From Israel with Deterrence: Strategic Culture,Intra-war Coercion and Brute Force

This study contributes to the debate on the role of nonnuclear (conventional) deterrence in international security by examining the Israeli practice of this strategy. By analyzing a case outside of Western strategic thought, which traditionally has dominated deterrence theory, it demonstrates how strategic thinking evolves differently in various ideational realms. The article highlights the impact of strategic culture on the Israeli conceptualization of deterrence, explores its deficits, and yields lessons for theoreticians and practitioners from the challenges of intra-war coercion operations. The study introduces the innovative term “culminating point of deterrence,” calls for improving analytical techniques for deterrence evaluation, claims that successful conventional deterrence perpetuates political conflict, stimulates the adversary's dangerous innovations, and argues for a tailored approach not only for formulating deterrence strategy, but also for exploring deterrence policies of different actors. The findings of the study are applicable beyond the Israeli case and are relevant to actors utilizing coercion strategies.     

Selection Effects and Deterrence

The empirical question of how often deterrent threats issued during international disputes succeed has been hotly debated for years, with some researchers arguing that virtually no robust cases of success can be identified. I argue that what appears to be an empirical and methodological debate actually arises from the inadequacy of classical rational deterrence theory, which fails to comprehend the implications of states' strategic self-selection into international disputes. Rational self-selection is shown to imply that in a sample of crises, deterrent threats issued after an initial challenge will tend to fail in precisely those cases where they are relatively most credible signals of an intent to resist with force. The product of a selection effect, this paradoxical implication allows a resolution of the debate on the efficacy of deterrence in crises. And because selection effects can arise whenever a historical "case" is the product of choices by actors who also influence the outcome in question, this example from the study of deterrence has broad relevance for empirical research.     

Using Ideas Strategically: The Contest Between Business and NGO Networks in Intellectual Property Rights

Whose ideas matter? And how do actors make them matter? Focusing on the strategic deployment of competing normative frameworks, that is, framing issues and grafting private agendas on policy debates, we examine the contentious politics of the contemporary international intellectual property rights regime. We compare the business victory in the establishment of the 1994 Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property (TRIPS) in the World Trade Organization with the subsequent NGO campaign against enforcing TRIPS to ensure access to essential HIV/AIDS medicines. Our analysis challenges constructivist scholarship that emphasizes the distinction between various types of transnational networks based on instrumental versus normative orientations. We question the portrayal of business firms as strictly instrumental actors preoccupied with material concerns, and NGOs as motivated solely by principled, or non-material beliefs. Yet we also offer a friendly amendment to constructivism by demonstrating its applicability to the analysis of business. Treating the business and NGO networks as competing interest groups driven by their normative ideals and material concerns, we demonstrate that these networks' strategies and activities are remarkably similar.     

"Women, Children and Other Vulnerable Groups": Gender, Strategic Frames and the Protection of Civilians as a Transnational Issue

This article offers an explanation for the use of gender essentialisms in transnational efforts to advocate for the protection of war-affected civilians. I question why human rights advocates would rely upon such essentialisms, since they arguably undermine the moral logic of the civilian immunity norm on which their normative claims are based. This can be understood, I argue, as part of a strategic framing process in which pre-existing cultural ideas, filtered through an environment characterized by various political constraints, impact the rhetorical strategies available to advocates. In-depth interviews with civilian protection advocates reveal that many believe that warring parties, the global media, transnational constituencies and partners in the international women's network will all be more receptive to their message if it is couched in terms of protecting "women and children" specifically. Network actors believe that while this may undermine the protection of adult male civilians and while it may reproduce harmful gender stereotypes, these problems are outweighed by the gains in access to needy populations and the benefits of getting "civilians" on the international agenda. I conclude by considering the extent to which this cost/benefit analysis is being contested and reconsidered by some actors within the civilian protection network.     

Simulating terrorism and insurgency: video games in the war of ideas

This article analyses several video games created by Hezbollah and Afkar Media which simulate recent conflicts in Israel and Lebanon. These games are representative of an important new means of waging ideological warfare which is increasingly a part of the media strategies that states, violent non-state actors and media corporations employ in their efforts to persuade audiences. I argue that video games allow their developers to address players as though they were participants in ongoing conflicts, rather than passive observers, and that this style of presentation is extremely useful to efforts to create an attractive image of people who are frequently described as ‘terrorists’. Video games also enable their developers to carefully construct media narratives that appear to be realistic depictions of contemporary conflicts even when those narratives show signs of bias. Through these mechanisms, video games provide violent non-state actors and organizations sympathetic to them with a means of presenting their grievances and displaying their fighting prowess in ways that advance the organizations' strategic goals.     

