Germany's power and the weakening of states in a globalised world: deconstructing a paradox

It is somewhat ironical to ponder Germany's power at a time when radical changes due to globalisation vastly limit the efficiency of state actions worldwide. Certainly, Germany's resources increased with reunification – though the country also has to bear its costs. An enumeration of the – possible – resources of German power provides us, however, with little understanding of the nature of German power, embedded as the country is in a European system from which it derives its strength. Hence, only an analysis of this system fully renders the picture, contrary to what neo-realists and liberals might assume. While Germany did exercise a semi-hegemony over Western Europe in the monetary area up to EMU, the further integration of the EU has altered the European structure and diffused Germany's power. A particular configuration allowed Germany to devise one-sidedly the rules of EMU. This configuration does not exist in other issue-areas, such as, for example, defence and enlargement. This does not mean that power is absent from Germany's tool-box: political credit in particular is abundant. Yet in a larger Europe, where coalitions are more issue-oriented and hence more volatile than formerly, Germany's power will turn out to be more limited than its demands for recognition may lead us to believe.     

The federal republic and the future of Europe: A reassessment

Speculation concerning a dominant or hegemonic role to be played by a unified Germany in a post‐cold war Europe is misplaced. The extent to which the Federal Republic of 1949–89 has been caricatured as an economic giant but a political dwarf has undermined an appreciation of the manner in which successive Bonn governments have used multilateralism in foreign policy to further Germany's political influence in Europe long before national reunification. At the same time, it is unlikely that reunification will bring a dramatic change in German foreign policy. The nature of the Federal Republic's domestic politics, as well as the relationship with the European Community, apply substantial constraints on the ability, or the desire, to bring about a radical reorientation. The principal architect of change in Germany's relationship with its neighbours will be the country's expansive corporate sector. The gap between the restrained nature of Germany's diplomacy and the extrovert dynamism of its industry, furthermore, promises to make the Federal Republic's adjustment to a new international role awkward.     

Linkages between Parliamentary and Ministerial Careers in Germany, 1949–2008: The Bundestag as Recruitment Pool

Germany is noted within Europe for its weak tobacco control policies and its opposition to European Union tobacco control legislation. In this article, we aim to explain Germany's stance on tobacco control. We review two explanations commonly proposed, namely tobacco industry donations to political parties and the legacy of the Nazis' opposition to smoking, and examine the politics of tobacco control in detail. We suggest that the interplay of numerous factors explains Germany's stance. Aspects of political culture including the Nazi heritage which has resulted in a dearth of public health research and teaching, institutional factors such as the reliance on industry self-regulation facilitated by Germany's system of corporatist policy-making and interest group politics are key. The tobacco industry has also successfully used framing strategies to uphold the social acceptability of smoking and undermine the acceptability of tobacco control in Germany. In addition a phenomenon that we call ‘autarkic epistemic isolation’ explains why so little policy learning from abroad has occurred. We suggest that our multi-factor model has significant explanatory power for Germany's weak stance that has resulted in a long-standing policy equilibrium. Recent events, however, suggest that this equilibrium may now have been punctuated.     

Germany in Europe: return of the nightmare or towards an engaged Germany in a new Europe?

Especially since (re-)unification, perceptions of Germany alternate between the fear of the return of the German hegemon and – at the same time – the diametrically opposed call for more German leadership based on Germany's outstanding pro-European engagement. Nonetheless, Germany's foreign policy has changed little since 1989: it is still cautious rather than assertive. Due to Germany's experience with the two world wars, German foreign policy places great value on the enlargement as well as the deepening of the EU. In sum, Germany can best be characterised as a normal and engaged European state.     

