Notes on contributors

The pre-unification European and foreign policy of the ‘old’ Federal Republic was marked by four principal traits: an emphatically Western orientation, a strong commitment to multilateralism underpinned by close bilateral relations with France and the US, its civilian character, and Euro-centrism. Although it took place in radically different circumstances and under radically different conditions to the first, the second German unification nonetheless gave rise to fears among the political leaders of many other states in Western, Central and Eastern Europe – and among the proponents of some international relations theories – that it would herald sweeping changes in Germany's foreign policy orientation and profoundly destabilise inter-state relations in Europe. The contributions to this volume show that, in the decade following the second unification, there has been more continuity than change in German European and foreign policy. The most important change concerns attitudes and behaviour in respect of the use of military force. Under the pressure of its Western allies and events in the Balkans which have forced it to choose between opposition to war and opposition to genocide, Germany has shed much of its earlier inhibitions concerning the use of military force and become much more like a ‘normal’ big power in Europe. However, because this trend has been explicitly encouraged and welcomed by Germany's allies and partners and because it has taken place exclusively within the multilateral frameworks of NATO and the EU, it does not presage the return of a political ‘Frankenstein monster’ or the revival of the pre-Second World War patterns of European inter-state rivalry. The second German unification will assuredly not turn out to be a re-run of the first.     

Germany's power and the weakening of states in a globalised world: deconstructing a paradox

It is somewhat ironical to ponder Germany's power at a time when radical changes due to globalisation vastly limit the efficiency of state actions worldwide. Certainly, Germany's resources increased with reunification – though the country also has to bear its costs. An enumeration of the – possible – resources of German power provides us, however, with little understanding of the nature of German power, embedded as the country is in a European system from which it derives its strength. Hence, only an analysis of this system fully renders the picture, contrary to what neo-realists and liberals might assume. While Germany did exercise a semi-hegemony over Western Europe in the monetary area up to EMU, the further integration of the EU has altered the European structure and diffused Germany's power. A particular configuration allowed Germany to devise one-sidedly the rules of EMU. This configuration does not exist in other issue-areas, such as, for example, defence and enlargement. This does not mean that power is absent from Germany's tool-box: political credit in particular is abundant. Yet in a larger Europe, where coalitions are more issue-oriented and hence more volatile than formerly, Germany's power will turn out to be more limited than its demands for recognition may lead us to believe.     

Change and continuity in post-unification German foreign policy

Ten years after unification, Germany still maintains its post-Second World War foreign policy course based on transatlantic multilateralism and European integration despite changes in Germany's international and domestic contexts. This study argues that neither realist nor institutionalist explanations can explain the post-unification pattern of German foreign policy. Instead, continuity and change in this policy can be understood best through a role-theoretical approach based on the civilian power idealtype. Two causal pathways are developed which account for continuity in foreign policy orientation (goals) and strategies while explaining change in the choice of foreign policy instruments. First, the apparent success of Germany's traditional foreign policy role concept during and after unification helped to reify a broad foreign policy consensus around the goals and strategies of an ideal-type civilian power. Second, major foreign policy crises, such as the Yugoslavian wars, stirred the long held hierarchy between the core values of reticence vis-à-vis the use of force (never again German militarism) and the special German responsibility to prevent genocide (never again Auschwitz). The interaction between domestic and foreign expectations provides a promising source for explaining change and continuity in Germany's foreign policy role concept and behaviour.     

The end of the affair? Germany's relationship with France

French–German resistance to the US war against Iraq marked a high point in the two countries' political alignment. It was followed by French proposals for even closer integration. Yet French and German policies and priorities differ in a number of fields. Prominent among these is the EU, where Germany has long worked for a reduction in EU spending and a redistribution of votes among the member countries. After reaching a compromise on these issues, co-operation with France on foreign and security policy has grown particularly close. This has affected Germany's relations with Central and Eastern Europe and with the US, areas where Germany traditionally pursued policies different from France. At the end of the second period of the Red–Green government, Germany's national interests have been redefined as a result of the relationship with France.     

Notes on contributors

In the Kosovo crisis, Germany for the first time since 1955 joined NATO military combat operations in a major way. While this has often been interpreted as a fundamental major departure ('normalisation') in Germany's post‐war foreign policy, this article argues that Germany's willingness to contemplate joining a NATO war even without a mandate by the UN Security Council represents an evolution, rather than a fundamental change in Germany's foreign policy orientation. This evolution can be explained best as a logical and consistent response of Germany's foreign policy identity which reconciled, through modification, its traditional post war foreign policy identity as a ‘civilian power’ to a radically different security environment.     

