Scarce Differences: Toward a Material and Systemic Foundation for Offensive and Defensive Realism

A divide has opened up between offensive and defensive realism as to the relative scarcity of security in the international system, with powerful implications for the vision each approach offers about the nature of international politics. Yet we still do not understand why the two diverge given their common neorealist foundations. This article reviews implicit, explicit, and other potential explanations of that difference—the relationship between power and security, the offense-defense balance, the prevalence and efficiency of balancing vs. bandwagoning, and the role played by uncertainty in decision-making—and finds them lacking in their ability to provide an adequate account that is systemic and structural in nature, does not violate arguments the scholars have made in practice, and does not confuse cause with effect. Finding prior efforts lacking, this article proposes that the distinction could be logically rooted in material scarcity, a familiar theme in realism historically that has been ignored in more recent formulations. Drawing a distinction between a “dangerous world” in which uncertainty is the core problem and a “competitive world” in which scarcity bedevils state relations helps explain where offensive and defensive realism both diverge and converge.     

British Neutrality versus Offshore Balancing in the American Civil War: The English School Strikes Back

The American Civil War is an important test case for offensive realism because it was the last occasion when offshore balancing by Britain could have prevented the United States from becoming a regional hegemon. Instead, Britain drew on the norm of nonintervention to justify a policy of neutrality. Offensive realists reject the idea that Britain was constrained by normative considerations but disagree about why Britain failed to operate as an offshore balancer. I acknowledge the importance of the offensive realists' regionalized approach to the international system, but use English School thinking to argue that the normative framework that Britain and the United States subscribed to must be taken into account to provide a coherent explanation of Britain's response to the Civil War. Detailed archival research demonstrates that despite concern about u.s. regional hegemony, Britain was unequivocally constrained by normative considerations. The case study suggests, therefore, that societal constraints were stronger than systemic ones.     

Undermining Adversaries: Unipolarity,Threat Perception,and Negative Balancing Strategies after the Cold War

This paper engages the ongoing soft balancing debate by suggesting a new analytical framework for states’ countervailing strategies—a negative balancing model—to explain why states do not form alliances and conduct arms races to balance against power or threats as they previously did. Negative balancing refers to a state's strategies or diplomatic efforts aiming to undermine a rival's power. By contrast, positive balancing means to strengthen a state's own power in world politics. I argue that a state's balancing strategies are shaped by the level of threat perception regarding its rival. The higher the threat perception, the more likely it is for a state to choose positive balancing. The lower the threat perception, the more likely it is for a state to choose negative balancing. I suggest that the hegemon provides security as a public good to the international system in a unipolar world in which the relatively low-threat propensity of the system renders positive balancing strategies incompatible with state interests after the Cold War. Instead, states have employed various negative balancing strategies to undermine each other's power, especially when dealing with us primacy. China's negative balancing strategy against the United States and the us negative balancing strategy against Russia are two case studies that test the validity of the negative balancing model.     

State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource-Extractive State

Neorealist theory holds that the international system compels states to adopt similar adaptive strategies—namely, balancing and emulation—or risk elimination as independent entities. Yet states do not always emulate the successful practices of the system's leading states in a timely and uniform fashion. Explaining this requires a theory that integrates systemic-level and unit-level variables: a “resource-extraction” model of the state in neoclassical realism. External vulnerability provides incentives for states to emulate the practices of the system's leading states or to counter such practices through innovation. Neoclassical realism, however, suggests that state power—the relative ability of the state to extract and mobilize resources from domestic society—shapes the types of internal balancing strategies that countries are likely to pursue. State power, in turn, is a function of the institutions of the state, as well as of nationalism and ideology. The experiences of six rising or declining great powers over the past three hundred years—China, France, Great Britain, Japan, Prussia (later Germany), and the United States—illustrate the plausibility of these hypotheses.     

