Nuclear Weapons and Intergenerational Exploitation

Nuclear weapons' defenders claim that they lower the risk of war, at the price of devastation if war breaks out. Sooner or later, however, on a realist analysis, catastrophic nuclear war is sure to come. Nuclear deterrence thus buys us a better chance of dying in bed, while each post-holocaust generation will have to pick up the pieces. If the nuclear optimists are wrong, hoping to spread or perpetuate nuclear deterrence is foolish; but if they are right, it is exploitative. Like big cars and cheap flights, nuclear deterrence benefits us at the expense of future generations. States that do not already have the bomb should not get it. Britain and France should consider disarmament, while Russia and the United States should slash their arsenals. Minimum deterrence should be equally stable, but most nuclear optimists, being neorealists who hold that war will continue, should want deep cuts even if it is not.     

France,Civil-Military Relations,and Nuclear Weapons

Robert S. McNamara, In Retrospect; The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam. New York: Random House, 1995. xviii, 414 pp./$27.50 cloth.     

《禁止核武器条约》之困境及出路

2021年1月22日起生效的《禁止核武器条约》致力于在全球范围内禁止核武器的拥有、研发、储存、转移、试验、使用或是威胁使用等行为,从而将核武器完全非法化。尽管《禁止核武器条约》反映了人道主义的关怀和无核世界的愿景,但该条约无论是在理论层面还是在现实层面都面临着不小的困境。从理论上看,《禁止核武器条约》以确立禁核规范来推动国际社会所有成员国弃核的逻辑基础并不牢固,因为规范可能退化甚至被颠覆,未必能够对国家产生强有力的约束。在现实层面,《禁止核武器条约》则因为全盘否定核威慑的重要性而遭到拥有核武器国家及其盟国的联合抵制,并暴露出该条约忽视部分国家的安全关切、损害国家自卫权利以及忽略裁军核查机制等不足。鉴于国际社会围绕《禁止核武器条约》产生了诸多争议,未来,该条约还是应当落脚到分步骤、渐进式的核裁军路线上来,需要在提供安全保证、区分禁核情形、建立核查机构,以及加强与不扩散国际机制兼容等方面进行完善,以促进当前核不扩散国际机制的改革和推动陷入停滞的核裁军进程的持续进行。     

日本核武装?

今年初以来,美国主张“容忍日本核武装”的言论不绝于耳。先有《华盛顿邮报》刊登的“日本牌”一文,明确主张以容忍日本核武装向中国施压:“如果中国不加入(对朝)包围网,美国应该支持日本持有自己的核威慑力量”;①后有美国前国防部长科恩访日时向日本执政党议员发问:“如果置之不理,朝鲜年内就可制造出6—8枚核武器,日本将如何反应?是配备弹道导弹防御系统,还是进行核武装?”②这些言论出现于美国自有朝核问题因素在     

后西方世界秩序下的核武器与核威慑

全球国际社会正处于一个关键的变化时期。长期以来占主导地位的西方秩序在如下几个方面面临包围:霸权分散、全球资本主义危机日益加重、全球共同面临恐怖主义、大规模移民以及环境变化等带来的各种威胁。英国脱欧、特朗普当选美国总统这些事件表明,作为世界秩序核心的英语世界,已失去其主导力量。目前的发展格局将朝着多元化的后西方世界秩序发展。在此秩序下,没有超级大国,只有大国,并且这些大国大多比较自我封闭,因此,并不存在真正意义上的争夺全球霸权的现象。文化差异将比意识形态差异更为重要。文章首先将这一秩序的轮廓做一大致勾勒,然后探讨这一秩序对未来几十年核武器与核威慑所要扮演的角色来说将意味着什么。最为关注的着眼点是,全球格局从全球层面向区域层面的转变以及复杂的核扩散与核威慑态势。     

以色列核选择的公开化及其影响

近年来,以色列长期奉行的核模糊政策越来越多地受到质疑,面临内外多方面的压力,核模糊政策自身的一些弊端和负面影响也日益凸显。随着国际核不扩散形势的发展及中东安全局势的变化,以色列为了更好地保证自身安全试图改行公开核选择的政策,这将对国际核不扩散机制及中东地区安全产生重要影响。     

Project Plowshare versus the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty

In 1957, representatives from the United States Atomic Energy Commission, the University of California Radiation Laboratory at Livermore, and other centres involved in nuclear research established Project Plowshare, a programme to apply the atom to what they called “peaceful nuclear explosions.” Although those involved in Plowshare proposed a variety of projects, they devoted most of their resources to the construction of a sea-level isthmian canal that would replace the existing Panama Canal. Turning that proposal into reality, however, ran into numerous roadblocks, amongst them the 1968 Treaty on the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. By 1970, the canal project had collapsed, and not long thereafter, Plowshare itself came to an end. But one desire of Plowshare scientists, that of creating “clean” nuclear explosives, may be in the offing. If developed, such devices could pose a threat to the existing non-proliferation regime.     