Conflicting Images? Germany and the Rise of China

While Germany's ‘Chinapolitik’ under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder was driven by economic interests, Angela Merkel promised a normative turn in foreign policy toward China. This apparent turn became most visible in 2007 when she met with the Dalai Lama, which caused strong diplomatic protest from Beijing. This article asks whether Germany's foreign policy toward China did in fact shift under the leadership of Angela Merkel. Based on cognitive approaches, especially image theory, the perception(s) of China held by Chancellor Merkel and their impact on German foreign policy toward China are analysed. The findings suggest that the dominant image of China is that of a key trade partner on whom Germany's economy is increasingly dependent with little emphasis given to the political or normative discrepancies between the two countries. The article argues that Sino-German relations under Merkel appear to be more one-dimensional than the fall-out over the Dalai Lama issue suggests.     

No Future for Germany's Past? Collective Memory and German Foreign Policy

Like most aspects of German politics and society after 1945, post-war German foreign policy has traditionally been greatly influenced by the legacy of Germany's National Socialist past and the Second World War. The semi-sovereign and divided nature of the West German state along with the strong argumentative force of collective memory in foreign policy discourse ensured a strong presence of Germany's historical legacy in both institutional and discursive terms resulting in a foreign policy which was characterised by self-limitation, a strong commitment to multilateralism and a civilian foreign policy culture. This article will argue that the interpretation of German collective memory of the Holocaust and the Second World War underwent significant changes under the red–green governments between 1998 and 2005, in particular with regard to the use of force. Although German collective memory continued to be present during this period, it lost its predictability and was used in a variety of crises to justify a range of responses, including military action.     

The German Lander and EU enlargement: Between apple pie and issue linkage

While the government parties had blamed the lingering burden of unification and the global economic crisis for the bulk of Germany's troubles in the 2002 election campaign, the topic of gridlock and policy reform is re-entering the agenda of German politics. From a scientific view, the analysis of Schröder's potential for policy change imposes some challenges. Germany needs reforms in many policy areas, in particular in the economic and societal domains. We present a new method to measure the positions of political parties on many issues. To identify the structural causes for German gridlock we apply the spatial model for legislative choice, which uncovers the room for manoeuvre. More precisely, we intend to show how much potential for policy change the Schröder government will have in economic, societal and foreign policy, and which policy position will be promoted by the Red–Green coalition in these areas.     

The Power of Ideas: How Bundesbank Ideas Have Influenced the Reconstruction of the National Bank of Poland

This article is concerned with the qualitative rise of German influence in an enlarged European Union (EU). The point of departure is the assumption that eastward enlargement facilitates the further expansion and manifestation of German power in Europe via the institutionalisation of parts of the Modell Deutschland in the candidate countries prior to their accession. This article examines the power tools that have facilitated the transfer of Bundesbank ideas into the institutional structure of Poland's national central bank, Narodowy Bank Polski (NBP). The analysis demonstrates that the relationship between Germany and its eastern neighbours is not only determined by the former's physical capacities but, in reflection of post-war Germany's foreign policy strategy, relies on the persuasiveness of Germany's ideational lead.     

National Role Conceptions,Domestic Constraints and the New ‘Normalcy’ in German Foreign Policy: the Eurozone Crisis,Libya and Beyond

German foreign policy can fruitfully be analysed through the lens of a modified two-level framework which identifies three interdependent drivers behind government decision making: the expectations of Germany's international partners, domestic constraints and the national role conceptions of decision-makers. In recent years, the configuration of these three drivers has witnessed a two-fold change. First, there has been a nascent shift towards the role conception of Germany as a ‘normal ally’. Second, the domestic context of German foreign policy has become more politicised and contentious. In consequence, Germany's current foreign policy tends to attach relatively less weight to the expectations of its allies, to be more driven by domestic politics – and to be altogether less predictable. The widely criticised approaches of the Merkel government to the Eurozone crisis and to the NATO mission in Libya, in turn, accord to this pattern and stand for the new ‘normalcy’ in German foreign policy.     

The 1999 Berlin land election

The Berlin election of 1999 resulted in the continuation of the city's Grand Coalition with the veteran CDU leader, Eberhard Diepgen, at the helm, and confirmed the PDS as the strongest party in East Berlin. This article examines the election campaign in Berlin and considers the key factors which determined the outcome. It also considers whether or not the ‘wall in the ballot box’, a political manifestation of the infamous ‘wall in the mind’, still exists over nine years after German reunification. The author argues that the unique history, demography and social make‐up of Berlin, coupled with the prevailing political mood throughout the Federal Republic, made another grand coalition inevitable. She demonstrates that, judging by voting behaviour, ‘inner unity’ remains elusive in Germany's new capital.     