Economic Interdependence and the Balance of Power

To account for variance in great powers responses to threats and the implications for the peacefulness of the international system since the late nineteenth century, this article elucidates a theory which refines and synthesizes economic liberal perspectives and realist balance of power theory. I argue that different patterns and levels of economic interdependence in the great power system generate societal-based economic constraints on, or incentives for, state leaders of status quo powers hoping to mobilize economic resources and political support to oppose perceived threats. This mobilization process influences strongly the preferences of status quo powers, other states beliefs about those preferences, and the interpretation of signals in balance of power politics. In this way, economic ties influence the strategies great powers pursue. Firm balancing policies conducive to peace in the international system are most likely, I then hypothesize, when there are extensive economic ties among status quo powers and few or no such links between them and perceived threatening powers. When economic interdependence is not significant between status quo powers or if status quo powers have strong economic links with threatening powers, weaker balancing postures and conciliatory policies by status quo powers, and aggression by aspiring revisionist powers, are more likely. I then illustrate how these hypotheses explain the development of the Franco-Russian alliance of the 1890s and its effectiveness as a deterrent of Germany up to 1905, British ambivalence toward Germany from 1906 to the First World War, the weakness of British, French, Soviet, and American behavior toward Germany in the 1930s and World War II, and the American and European responses to the Soviet threat, including the NATO alliance, and the "long peace" of the post-1945 era.     

If Not Soft Balancing,Then What? Reconsidering Soft Balancing and U.S. Policy Toward China

Some scholars argue that soft balancing is a typical state behavior against the hegemon under unipolarity. Others contend that soft balancing against the hegemon is ineffective. We challenge both arguments and suggest that soft balancing is not only a product of specific configurations of the power distribution in the system, unipolarity, but also a rational behavior under another condition, economic dependence. We argue that the interplay between power disparity and economic dependence shapes a state's decision in choosing different balancing strategies. The higher the power disparity and economic dependence, the more likely a state chooses soft balancing to pursue its security. Using U.S. policy toward China after the Cold War as a crucial test, we suggest that the huge power gap and increasing economic interdependence between the United States and China shape U.S. soft balancing rather than hard balancing toward China. We conclude that future U.S.-China relations depend on whether the United States declines as a result of China's rise and on the degree of economic interdependence between the two countries.     

美国东北亚政策的进攻性现实主义解读

以米尔斯海默为代表的进攻性现实主义是现实主义理论的最新发展,其从历史分析与理论论证的角度为美国的东北亚政策提出了"离岸平衡手"的解读与构想。然而朝核危机爆发后,美国的东北亚政策正朝着建立多边安全机制的方向发展,进攻性现实主义提出的"中国威胁论"也不攻自破。     

“Brighter Futures,Better Times”: Britain,the Empire,and Anglo–American Economic Competition in Cuba, 1898–1920

This article examines Anglo–American economic competition in Cuba in the crucial twenty years after 1898. Anglo–American economic competition on the new island nation suggest a number of things about the nature of British and American imperialism, the difficult position of smaller countries—and economies—like Cuba, and the “inevitability” of American economic pre-eminence in the evolving twentieth century. And as an important corollary to the British dimension of this question is the role that Canada and Canadian overseas investment played in the extension of Britain's economic power and influence in the wider world.     

Lincoln's Gamble: Fear of Intervention and the Onset of the American Civil War

Few studies consider how civil war onset can be influenced by third parties and by the belligerents’ perceptions of third party actions. I show that the American Civil War, a war largely ignored by civil war scholars, sheds insights into how anticipation of third party intervention influences the decision-making process within the target state and how the possibility of third party intervention can influence the onset and escalation of civil war. The American Civil War is an especially interesting case for exploring the role of third parties in civil war initiation since, unlike most cases considered by the existing civil war literature, the American Civil War is an instance of nonintervention: the third parties (the European powers in this case) mattered despite staying out of the conflict. Specifically, I argue that fear of foreign recognition (particularly by the British) played an underappreciated (if not the decisive) role in the earliest stages of the American Civil War by influencing Lincoln's decision to authorize the first major battle of the war at Manassas Junction, Virginia.     

Explaining Changes in U.S. Grand Strategy: 9/11, the Rise of Offensive Liberalism,and the War in Iraq

This paper proposes a model for explaining shifts and variations in U.S. grand strategy. The model is based on a distinction between four ideal-type grand strategies or ideational approaches to security according to the objectives and means of security policy: defensive and offensive realism, and defensive and offensive liberalism. While the four approaches are continually present in the U.S. policy community, it is the combination of two systemic conditions—namely the distribution of capabilities and the balance of threat—that selects among the competing approaches and determines which grand strategy is likely to emerge as dominant in a given period. Great power parity is conducive to realist approaches. In contrast, a situation of hegemony encourages the emergence of ideological grand strategies, which focus on ideology promotion, according to the ideology of the hegemon. In the case of a liberal hegemon, such as the United States, liberal approaches are likely to emerge as dominant. In addition, a relative absence of external threat encourages defensive approaches, while a situation of high external threat gives rise to offensive strategies. Thus, various combinations of these systemic factors give rise to the emergence of various grand strategies. This model is tested in two cases of the two most recent shifts in U.S. grand strategy following 1991. In accordance with the expectations of the model, a change in the distribution of capabilities with the end of the Cold War made possible a change from realist to liberal strategies. In the benign environment of the 1990s the dominant strategy was defensive liberalism, while the change in the balance of threat after 9/11 gave rise to the grand strategy of offensive liberalism.     

