Jordan: Between the Arab Spring and the Gulf Cooperation Council

The Arab Spring has fundamentally shifted the strategic balance in the Middle East. As all sides rush to ensure that their interests will be secured, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has emerged as a key battleground between those who would like to see a more democratic region, and those who would like to maintain economic stability. On one side of this debate is the Gulf Cooperation Council, led by Saudi Arabia, that views democratic reform as a threat to economic stability. On the other side are the forces of the Arab Spring, which have called for political reform in states such as Egypt, Syria, and Libya, even if these reforms come at the expense of stability. This article examines the various forces, both domestic and international, that are attempting to influence Jordan, and through it, the balance of power in the Arab World.     

Economic Interdependence and the Balance of Power

To account for variance in great powers responses to threats and the implications for the peacefulness of the international system since the late nineteenth century, this article elucidates a theory which refines and synthesizes economic liberal perspectives and realist balance of power theory. I argue that different patterns and levels of economic interdependence in the great power system generate societal-based economic constraints on, or incentives for, state leaders of status quo powers hoping to mobilize economic resources and political support to oppose perceived threats. This mobilization process influences strongly the preferences of status quo powers, other states beliefs about those preferences, and the interpretation of signals in balance of power politics. In this way, economic ties influence the strategies great powers pursue. Firm balancing policies conducive to peace in the international system are most likely, I then hypothesize, when there are extensive economic ties among status quo powers and few or no such links between them and perceived threatening powers. When economic interdependence is not significant between status quo powers or if status quo powers have strong economic links with threatening powers, weaker balancing postures and conciliatory policies by status quo powers, and aggression by aspiring revisionist powers, are more likely. I then illustrate how these hypotheses explain the development of the Franco-Russian alliance of the 1890s and its effectiveness as a deterrent of Germany up to 1905, British ambivalence toward Germany from 1906 to the First World War, the weakness of British, French, Soviet, and American behavior toward Germany in the 1930s and World War II, and the American and European responses to the Soviet threat, including the NATO alliance, and the "long peace" of the post-1945 era.     

Pivot but Hedge: A Strategy for Pivoting to Asia While Hedging in the Middle East

The U.S. government's new emphasis on the Asia-Pacific represents a bold strategic choice that could animate U.S. national security policy for years to come. Yet the United States must balance its rightful new focus on the Asia-Pacific with the volatility that still exists in other areas of the world. The United States should pivot to the Asia-Pacific—but to protect its vital interests, it should also hedge against threats elsewhere, particularly in the greater Middle East. To implement a “Pivot but Hedge” strategy, the U.S. government should do three things. First, it should exercise caution when cutting the defense budget. Second, it should give the military services greater leadership roles in specific regions: naval and air forces should lead in the Asia-Pacific, while ground forces should lead in the greater Middle East. Third, it should maintain expansible, capable, and well-trained ground forces as a hedge against global uncertainty.     

Revisionism and Its Variants: Understanding State Reactions to Foreign Policy Failure

States respond to failure in different ways. In light of the phenomenon of revisionist states, it is particularly important to understand why some revisionist states revert to status quo pursuits in the face of policy failure, while others pursue revisionism even in the face of external developments that we might expect would push them toward moderation. Domestic structure, domestic politics, and elite ideology each contribute to an explanation of how revisionist states respond to policy failure, but none of these variables alone tells the full story. As is illustrated through case studies of Iranian, Israeli, and Iraqi foreign policy in the 1980s, domestic structure plays the launching role in the analysis of how a revisionist state will behave. Regime type structures the incentives facing leaders and determines whether domestic politics or elite ideology is determinative in predicting a revisionist state's reactions to failure.     

Useful ignorance: The benefits of uncertainty during power shifts

This paper develops a formal model exploring how declining states allocate scarce military resources across multiple commitments under uncertainty. The model reveals that under certain conditions, states might actually benefit from their own uncertainty. In the model, a declining state’s uncertainty creates incentives for a revisionist rising power to misrepresent its intentions. But importantly, this misrepresentation requires the rising state to act cooperatively, implementing policies that immediately benefit the declining state. The model reveals how declining states can exploit these incentives in order to maximize the short-term benefits of their counterpart’s cooperation. Under some conditions, the benefits of this deceptive cooperation can outweigh the long-term costs of being deceived. These dynamics do not operate when the declining state is certain of the rising state’s type. I illustrate this logic through a case study of Great Britain’s pre-WWI naval withdrawal from East Asia.     