Deterrence,uncertainty and cooperative behavior

The paper analyzes deterrence relationships in situations when the relevant forms of behavior are subject to lags such as in the case of foreign interventions and technological arms races. Mutual deterrence is a way of inducing cooperative behavior. Successful deterrence, in the cases considered, can be considered as ways of inducing cooperative behaviors in Prisoners’ Dilemma Supergames, the model used in this paper. It is argued that, in general, deterrence is more likely to be successful and hence cooperative behavior more prevalent in systems where the actors can move between strategies quickly (i.e., are flexible) and which are characterized by low uncertainty. The paper also analyzes the concept of discounting and time preference in the discussion of political phenomena where the concept has no market interpretation. It is analyzed as a rational response to uncertainty.     

Designing Police: Interpol and the Study of Change in International Organizations

On those rare occasions when scholars of international organizations (IOs) consider the issue of change, they typically highlight the centrality of states. Although states are important for understanding when and why there is a change in the tasks, mandate, and design of IO, IOs themselves can initiate change. Drawing from sociological institutional and resource dependence approaches, in this article we treat IOs as strategic actors that can choose among a set of strategies in order to pursue their goals in response to changing environmental pressures and constraints that potentially threaten their relevance and resource base. We delineate six strategies—acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance, manipulation, and strategic social construction, and suggest that the strategic choice by IOs is contingent on the level of both organizational insecurity and the congruence between the content of environmental pressures and organizational culture. We emphasize how IOs must make a trade-off between acquiring the resources necessary to survive and be secure, on the one hand, and maintaining autonomy, on the other. We apply this framework to the case of Interpol, investigating how different calculations of these trade-offs led Interpol staff to adopt different strategies depending on its willingness to accept, resist, or initiate changes that demand conformity to external pressures.     

The Electoral Terrorist: Terror Groups and Democratic Participation

Why do some terrorist groups participate in the electoral process but not others? If elections provide some strategic or tactical benefit then we would expect other groups to emulate that strategy. However, we see variation in the adoption of an electoral strategy by terrorist groups. I argue that involvement in territorial disputes and group competition determine whether terrorist groups embrace an electoral strategy. Conflicts involving territorial disputes are more likely to see terrorist groups contest elections because electoral participation may aid in the creation of the independent or autonomous territory they desire. Increased group competition changes the number of actors, which impacts the level and distribution of resources (supporters, finance, and arms) involved in the conflict. When multiple terrorist groups compete, groups are motivated to participate in elections in response to new competitive pressures. This argument is tested using a large-n dataset of 89 terrorist groups in existence during the years 1968–2006 and a case study of Hamas's decision to contest elections.     

Preemption in the Bush Doctrine: A Reappraisal

This article argues that the elevation of preemption to a cardinal status in the Bush Doctrine following September 11, 2001 resulted from a larger strategic consideration—to convince rogue states to discontinue their weapons of mass destruction programs and their sponsorship of terrorism. Dismantling the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq as a demonstration of preemptive action was seen as necessary to ensure the forceful and credible conveyance of this message to other rogue states, especially Iran and North Korea. I call this strategic logic behind publicizing preemption, "demonstrative compellence." Because the logic of preemption in the Bush Doctrine relied heavily on the Iraq war and its demonstrative force, it has little relevance to the future conduct of U.S. foreign policy and should not be described as revolutionary.     

The Discursive Demolition of the Asian Development Model

I demonstrate the constitutive effects of discursive strategies and explore the discursive conditions in which changing ideas generate these effects. I perform an extensive analysis of the discursive strategies generated by three key actors in the Asian financial crisis. I argue that all three, U.S. Treasury, the International Monetary Fund, and the Kim Dae-jung South Korean administration, represented key practices associated with the Asian model as "cronyism" and as "corruption," thereby normatively delegitimating these practices, thereby effecting the demise of the Asian model of development in Korea. I argue that these discursive practices generate narrative structures that have a constitutive effect on the subsequent discursive and economic practices of actors. The manner in which the narratives represent "causes" of the crisis constitute and reconstitute the social meanings by which past and current social and economic practices are legitimated or de-legitimated. The structures constituted by these social meanings re-create and reconstitute the present and future conditions for strategic action. I conclude with a demonstration of how these narratives institutionalize the discourses they construct through changes in Korean state and commercial institutions.     

