The “Somalinisation” of terrorism and counterterrorism in Kenya: the case of refoulement

Kenya’s state discourse on terrorism and counterterrorism securitises Somali refugees and refugee camps. Using the securitisation theory, a perspective of social constructivism as a theoretical framework, the article attempts to establish the relationship between the securitisation of Somali refugees and refugee camps and refoulement as a measure to counter the securitisation. The arguments raised are the speech acts of Kenya’s securitising actors expressed in the terrorism discourse present Somali refugees and refugee camps as existential threats to peace and security in the country. Consequently, their speech acts expressed in the counterterrorism discourse present non-refoulement of the refugees as an existential threat to national security so as to justify, to the targeted audience, the adoption of refoulement, a norm-violating measure, to counter the fear of the threat of terrorism from Somali refugees and refugee camps. Terrorism and counterterrorism in Kenya have, therefore, been “Somalinised”. The conclusion offers ways of preventing the “Somalinisation” of terrorism and counterterrorism in Kenya.     

A CTS model of counterterrorism

To date, critical terrorism studies (CTS) has been very good at critiquing contemporary counterterrorism, but has not yet offered an alternative model which could be used for research and evaluation, as well as policy advice. This article seeks to address this gap by constructing a CTS model of counterterrorism. The first section of the article explicates the appropriation of “emancipation”, and why it is key for an alternative model of counterterrorism. The article then goes on to outline a CTS model and explain how it addresses all the main weaknesses of contemporary counterterrorism models, because it is based on a more robust ontology and epistemology which addresses terrorism as deep politics, it is normatively based on emancipation, it approaches terrorism and security holistically, and it is rooted in means/ends consistency. The final section of the article argues that the CTS model is not a theoretical utopia. A comparison with Norwegian counterterrorism shows that it can be useful for evaluating and advising real-world counterterrorism.     

Terrorism Research: The Record

Looking back at the beginnings of academic research on terrorism just over 40 years ago, it is extraordinary to see that what was once a marginal subject for social science has developed into a full-fledged program of “terrorism studies.” In fact, recently a sociologist considered the subject of sufficient importance to write a doctoral dissertation and then a book on the “social construction” of the field (Stampnitzky 2013). This essay highlights some examples of the contributions scholars from different disciplines have made to understanding terrorism. There is no consensus on any general theoretical laws of terrorism (there is no equivalent of a democratic peace theory, for example), but researchers have defined key concepts and deepened explanations of cause, effect, and process.What follows identifies four interrelated areas of explanatory inquiry into terrorism that have emerged over years of research: the effectiveness of terrorism as a strategy of opposition, the determinants and consequences of counterterrorism policies, how campaigns or waves of terrorism end, and how analysis of terrorism can be situated in a broader theoretical framework rather than treated as a phenomenon sui generis. Particular emphasis is placed on studies that are comparative and/or that situate the specific case of terrorism in a general theoretical perspective.     

Discourses on countering violent extremism: the strategic interplay between fear and security after 9/11

This article explores the construction of extremism in media discourse, the factors driving specific constructions and the implications of these constructions for counterterrorism policy. We contend that extremism has predominantly and increasingly been framed as a security issue. This article explores the implications of this practice through the framework of securitisation. We measure the average intensity of security framing in 38,616 articles found in three major US newspapers, New York Times, Wall Street Journal and Los Angeles Times, between 20 January 1993 and 19 January 2017 comprising the Clinton, Bush and Obama presidencies, and look at factors influencing the shift in intensity over time. Through our analysis, we show that it is possible to return to a pre-9/11 discourse but that the confluence of real-world events and the strategic choices of political actors have so far prevented this from fully occurring. We then explore the effect of securitisation on public perceptions of the threat from terrorism, finding that increases in the intensity of security framing artificially increases the public’s worry about becoming a victim of terrorism. We conclude by discussing implications for the communication of counterterrorism policy and the requirements for an after, after 9/11 approach     

