We Always Fight the Last War? Prior Experiences in Counterinsurgency and Conventional Warfare and War Outcomes

Does previous experience with conventional warfare harm a military fighting an insurgency? Or, conversely, does prior experience with a counterinsurgency lower a military’s likelihood for winning a conventional interstate war? Whereas firepower, maneuver, and associated tactics are essential for conventional warfare, counterinsurgency requires restrictions on firepower and effective policing in order to “win hearts and minds.” These competing requirements for military preparedness for conventional warfare and counterinsurgency have been extensively debated. However, the consequences of fighting counterinsurgency on a state’s readiness for fighting conventional wars (and vice versa) have been unexplored. We examine the relationship between past experiences with one type of conflict and war outcomes of the other type of conflict through a quantitative analysis of all wars that ended between 1838 and 2005. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that past experiences with either counterinsurgency or conventional warfare have little association with future success in war, conventional or not.     

Interaction and participation in sub‐war conflict, 1959–63

This research is concerned with the spread of sub‐war conflicts. It is hypothesized that higher levels of interaction with the contestants in such conflicts increase the probability of participation. A study of the behavior of the states in the CREON data set toward the Cold War during the years 1959–63 supports this contention. Attention then centers on determining the types of states that are most prone toward high levels of interaction. The findings in this section indicate that alliance members have significantly higher levels of interaction than non‐members. For members there is a strong negative logarithmic relationship between a state's geographical distance from the center of conflict and its level of interaction. This suggests that security interests strongly affect the inclination of such states to participate. Among non‐members of alliances, economic involvement in the international system and ties to the Warsaw Treaty Organization are most closely associated with interaction.     

The Eisenhower Administration and Public Diplomacy in India: An Ambivalent Engagement, 1953–1960

The United States–India relationship was fraught with misapprehension and ideological disagreement during the 1950s. Public diplomacy provides a valuable context for examining these dynamics. This analysis assesses the planning, deployment, and reception of American public diplomacy to India under President Dwight Eisenhower, a period encompassing Washington’s 1954 alliance with Pakistan and economic aid to India in 1957–1958. Public diplomacy reflects the Administration’s difficulty in clarifying its interests in India. The rhetorical and moralising approach of India’s leadership, and their prominence in the global non-aligned movement, contributed greatly to this ambivalence. Public diplomacy planning highlights Washington’s difficulties in confronting India’s identity in world politics; it struggled to craft messages on racial attitudes, consumerism, and Communism, whilst Soviet public diplomacy gave strong competition throughout the period. At the same time, several aspects of American public diplomacy resonated with Indian audiences, indicating that there was the possibility of a closer American relationship with India had Washington taken a different high policy approach to the region.     

Hybrid Warfare,International Negotiation,and an Experiment in “Remote Convening”

The authors are leading a multinational effort to understand the effects of “hybrid” warfare on international commercial negotiation. The start-up process is itself essentially a negotiation, among about forty individual practitioners and scholars with very diverse backgrounds, over whether and how they will work together. In a pandemic, a key risk is that the necessary cooperation and trust will be harder to build, particularly among professionals who are dealing with security-sensitive issues and who have never met each other. This article discusses the current necessity of replacing the in-person model for eliciting such cooperation which the authors had developed previously for large collaborative projects, and describes a “remote convening” replacement process.     

Abba Eban and the Development of American–Israeli Relations, 1950–1959

Abba Eban, Israel’s ambassador in Washington and representative at the United Nations from 1950 to 1959, had a central role in the transformation of American–Israeli relations during a period of frequent discord over key strategic issues. This analysis examines the influence of one prominent actor upon bilateral ties that would eventually become the American–Israeli “special relationship.” Eban’s oratory talent, linguistic skills, and effective style of diplomacy augmented both Israel’s image in the view of the American public and relations with official Washington. The article explores several critical elements of these relations during the 1950s, re-examining both Eban’s involvement in events such as Israel’s approach toward the problem of borders, its policy of military retaliation, and the response to severe American pressure following the 1956 Sinai campaign. Whilst not attributing the development of close relations between the two Powers solely to the works of a single individual, evidence suggests that Eban was the right man in the right place and time to provide the necessary foundations for the elevation of American–Israeli relations to “special” in the following decade.     

Nuclear Weapons in Britain's Policy towards France, 1960–1974

This article will attempt to draw attention to the Anglo–French nuclear weapons negotiations that ran alongside the British applications to join the EEC during the years 1960–1974. It suggests that the prospect of an entente nucléaire was an issue that played a unique role in the UK's negotiating strategy. It will argue that three successive Prime Minister's—Macmillan, Wilson and Heath—attempted to forge an agreement in the hope of overcoming French objections to Britain's entry, albeit for different reasons. All three were hampered by the “special nuclear relationship” with the Americans and this eventually precluded a mutually beneficial resolution.     

Surveillance to Combat Terrorist Financing in Europe: Whose Liberty,Whose Security?

Abstract

This article analyses recent developments in the campaign to combat terrorist financing in Europe and questions the utility of financial surveillance as a method to counter terrorism. A background presentation of surveillance in modern society is followed by an overview of earlier international initiatives to interdict money laundering. The measures used to combat terrorist finance are built upon this foundation of surveillance and criminal investigation. Applying these measures in the ‘war on terror’ has unintended consequences for the financial transactions of citizens and non-citizens alike. The article concludes by considering these problems and their impact on society within the context of a larger concern for the impact to individual liberty from these surveillance practices in pursuit of security in the early twenty-first century.     