Dangerous Days: The Impact of Nationalism on Interstate Conflict

Does an upsurge in nationalism make interstate conflict more likely? This article gives evidence to suggest that spikes in nationalism do have a direct impact on the likelihood of disputes between states. In it, I use national days or anniversaries as occasions that increase the salience of a national identity and its historical wars. I show that in the two months following national days, conflict is markedly higher than would be expected—almost 30 percent more likely than the rest of the year—and particularly likely for states who initiate conflict or who have revisionist intentions. I demonstrate further how nationalist sentiment can increase international tensions with a case study of national anniversaries in China and Japan. Together, this evidence suggests that the increase in nationalism around national days provides both risks and opportunities to regimes and shapes when they choose conflict over cooperation in international relations.     

中亚外高形势衍变中的中东因素（英文）

Central Asia and Transcaucasia is one of the world's major Muslim-populated areas and is closely connected to the Middle East. Three major forces from the Middle East are actively seeking influence in the region:Iran,Turkey,and Islamic extremists represented by the Islamic State.     

Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and Balancing in East Asia

Realists agree that great powers balance the military power of rising powers, but there is little agreement regarding secondary-state responses to rising powers. First, there are differences regarding whether secondary states balance or accommodate rising powers. Second, there are differences among realists regarding the distinct roles of economic and military factors in secondary-state alignment policies. Third, some scholars argue that state alignments are not necessarily determined by realist variables, but can reflect preferences shaped by intentions, historical experiences, or cultural influences. This paper addresses these issues in balance-of-power theory. Its empirical focus is the impact of the rise of China on secondary-state alignments in East Asia. After examining the complex mix of China's military and economic reach in East Asia, it concludes that secondary-state behavior is sensitive to local variation in the great power capabilities and that secondary states tend to accommodate rather than balance rising powers. It further concludes that economic capabilities alone are insufficient to generate accommodation, so that the political-economy literature should reexamine cases of apparent secondary-state accommodation to economic dependency, sensitive to the presence of military vulnerability on the part these secondary states to proximate great powers. These conclusions suggest that there is nothing sui generis or culturally-determined in East Asian international politics and that realism can explain alignment behavior among East Asian states as well as it does among European states. Research on East Asia's response to China's rise that is sensitive to intra-regional variations in U.S. and Chinese military and economic capabilities also challenges assumptions of an emerging Chinese regional hegemony or of a costly region-wide U.S.-China competition.     

Exit Britain: British Withdrawal From the Palestine Mandate in the Early Cold War, 1947–1948

The British decision to withdraw from the Palestine mandate in 1947–1948 may at first glance appear contradictory to British strategic interests. The Middle East and Palestine were vital to Britain's Cold War strategy, and its government repeatedly stated the need for a continued British presence in the region to prevent Soviet expansion. Why then withdraw from Palestine just as the Cold War started? The traditional explanation is that Britain withdrew because of economic exhaustion and its inability to remain a great power. But this article shows that economic and strategic considerations both contributed to the decision to withdraw. Britain's involvement in Palestine threatened to undermine its relations with the independent Arab states, and the decision to withdraw from Palestine was therefore taken in the hope that this would secure Britain's position in the rest of the Middle East.     

U.S. Strategy in a Transitioning Middle East: Reviving ‘State Responsibility’

In light of the uncertainty surrounding the Middle East stemming from the Arab Awakening, and the inability of Washington to shape the process of transition, U.S. decision- makers must rethink their strategy for the region in general and for counterterrorism in particular. Reducing U.S. involvement in the region and letting the dust settle will serve American interests better and allow for building healthier relations with Middle Eastern countries. At the same time, since the risk of negative effects on neighboring states that accompany transition must be kept in check, the United States, together with other powers, should lead the international community in reviving the principle of “state responsibility” as a productive way to reduce spillover of conflicts and even provide incentives for actors in the region to limit violence.     