Linkages between Parliamentary and Ministerial Careers in Germany, 1949–2008: The Bundestag as Recruitment Pool

Germany is noted within Europe for its weak tobacco control policies and its opposition to European Union tobacco control legislation. In this article, we aim to explain Germany's stance on tobacco control. We review two explanations commonly proposed, namely tobacco industry donations to political parties and the legacy of the Nazis' opposition to smoking, and examine the politics of tobacco control in detail. We suggest that the interplay of numerous factors explains Germany's stance. Aspects of political culture including the Nazi heritage which has resulted in a dearth of public health research and teaching, institutional factors such as the reliance on industry self-regulation facilitated by Germany's system of corporatist policy-making and interest group politics are key. The tobacco industry has also successfully used framing strategies to uphold the social acceptability of smoking and undermine the acceptability of tobacco control in Germany. In addition a phenomenon that we call ‘autarkic epistemic isolation’ explains why so little policy learning from abroad has occurred. We suggest that our multi-factor model has significant explanatory power for Germany's weak stance that has resulted in a long-standing policy equilibrium. Recent events, however, suggest that this equilibrium may now have been punctuated.     

In search of a post-hegemonic order: Germany,NATO and the European security and defence policy

This article explores the erosion of the conditions which supported Germany's emergence as a ‘Civilian Power’, in particular fundamental changes in the US perspective on the transatlantic relationship and international security, but also the increased sensitivity of German foreign policy to domestic circumstances. It explores Germany's so far ambivalent and inconsistent role in the pursuit of a post-hegemonic order for Euro-Atlantic security, focusing in particular on the emerging European Security and Defence Policy.     

German foreign policy and transatlantic relations since unification

Looking at German foreign policy and transatlantic relations since unification, this article argues that fundamental views and principles about Germany's role in Europe and the world have endured. The integrationist impulse remains strong. As shown by Kosovo, Germans have put this multilateralism above qualms about the use of military force. This has also left Berlin and Washington continuing to share many objectives, not only traditional ones about power and peace in Europe, but also on a whole host of challenges that have come with globalisation, both in the wider world and in the multiplicity of commercial and civil relationships across the Atlantic.     

Germany in Europe: return of the nightmare or towards an engaged Germany in a new Europe?

Especially since (re-)unification, perceptions of Germany alternate between the fear of the return of the German hegemon and – at the same time – the diametrically opposed call for more German leadership based on Germany's outstanding pro-European engagement. Nonetheless, Germany's foreign policy has changed little since 1989: it is still cautious rather than assertive. Due to Germany's experience with the two world wars, German foreign policy places great value on the enlargement as well as the deepening of the EU. In sum, Germany can best be characterised as a normal and engaged European state.     

Profits and Cold War - Politically Motivated Export Finance in West Germany during the 1950s: Two Case Studies

The importance of exports in the process of West Germany's reintegration into the international community after the Second World War is well documented. In addition to political rehabilitation and the fundamental need for hard currency, there were also political reasons for the importance the federal government placed upon exports. In order to support American Cold War strategy, it was drawn into a risky credit programme to Yugoslavia, which at one stage was also used to further Adenauer's own agenda. Changes in West German political priorities, resulting partly from the Hallstein Doctrine, forced the government into still more politically motivated export finance and foreign aid. Without losing importance as the engine of German economic growth, export finance and economic aid became increasingly important to the country's foreign policy from the late 1950s onward.     

Economic Linkage and Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik: The Case of the Warsaw Treaty

This article focuses on German–Polish relations at the time of the 1970 Warsaw Treaty, a pivotal moment in German diplomatic history. However, the study's relevance goes beyond this case. It illustrates an important source of the Federal Republic's international influence, past and present: its ability to use economic strength for political purposes. As this case shows, Germany has been particularly successful in using economic incentives (positive linkage) to improve ties with its neighbours. This article illustrates the important role of positive linkage both in German Ostpolitik and in international relations in general.     

German Foreign Policy and the Libya Crisis

German foreign policy has come under scrutiny due to its decision to abstain in the vote on UN Security Council Resolution 1973 in March 2011 on the Libyan no fly zone. Germany's decision not to support France, the UK and the USA ensured that no common EU position emerged and NATO's response to the crisis proved difficult. German foreign policy was caught between enlarging its influence and role in crisis management and reserving the right to reject involvement in operations that do not fit with its national interest. Drawing on the work of Robert Gilpin, the article argues that Germany's decision to abstain on United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 can be explained by understanding the cost/benefit calculations of the German government, pressured by the protracted Eurozone crisis.