Third world neutralism and British Cold War strategy, 1960–62

European decolonization appeared to the Western powers to open up fresh areas of the globe to Cold War competition. Concerned by the coincidence of Afro-Asian and Sovier pressure on the European colonial powers, and preoccupied with the redefinition of Britain's global role in the wake of decolonization, the British Foreign Office was convinced, despite much evidence to the contrary, that the West needed to champion ‘neutralism’ in order to prevent the Afro-Asian states from orienting towards the Soviet sphere. This article argues that this policy was determined more by their anxieties about Anglo-American relations in the wake of decolonization than by a deeply held conviction of the imminence of the extension of the communist world.     

Accredited to Africa: British diplomatic representation and African experience,c. 1960–95

This article examines the 1960 soviet attack on Dag Hammarskjold and its proposal to reform the office of the UN Secretary-General into a troika and the Soviet lines, the article seeks to show that the British had sufficiant concerns about the direction Hammarskjold was taking the office of Secretary-General to be more in line with Soviet attitudes than they would have been willing to admit publicly. British support for Hammarskjold in the Congo crisis was not unqualified and the article notes that following Hammarskjold's death, it was not Britain's interest to see Hammarskjold's successor being given the political freedom he had enjoyed.     

Civil War Diffusion and the Emergence of Militant Groups, 1960–2001

In this research note, I argue that scholars of the international diffusion of civil conflict would benefit from directly measuring rebel mobilization prior to the onset of civil war. To better understand the way in which international processes facilitate dissidents overcoming the collective action problem inherent in rebellion, I focus on militant organizations and model the timing of their emergence. I use several data sets on militant groups and violent nonstate actors and rely on Buhaug and Gleditsch’s (2008) causal framework to examine how international conditions predict militant group emergence. While Buhaug and Gleditsch conclude that civil war diffusion is primarily a function of internal conflict in neighboring states, once militant group emergence is substituted in the dependent variable, I observe that global conditions affect rebel collective action. A final selection model links militant groups with civil conflict onset and demonstrates the variable performance of diffusion effects. The results indicate that many rebels mobilize in response to more global events and then escalate their behavior in response to local conditions.     

Change and Stability in Eastern Asia: Nationalism,Communism, and British Policy, 1948–1955

British policy in Eastern Asia, 1948–55, aimed to combine the attainment of change leading to stability, to be secured through cooperating with nationalism against the growing threat from communism. After initial errors, ministers and officials revealed realism and flexibility, as shown in policies towards Burma, Malaya, and China. As regards Japan, the United States dominated decisionmaking and British views were rather negative towards the viability of political reform in the longer term and towards economic revival. The collapse of French authority in Indo-China pushed Anthony Eden towards compromise with the communist powers at the Geneva conference in 1954: Britain diverged from the US in supporting a strictly defensive alliance (SEATO), which was linked with an ambivalent approach to the future of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.     

From Natural Mediator to Junior Partner: Perceptions and Self-Perception in West Germany’s Diplomatic Conferences on Africa, 1959–1968

This analysis finds basis largely on the protocols of the three West German diplomatic conferences held in Africa in 1959, 1962, and 1968. It scrutinises the idea, advanced by part of Bonn’s foreign policy élite at the end of the 1950s, that the Federal Republic of Germany had a “special mediatory role” to play between the West and Africa in the age of decolonisation. The Federal Republic played a significant indirect role, especially on the economic side, in keeping Africa tied to the West after the end of colonialism. However, because of its exposed political situation in Europe, it was never in a position to pursue a real mediating effort in Africa’s decolonisation conflicts, therefore limiting its ambitions to that of “junior partner” of the former colonial Powers in the second half of the 1960s.     

A Behavioral Model of Dispute Escalation: The Major Powers, 1816–1976

This study combines the empirical evidence drawn from studies of conflict escalation in political science, and the social‐psychological insights concerning human inference and prediction, to develop a dynamic model of dispute escalation. This model makes systematic use of historical data concerning the behavioral unfolding of disputes involving at least one major power to generate probabilistic predictions of the war/no war outcomes of such disputes. Using the Correlates of War Project data on major power disputes in the 1816–1976 period, these predictions are tested against the actual outcomes of the disputes. Overall, the model predicts correctly nearly 94 percent of the cases and compares favorably to several null models against which it is tested. However, while not consistently biased the model's predictions are characterized by considerable instability across various probability ranges. This suggests that the incorporation of more stable factors such as underlying systemic and dyadic attributes may substantially improve the overall performance of the model as well as the stability of its predictions.     

Caught in the Middle: The United Nations Emergency Force,Israel, and the 1960 “Rotem Crisis”

The refusal of the UN forces in Lebanon to accede to Israel's request to provide information on events they were witness to (the October 2000 abduction of three Israeli soldiers on the border), and the subsequent crisis between the two, are not unprecedented. A much more severe crisis broke out in 1960 after nearly the entire Egyptian army surprisingly deployed a few kilometres behind the UN Emergency Force's (UNEF) posts along the border with Israel in Sinai. Israel hurried to request UNEF to provide information—considered crucial to its survival—on this deployment, but was refused.

The author reviews this unknown incident and tracks on the diplomatic efforts made by the then UN Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld alongside about UNEF's role and functions in this affair. He examines the UN's refusal and concludes that while the Egyptians did partially violate some informal understandings with the UNSG, it was indeed justified.