Notes on contributors

In the Kosovo crisis, Germany for the first time since 1955 joined NATO military combat operations in a major way. While this has often been interpreted as a fundamental major departure ('normalisation') in Germany's post‐war foreign policy, this article argues that Germany's willingness to contemplate joining a NATO war even without a mandate by the UN Security Council represents an evolution, rather than a fundamental change in Germany's foreign policy orientation. This evolution can be explained best as a logical and consistent response of Germany's foreign policy identity which reconciled, through modification, its traditional post war foreign policy identity as a ‘civilian power’ to a radically different security environment.     

German Defence Policy under the Second Merkel Chancellorship

The CDU/CSU/FDP coalition (2009–13) has witnessed the emergence of three important changes in the international security environment: the US ‘Asia Pivot’, the global financial crisis and the fallout from Germany's backseat role in the Libya crisis. This article examines how German defence policy has adapted to this changing context. It explores the reforms which have taken place to the Bundeswehr's structure and military capability procurement process under defence ministers Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg and Thomas de Mazière. The article also looks at German policy toward defence cooperation through CSDP and NATO. The article finds that while some important changes have been enacted to German defence policy, Germany is failing to properly adapt to the changing strategic environment. The article concludes by examining key defence policy challenges facing the government over the 2013–17 legislative period and the implications of the analysis for theoretical debates on German defence policy.     

Europe and the German Model: Growing Tension or Symbiosis?

Recent conflicts between the Commission of the European Communities and the German government suggest a growing tension between structures of the German political economy and the agenda of economic liberalisation fostered by European integration. Will mounting conflict ultimately force Germany to choose between its commitment to the integrity of the social market economy and support for European economic integration? This article considers the cases of Germany's public sector banks and the German postal service. Both entail potential conflict between the public service functions integral to the social market economy and the competition central to Europe's single market. Examination of these cases suggests that, rather than forcing change on a reluctant Germany and jeopardising the core of the social market economy (SME), enforcement of European competition policy from Brussels has taken place in fundamental symbiosis with the SME. Nonetheless, tensions between federal government and Länder indicate that a positive-sum relationship between Europe's single market and Germany's social market economy may be constrained by German federalism.     

Change and continuity in post-unification German foreign policy

Ten years after unification, Germany still maintains its post-Second World War foreign policy course based on transatlantic multilateralism and European integration despite changes in Germany's international and domestic contexts. This study argues that neither realist nor institutionalist explanations can explain the post-unification pattern of German foreign policy. Instead, continuity and change in this policy can be understood best through a role-theoretical approach based on the civilian power idealtype. Two causal pathways are developed which account for continuity in foreign policy orientation (goals) and strategies while explaining change in the choice of foreign policy instruments. First, the apparent success of Germany's traditional foreign policy role concept during and after unification helped to reify a broad foreign policy consensus around the goals and strategies of an ideal-type civilian power. Second, major foreign policy crises, such as the Yugoslavian wars, stirred the long held hierarchy between the core values of reticence vis-à-vis the use of force (never again German militarism) and the special German responsibility to prevent genocide (never again Auschwitz). The interaction between domestic and foreign expectations provides a promising source for explaining change and continuity in Germany's foreign policy role concept and behaviour.     

Beyond ethnoculturalism? German citizenship in the new millennium

This article examines the content of Germany's new citizenship laws against the background of previous policy, which was influenced by the original Wilhelmine goal of maintaining an ethnically and culturally pure citizenry. However, immigration has made this goal unsustainable and necessitated a more inclusive citizenship law. Based on an analysis of the new provisions in detail, it is argued that the new law marks a significant, though not complete departure from its ethnocultural past, which brings German citizenship policy into the European mainstream.     

The Power of Ideas: How Bundesbank Ideas Have Influenced the Reconstruction of the National Bank of Poland

This article is concerned with the qualitative rise of German influence in an enlarged European Union (EU). The point of departure is the assumption that eastward enlargement facilitates the further expansion and manifestation of German power in Europe via the institutionalisation of parts of the Modell Deutschland in the candidate countries prior to their accession. This article examines the power tools that have facilitated the transfer of Bundesbank ideas into the institutional structure of Poland's national central bank, Narodowy Bank Polski (NBP). The analysis demonstrates that the relationship between Germany and its eastern neighbours is not only determined by the former's physical capacities but, in reflection of post-war Germany's foreign policy strategy, relies on the persuasiveness of Germany's ideational lead.     

