British Neutrality versus Offshore Balancing in the American Civil War: The English School Strikes Back

The American Civil War is an important test case for offensive realism because it was the last occasion when offshore balancing by Britain could have prevented the United States from becoming a regional hegemon. Instead, Britain drew on the norm of nonintervention to justify a policy of neutrality. Offensive realists reject the idea that Britain was constrained by normative considerations but disagree about why Britain failed to operate as an offshore balancer. I acknowledge the importance of the offensive realists' regionalized approach to the international system, but use English School thinking to argue that the normative framework that Britain and the United States subscribed to must be taken into account to provide a coherent explanation of Britain's response to the Civil War. Detailed archival research demonstrates that despite concern about u.s. regional hegemony, Britain was unequivocally constrained by normative considerations. The case study suggests, therefore, that societal constraints were stronger than systemic ones.     

Lincoln's Gamble: Fear of Intervention and the Onset of the American Civil War

Few studies consider how civil war onset can be influenced by third parties and by the belligerents’ perceptions of third party actions. I show that the American Civil War, a war largely ignored by civil war scholars, sheds insights into how anticipation of third party intervention influences the decision-making process within the target state and how the possibility of third party intervention can influence the onset and escalation of civil war. The American Civil War is an especially interesting case for exploring the role of third parties in civil war initiation since, unlike most cases considered by the existing civil war literature, the American Civil War is an instance of nonintervention: the third parties (the European powers in this case) mattered despite staying out of the conflict. Specifically, I argue that fear of foreign recognition (particularly by the British) played an underappreciated (if not the decisive) role in the earliest stages of the American Civil War by influencing Lincoln's decision to authorize the first major battle of the war at Manassas Junction, Virginia.     

The War over Iraq: Selling War to the American Public

The Holocaust has become an important part of the everyday discourse of American life. Indeed, it has become one of the central historical analogies for thinking about U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War world. The received wisdom about the Holocaust among most Americans is that the United States and the rest of the civilized world turned away Jews seeking to escape Nazi Germany before World War II, and then sat idly by while the Third Reich murdered nearly 6 million of them during the course of the war. In light of this reprehensible indifference, the United States shares some responsibility for the Holocaust, and it must “never again” allow large numbers of people to be slaughtered because of their race, ethnicity, or religion. Historical analogies are ubiquitous in foreign policy debates. Not only do they routinely shape state behavior, they usually do so for the worse. Hence, we should be wary of all historical analogies and examine them carefully to make sure they are based on sound history and used wisely by policymakers. The widely accepted Holocaust analogy illustrates, in my view, both how analogies are frequently based on a faulty reading of history and that policies based on them have not always served U.S. interests.     

Managing the Hegemon: nato under Unipolarity

The shift to unipolarity has introduced new dilemmas for America's allies. Their level of strategic uncertainty has increased, largely because under unipolarity, allies' threat perceptions are more likely to diverge across time or issue areas and are not shaped as much by structural systemic factors. Although they want to maintain the pre-existing security arrangements as a means of managing the rising uncertainty, allies need to deal with the dual concern of either being trapped into the hegemonic partner's policies, or being abandoned by the hegemon. These two concerns—the alliance security dilemma—may become more or less prominent given the nature of the divergence in threat perceptions on different issues and at different times. To deal with this dual threat, allies employ two strategies: using the pre-existing alliance as a pact of restraint, and developing a division of labor with the hegemon. Both the dilemmas and the strategies used to mitigate them are examined here in the context of the European behavior within nato following the Gulf War, the nato involvement in Kosovo, the war in Afghanistan, and the war in Iraq.     

The Future of Chemical Weapons: Implications from the Syrian Civil War

Abstract

With chemical weapons (CW) use in Syria raising questions about the health of the CW norm, this article analyzes whether the Syrian case will lead to further proliferation and use of chemical weapons by states. We examine the use of chemical weapons at Ghouta in 2013 and on the Hama Plains in 2014 and find that: first, chemical weapons have demonstrated limited military utility in Syria, either tactically or as a tool of civilian victimization; second, the costs of use have been repeatedly demonstrated by the international reaction to their use; and third, the use of sarin—a nerve agent—has attracted a stronger international response than the use of chlorine, a less lethal agent. Consequently, we conclude that the Syrian case is unlikely to lead to significant proliferation and use of chemical weapons; any that does occur is most likely to involve states already outside the CW norm.     

