伊拉克战争与美国的大战略失误

美国发动对伊战争有着长远的战略考虑,但伊拉克战争本身在目标和手段上都无助于实现或推进美国在“9.11”事件后所确立的大战略目标。美国在伊拉克战争期间的大战略失误,突出地表现为大战略目标与单个军事行动目标之间的模糊和抵触,大战略目标与手段之间严重失衡。长远地看,如果美国偏重于单边主义和军事力量,其巩固“单极”世界的图谋会遇到更大的国际障碍。     

U.S. Grand Strategy and Counterterrorism

Ten years into a trillion dollar effort to answer the attacks of September 11, 2001, it is difficult to tell whether U.S. counterterrorism is achieving its intended effects, much less explain how it fits within a viable American grand strategy. As dramatic changes unfold in the Arab world, experts still debate whether or not the United States is winning the fight against al Qaeda.     

伊拉克战争是"情报失误"还是蓄意发动?--写在伊拉克战争一周年之际

美国为了控制海湾地区,进而实现控制欧亚中南部乃至整个欧亚大陆的目的,从90年代起就蓄谋发动伊拉克战争.所谓伊拉克拥有大规模杀伤性武器的指责,不过是美国情报部门在布什政府授意下刻意捏造的借口.     

"9·11"以来美国中亚战略的调整

“9·11”之后,美国为了抢占欧亚大陆的地缘战略重心和中亚丰富的能源,同时加强美在亚太地区的战略优势,对中亚战略进行了大幅调整。随着美国在中亚地区的影响日益扩大,地区内不确定因素增多,中亚局势日趋复杂。     

关于美国大战略的框架性分析

本文从安全与对外能力、政治意愿、战略目标等层面着眼 ,力图建立评估大战略的理论框架 ,并据此剖析以单极霸权为核心的美国大战略。作者指出 ,任何大战略的成功 ,都有赖于战略目标与战略手段之间的平衡。且不论当前美国大战略的目标何其宏大、意愿何其强烈 ,实力不足将是美国单极霸权战略目标得以实现的最大障碍     

伊拉克战争对美拉关系的影响

3月20日,美国等国家在未经联合国授权的情况下对伊拉克开战,现在战争已进入尾声,伊拉克战后重建问题已提上国际社会的议事日程。那么,这场战争会对美拉关系产生什么影响?美拉关系会由此而发生改变吗?     

Stability and Change in U.S. Grand Strategy

Since the Global War on Terror (more recently termed the Long War) emerged as the centerpiece of U.S. grand strategy in 2001, the post–Cold War U.S. debate has narrowed significantly. Essentially three alternative strategies now compete for pride of place. Two are variants of a “primacy” strategy; one is a variant of “restraint,” sometimes termed “offshore balancing.” All three strategies take globalization as a given and as a positive development. None specifically connects U.S. military power to globalization. To the extent that globalization can be argued to have negative consequences, restraint offers a different remedy than either version of primacy. This article offers a brief characterization of globalization and speculates on its positive and negative results. The three grand strategies that remain visible in the U.S. public policy debate, and their suggested remedies, are then discussed. Finally, the U.S. military strengths and weaknesses are evaluated in order to gauge which strategy's remedies are most feasible.     

Fixing the Meaning of 9/11: Hegemony,Coercion, and the Road to War in Iraq

As the costs of the invasion and occupation of Iraq mount, scholars have sought to explain how the United States came to launch this war in the first place. Many have focused on the “inflation” of the Iraq threat, and indeed the Bush administration did frame the national dialogue on Iraq. We maintain, however, that the failure of most leading Democrats to challenge the administration's case for war in 2002–2003 cannot be explained fully by the bully pulpit, Democrats' reputation for dovishness, or administration misrepresentations. Rather, we argue that leading Democrats were relatively silent in the run-up to war because they had been “rhetorically coerced”, unable to advance a politically sustainable set of arguments with which to oppose the war. The effective fixing of the meaning of the September 11 attacks in terms of the “War on Terror” substantially circumscribed political debate, and we explain why this discourse became dominant. The Bush administration then capitalized on the existing portrait of Saddam Hussein to bind Iraq tightly into the War on Terror and thereby silence leading Democrats and legitimate the war. The story of the road to war in Iraq is not only one of neoconservative hubris and manipulated intelligence. It is also the story of how political actors strove effectively after 9/11 to shape the nation's discourse of foreign affairs and of how the resulting dominant narratives structured foreign policy debate. Behind the seemingly natural War on Terror lurk political processes of meaning-making that narrowed the space for contestation over Iraq.     

