War, Peace, and the Invisible Hand: Positive Political Externalities of Economic Globalization

Studies of signaling in international relations reveal how punishing bluffing ex post through domestic audience costs or opposition groups facilitates credible ex ante communication among states and reduces the impetus toward war. Global integration of economic markets may also reduce uncertainty by making talk costly ex ante. Autonomous global capital can respond dramatically to political crises. To the degree that globalization forces leaders to choose between pursuing competitive political goals and maintaining economic stability, it reveals the intensity of leaders' preferences, reducing the need for military contests as a method of identifying mutually acceptable bargains. Asymmetric integration can dampen the pacific effects of globalization, but asymmetry does not in itself exacerbate dispute behavior. We present the theory and offer preliminary corroborative tests of implications of the argument on postwar militarized disputes.     

Public Commitment in Crisis Bargaining

The "audience cost" literature argues that highly-resolved leaders can use public threats to credibly signal their resolve in incomplete-information crisis bargaining, thereby overcoming informational asymmetries that lead to war. If democracies are better able to generate audience costs, then audience costs help explain the democratic peace. We use a game-theoretic model to show how public commitments can be used coercively as a source of bargaining leverage, even in a complete-information setting in which they have no signaling role. When both sides use public commitments for bargaining leverage, war becomes an equilibrium outcome. The results provide a rationale for secret negotiations as well as hypotheses about when leaders will claim that the disputed good is indivisible, recognized as a rationalist explanation for war. Claims of indivisibility may just be bargaining tactics to get the other side to make big concessions, and compromise is still possible in equilibrium.     

Crises as Signals of Strength: The Significance of Affect in Close Allies’ Relationships

Affect exists among close allies and influences their actions and reactions vis-à-vis each other. These countries’ perceptions of, and affective attachment to, the specialness of their relationships explains why, in certain circumstances, big clashes occur among them. In this sense, affect explains why crises among close allies are more signals of strength than weakness: the passionate nature of such crises—as opposed to more routine or recurrent disagreements—is triggered by the high value placed by close allies on their ties and not, as often stated in the literature, by the erosion of these ties. After developing this argument, I illustrate it with the analysis of two crises among close allies: the Suez crisis between Britain and the United States in late 1956, and the Iraq crisis between France and the United States in early 2003. I then contrast these episodes with a crisis between two allies with a much less affectively charged relationship—the United States and Turkey, also in early 2003 over the Iraq War issue.     

Unpacking Autocracy: Political Regimes and IMF Program Participation

Why do some countries participate in IMF programs while others refuse to do so? We suggest an answer to the question by unpacking one side of the typical democracy–autocracy dichotomy. Specifically, we utilize the growing literature on the varieties of authoritarianism to develop an argument linking the different incentives and constraints that leaders in party-based, personalist, and military regimes face when considering whether to sign agreements with the IMF. Empirically, we demonstrate that distinguishing among autocracies uncovers important variations in the sensitivity of such regimes to the political costs incurred by IMF participation. Party-based autocracies, for instance, respond to both sovereignty costs and the benefits of program participation during severe economic crises. Personalist regimes, however, are not sensitive to the sovereignty costs incurred with IMF participation and thus only participate when doing so provides needed revenue during economic crises. The unique features of military juntas, by contrast, suggests that such regimes are not sensitive to either of these political costs and thus do not respond to economic crises in the same way as their autocratic counterparts.     

Mind the Gap: Civilian Protection and the Politics of Peace Operation Design

Protecting civilians from conflict and atrocities has become a major focus of governments, the UN, and activists. Yet peace operations—the main policy instrument for directly shielding civilians from violence—vary widely in how well they are designed to do so. One much-maligned problem is a gap between a force's ambitions to protect civilians and its physical resources for doing so. Missions plagued by these ambitions–resources gaps gesture toward protecting civilians but are not designed to do so effectively. They can also worsen civilian suffering. This article explores the politics behind these gaps, focusing on the role of powerful states—especially major Western democracies—in creating and facilitating them. It argues that ambitions–resources gaps represent a form of organized hypocrisy that helps political leaders balance competing normative and material pressures to protect civilians while limiting costs and risks. Case studies of France's Operation Turquoise in Rwanda and US support for the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in Darfur support the argument.     