Combating Terrorism in Central Asia: Explaining Differences in States' Responses to Terror

This work examines differences in the level of violence of counterterrorism measures adopted by Central Asian states. Why do some Central Asian governments opt for wanton repression in the name of the struggle with terrorism, while others adopt less severe methods of control and prevention? To answer this question, this study draws on a synthesis of rationalist and constructivist explanations. Like rationalists, it posits that the magnitude of terrorism and states' material capabilities affect governments' responses to terrorism. Following constructivists, the study stresses the impact of ideas about the nature of terrorist threats and views on the appropriateness of the use of force on the counterterrorism policies of Central Asian states.     

Bringing politics back in: the introduction of the ‘performative power’ of counterterrorism

While it is sensible that governments and academics endeavour to assess the effectiveness of counterterrorism policies, this article argues that it is almost impossible to measure arithmetically the outcome of counterterrorism efforts for a variety of reasons. However, this does not mean that the effect of governmental policy cannot and should not be assessed. This article argues that it is not necessarily the policy measures and their intended results as such, but much more the way in which they are presented and perceived, that determine the overall effect of the policy in question. The article introduces the concept of ‘performativity’, which involves the extent to which a national government, by means of its official counterterrorism policy and corresponding discourse, is successful in selling its representation of events, its set of solutions to the terrorist problem, as well as being able to set the tone for the overall discourse on terrorism and counterterrorism. Due to the distinct relation between the performative power of counterterrorism efforts and the arc of violence carried out by terrorist movements, analysing the level of performativity will provide an indication to the effectiveness of counterterrorism policies. It is argued that a low level of performative power generally has a more rapidly neutralising effect on radicalisation and political violence than large-scale, public counterterrorism efforts.     

Fencing in Warfare: Threats,Punishment, and Intra-war Deterrence in Counterterrorism

New theoretical approaches have been developed that apply deterrence and coercion to counterterrorism. Critics have suggested, however, that in the particular case of deterring terrorism by threats of punishment, a mismatch exists between deterrent goals and counterterrorism intentions: the twin aims of destroying and deterring a single opponent is logically and theoretically incompatible. These criticisms, however, neglect to take two important factors into consideration. First, threats of punishment in counterterrorism can be applied against a wide assortment of actors involved in and associated with terrorism and political violence. Second, the concept of “intra-war deterrence” suggests ways in which a state can deter certain behavior or a specific form of warfare while engaging in open conflict with that same adversary. In exploring both factors, this article posits that states can gain coercive leverage over different actors involved in terrorism, including organizations with which they are actively hoping to defeat.     

Indian counterterrorism policy and the influence of the Global War on Terror

India has been a major victim of Islamist terrorism and has long fought against an array of Islamist terrorist groups. Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, India's previously lonely struggle against terrorism has taken place against the background of the US-led Global War on Terror (GWOT). After outlining India's Islamist terrorist challenge, this article examines India's evolving approach to counterterrorism and how the GWOT has influenced it. It concludes that India has adopted a localized, defensive, law-and-order approach to counterterrorism which has evolved in response to various attacks over the years but still remains seriously underdeveloped. The GWOT has influenced Indian counterterrorism in important ways, although its influence has been subtle and indirect rather than transformative. The GWOT has enhanced Indo-American counterterror cooperation, shaped India's terror environment by launching the war in Afghanistan and enriched Indian counterterrorism with American experience. Just as important, it has also had an impact on India's debate on counterterrorism, civil liberties and human rights.     

Does Democracy Decrease Fear of Terrorism?

ABSTRACT

Fear is an integral part of terrorism. Fighting fear can thus be a crucial part of counterterrorist policies. In the case of terrorism, citizens look to the state for protection. Yet, most studies of terrorist fear emphasize individual-level factors. We lack studies that link fear to features of the state, especially whether democratic states are capable of reducing fear among its citizens. Our study aims to fill part of this research gap by asking whether democratic government reduces or increases fear of terrorism. We find that there is substantial cross-country variance in citizens’ fear of terrorism. The results suggest that fear is more widespread among citizens in non-democratic countries compared to citizens in democratic countries. Actual exposure to terrorist attacks has no impact on citizens’ fear of terrorism when we account for whether the country is a democracy or not. Hence, democratic government displays resilience towards fear mongering.     