Norms Are What States Make of Them: The Political Psychology of Norm Violation

I examine why states violate norms they embrace as members of international society. The rationalist answer, that norms are violated whenever they conflict with interests, is underspecified and empirically challenged. Constructivists cannot address violations well from their structural, sociological perspective. I argue from political psychology that violations stem from the motivated biases of actors who face a moral dilemma between personal desires and social constraints. These biases compel leaders to interpret norms and situations in a manner that justifies violation as socially acceptable. The ability to do so depends on the norm and the situation. The more parameters a norm possesses, and the more ambiguous those parameters are, the easier it is for actors to interpret them favorably to justify violation. Oftentimes norms are what states make of them. If the situation is plausible for states to claim exemption, they violate; otherwise they are constrained. The U.S. invasion of Panama illustrates these dynamics.     

Quantum Sensing's Potential Impacts on Strategic Deterrence and Modern Warfare

This article examines the impact of quantum sensing on strategic deterrence and modern warfare. It has two related objectives. The first is to highlight quantum sensing as an important area of research for the policy communities considering the role of emerging technologies on strategic deterrence and countering weapons of mass destruction. The second aim is to present the potential warfighting implications of quantum sensing if employed by either the United States or its adversaries. While quantum sensing technologies offer opportunities to transform modern warfare, they also present challenges and risks. The article contends that the quantum sensing investment, research, and development should be prioritized within the Department of Defense's quantum science modernization agenda to ensure that the U.S. military does not cede technological advantage to competitors, such as the People's Republic of China, who are actively investing in quantum sensing applications that could upend the United States’ existing deterrence and warfighting capabilities.     

Where We Get Thucydides Wrong: The Fallacies of History’s First “Hegemonic” War

Thucydides’ History remains the basis for numerous claims within International Relations Theory, contributing to defining concepts from the security dilemma to the dynamics of bi-polarity and hegemonic transition theory. But the historical record that underpins Thucydides’ History provides a more complex view of the rivalry between Athens and Sparta. This analysis argues that basing explanations for the Great Peloponnesian War on the premise of Spartan “fear” is incomplete. A bi-polar, hegemonic rivalry did not lock-in the two states; they existed in a complex multi-polar system. This multi-polarity allowed other actors—notably Corinth—to play a key role in the outbreak of war. It was consideration for alliances, empires, and political rivalries within the context of multi-polarity, rather than a prosaic Spartan “fear,” that were at the heart of the war. These unique characteristics combined with the misrepresentation of the historical record, make generalising from the Peloponnesian War dangerous.     

On Extended Nuclear Deterrence

This analysis discusses the central challenges that countries face when they practice extended nuclear deterrence. One key problem has to do with credibility: potential aggressors may not believe that a country would fight to defend an ally, particularly if doing so risks a nuclear attack against its homeland. Countries might be able to address this issue by forging formal alliances with protégés or by stationing nuclear forces on the protégé’s territory. Do these measures discourage third-party aggression? Defence pacts involving nuclear-armed states effectively bolster extended deterrence. One risk of extending nuclear protection from the American perspective, however, is that it might pull the United States into unwanted wars by risk-acceptant protégés. Yet, in a nuclear context, the risk of alliance entrapment is generally overblown. Placing nuclear weapons on an ally’s territory does much less to bolster extended deterrence than one might initially think. Although foreign nuclear deployments may reassure allies and promote non-proliferation to some degree, their value for extended deterrence is fairly minimal. The United States continues to deploy nuclear weapons in five European countries, but the case for maintaining these deployments is decidedly weak.     

U.S.Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy and China's Coping Strategy

Deterrence and coercion are two kinds of strategies,the latter being more aggressive than the former.The U.S.Asia-Pacific Rebalancing strategy is an important diplomatic legacy of Obama's administration.For the issues involving the Diaoyu Islands,the South China Sea,cyber security,DPRK's nuclear program,and Iran's nuclear program,the U.S.has carded out military deterrence and non-force coercion against China.But generally,these are low-level coercive measures and distinct from the severe economic sanction and diplomatic isolation imposed by the U.S.on Russia,Syria,DPRK and Iran in recent years.Concerning issues where the U.S.and China hold distinct views,there would be less strategic leeway for the two countries.If the U.S.is to strengthen deterrence and coercion towards China,China can respond more actively and effectively,but it will be more difficult to build a new model of China-U.S.major-country relationship.     