Middle East Transformation from the Perspective of U.S. Middle East Policy

The Middle East, one of the most turbulent regions in the world, has embarked on another round of chaos since America waged the Iraq war in 2003, new players vying to fill the power vacuum, entrenched hatred multiplying with new wounds. Ecstasy turned into agony as Americans watched the war unfold. U.S. think tank researchers and politicians, reflecting on the war and U.S. Middle East policy, urged the Bush administration to adjust the policy and break the strategic impasse. Under grave pressure from home and abroad, the White House finally began to respond. Against this backdrop, the year 2007 witnessed the most intensive and extensive shift of U.S. Middle East policy in recent years and a drastic return of realism in America＇s foreign policy. These policy changes rippled in the Middle East, precipitating policy changes of other powers and transformation of the geopolitical landscape. The Middle East, as we can see, is heading toward a new age of pain and growth.     

伊斯兰教与中东国家现代化的基本特点

中东地区的宗教地域特征和伊斯兰教固有的强烈涉世性决定了中东国家现代化之路有别于其他国家,并围绕伊斯兰教而显露分野.中东伊斯兰国家现代化进程显现出下列基本特点:(1)中东地区是发展中国家最先启动现代化进程的地区之一,其类型属于外源后发型;(2)中东国家的现代化模式有多样性和多元化特色,不同程度的国家干预和"超政府力量"对各国现代化进程起主导作用;(3)在现代化进程中,中东各国的政治发展普遍滞后于经济发展,但经济发展并未促成社会和经济结构发生质的飞跃;(4)中东是多种矛盾的集合点和冲突的进发区,各国都缺乏现代化必需的稳定的内外环境,现代化进程不断受阻;(5)中东国家现代化进程始终面临如何更深入地协调宗教与世俗,传统与现代化关系的问题.     

The Status of Democracy and Human Rights in the Middle East: Does Regime Type Make a Difference?

The collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War have been accompanied by the spread of democracy, advancement in human rights, and the introduction of market reforms throughout the world. The Middle East has been no exception to this trend. There, in response to mounting economic crises and domestic pressures, several governments introduced democratic and economic reforms. This article investigates the progress that Middle East states have made on the path to political liberalization. In particular, it explores whether democratic reforms vary between regional republics and monarchies. To do so, the study analyzes patterns and trends associated with the distribution of political authority and human rights. The article employs five dimensions in this process, including electoral procedural democracy, liberal democracy, personal integrity rights, subsistence rights, and economic freedom. On the one hand, our findings comport with the view that Middle East states have not made significant progress toward institutionalizing procedural democracy and civil liberties. On the other, they lend support to the notion that liberalization is occurring in the region, particularly among monarchies.     

中东剧变与阿拉伯世界的未来

当前中东正经历的历史性剧变,不仅引发阿拉伯世界的集体大动荡,而且严重冲击地区政治、安全和地缘政治关系,也对大国的中东政策构成重大挑战。未来中东局势改革已势在必行;伊斯兰政治力量将增大,阿拉伯世界长期陷入内乱,伊朗、土耳其将谋求发挥更大地区影响力;美国全球战略与中东政策面临多重结构性挑战;欧盟在外交、能源、安全、移民等方面遭遇前所未有的压力;国际原油市场受冲击从而影响全球经济复苏。     

Repression and Monarchical Resilience in the Arab Gulf States

Why the uprisings that broke out across the Middle East and North Africa in 2010-11 ousted the leaders of republics but left monarchies largely intact remains puzzling. One promising explanation for the resilience of monarchical regimes argues that monarchs exercise repression in a comparatively restrained and largely effective fashion. Proponents of this theory tend to conflate two crucial causal factors: the level of state coercion exercised against opposition activists and the degree of indiscriminateness with which coercion is deployed. By treating these variables as analytically distinct, a more compelling explanation for monarchical resilience can be advanced. The advantages of the revised argument are illustrated by revisiting the divergent trajectories of the uprisings in Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.     