Who is a Terrorist? Ethnicity,Group Affiliation,and Understandings of Political Violence

What does the American public label as “terrorism?” How do people think about the factors motivating violence, and in turn, the policies that are favored? Using ingroup and outgroup dynamics, we argue that the terrorist label is more readily applied to Arab-Americans than Whites, and to members of militant groups. Moreover, people attribute different motives to violence committed by Arabs versus Whites, and favor different policies in response. We conducted an experiment where we randomly assigned one of six stories about a failed armed attack, each with a different combination of ethnicity and group affiliation. We find that an Arab ethnicity and Islamist group affiliation increase the likelihood of labeling an act as terrorism. Attacks by Whites and members of a White supremacist group are less likely to be labeled terrorism. Rather, Whites are more likely to be called “mass shooters.” Despite never discussing motive, Arab-American attackers are more likely to be ascribed political or religious motives, while White suspects are more likely to be seen as mentally ill. Lastly, an Arab ethnicity increases support for counterterrorism policies and decreases support for mental health care.     

The Fifth Wave: The New Tribalism? 1

In political disputes, issue frames set parameters for debate and shape which view dominates. This study expands issue framing research to examine the influence of frames on the perception of future terrorist threats as well as subsequent support for related counterterrorism policies. We test several hypotheses using data from an experimental field poll. We find that issue frames clearly influence perceptions of threat. However, our frames, which posit specific terrorism threats, only have a limited influence on respondent preferences for counter-terrorism policies. We consider a variety of explanations for these results and provide direction for future research.     

Terrorism as Cancer: How to Combat an Incurable Disease

ABSTRACT

This paper provides an alternative framework that conceptualizes the threat posed by terrorism based on an epidemiological approach that views it as a chronic disease like cancer rather than as a military, ideological, or socio-economic problem. After highlighting the similarities in the causes, behavior, treatments, and challenges of combating terrorism and cancer, this paper presents a staging system policymakers can use to educate the public and allocate counterterrorism resources more efficiently. This approach encourages policymakers to see terrorism for what it is (an all but inevitable facet of modern life that can be managed but never fully eliminated), and not what they wish terrorism to be (a national security problem that can be solved, defeated, or vanquished). It provides policymakers with a useful model to conceptualize the threat and treat terrorism in a comprehensive manner, from preventing future attacks to effectively responding to them when they will inevitably occur.     

Terrorism and Counterterrorism: An Integrated Approach and Future Research Agenda

In this commentary, we make the case that the analysis of terrorism and counterterrorism must be based on an integrated theory that links both issues together. Terrorist groups’ ultimate goals must be distinguished from their strategic goals and the strategic logic by which they employ terror and select targets to further their ultimate goals. The strategic logic of terrorism is thus key to understanding patterns of terrorism and the counter-reaction by governments against it. We make the case for a unified approach and suggest major areas for future research.     

A Conceptual Framework for Addressing Psychological Process in the Development of the Terrorist

A conceptual framework is presented for addressing psychological issues in the development of the terrorist. In particular, the authors suggest that viewing terrorism as a process may lead not only to better conceptual development in analyses of the terrorist, but may also lead to the development of more practical and efficient counterterrorism initiatives. Additionally, viewing terrorism in this way may finally lead to the formation of a clear and unambiguous position for psychology within an interdisciplinary approach to analyses of both terrorism and the terrorist.     