中美不对称核稳定与美国战略机会主义论析

中美两国安全关系在两国总体关系中扮演着重要的角色,研究中美之间的战略稳定关系,对于维护两国安全关系的稳定具有重要意义。中国的核威慑实力弱于美国,中美之间呈现出不同于传统战略稳定关系的不对称核稳定态势。中国对美国存在一定的核威慑能力,但有效性仍有差距和不足。这一差距容易使美国产生压制和削弱中国核报复能力的机会主义思想。实施限制损伤战略、发展导弹防御能力、进行战略反潜是美国对中国实施战略机会主义的主要行动。美国谋求削弱中国核报复能力、打破中美不对称核稳定的企图,与中国努力维持核威慑能力、维持中美不对称核稳定的行为形成了两股力量相持的态势。中国应重点提升核武器的质量,提高威慑信号的传递效能,以可信可靠的核威慑和核反击能力打消美国战略机会主义心态,维持两国间的战略稳定,特别是危机稳定性,筑牢遏制战争爆发的基础。     

Fencing in Warfare: Threats,Punishment, and Intra-war Deterrence in Counterterrorism

New theoretical approaches have been developed that apply deterrence and coercion to counterterrorism. Critics have suggested, however, that in the particular case of deterring terrorism by threats of punishment, a mismatch exists between deterrent goals and counterterrorism intentions: the twin aims of destroying and deterring a single opponent is logically and theoretically incompatible. These criticisms, however, neglect to take two important factors into consideration. First, threats of punishment in counterterrorism can be applied against a wide assortment of actors involved in and associated with terrorism and political violence. Second, the concept of “intra-war deterrence” suggests ways in which a state can deter certain behavior or a specific form of warfare while engaging in open conflict with that same adversary. In exploring both factors, this article posits that states can gain coercive leverage over different actors involved in terrorism, including organizations with which they are actively hoping to defeat.     

Deterring the terrorist: A psychological evaluation of different strategies for deterring terrorism

This article seeks to evaluate different anti‐terrorism strategies from a psychological perspective. Two major deterrent strategies are identified: the Denial Strategy and the Reintegrative Strategy. It is the contention of this article that both these strategies may be thought of as practical applications of different theories of crime deterrence. The Denial Strategy effectively mirrors early theories of crime deterrence, which concentrate on minimising the benefits, and increasing the costs, of crime through legal sanctions. By way of contrast, the Reintegrative Punishment Strategy represents a modern and more sophisticated theory of deterrence, which recognises the cost of non‐legal sanctions to the terrorist and the need to reintegrate the terrorist back into society. This article discusses the relative psychological merits of both these strategies, focusing on the normal psychology of the terrorist. In the course of this examination two major defects of the Denial Strategy are established and it is argued that the Reintegrative Punishment Strategy of deterring terrorism has greater psychological validity because it confronts the issues of the alienation and reintegration of the terrorist. These findings highlight the dangers of policy‐makers neglecting the psychology of the terrorist.     

Tempering Optimism about Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia

This article tempers the argument of deterrence optimists, who make the case that nuclear deterrence has maintained the peace between regional nuclear rivals. In particular, it challenges the assertion by Kenneth Waltz that “nuclear deterrence has passed all of the many tests it has faced” among regional rivals in South Asia. Examining two major regional military crises, this article notes that, first, nuclear deterrence was not the key factor ending these crises. Instead, nonnuclear factors involving American diplomacy, which provided the participants with timely exit strategies, ended the crises. Second, if these crisis-ending factors had not been present, there was a strong possibility of significant military escalation, and nuclear deterrence would not have averted such an escalation. The article concludes by noting that, in regions where deterrence optimism is not well supported, Washington may continue intervening in crises between nuclear rivals, and, anticipating such a U.S. approach, regional rivals could become involved in repeated military crises over the long term.     

Deterrence games and social choice: Asymmetry,aggregation of preferences,and a conjecture about uncertainty

Rational choice principles of mutual deterrence in 2 × 2 games elaborated for Prisoner's Dilemma and for Chicken are generalized to a variety of other, asymmetric games in which players’ preferences satisfy a Condition for Mutual Deterrence. Players’ preferences are taken to be aggregations from the preferences of subsidiary participants. It is shown that, unless all subsidiary actors hold deterrable preferences, the ordering of the player cannot be guaranteed to be deterrable. Uncertainty regarding the preferences of subsidiary actors is conjectured to make it more likely a player will adopt a deterrence strategy, no matter the opponent's preferences in fact.