Institutional change and continuity in German infrastructure management: The case of electricity reform

Why, despite improving living conditions, has the acceptance of the Western system of institutions (democracy, market economy) decreased in the past few years in eastern Germany? This article criticises the widely held socialisation thesis which seeks to explain the declining acceptance of the Western system on the basis of the difficulties faced by east Germans in adapting to the new conditions. Their attitudes were formed by the socialist system of the GDR, and they still clung to socialist ideals. This article, on the contrary, argues that the declining trust in political institutions and market economy results from current experiences of the transformation process in unified Germany, primarily as a consequence of being treated as ‘not equal’ to west Germans.     

Regime change and public administration in East Germany ‐ some findings from a research project in Brandenburg and Saxony

After the accession of the GDR to the Federal Republic, the transfer of institutions and personnel from the west to the east, especially the transformation of a ‘cadre‐administration’ into a modern western‐type public administration ranked very high on the political agenda. This article presents some findings from a research project on ‘Administrative Culture in East Germany’, conducted in the states of Brandenburg and Saxony. The questions to be addressed are whether one could speak of a total replacement of eastern and western élites during the process of unification. What are the results of élite transfer from the west? What is the composition of the new administrative elites in the east German Länder? Are there significantly different political perceptions by ‘easterners’ and ‘westerners’ of the problems confronting public administrators?     

The Partnership between the Czech and German Greens

The paper (1) reviews the value differences between west and east Germany after unification and their development to date, and (2) explains the fact that between 1990 and 1995 east and west Germany do not approach each other in terms of values. (1) Of the four values considered, equality is more strongly endorsed in west Germany, whilst achievement is more strongly endorsed in the east. Co‐determination finds more support in west Germany. Acceptancy of institutions differs in its two domains in opposite directions: Religiosity is more strongly supported in west Germany, morality in east Germany. Across all four values, differences between both parts of the country mostly remain constant or even grow between 1990 and 1995. (2) As the former German Democratic Republic relied heavily on ‘work’ as an integrative ideology, east Germans should still be able to create a feeling of togetherness today based on the work product they established under the GDR. On the other hand, as this work is no longer linked to an unjust and ineffective political and economic system, it retrospectively gains in value on the one hand. Yet, as it is inevitably poorly assessed in the economic reconstruction of east Germany, it continually loses its value on the other hand. As unification has set off these contradicting developments, east Germans attribute them to west Germany; hence their growing distance from west German values.     

The Civic Culture and Unified Germany: An Overview

In this article we attempt to examine what has happened to the Civic Culture paradigm in the past 50 years with particular focus on Germany. We first discuss the impact of the research and its core findings for the Federal Republic. Second, we focus on the issue of ‘inner unity’. Third, we present data on the development of unified Germany's political culture since the 1990 unification. We examine the influence over time of the major explanatory variables that have been central to post-unification culture research: socialisation or the effect of the socialist past, the contrasting economic experiences of both regions during the early decades of their democratic existence and the role of identity politics in shaping each region's view of each other. Finally, this article contends that in spite of the cultural differences there is a consensus on the institutions, processes and values of political democracy in the unified Republic.     

Coming to terms with the communist past: East Germany in comparative perspective

As so often after the collapse of authoritarian regimes, the post‐communist societies of eastern Europe confront the problem of dealing with alleged regime‐sponsored criminality by their predecessor rulers. This article examines the various approaches taken toward this problem in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and (east) Germany, with special emphasis on the anomalies presented by the latter case. It is argued that the different approaches taken in these countries can be explained by a combination of two main factors: the ‘weight of the past’ (the level of development of civil society before 1989) and the ‘politics of the present’.     