Notes on contributors

The pre-unification European and foreign policy of the ‘old’ Federal Republic was marked by four principal traits: an emphatically Western orientation, a strong commitment to multilateralism underpinned by close bilateral relations with France and the US, its civilian character, and Euro-centrism. Although it took place in radically different circumstances and under radically different conditions to the first, the second German unification nonetheless gave rise to fears among the political leaders of many other states in Western, Central and Eastern Europe – and among the proponents of some international relations theories – that it would herald sweeping changes in Germany's foreign policy orientation and profoundly destabilise inter-state relations in Europe. The contributions to this volume show that, in the decade following the second unification, there has been more continuity than change in German European and foreign policy. The most important change concerns attitudes and behaviour in respect of the use of military force. Under the pressure of its Western allies and events in the Balkans which have forced it to choose between opposition to war and opposition to genocide, Germany has shed much of its earlier inhibitions concerning the use of military force and become much more like a ‘normal’ big power in Europe. However, because this trend has been explicitly encouraged and welcomed by Germany's allies and partners and because it has taken place exclusively within the multilateral frameworks of NATO and the EU, it does not presage the return of a political ‘Frankenstein monster’ or the revival of the pre-Second World War patterns of European inter-state rivalry. The second German unification will assuredly not turn out to be a re-run of the first.     

Are We Doing Enough? Change and Continuity in the German Approach to Crisis Management

In the two-and-a-half decades since unification Germany has developed a distinctive approach towards international crisis management. This approach accepts the need to engage in the full spectrum of military and civilian operations but maintains a clear preference for the latter. Consequently, the European Union with its profile as a civil–military actor in international security is the preferred framework for German contributions. The article analyses the development of the German approach during the governments of Gerhard Schröder and Angela Merkel in the light of three interlinked debates on German foreign policy: continuity and change; multilateralism; and leadership. The announcement of a more active German foreign policy in 2014 has reanimated these debates. Concentrating its efforts on networked security and capacity building Germany has become an indispensable player in international crisis management. At the same time Germany's deeply rooted attachment to a culture of military restraint and continued reluctance to lead, limit its ability to work for necessary reforms at the European level.     

In search of a post-hegemonic order: Germany,NATO and the European security and defence policy

This article explores the erosion of the conditions which supported Germany's emergence as a ‘Civilian Power’, in particular fundamental changes in the US perspective on the transatlantic relationship and international security, but also the increased sensitivity of German foreign policy to domestic circumstances. It explores Germany's so far ambivalent and inconsistent role in the pursuit of a post-hegemonic order for Euro-Atlantic security, focusing in particular on the emerging European Security and Defence Policy.     

Energy Security and Germany's Response to Russian Revisionism: The Dangers of Civilian Power

This article examines the impact of German dependence on Russian gas supplies for Europe's ability to apply effective sanctions against Russia. It demonstrates that by focusing on the environmental dimensions of energy policy and a policy of rapprochement with Russia, Germany has neglected the security of supply implications of its dependence on Russian gas. The article argues that Germany's excessive energy dependence on Russia has limited the ability of the EU to challenge Russian revisionism by targeting its energy sector through sanctions. The article makes a number of energy policy recommendations which will be essential for Germany to avoid undue Russian influence on its foreign and security policies. The article concludes by exploring the utility of Neoclassical Realism in understanding Germany's approach to energy security. In doing so it highlights the dangers of allowing ideology to cloud a sober assessment of the imperatives of the balance of theat.     