Power,Patterns, and Process in European Union History

Sebastian Rosato's admirably provocative Europe United retells the origins of the European Union (EU) as a realist story of the balance of power. While he deserves praise for a bold attempt to extend offensive realism into history's greatest instance of international cooperation, the book ultimately reads as a cautionary methodological tale about how not to support a realist argument. Realist theory has been influential mainly because it offers strong expectations about major patterns in the world—relatively unitary decision-making within states and specific kinds of foreign policies between them—but Rosato's evidence focuses on a thin version of process. He selectively cites leaders' statements about their policy choices across the story, providing no leverage on how these statements related to patterned interests within or across countries. Interestingly, a similar error weakens work by the most salient IR scholar writing on EU history, Andrew Moravcsik. Their shared problems hint at a pattern of IR scholars overlooking patterns in historical evidence.     

Germany’s Ocean Greyhounds and the Royal Navy’s First Battle Cruisers: An Historiographical Problem

Recently some revisionist historians have contested the evidential basis for the argument put forward by their post-revisionist colleagues that the growth of the German mercantile marine, most particularly ships capable of being transformed into armed commerce raiders, was viewed with alarm in the British Admiralty and played a significant part in shaping British naval policy before 1914. Looking in detail at their reasoning, this assessment demonstrates that the rejection of this argument is based upon a faulty and incomplete understanding of the documentary record. Moreover, it is driven by a desire to defend the thesis that they have previously articulated that the expansion of German maritime power played a limited role in British defence policy before 1914. However, their objections do not withstand detailed scrutiny. Whatever might have been the British view of the long-term threat posed by Russia and France, Germany’s growing strength, including in merchant shipping, loomed large as a security problem in the decade and a half before 1914. The wartime activities of German commerce raiders, notably the Kronprinz Wilhelm, suggest that fears of a German commerce war were entirely rational.     

GUUAM and the future of CIS military cooperation

This study analyses the establishment and development of the GUUAM cooperation and offers an assessment of the future implications of this regional grouping for the CIS military alliance. It presents three key arguments. First, that the GUUAM members have bandwagoned with western states at the system level and balanced against Russia at the regional level. Second, that there is a dialectical relationship between these two policies, with one getting added momentum from the other. And finally, that on this background we should expect to see increased future balancing by the GUUAM states — and possibly by other CIS members as well — causing a further undermining of the CIS military cooperation.     

Security and Freedom on the Fulcrum

ABSTRACT

Counterterrorist arguments that justify the erosion of individual rights frequently depend on the claim a balance can—and should—be struck between security and freedom. But this analogy, under both consequentialist and rights-based analysis, is at best misleading and at worst structurally wrong. Calculations from utility resting on the immediate dangers posed by terrorism do not give appropriate weight to (a) the long-term effects of inroads into individual rights, (such as individual harm, blocked political, social, and legal mechanisms), and (b) precedent-setting in a tightly-interwoven structure of individual rights and state power. Constitutive rules further delimit the types of measures that can be introduced, regardless of the “tradeoffs” considered in balancing security and freedom. In the rights-based realm, arguments related to expanded state powers, distributive justice, and practical effect undermine the analogy.     

Preface

ABSTRACT

Although first explicitly coined in Renaissance Italy, the notion of a ‘balance of power’ – the conduct of state actors to meet the logics of power balancing – goes back to pre-modern times. Traditionally, scholars have looked to the Punic Wars and the early modern period as early evidence for the balance. However, the ancient Near East during the second-millennium BC has received far less attention. Yet Western Asia existed as an international arena of states fully integrated in a system based on interdependence and power balancing. In the field of International Relations, systematic analyses of this phase in world history remain under-developed. Accordingly, the question of when a systemic environment for the balancing behaviour existed for the first time has been addressed less in International Relations theory where the literature leans primarily on the European experience.     