Security Versus Liberty in the Context of Counterterrorism: An Experimental Approach

A critical question in counterterrorism studies concerns the extent to which governments adequately balance the continual provision of individual rights and freedoms with the appropriate level of national security when faced with a terrorist attack. We experimentally assess this tradeoff utilizing a 2 × 2 × 2 between-groups factorial design, manipulating (a) the extent of terror-related threats, (b) the level of invasiveness of subsequent counterterrorism policies, as well as (c) the terror context: transnational and domestic. The results provide evidence that the public is more willing to accept greater reductions in civil liberties under a greater threat of terrorism only when the perceived effectiveness of those policies to prevent future acts of terrorism is high. Furthermore, we find these results to be specific to the context of a transnational terror threat. This suggests that the public will be unwilling to accept reductions in civil liberties when the source of the attack is domestic, regardless of the level of threat or how effective subsequent policies may be in preventing future attacks.     

Does Terrorism Pay? An Empirical Analysis

Does terrorism help perpetrators to achieve their demands? Few research questions about terrorism generate as much controversy. This study contributes to the debate in two main ways. First, we identify major limitations within the burgeoning literature on the effectiveness of terrorism. Specifically, we highlight the main methodological problems vexing empirical assessments of whether terrorism promotes government concessions. Second, we present a research design that circumvents those recurrent methodological shortcomings. In short, we find no empirical evidence to suggest that terrorism pays. In fact, multiple variants of the tactic in hostage standoffs impede the perpetrators from coercing government compliance. The negative effect of terrorism on the odds of compliance is significant and substantial across logistic and multilevel logistic model specifications, particularly when civilians are killed or wounded in the coercive incident. These findings have important implications for both scholars and practitioners of counterterrorism.     

The Role of the Chemical Weapons Convention in Countering Chemical Terrorism

A series of incidents over the past two decades has indicated that some terrorist groups are interested in acquiring and using improvised chemical devices (ICDs). Although the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is a disarmament treaty that is legally binding only on sovereign states that join it voluntarily, the Convention fortuitously includes several provisions that can help its members to prevent chemical terrorism or to manage the consequences of an attack. This article examines the articles of the CWC that are relevant to counterterrorism and discusses how their implementation could be improved at the national and international levels. The article also addresses the role that the CWC secretariat, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in The Hague, currently plays in preventing and responding to incidents of chemical terrorism, and the political factors that constrain its activities in the counterterrorism field.     

Support for Terrorism: The Role of Beliefs in Jihad and Institutional Responses to Terrorism

ABSTRACT

Passive support for terrorism refers to expressions of sympathy for acts of terrorism and/or the justifications (ideology) used by terrorist groups to legitimise their beliefs and actions. One form of passive support is whether Muslims feel terrorists have valid grievances. Appealing to a sense of grievance is a key way that violent Islamists attempt to recruit fellow Muslims to their cause. Using survey data collected from 800 Muslims living in Australia, this paper examines factors that lead Muslims to believe that terrorists have valid grievances. Factors examined include beliefs in jihad and attitudes towards counterterrorism policing and laws. Other variables included in the analysis are social identity, age, gender, income, religious denomination (Sunni vs. Shia), religious commitment, i.e., Mosque attendance, and recent contact with police. The most significant predictor of passive support for terrorism was found to be particular beliefs in jihad. The perceived legitimacy of counterterrorism laws and trust in police were also important. Implications for countering extremist ideology and generating community cooperation in counterterrorism will be considered.     

Torture and terrorism: an interview with Moazzam Begg

This article presents some of the findings of research on issues surrounding teaching terrorism and political violence at UK higher education institutions. It reports the results of a survey of UK institutions of higher education on their responses to government and other pressures in relation to terrorism. The data show a minority of universities have developed systems, policies or procedures for ‘preventing violent extremism’, while a significant number have developed close cooperation and collaboration with state counterterrorism policies raising potential issues of academic freedom. This article then examines three high-profile cases – incidents where universities, lecturers and students have come under political and legal pressures over the content of terrorism courses or accusations of ‘radicalisation’ on campus. It suggests that these pressures can be and sometimes are resisted, but that they have on occasion effectively narrowed the scope of academic freedom in practise with the danger that a further chilling effect follows in their wake.