Old Laws,New Citizens: Trust in the Courts in the New Federal States

After the reunification of West and East Germany, West German laws, lawyers and judges almost completely replaced the East German legal system, giving rise to a unique situation in which ‘old laws’ governed ‘new citizens’. Are West German laws and legal institutions incompatible with the socialist values of East Germans? Or do East Germans judge legal institutions based on their performance? Using three surveys from the 1990s and 2000s this article shows support for both cultural and performance approaches to institutional trust, but suggests that the impact of cultural factors may have declined over time. Improved economic and political performance in the 2000s, moreover, has led levels of trust in the East to reach nearly the same levels as in the West. Surprisingly, the results show as well that ‘socialist values’ in West Germany are also a barrier to trust in the courts.     

East Germany: another party landscape

Viewed from the heart of the EU in Brussels, German European policy has not been significantly altered by unification. A major reason for this policy continuity is the stability of the composition of German's foreign policy ‘establishment’ in the federal bureaucracy as well as in the political parties. For a combination of reasons, including the economic conjuncture, the enhanced European policy role of the Länder governments, and the lack of socialisation of east Germans into the European project after the Second World War, the political climate has, however, grown more hostile to closer integration. This may prove though to be a conjunctural phenomenon, which will change with an upturn of the German economy. There will be no ‘Britishisation’ of German European policy.     

The German solidarity pact: A case study in the politics of the Unified Germany

The political process in the old Federal Republic was distinguished by all‐pervasive negotiations and an orientation towards consensus, as indicated by the concepts of ‘co‐operative federalism’, ‘co‐operative opposition’ and ‘neo‐corporatism’ frequently used to describe relations between the federation and the state governments, between the federal government and opposition, and between the federal government and organised economic interests. Some observers expected German unification to lead to fundamental changes in these traits. This study of the negotiations which took place over a ‘Solidarity Pact’ between September 1992 and March 1993 concludes that, far from the political process of the old Federal Republic having been transformed by unification, its distinguishing traits appear rather to have been reinforced. It argues that, whilst there will be no second Solidarity Pact, cooperation and compromise will remain more pervasive in the politics of the unified Germany than confrontation and polarisation.     

Germans and ‘others’: Racism,xenophobia, or ‘legitimate conservatism'?

Drawing on data from various sources, the article assesses the extent of xenophobia and the potential support base for right‐wing extremism in the united Germany. The data shows that West Germany displayed a considerable level of xenophobia before unification, and that at present, Germans in east and west display strikingly similar patterns of hostility towards foreigners. In comparison to their European neighbours, however, the Germans are not markedly different. In addition to levels of education, and placement on a Left‐Right scale, the driving force behind xenophobic attitudes ‐ both in Germany and in other European Community states ‐ are economic and social fears and a perception of relative deprivation.     

Nothing but gloom: Women and academia in the new Germany

The real losers in restructuring the former East German university system are women scholars. Women are not only the first to lose their positions in the process of Abwicklung they are also the last to be considered in the new stage of rebuilding the university system. Thus the politics of Abwicklung, has to be understood as a microcosm of the gendered nature of German unification as a whole. Unification has provided German conservatives the opportunity to roll back not only the social policies of the east, but also the feminist achievements in the west. While this process may, because of the specificity of unification, be restricted to the German situation, nevertheless many studies show that even without the process of unification, women in virtually all former eastern European countries are experiencing their ‘forced’ return to the private sphere.     

East German Intelligence and Ireland, 1949–90: Espionage,Terrorism and Diplomacy

This article analyses the writings of a prominent German social and political theorist ‐ Jürgen Habermas ‐ on the process of (reunification in Germany and examines responses to his interventions by right‐wing thinkers opposed to his views. (Re)unification is a setting of rapidly developing and changing events which present a challenge to Habermas’ thinking. Put simply, Habermas is highly critical of the ‘rush towards (re)unification’ and the process which has followed it. In particular, he objects to attempts by right‐wing thinkers, predominantly historians, to rewrite German history and which elude German responsibility in respect of the horrors of the Holocaust. Equally, he has explicitly shown the links between questions of German identity and the rewriting of German history and argues that the only viable identity for Germany post‐(re)Unification is that of ‘constitutional identity’ and not national identity. His writings have, however, been the subject of sometimes vehement and vitriolic critiques and this article seeks not only to engage with these but also to examine the interventions of Habermas in relation to his earlier more theoretical writings.     