The Preventive War that Never Happened: Britain,France, and the Rise of Germany in the 1930s

The theory of “preventive war” states that, under certain conditions, states respond to rising adversaries with military force in an attempt to forestall an adverse shift in the balance of power. British and French passivity in response to the rapid rise of Germany in the 1930s would appear to constitute one of the leading empirical anomalies in the theory, one the theory's proponents must explain. After clarifying the meaning of the preventive motivation for war and specifying the conditions under which it should be the strongest, we examine French and British behavior in the crises over the Rhineland in 1936 and Sudeten Czechoslovakia in 1938 through an intensive study of government documents and private papers. We argue that French political leaders, anticipating a continuing adverse shift in relative power, wanted to confront Hitler, but only with British support, which was not forthcoming. British leaders believed, even by 1936, that the balance of power had already shifted in Germany's favor, but that German ascendancy was only temporary and that British rearmament would redress the balance of power in a few years. We contrast our argument with alternative interpretations based on domestic political pressures and ideologically driven beliefs and interests.     

Generals in Cyberspace: Military Insights for Defending Cyberspace

Recently, there have been calls for the United States to unleash the offensive power of cyber space. Advocates contend that offense has the advantage in cyberspace. This article argues that cyberspace does not favor the offensive at either the tactical or the strategic level. In fact, a defensive doctrine has clear advantages over an offensive one. Support for this argument can be found in two unexpected sources: official statements of U.S. Army doctrine and Carl von Clausewitz's On War. This is surprising, given that scholars consider both the U.S. Army and Clausewitz diehard apostles of the cult of the offensive. This essay seeks to import their insights about the advantages of the defense into the virtual realm. When read carefully, U.S. Army doctrine and Clausewitz's classic text support the claim that defense is the stronger approach in the cyber realm.     

从属侧施压:同盟强化还是同盟瓦解?——“进攻性楔子战略”成败的政治条件及其类型化研究

在研究同盟分化的议程中,关于“楔子战略”的类型化研究很多,但是关于不同类型“楔子战略”背后差异化的因果机制及其传导过程的研究却很少。“从属侧施压”是“进攻性楔子战略”的一个重要组成部分,它特指利用危机向特定类型敌对联盟中的次要盟友进行安全施压,进而促成敌对联盟内部关系紧张直至瓦解的一种同盟分化手段。通过对“从属侧施压”这一微观同盟理论各要素间共变关系的研究发现,大国间“现有权势对比”“权力变动趋势”和“权力盈亏态势判定”是决定“从属侧施压”战略实施效果的三个核心变量。同盟主导国在“实力较强”且“趋势焦虑”情势下介入盟友危机的意愿最强,反之则最弱。对于“实力较强但趋势占优”和“实力较弱且趋势焦虑”两种不确定情况,借助于“前景理论”对同盟主导国“权力盈亏态势”进行辅助判别,则具有较强的解释力。该理论的提出,不仅对现有“进攻性楔子战略”具体实施条件、时机把握与策略选择有着较强的现实指导意义,也有助于战略实施方避免因条件与时机误判而促成事与愿违的敌对同盟强化。     

Structure and Perceptions: Explaining American Policy Toward China (1949–50)

American policy toward China during the early Cold War has long been considered as a prime anomaly to balance of power theory. Many realists have argued that domestic forces caused a confrontational policy, overriding structural imperative to accommodate China to balance the stronger Soviet power in Asia. Refuting the domestic explanation, I argue that balance of power consideration primarily determined the U.S. policy. Under the powerful pressure of bipolar competition, the Truman administration persistently pursued a realist policy of forming an alliance with Communist China, or at least neutralizing it, through accommodation in order to balance the Soviet Union in Asia. This policy was based on the assessment of Soviet superiority in Asia. However, my analysis of the power structure shows that there was little structural incentive for China to cooperate with the United States against the Soviet Union because the latter was in a somewhat disadvantageous position globally and had limited offensive capabilities in Asia. Further, Chinese leaders perceived the United States as the superior power in bipolarity. Consequently, China formed an alliance with the Soviet Union to check the United States according to its own balance of power logic.     

Of Mechanisms and Myths: Conceptualising States’ “Soft Power” Strategies through Sports Mega-Events

ABSTRACT

Joseph Nye’s concept of “soft power” has become an increasingly used term to help explain why states—including so-called “emerging states”—are paying greater attention to acquiring various forms of cultural and political attraction. However, within mainstream International Relations, Political Science, and Sport Studies literature, a continuous debate remains as to what actually constitutes soft power, how national leaders go about acquiring it, and how forms of attraction convert into power outcomes in both the short- and long-term. This analysis endeavours to overcome these issues by offering an “ideal type” model that details states’ soft power strategies, the mechanisms they use, and the tangible future outcomes they gain.