Sustaining the Peace: Determinants of Civil War Recurrence

Over half of all civil wars that began and ended between 1944 and 1997 were followed by at least one if not more episodes of civil war. We present a model to explain which characteristics of a civil war and the post-war environment make civil war more or less likely to recur. We test this model with data on civil wars that began and ended between 1944 and 1997. Findings suggest that civil wars are less likely to recur following rebel victories and peace agreements supported by peacekeeping forces. Post-war economic development also reduces the probability of civil war recurrence, and the longer the peace can be sustained, the less likely civil war is to recur. These effects hold regardless of whether the previous war was ethnically based or not, and whether it was secessionist or revolutionary.     

Ideas in Conflict: The Nationalism Literature and the Comparative Study of Civil War

The comparative study of civil war has recently gone through a “structural turn,” towards large-n quantitative studies that explain the variation in the incidence of civil wars in terms of structural factors. The alternatives have been a return to case studies and a constructivist critique that emphasizes the role of ideas in conflict. While there is no a priori reason to reconcile these approaches, it remains a practical task for those who want to understand how a given social situation escalates into civil war. After reviewing the two poles in the debate, we mine the literature on nationalism for insights into this issue.     

The Causes of the Syrian Civil War and Its Impacts

Peaceful protests broke out in Syria on 18 March 2011, and the subsequent emergence of a civil war threatened the 11-year-long rule of the Bashar al-Assad government. The civil war cost up to 80,000 lives up until May 2013,1 making it the bloodiest battlefield in the Middle East in decades. This article analyses the current situation, its historical roots and the ongoing impacts of the civil war in order to forecast the future trends of the Syrian turmoil.     

Lost in Translation: The Problem of Perceptual Limitations in Civil War Peace Negotiation

This article examines the negative role that actors' perceptual limitations play in civil war peace negotiation by reviewing the Sino-Khmer Rouge interplay during the Cambodian peace negotiations (1987–1993). The study contends that China continually failed to challenge the Khmer Rouge's negotiation strategies, which were founded on the faction's flawed understanding of its situation. Moreover, the inadequate communication between China and its client faction and the Khmer Rouge's lack of institutions for obtaining and analyzing information are identified as the two main reasons for the failure of Chinese intervention.     

伊拉克战争与美国的大战略失误

美国发动对伊战争有着长远的战略考虑,但伊拉克战争本身在目标和手段上都无助于实现或推进美国在“9.11”事件后所确立的大战略目标。美国在伊拉克战争期间的大战略失误,突出地表现为大战略目标与单个军事行动目标之间的模糊和抵触,大战略目标与手段之间严重失衡。长远地看,如果美国偏重于单边主义和军事力量,其巩固“单极”世界的图谋会遇到更大的国际障碍。     

冷战后美国对朝政策中的国会因素

冷战结束以来 ,美朝关系几经波折 ,始终没有摆脱冷战的阴影 ,至今仍处于敌对状态。本文认为 ,伴随着冷战后国会权力的复兴 ,美国国会通过宪法赋予的权力和其它途径 ,在美国对朝政策的三个主要阶段分别起着不同程度的负面作用。从冷战结束之初到美朝《框架协议》签订的第一阶段里 ,国会极力要求总统对朝鲜采取比较强硬的政策 ,但影响不大 ;在《协议》签订到克林顿任期结束的第二个阶段里 ,国会一直是限制美朝关系发展的一支强大阻碍力量 ;目前这个阶段 ,国会基本上配合总统执行对朝强硬政策。     

The Dynamics of Mass Killings: Testing Time-Series Models of One-Sided Violence in the Bosnian Civil War

Many observers contend that wartime civilian victimization is an instrument of political leaders to achieve a particular goal. This article examines whether retaliation for similar acts by the other side, the developments on the battlefield, or the behavior of international actors accounts for the ups and downs of this so-called one-sided violence. Using information from the Konstanz One-Sided Violence Event Dataset and other sources, we evaluate the empirical relevance of these complementary models statistically. Time series analyses of the weekly number of killed and harmed Muslims (Bosniacs) and Serbs during the Bosnian civil war support the military and the massacre logic. We show that the Serbian side decreased one-sided violence following a territorial conquest, but that its one-sided violence was not a reciprocal response to the Bosniac targeting of civilians. Conversely, the Bosniac side resorted to violence during times of increasing Serbian atrocities and when the fighting was particularly intense. The analysis reveals that most international interventions did not reduce the carnage, but that the Serbs responded to Russian moves.     

