American foreign policy: A look ahead

The author reviews recent foreign policy achievements of the U.S. government. Relations with PRC and USSR are seen as having set the stage for further lessening of hostilities. The strong centres of power emerging in Europe and Japan are seen as requiring new frameworks for increasing cooperation, particularly in the areas of military deterrence vis‐à‐vis adversarial power centers and in the establishment of new and more equitable monetary and trading relationships. Relations with Third World countries are discussed. A large thrust of American foreign policy in the coming years is seen as devoted to the creation of a stable international system which is less dependent on the contribution of the United States.     

The choice for multilateralism: Foreign aid and American foreign policy

Why do governments choose multilateralism? We examine a principal-agent model in which states trade some control over the policy for greater burden sharing. The theory generates observable hypotheses regarding the reasons for and the patterns of support and opposition to multilateralism. To focus our study, we analyze support for bilateral and multilateral foreign aid giving in the US. Using new survey data, we provide evidence about the correlates of public and elite support for multilateral engagement. We find weak support for multilateralism and deep partisan divisions. Reflecting elite discourse, public opinion divides over two competing rationales—burden sharing and control—when faced with the choice between multilateral and bilateral aid channels. As domestic groups’ preferences over aid policy diverge from those of the multilateral institution, maintaining control over aid policy becomes more salient and support for multilateralism falls.     

Issue definition and two-level negotiations: An application to the American foreign policy process

This article builds on the two-level games and international negotiation literatures and shows how the use of an issue typology can shed light on the nature of the interactions between domestic political forces and international negotiations. This is done by presenting four foreign policy process models illustrating that the decision-making process varies depending on the type of issue that is involved in a particular situation. The varying structure and nature of the process affects the range of the domestic level win-set and hinders or aids the achievement of international agreement depending on which model is in play. Although the focus in this article is on the American foreign policy process, the argument is generic to the broader theoretical development of the two-level games approach because similar, but country-specific, decision-making models can be developed for use in the study of non-American foreign policy. Such generalizations build on recent work focusing on the impact of state structure on the foreign policy process and its outcomes.     

Utopianism and the Bush foreign policy

Amidst a renewed debate over the existence of an American empire, serious questions have emerged about whether the Bush foreign policy can be described as ‘realist’ given the widespread opposition that it encounters from academic realists. This paper is an attempt to shed light on this vexing issue by interpreting the Bush foreign policy through the lens of the broader religious–political tradition of America. Specifically, it argues that the neoconservatives in the Bush administration draw on the utopian strand of this tradition when setting their foreign policy agenda and justifying their decisions to the public. With special reference to Iraq, it discusses how three key utopian themes—the perfection of human life on earth, the possibility of limiting evil through conversion and the prospect of arresting human development—are reflected in the neoconservative agenda. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of how these themes run counter to the tenets of classical realism and of the ethical and political hazards that emerge from an attempt at utopian empire.     

Simulated foreign policy exchanges: The rationale underlying a theory of foreign policy interaction

This article is the first of a two‐part series on the development of a theoretical perspective for explaining foreign policy exchanges between nations. The first paper discusses the substantive thrust of the research, and presents an overview of the Monte Carlo computer simulation which lies at its core. The theory largely built on the body of research on events data analysis, attempts to assimilate the set of findings arising from this research into a single integrated theory. Basic assumptions of the theory derived from cybernetics and information theory are outlined, and the simulation rules used in the research are presented. These provide the basis for a later paper (to appear in Vol. 2, No. 2, 1975) that presents a formal mathematical theory which seeks to explain foreign policy exchanges.     

Immigration,refugees, and foreign policy

The author first notes that mass movements of people across international boundaries, whether voluntary or forced, are increasingly becoming topics for international concern. In particular, the late 1970s and early 1980s have seen a series of migration crises with powerful foreign policy implications. The policy consequences of these international migration movements are considered, with particular reference to U.S. policy.     

Political competition and foreign policy power sharing

In this essay I examine the intersection of domestic and international politics in the formation and conduct of foreign policy. 1 develop a three‐actor model that allows us to specify the incentives for power sharing under different assumptions about the distribution of preferences and capabilities between a government, a domestic opposition, and a foreign state. The model generates several interesting hypotheses about the interaction of policy goals and the willingness of actors to share power. In particular, I show that under certain conditions there are important asymmetries whereby doves may be more willing to share power than hawks. Importantly, this willingness is endogenous to the model and comes from the alignment of preferences in the policy space, rather than from an a priori value for the democratization of foreign policy making. The model also suggests several hypotheses about the circumstances under which states have incentives to meddle in the foreign policy processes of other states.     

Simulated foreign policy exchanges: A formal theory of foreign policy interaction (part II)

This article presents the underlying rationale for a theory of foreign policy dynamics, and is the second part of a two‐part series which specifies a theoretical perspective for explaining the exchanges between nations. The task of the first paper was to discuss the substantive thrust of the research, and to give a view of the Monte Carlo simulation which lies at its core. The theory deals with the relevance of such concepts as reciprocity, uncertainty, third party effects, bureaucratic politics and domestic events for explaining foreign policy. This article provides the axioms which structure our theory and formal theorems that follow from these axioms.