Towards a Measurement of Extreme Left-Wing Attitudes

Previous research on left-wing extremism relied largely on measurements that are unsuitable to detect and track extreme attitudes. In the absence of a clearly defined instrument for left-wing extremism, researchers based their predictions largely on indicators like voting behaviour or the left—right self-placement scale. Building on a large-scale investigation of data from the past 20 years, the paper shows that such indicators do not serve as adequate proxies, since those labelled as ‘extreme’ do not hold extreme attitudes in most cases. Analysing a variety of left-wing extremist attitudes across the past two decades shows that there is indeed a core set of attitudes that seem to resemble what we would call a traditional left-wing extremist identity. The paper suggests an instrument that can serve as a starting point for further developing an index of left-wing extremism. Finally, the potential of the extreme left is assessed using the constructed index. The results show that the estimated potential of the new measure differs substantially from conventional measurements, not in quantity but in its composition. As a result, traditional measurements fail to predict actual left-wing extremism. In particular, anti-pluralist mindsets are heavily neglected. Implications are thus discussed for Germany, and the world at large.     

Notes on contributors

The pre-unification European and foreign policy of the ‘old’ Federal Republic was marked by four principal traits: an emphatically Western orientation, a strong commitment to multilateralism underpinned by close bilateral relations with France and the US, its civilian character, and Euro-centrism. Although it took place in radically different circumstances and under radically different conditions to the first, the second German unification nonetheless gave rise to fears among the political leaders of many other states in Western, Central and Eastern Europe – and among the proponents of some international relations theories – that it would herald sweeping changes in Germany's foreign policy orientation and profoundly destabilise inter-state relations in Europe. The contributions to this volume show that, in the decade following the second unification, there has been more continuity than change in German European and foreign policy. The most important change concerns attitudes and behaviour in respect of the use of military force. Under the pressure of its Western allies and events in the Balkans which have forced it to choose between opposition to war and opposition to genocide, Germany has shed much of its earlier inhibitions concerning the use of military force and become much more like a ‘normal’ big power in Europe. However, because this trend has been explicitly encouraged and welcomed by Germany's allies and partners and because it has taken place exclusively within the multilateral frameworks of NATO and the EU, it does not presage the return of a political ‘Frankenstein monster’ or the revival of the pre-Second World War patterns of European inter-state rivalry. The second German unification will assuredly not turn out to be a re-run of the first.     

Brothers in arms or at arms? IG‐Metall in 1994: Confronting recession and unification

The protracted collective bargaining dispute in German manufacturing during spring 1994 displayed a variety of characteristics fundamental to an understanding of the social unification process in Germany. This article focuses on contextual conditions affecting the negotiating and compromise formation process. This serves to illustrate the ‘turbulent environment’ under which industrial relations are currently taking place. To illustrate this argument the article analyses the requirements and obstacles to finding a compromise in the 1994 bargaining round. The core challenge consisted in displaying a degree of organisational flexibility on both sides of the bargaining table. At the heart of this challenge is the search for a new architecture in German industrial relations which includes coming to terms with the combined effects of unification and economic restructuring.     

Xenophobia,ethnicity and national identity in eastern Germany

This article offers an explanation of the latent xenophobia in post‐unification eastern Germany from the perspective of national identity. Easterners over‐emphasised ethnicity as the one remaining identity pillar that was still not threatened by the transition processes of unification. However, instead of focusing on the ‘self — on pride in tradition, history and culture, easterners concentrated on the ‘other’ — on ethnic exclusion and ethnic chauvinism. The united Germany therefore faces the challenge of filling the empty shell of German ethnicity with a positive meaning.     