苏丹内战中的宗教因素

苏丹内战是当今世界历时最长、产生原因最复杂、冲突解决最棘手的内战之一。导致苏丹内战爆发和持续的因素主要有宗教问题、种族问题、认同问题、殖民遗留问题、国家权力分配问题、环境资源问题及外部影响问题等 ,但宗教问题是最关键的因素。北方伊斯兰教和南方基督教的冲突对内战的爆发、进程及未来走向都有根本性的影响。因此可以说 ,苏丹内战就是宗教冲突激化和延续的结果与表现。两种宗教固有的不同政治观是导致南北冲突的本质原因 ,也决定了冲突的解决必然是困难重重。尽管苏丹内战可望结束 ,但无宗教间的真正平等与友好就不会有苏丹的真正和平与统一。     

塞拉利昂内战中的外国雇佣军

冷战结束后 ,外国私营雇佣军公司越来越多地介入了非洲的内部冲突 ,这一现象的兴起有复杂的国际背景 ,也与非洲的冲突形势密切相关。有 3个主要的外国雇佣军公司介入了塞拉利昂长达十年的内战 ,它们的介入在客观上对塞拉利昂的冲突局势产生了影响。公司化的雇佣军行为 ,是对塞拉利昂这样弱小但资源丰富的后冷战国家新形式的“新殖民主义”。尽管塞政府付出了高昂的经济、主权和人道主义代价 ,雇佣军没有也不可能给塞拉利昂带来和平、稳定与民主。塞拉利昂的稳定依然非常脆弱 ,非洲国家和国际社会仍然没有找到在非洲冲突国家实现和平的有效方式 ,非洲的和平之路依然漫长     

The Future of War and American Military Strategy

The outcome of ongoing debates over the future of American military strategy will play a critical role in shaping the foreign and military policies of the United States over the next decade. Traditionalists worry about the shift towards emphasizing counterinsurgency (COIN) operations and irregular warfare, believing that the use of force is often ineffective in COIN situations and the American military should concentrate on planning for conventional war. In contrast, COIN advocates argue that the United States must focus its efforts on preparing for the wars it is most likely to fight, irregular wars. However, both schools of thought rely on assumptions about the future security environment that may reveal another path forward. First, although it seems intuitive to view irregular warfare as the dominant future concern, it is exceedingly difficult to predict accurately the future security environment, as the last 20 years have clearly shown. Second, and perhaps most importantly, the character of emergent threats will depend on how the United States focuses its resources. Paradoxically, no matter what it emphasizes, the military threats the United States is or will be most capable of defeating are the ones it is least likely to face, since potential adversaries will be deterred and seek other ways of confrontation. However, with some smart and careful investments, including the recognition that not all parts of the military have to be optimized for the same task, the United States military can both lock in its conventional dominance and continue to improve its ability to succeed in the irregular wars most likely to dominate the landscape in the short to medium term.     

Leveraging Strength: The Pillars of American Grand Strategy in World War II

This article argues that U.S. leaders navigated their way through World War II challenges in several important ways. These included: sustaining a functional civil-military relationship; mobilizing inside a democratic, capitalist paradigm; leveraging the moral high ground ceded to them by their enemies; cultivating their ongoing relationship with the British, and embracing a kind of adaptability and resiliency that facilitated their ability to learn from mistakes and take advantage of their enemies’ mistakes.     

Attacks on Civilians in Civil War: Targeting the Achilles Heel of Democratic Governments

Previous research has indicated that democracy decreases the risk of armed conflict, while increasing the likelihood of terrorist attacks, but we know little about the effect of democracy on violence against civilians in ongoing civil conflicts. This study seeks to fill this empirical gap in the research on democracy and political violence, by examining all rebel groups involved in an armed conflict 1989–2004. Using different measures of democracy, the results demonstrate that rebels target more civilians when facing a democratic (or semi-democratic) government. Democracies are perceived as particularly vulnerable to attacks on the population, since civilians can hold the government accountable for failures to provide security, and this provides incentives for rebels to target civilians. At the same time, the openness of democratic societies provides opportunities for carrying out violent attacks. Thus, the strength of democracy—its accountability and openness—can become an Achilles heel during an internal armed conflict.     

苏俄内战中的捷克军团问题述评

在协约国干涉苏维埃俄国革命中，捷克军团被协约国利用，充当协约国干涉西伯利亚革命的急先锋。捷克军团的叛乱严重侵犯了苏俄的国家主权，给西伯利亚地区的居民带来了深重灾难。由于在利用捷克军团叛乱上荚、法、美、日四国间有错综复杂的矛盾，而且捷克军团遭到红军和游击队的打击，捷克军团在1920年初撤离了苏俄。