conventional war. This analysis explains why a combination of politics, geography, and technology may conspire to produce such a war, despite the fact that both sides are planning for a short, high-intensity fight. It shows how the Peloponnesian War, an ancient conflict fought with ancient weapons, nonetheless provides a warning of what might happen in the present. It also describes a grim trade off that American policy-makers will face in the event of war. Washington can take steps to reduce the chance of nuclear escalation, but in so doing will make a long war more likely. The conclusion describes the diplomatic challenge of war termination in a protracted conflict where neither side can compel the other to back down.     

Window of opportunity: Reflections on an idea fashionable in the west

The essay warns about the extreme danger of the fashionable idea that the West has only a marginal role to play in Russia's integration into the world community. It does not take into account the ferocious war of ideas in post‐Soviet Moscow which all but insures that nationalist ambition ‘to return Russia to the status of a leading global power’ would come out a winner. As a result of this the window of opportunity that opened after the disintegration of the Soviet empire may well slam shut again. The only way to prevent it seems to be for the West to create its own strategy of Russia's integration in which the dominant up to now theme of economic assistance (hardware) is replaced by the theme of intellectual participation (or the software of integration). That is why the purpose of the essay is to try to offer a logical set of criteria that could provide the basis for such an intelligent strategy.     

Tactical Means,Strategic Ends: Al Qaeda's Use of Denial and Deception

This analysis surveys Al Qaeda's employment of denial and deception (D&D) and shows that it uses D&D on tactical and operational levels in order to achieve strategic results. It defines denial and deception and explains how they relate to Al Qaeda, overviews Al Qaeda's changing network structure and seeks to summarize how Al Qaeda employs D&D throughout its operations. This paper is structured to show that denial and deception are institutionalized factors that manifest themselves through all aspects of bin Laden's organization and that the traditional conception of D&D—that nonstate actors are incapable of employing deception as an element of grand strategy—is incorrect.     

A Theory of Terrorist Leadership (and its Consequences for Leadership Targeting)

States often target terrorist leaders with the belief that the leader's death or capture will cause the terrorist organization to collapse. Yet the history of this strategy of “leadership targeting” provides a mixed record—for every example of effectiveness, there are similar examples of ineffectiveness. The central question of this article is: what makes a terrorist leader important? Specifically, what does a terrorist leader do that no one else can do (or do as well) for the organization? To answer this question, I develop a theory of terrorist leadership that argues that leaders might potentially perform two main functions: they can provide inspiration and/or operational direction (or not for both). I also theorize as to how and why the provision of these functions changes over time as the organization itself changes. The consequences for leadership targeting flow naturally from this theory—when leaders provide these functions to the organization, leadership targeting is most likely to be effective. Case studies of Algeria, Peru, and Japan offer insights into why some cases of leadership targeting were effective and why others were not. The conclusion extends this model with an analysis of al-Qaeda's prospects after the death of bin Laden.     

Refugee Flows,Ethnic Power Relations,and the Spread of Conflict

Why do some refugee flows cause conflict in the host state and others do not? Drawing on bargaining models of war, I argue refugees are especially likely to cause conflict when they alter the host state's ethnic balance of power. More specifically, I explain why multiple informational and commitment problems arise when refugee flows produce a rapid shift in relative power between ethnic groups. As an empirical strategy, I examine a unique controlled comparison made possible by the influx of Kosovar refugees into Albania and Macedonia in 1999 that eliminates over a dozen competing explanations for civil conflict. I then use process tracing to demonstrate how a change in relative power between ethnic groups fostered violence in Macedonia, whereas the preservation of the ethnic balance facilitated a peaceful refugee flow into Albania. This evidence, though tentative, indicates that a refugee flow's effect on the host state's ethnic balance of power can help explain whether the state experiences peace or conflict.     

Vigilant Jewish fundamentalism: From the JDL to Kach (or ‘Shalom Jews,Shalom Dogs')

The essay aims to explain the emergence of Kahanism in Israel and why Israeli democracy saw it necessary to defend itself against Kahane's quasi‐fascist ideas and to curtail his legitimacy. The author reflects on the Kahanist phenomenon, its ideology and political programme which brought Rabbi Kahane to the Knesset. The reading of Kach's racist proposals explains why extraordinary measures were taken against Kahane by the political system as well as by the media and the educational system.