Growing up on Different Sides of the Wall – A Quasi-Experimental Test: Applying the Left–Right Dimension to the German Mass Public

This paper utilises survey data from the 1999 European Value Study to conduct a quasi-experimental analysis of the relationship between the left–right self-identification and policy preferences of Germany's electorate. Given the German division until 1990 it is plausible that citizens from East and West Germany had different ideological socialisation experiences swayed by the political discourse of their times. This paper models the influence of this diverse experience on ideological thinking, and examines the effects on the understanding of political issues. The findings suggest that differences do exist in the ideological consistency and attitude structuring of respondents. Compared to respondents in the West, East Germans are more likely to understand the term ‘left’ in socio-economic terms. On the other hand, they seem to connect the term ‘right’ rather to xenophobic issues. These results have crucial implications for political communication in representative democracies, as they question the one-level dimensionality of the left–right concept.     

The property question revisited: The restitution myth

The handling of the property question in the German unification process and Treaty has met with harsh criticism by east Germans and west Germans alike, unifying, for once, both radical and liberal left, as well as some conservatives. Conservative groups in the west were up in arms about the Treaty's recognition of the land reform under Soviet occupation, while the majority of people in the east and also the western left brandished the principle ‘restitution before compensation’ as a major obstacle to investment in the east. This article argues that restitution did not have the significance that is often claimed. In reality the situation was much more complex, and many other factors than the possible restitution of property were responsible for the slower than expected economic recovery of the east.     

German unification and the continuity of discontinuities: Cultural change and the far right in east and west

This paper contrasts the right‐wing potential in east and west Germany before and after unification in 1990 and relates it to patterns and changes in the east and west German political processes. The first is a restructuring of the political spectrum of the Bonn Republic prior to the fall of the Wall in which an electoral potential for new right‐wing parties has emerged. The second is the rapid and fundamental transformation process in the east and after the collapse of state socialism which takes place in the context of a modified subject culture with authoritarian and traditional patterns. Unification reinforces authoritarian and traditional patterns. Unification enforces those dynamics which had prepared the ground for the emergence of the New Right in the west while adding the insecurities and imponderabilities of the transformation process in the east.     

Constructing the ‘Immigrant’: Germany’s Radical Left in the Refugee Crisis

The article scrutinises how Germany’s non-political party radical left has discussed immigration and ‘cultural’ or ‘national’ identity in the context of past and current immigration into Germany, with a focus on the refugee crisis of 2015. Three types of radical left discourse are identified. First, some in the radical left have come to regard immigrants, in particular refugees, as an ‘ersatz proletariat’ and therefore as potential revolutionary instruments for their own project. Second, some agree that revolutionary change is necessary but subordinate their principles to practical support for immigrants and refugees in the here and now. Third, given the improbability of communist revolution and the crisis of ‘Western modernity’, some on the radical left have called for the defence of ‘the West’ and to help immigrants assimilate into Western civilisation. The article makes a timely contribution to the knowledge about contemporary radical left politics in Germany and shows the fractured nature of Germany’s non-political party radical left in the context of the refugee crisis. It also investigates the impact of ‘crisis’ as an ‘open moment’ and ‘catalyst’ on the radical left’s discourse-as-practice.     

Testing the west: Consumerism and national identity in eastern Germany

With unification, Western‐style consumerism washed over East Germany in a gigantic wave that stood in marked contrast to the socialist reality of limited supply and suppressed demands. This article examines the impact of consumerism as a repository of national identities in the new Länder in the aftermath of 1989. It argues that from a quantitative perspective East Germans firmly internalised consumerism by approximating to the consumption levels of their Western compatriots. Easterners also filled consumerism with political meaning. By buying certain products they expressed emerging regional pride, defiance against the sweeping transformation processes and a nostalgic and romanticised reference to the GDR past. These mass‐cultural expressions of national identity serve as telling indicators for the continued separation of the publics’ psyche in east and west.