Tempering Optimism about Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia

This article tempers the argument of deterrence optimists, who make the case that nuclear deterrence has maintained the peace between regional nuclear rivals. In particular, it challenges the assertion by Kenneth Waltz that “nuclear deterrence has passed all of the many tests it has faced” among regional rivals in South Asia. Examining two major regional military crises, this article notes that, first, nuclear deterrence was not the key factor ending these crises. Instead, nonnuclear factors involving American diplomacy, which provided the participants with timely exit strategies, ended the crises. Second, if these crisis-ending factors had not been present, there was a strong possibility of significant military escalation, and nuclear deterrence would not have averted such an escalation. The article concludes by noting that, in regions where deterrence optimism is not well supported, Washington may continue intervening in crises between nuclear rivals, and, anticipating such a U.S. approach, regional rivals could become involved in repeated military crises over the long term.     

The Evolutionary Path of Hamas: Examining the Role of Political Pragmatism in State Building and Activism

Of the two major Palestinian factions, Hamas has demonstrated that it is more radical and willing to use acts of terrorism than Fatah. While some arguments have made the case that Hamas has become more moderate in light of efforts to develop stable institutions of government and societal organizations, there has not been conclusive evidence of this ideological shift. In fact, the continued adherence to the Muqawama (resistance) Doctrine represents a decisive facet of the movement's enduring pledge to nullify the state of Israel through a prolonged war of attrition. This article examines the role of political pragmatism in the evolution of Hamas. First, it discusses why the moderation argument alone does not provide an adequate understanding of the movement's evolution, especially since it continues to embrace the use of terrorism and violence as facets of Islamism and as an extension of the Muqawama Doctrine. Second, rather than solely using the moderation argument, this article offers an alternative approach which considers how the combination of strategic policy approaches implemented by Hamas has reflected the role of pragmatism in pursuing its domestic and foreign policy agendas, which are intertwined with the values of the Muqawama Doctrine.     

Interdependence,asymmetric crises,and European defence cooperation

Although international crises are often believed to represent windows of opportunity to strengthen European defence cooperation, recent crises have not seemed to produce a clear convergence of European Union (EU) member states’ security interests. This article seeks to address this puzzle by arguing that European defence cooperation is a response to crises that place European states in a situation of military interdependence. Conversely, asymmetric crises, i.e. crises that affect European states unevenly, encourage those states to maintain their autonomy of action. This theoretical argument is supported by two case studies: the failure of the European Defence Community in the early 1950s and the current difficulties experienced by the EU’s military operations. These two cases illustrate a striking continuity in that, because of (neo)colonial ties in particular, European states are often unevenly affected by international crises, which tends to make defence cooperation less effective.     

Madagascar between peace and conflict—domestic capabilities for peaceful conflict management

Despite severe political instability and many political crises since independence, Madagascar has experienced peace for nearly four decades. Unlike the dominant research on causes of armed conflict, this article focuses on the causes of peace. It introduces a new concept—domestic capabilities for peaceful conflict management—to identify factors related to conflict fault lines, civil–military relations and a culture of constructive conflict management, that facilitate the prevalence of peace. The domestic capabilities for peaceful conflict management perspective draws attention away from preventive diplomacy and external intervention and places the focus on internal capabilities for peace. On this basis, the article also analyses the severe crisis in 2009 and how it was handled.     

Leopards Can Change Their Spots: When Leaders Take Out of Character Actions

According to audience cost theories, out of character actions by hawkish leaders are likely when such leaders can use their reputations to deflect criticism. This analysis examines the theory of out of character actions, focusing on shifting international conditions and the use of secrecy to allow leaders both to lead public opinion and avoid unwanted scrutiny. The plausibility of this theory is tested in the paradigmatic case for hawkish policy reversal: Richard Nixon’s rapprochement with China in 1971–1972. Examination of four facets of Sino–American relations—the Soviet dimension, conservative opposition to rapprochement, growing domestic support for improved relations, and the secrecy of negotiations—reveal the significance of contextual factors and Nixon’s decisions in explaining improved relations. Leaders can effectively change their type with minimal political repercussions, as long as conditions are favourable and audience costs can be minimised.     