Terrorism-Free Zone in East Central Europe? Strategic Environment,Risk Tendencies,and Causes of Limited Terrorist Activities in the Visegrad Group Countries

The aim of this article is to analyse terrorism and the phenomena linked to it in East Central Europe. In comparison with a number of other regions of today's world, this area can currently seem to be a relatively “terrorism-free zone.” Although the number of terrorist attacks committed in this territory is insignificant, this does not mean that the risk of terrorism is entirely negligible in the region. This text explains some historical determinants of the current situation and describes the consequences both of regime change in the countries in question and of their foreign policy decisions after 1989. I also analyse the importance of East Central Europe as a logistical space for international terrorism (weapons procurement, stays of terrorists, etc.). I characterise the threats of Islamic and Middle Eastern terrorism in connection with the pro-American and pro-Israeli policies of East Central European countries, especially after 9/11, assess the risks posed by the domestic extremist scenes in those countries that have a relationship with terrorism, and take notice of the accusations of terrorism that have been voiced in international politics. On the basis of this data, I then provide an overview of the importance of East Central Europe for the contemporary study of terrorism.     

Ethnicity,political survival,and the exchange of nationalist foreign policy

How does leadership’s desire for political survival in ethnically heterogeneous democracies affect the probability of states exchanging nationalist foreign policy? I define nationalist foreign policy as foreign policy that aims to fulfill national self-governance using a civic or ethnic frame. I argue that civic-nationalist policy disputing the territoriality of one’s own state is more likely, while ethno-nationalist policy favoring the leadership’s foreign co-ethnics is less likely, when the size of the leadership’s ethnic group is small and the level of democracy is relatively high. This is because the leadership, under such domestic conditions, has to mobilize support from other ethnic groups in order to stay in power. Civic-nationalist policy allows the leadership to increase domestic solidarity across ethnic lines and mobilize support from other ethnic groups, whereas ethno-nationalist policy would risk other ethnic groups criticizing the leadership of being ethno-centrist. These hypotheses are supported by quantitative analysis using an original dataset.     

Consider the Source: Organizational Bias in Estimates of Foreign Military Spending

I seek to determine the degree and nature of bias in the military spending estimates of the two main sources of such data—the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). I examine how ACDA and SIPRI revise their estimates of foreign military spending. I do so by evaluating ACDA and SIPRI growth rate estimates from successive statistical volumes for a full sample of countries and years as well as for seven identified regions (Africa, East Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, South Asia, NATO Europe, and the Warsaw Pact), to determine whether, and by how much, early and late estimates of each organization depart from its own or the other's final estimates. The findings reveal that systematic (or patterned) error for some regions is high and that unpatterned error for some regions is extremely high. The latter finding is important because unpatterned error can become systematic with changes in sample size.     

Causes of the US Hostage Crisis in Iran: The Untold Account of the Communist Threat

This article provides a revisionist account of the occupation of the US embassy in Tehran in November 1979, one of the most conspicuous manifestations of anti-Americanism in recent history. Drawing solely upon primary documents, largely from various Iranian communists and Islamists, it questions the conventional wisdom that the Islamists' takeover of the embassy was a grassroots reaction to American policies, particularly after President Carter admitted the ailing Shah. It also challenges the argument that the radical students stormed the embassy primarily to bring down the nationalist provisional government. Instead, I introduce a critical overlooked factor and argue that the Hostage Crisis can be better explained as a preemptive act by the Islamists to outbid the leftists' anti-American activities. I demonstrate that the United States and the Islamists were seeking to maintain normal relations during and even after the 1979 revolution. However, various communist organizations that surfaced after the revolution posed an existential threat to the new Islamist-nationalist government, quickly dominating universities, labor unions, and intellectual circles throughout the country and accusing the Islamists and their nationalist allies of collaborating with the United States. In this climate, the Islamists strategically adopted the Left's anti-imperialist language and eventually occupied the US embassy to establish their anti-American credibility.     

Reshuffling the Middle East: A Historical and Political Perspective

The Middle East is experiencing one of the darkest periods in its history and a new regional order is still far from being established. Yet, it appears increasingly clear that few matters will affect its developments more than the ongoing regional demographic dynamics. The region’s history and spatial background provide a framework for approaching these epochal shifts and critically examining the ‘ethnic stabilisation’ thesis, which interprets current demographic movements as a kind of normalisation of the region’s ‘original’ demographics. Instead of this ‘medievalization of the Middle East’, many people in the region are keen on ‘getting back into history’ and ‘regaining possession’ of their multifaceted past: a powerful antidote to the geopolitical reductionism so popular nowadays.