超越“确保摧毁”：核武器数量、承诺可信度与核威慑原理

现有几乎所有关于核威慑的理论和政策研究都认为,核武器数量是否达到确保摧毁门槛对核威慑有效性有决定性影响。这种"确保摧毁"原则对学界的影响已达到范式级程度,以至于学者们在争论中国核武器数量够不够这个政策问题时,均自发地从该原则出发论证各自的主张。本文认为,"确保摧毁"范式忽视了承诺可信度在核威慑生效过程中所起的关键性作用,特别是未能充分意识到核武器数量变化对承诺可信度的反向影响以及这种反向影响对核威慑生效机制的影响,因而错将是否具备确保摧毁能力作为判断核威慑是否有效的唯一标准。通过剖析核武器数量、承诺可信度与核威慑有效性三者的作用关系,充分说明,"确保摧毁"既不是核威慑有效的充分条件,也不是其必要条件;未达到确保摧毁门槛时无需增加核武器同样有可能实现有效核威慑,而达到该门槛后为确保威慑有效反而应当(继续)增加核武器。超越"确保摧毁"范式有助于更准确、更完整地理解核威慑生效的全部机制。     

“保守革命”与“自由放任”的终结

2008年美国大选是1992年以来民主党首次同时拿下府会的一次大选,极大地改变了美国国内政治地图,将对未来美国内政外交产生深远影响。导致此次民主党获胜的原因是多方面的,保守主义思潮式微、自由主义思潮复兴是影响这次大选结果的战略因素,此次民主党获胜正是得益于美国社会政治思潮的这种战略交替。奥巴马高票当选和民主党扩大国会优势,标志着始于20世纪60年代中期的美国"保守革命"和始于20世纪80年代初的"自由放任"经济社会发展模式的终结。从意识形态层面来看,美国开始从"中右"国家向"中左"国家转变。     

苏联核武器生产厂的人才政策及劳动纪律

二战结束之际，美国投向日本的两颗原子弹将刚刚从战争的阴霾中走出来的苏联引向了另一场战争一核武器的研制。四年之后，代号为PДC-1的苏联第一颗试验用原子弹爆炸成功。决定苏联核武器研制取得成功的因素很多，而核武器生产厂的人才政策及劳动纪律便是其中之一。     

从经济一体化走向政治经济联盟——拉美团结自强争取独立的历史道路

拉美一体化的思想渊源来自独立战争领导者玻利瓦尔倡导的美洲联盟思想。二战后在欧洲经济一体化的影响和联合国拉美经委会的地区主义倡导下,拉美一体化进程开始蓬勃发展,产生了多个次地区和地区性的一体化组织。在经历了20世纪七八十年代的低潮后,90年代以来拉美国家在开放的地区主义指导下展开了新一轮一体化高潮,原有的次地区一体化组织实行了大幅重组,并建立了一批新型一体化组织,包括南方共同市场、南美洲国家联盟和美洲玻利瓦尔联盟等。拉美一体化进程最初主要是在经济领域,后逐步渗透到政治等领域。2010年拉美和加勒比国家共同体宣告成立,表明拉美地区一体化开始走向全地区政治经济大联盟,但其前景如何仍然有待观察。     

The Sturdy Child vs. the Sword of Damocles: Nuclear Weapons and the Expected Cost of War

Abstract

Is the world better off with nuclear weapons or without? Nuclear pessimists point to the potentially devastating costs of a nuclear war. Nuclear optimists argue that nuclear weapons reduce the likelihood of war and are thus beneficial. This debate is inconclusive in part because it misses an important conceptual point. We should care both about the cost of war and the likelihood of war, as they combine to form the expected cost of war, which is the product of the two. I discuss five implications of focusing on expected costs. Three support the pessimists: (1) nuclear weapons raise the upper limit on how destructive wars can be; (2) there may be a floor on how low the likelihood of war can go; and (3) risk aversion over damage will raise the expected cost of nuclear war. The remaining two support the optimists: (4) strategic models exhibit a declining expected cost of war; and (5) casualty data show that the expected cost of war is declining over its observed range in the past two hundred years.     

当前加勒比地区的发展

加勒比共同体多数成员都是中等收入的发展中国家,它们的国土面积狭小,但经济的对外开放程度相对较高.除了苏里南和海地之外,加勒比共同体成员国都曾经是英国的殖民地.     

东南亚形势的回顾与展望

2000年东盟多数国家政局相对稳定,经济全面恢复增长.东盟在加强内部合作、促进地区一体化方面取得一定进展.但印尼、菲律宾政局动荡加剧,一些国家经济发展中的深层次问题尚未得到解决,因此,在2001年中东盟将继续面对诸多严峻挑战.     

Mismatched Deterrents: Preventing the Use of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons

The basic logic of graduated deterrence worked fairly well against the Soviet Union, as each level of aggression was to be deterred by a matching response. But this logic has now been undermined vis-à-vis future rogue state chemical and biological attacks by the spread of dual-use technologies that can be diverted to weapons, and by decisions of the United States and other democracies to forego possession of chemical or biological weapons. This article identifies some of the serious difficulties of alternative approaches to deterring chemical or biological attacks, ranging from nuclear escalation to a reliance on supposed American advantages in conventional weapons. Lumping chemical and biological weapons together with nuclear weapons into a new category of "weapons of mass destruction" is a very imperfect solution.     

Difficult Europeans: NATO and Tactical/Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons in the Cold War

This analysis examines NATO’s tactical/non-strategic nuclear weapons in the Cold War both for their perceived deterrent value against the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact and as potential war fighting weapons. Within this debate lay questions related to extended deterrence, security guarantees, regional or theatre conflict, and escalatory potential. A central tenet that emerged in Europe was that nuclear weapons needed emplacement on the territory of non-nuclear NATO members to make deterrence more tangible. It raised huge questions of consultation. Once the Soviet Union had intercontinental missiles, the credibility of American readiness to use nuclear weapons in defence of its allies came into question. European alternatives and different consultation mechanisms to facilitate nuclear use became central to intra-NATO relations. Actively debated across NATO, they directly concerned above all the United States, Britain, and France—the nuclear weapons states in the NATO area—and West Germany, the potential main battleground in a Warsaw Pact invasion. Although dormant in NATO since the end of the Cold War, these issues will likely see revisiting in both Europe and other regional trouble spots.