The unipolar exit: beyond the Pax Americana

In this article I show that the unipolar era already is drawing to a close. Three main drivers explain the impending end of the Pax Americana. First, the rise of new great powers—especially China—is transforming the international system from unipolarity to multipolarity. Second, the United States is becoming the poster child for strategic over-extension, or as Paul Kennedy dubbed it, imperial overstretch. Third, the United States' relative economic power is declining, and mounting US fiscal problems and the dollar's increasingly problematic role as the international financial system's reserve currency are undermining US hegemony. After examining how these trends undermine the argument for ‘unipolar stability’, I conclude by arguing that over the next two decades the Pax Americana's end presages dramatic changes in international politics.     

Effects of Economic and Symbolic Threat Appeals in Right-Wing Populist Advertising on Anti-Immigrant Attitudes: The Impact of Textual and Visual Appeals

Right-wing populist parties portray immigrants as economic or symbolic threats in their political advertisements by constructing a moral divide between the “good” ordinary people and “bad” immigrants. Yet, it remains unclear how these different threat appeals contribute to the formation of anti-immigrant attitudes among citizens and what role visual elements play in producing these effects. A survey-experiment with a quota sample of 471 participants reveals that, overall, symbolic threat appeals exert stronger effects on anti-immigrant attitudes than economic ones. When presented via text alone, only symbolic—not economic—threat appeals increased anti-immigrant attitudes via the activation of heuristic processing such as the reliance on negative stereotypes or feelings of anxiety, in particular among lower-educated citizens. When visuals were present, both types of threat appeals enhanced anti-immigrant attitudes among citizens across all education levels based on heuristic processing. Additionally, high image-text congruency induced cognitive argument approval resulting in higher anti-immigrant attitudes.     

Avoiding Audience Costs: Domestic Political Accountability and Concessions in Crisis Diplomacy

We challenge the widely accepted proposition that democratic leaders are more accountable than autocratic leaders. We argue that a winning coalition's abilities to monitor and sanction a leader increase as its size decreases. Hence, contrary to conventional wisdom, our theory suggests that autocratic leaders are more accountable than democratic leaders due to the monitoring and sanctioning advantages of smaller coalitions relative to larger coalitions. Many international relations scholars hold that the conventional wisdom explains important variation in leaders’ behavior during crisis bargaining and in the outcomes of international disputes. We evaluate our theory and the conventional perspective by examining rival predictions regarding leaders’ ability to avoid incurring audience costs by conducting crisis negotiations and making concessions outside their coalitions’ view. A reassessment of us-ussr diplomacy during the Cuban Missile Crisis, a favored case of the conventional wisdom, indicates the plausibility of our theory in the context of security crises.     

Towards linking normative theory,communication policy and audiences in South African communication research

Abstract

In this article the need to revisit South African normative media theory and communication policy against the background of fundamental audience research is emphasised. This is done in view of the postmodemist argument that ‘classic’ normative media theory is no longer suitable as a yardstick for the measurement of media performance, quality and ethics in postmodern societies, in a changing media landscape. Bearing in mind that South Africa cannot be fully characterised as a postmodernist and advanced capitalist society, but based on the nature of its First World media system functioning in a multi-cultural, multi-racial, multi-ethnic and multi-linguistic society, the tendency to see ubuntuism as a point of departure for such revision is questioned. This is done in favour of an approach in which difference and diversity are acknowledged, including the different roles the media can play and the different forms in which it can (and do) contribute to social responsibility. As far as policy research is concerned, it is emphasised that such research should be based on normative theory about the role of the media in South African society. If not, South African communication policy will continue to be fragmented and responsive to mainly technological developments and opportunities, instead of being based on communicative goals and needs. This article concludes by emphasising that both normative theory and policy should be based on fundamental audience research, which is argued to be neglected in South African communication research.     

Filling the Void of Meaning: Identity Construction in U.S. Foreign Policy After September 11, 2001

The paper aims to shed light on the conceptual link between international crises such as the one following September 11, 2001, and processes of identity construction through foreign policy. Crisis and identity construction are conceptualized as constant political phenomena. The political process is constituted by meaningful acts of social agents, and can thus only be grasped by analyzing meaning. Meaning is transmitted by language. Meaningful language is never reducible to individual speakers; it is a social act. The sum of articulatory practices in a social field is called discourse. Linking Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) with the theory of hegemony developed by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, I will be able to show how hegemonic discourses serve as the nexus between the discursive construction of crises and identity change. A number of problems will be acknowledged when linking these two strands of thinking, as CDA and Laclauian theory work with tentatively different conceptions of discourse. The construction of the "war on terror" by the Bush administration between September 2001 and May 2003 is used as a case to illustrate the theoretical argument.     