Germany's Constitution and participation in international peacekeeping operations

In this article, Torsten Stein, Professor of Constitutional, European and Public International Law and Director of the Institute of European Studies at the University of Saarland, Saarbrücken, traces the constitutional development that has enabled Germany to take part in a meaningful way in United Nations peacekeeping operations (PKO). As in Japan, Germany's post-war Constitution (Basic Law) was held to prohibit such participation. Germany's Federal Constitutional Court, however, has found an interpretation of the Constitution that - without amending the Constitution or any other pertinent legislation - allows a "German solution" which reconciles the putative post-war prohibitions with Germany's obligations as a member of the United Nations. Stein, who is also a Colonel in the German Air Force Reserve, warns that the "five conditions" contained in Japan's 1992 Peacekeeping Operations Law are unrealistic in view of present day PKO, but envisages an interpretation of the Japanese Constitution that might follow the German example.     

Croyances et coopération : analyse du réseau des acteurs de la Politique de sécurité et de défense commune de l'UE

This article analyses the European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy in a sociological perspective. Although nationalities still influence ESDP actors' preference in matters of European defence, they are not linked to their cooperation relations in a policy field that has been transgovernmentalized in a decade only. using Social Networks Analysis and an original database, we compare the cooperation relations of a sample of key ESDP actors with their beliefs on some issues of this policy field. In accordance with our theoretical framework, the Advocacy Coalition Framework, we find that the increasing number of cooperation relations between our actors is linked with the convergence of some categories of beliefs about European defence.     

Explaining Germany’s Position on European Banking Union

Much has been written about European banking union and Germany’s role in shaping it. Missing, however, is a comprehensive explanation for Germany's contradictory positions on banking union: German policymakers gambled on a single supervisory mechanism, and a single resolution mechanism yet drew the line on European-wide deposit insurance. We explain Germany’s mixed positions on banking union by drawing on prospect theory and theories of policy salience.     

Problems in Australian Foreign Policy January-June 1970

Australia's external policy during the first half of 1970 was dominated by three concerns-defence planning and weapons acquisition, Vietnam/Cambodia, and defence commitments in Malaysia/Singapore. Discussion of Australia's approach to these policy concerns should, however, be set in somewhat broader perspective. First, it seems appropriate to indicate the domestic context in which policies were being formulated. Second, a review of the governing principles which provided the rationale for particular policy movements is called for.     

German Foreign Policy and the Libya Crisis

German foreign policy has come under scrutiny due to its decision to abstain in the vote on UN Security Council Resolution 1973 in March 2011 on the Libyan no fly zone. Germany's decision not to support France, the UK and the USA ensured that no common EU position emerged and NATO's response to the crisis proved difficult. German foreign policy was caught between enlarging its influence and role in crisis management and reserving the right to reject involvement in operations that do not fit with its national interest. Drawing on the work of Robert Gilpin, the article argues that Germany's decision to abstain on United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 can be explained by understanding the cost/benefit calculations of the German government, pressured by the protracted Eurozone crisis.     

Finanzplatz deutschland: National or European response to internationalisation?

Germany's has long been held up as a competitive, bank‐based financial system, providing long‐term and secure finance for industrial and service companies. The emphasis here is on the international market and regulatory conditions which have helped to transform the the financial system. In the 1980s, the government remained averse to any ‘Big Bang’ experiment, adapting national securities markets to policy initiatives in the US, and in London and Paris. This aversion was rooted in Bundesbank opposition to the development of money markets, and to the practice of corporate‐bank‐insurance cross‐shareholding among Germany's big publicly listed corporations. The politics of ‘Finanzplatz Deutschland’ achieved a balance between maintaining national institutions and adapting them carefully to international markets and regulation. Implementing monetary union and the European financial area in the 1990s and beyond amounts in effect to a ‘Big Bang ‘ policy which is already under way. The prospect of a liquid ‘Euro'‐market for securities, and increasingly competitive banking and insurance markets, spells a shift in German corporate policies towards Anglo‐American practices. National cross‐shareholding corporate structures will not long survive a single currency.