Basic problems in the theory of uneven and combined development. Part II: unevenness and political multiplicity

Where does ‘the international’ come from? What accounts for its existence as a dimension of the human world? This article attempts an answer, in three steps, using the idea of ‘uneven and combined development’ (U&CD). First, a depth model is constructed, comparing different ways of linking uneven development with international relations. Thus far, it turns out, these ways have all presupposed the fact of political multiplicity, rather than explaining it. In search of explanation, the article turns, secondly, to the compelling historical sociological argument of Barry Buzan and Richard Little. This locates the origins of geopolitics in the late prehistoric shift from hunter-gatherer to settled agricultural existence, together with associated processes of social differentiation and proto-state formation. Buzan and Little's explanation appears at first to pre-empt the need for the concept of U&CD. Yet closer inspection reveals that unevenness and combination play a key role in their empirical account without, however, being theorized. The third step of the argument therefore seeks to show how these are necessary parts of the process of social change which Buzan and Little describe. And in this way it emerges that the origins of ‘the international’ do indeed lie in the uneven and combined character of historical development.     

Crises and Crisis Generations: The Long-term Impact of International Crises on Military Political Participation

Why do states facing high levels of international threat sometimes have militaries that are heavily involved in government and at other times relatively apolitical, professional militaries? I argue that the answer to this puzzle lies in a state's history of acute international crises rather than its chronic threat environment. Poor outcomes—defeats or stalemates—in major international crises lead to professionalization and depoliticization of militaries in both the short- and long-term. A poor outcome creates pressure for military professionalization and withdrawal from politics in order to increase military effectiveness. This effect persists years later due to generational shifts. As officers of the “crisis generation” become generals, they bring with them a preference for professionalization and guide the military towards abstention from politics. I test this theory using a new global dataset on military officers in national governing bodies from 1964–2008 and find strong support for it.     

National Unification and Mistrust: Bargaining Power and the Prospects for a PRC/Taiwan Agreement

Can states that mistrust each other as much as the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan reach unification agreements? Unification agreements are most feasible when one of two conditions holds: the unification bargain does not independently erode the bargaining power of the weaker state, or the more powerful state can commit credibly not to use its increased bargaining power to restructure the agreement ex post. Our argument accounts for two historical cases—the nineteenth century Argentine and German unifications—and helps to explain why the PRC has found it difficult to make progress on achieving a peaceful bargain with Taiwan. We describe several possible future scenarios for cross-Strait relations and show that democratization in the PRC is not a necessary prerequisite for a unification agreement between the mainland and Taiwan.     

Refracted axis: Kitayama Jun'yū and writing a German Japan

The question of how individuals navigate a given regime is inevitably a delicate one, but one no less important because of its sensitivity. This article examines the case of one Kitayama Jun'yū – author of dozens of works during the 1930s and 1940s that purported to introduce Japan to a German audience – and his changing rhetorical strategies in presenting a Japan that would be acceptable to his readership. It employs an adapted notion of Bhabha's concept of ‘mimicry’ as a means to understand both developments internal to Kitayama's works as well as their changing reception. This framework recognizes that power dynamics played an influential role in cross-cultural exchange between the two countries; at the same time, it enables a depersonalized engagement with cultural politics that does not rest on identifying individual authorial political allegiances. Drawing on both Kitayama's writings and archival materials that reflect official and semi-private responses to his work, this article offers a closer look at how a particular Japanese intellectual negotiated Japan's place within the discursive space of the National Socialist regime.     

The Democracy Aid Calculus: Regimes,Political Opponents,and the Allocation of US Democracy Assistance, 1981–2009

To encourage the spread of democracy throughout the developing world, the United States provides targeted aid to governments, political parties, and other non-governmental groups and organizations. This study examines the calculations behind the allocation of democracy assistance, with special attention to the role of regime conditions and policy compatibility in the provision of aid. We argue that both concerns—the opportunity for successful democratization and critical goals related to containing and countering political opponents—are central to democracy aid allocations. We theorize how these two concerns determine the amount of aid allocated, operationalizing these concepts using measures of the original democracy level, change in the democracy level, and policy compatibility. We find support for our argument in tests of US democracy aid allocations by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) from 1981–2009.