美军从伊拉克到阿富汗的战略转向

2月17日,美国总统奥巴马在北卡罗来纳州的军事营地宣布,美国已经着手进行结束伊拉克战争的工作,截至2010年8月31日以前美军将撤出大部分作战部队,只留下大约5万军人在伊遂行有限非战斗任务。根据前总统布什与伊拉克政府达成的安全协议,剩余部队将在2011年底前全部撤离伊拉克。同时,美军将战略重点转向阿富汗,计划2010年前向阿富汗增兵1.7万人,据估计美军驻阿部队将从目前的3.4万人增加到6.6万人。此次战略调整既是奥巴马兑现总统竞选时的诺言,更是美国出于重新调整和规划其在全球范围内反恐的战略考虑。     

Reflections on the Iraq War: Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy

Our foreign policy elites, the press, our elected representatives and the general public internalize “lessons” from each war, although the lessons may be wrong or misapplied. How we arrive at such consensus lessons is a mystery. It is too early to predict what lessons from Iraq will guide future U.S. decision-making. But on the situation as it now stands, it is possible to make some broad generalizations concerning what went right in Iraq and what went wrong.     

伊拉克战争凸现欧美矛盾

伊拉克战争已基本结束 ,但由此引发的欧美之间的分歧并未消除。欧美之间传统的战略同盟关系正在发生深刻变化 ,并对未来国际关系的发展产生重要影响。     

从伊拉克战争看美国的单边主义

伊拉克战争是美国提出先发制人战略后的第一次实践 ,是美国实行单边主义的一个突出事例。美国未经联合国授权 ,发动了这场战争 ,国际社会没有把美国拦住。战争发生后 ,美国又在某种程度上把战争的结果强加给国际社会 ,在安理会通过了一系列决议 ,表现了国际社会的无可奈何。但伊拉克战争有许多出乎美国决策者意料的事 :他们没有料到联合国不授权 ,没有料到对美军的抵抗主要发生在大规模战争结束以后 ,而不是以前 ,没有料到“对民主的普遍诉求”在伊拉克不那么管用 ,没有料到伊拉克的国家建设如此之难。现在美国陷在了伊拉克 ,这里成了单边主义的泥潭。伊拉克战争已经表明 ,单边主义的代价太大 ,不仅是人力和财力上的代价太大 ,而且也大大损耗了美国的软国力。     

伊拉克战争中的民族、宗教因素解读

伊拉克战争前后贯穿着复杂的民族、宗教因素。就美国而言 ,一方面布什把伊拉克战争看成是捍卫以美国为代表的基督教文化和美国式民主的战争 ,另一方面美利坚民族也将伊拉克战争视为“改造世界”的宏伟计划的步骤之一。而伊拉克国内宗教派别与民族间的矛盾也在一定程度上促使伊拉克难以共同对敌 ,在战争中速败。除伊拉克之外的中东国家则由于伊斯兰教传统观念而在伊拉克战争的立场问题上陷入两难境地。对伊拉克战争中民族、宗教因素的分析也给予我们颇多启示。     

"9.11"事件后的美欧关系

冷战结束后 ,随着欧洲国家对美安全需求减少、自身经济实力不断增强、独立愿望日趋强烈 ,美欧在一系列重大国际问题上出现分歧 ,双方矛盾从经济、环保领域上升到外交、安全等政治领域 ,美欧关系正经历着历史性的调整和变化。     

美伊拉克新战略胜算几何？

1月10日，布什在白宫发表重要政策演说，出台美国对伊拉克新战略。新战略主要包括以下内容：1、向伊拉克增兵2．15万人。加大对伊拉克军事力量的培训力度，向伊军派出更多的美军顾问。同时，加强美伊两军的协同作战，规定每个伊拉克战斗师配备一个美军旅。2、调整军事战术。要求美军在肃清武装分子后不能撤出，必须维护好地区治安，以防止武装分子卷土重来。另一方面，要求美军更为灵活大胆地展开特种战争。3、要求伊拉克现政府承担更多责任，加速经济重建与民族和解进程，包括要求它在今年11月前承担起境内所有省份的安全任务；通过惠及伊拉克所有民众的石油分配法案；今年举行各省选举以赢得地方领袖的支持；搞好经济重建以创造更多的就业机会；考虑修改伊拉克宪法；取消限制伊拉克前复兴党人参政的法律等。4、打击伊朗、叙利亚在伊拉克从事的“敌对”活动，遏制这两个国家对伊拉克的影响，以及对驻伊美军及其盟友构成的威胁。5、积极争取埃及、沙特等中东温和国家的支持。6、进行一系列的人事变动：主张增兵、擅长特种战争的彼得雷乌斯将军接替凯西担任驻伊美军最高指挥官；原太总司令法伦则取代了阿比扎伊德出任美中央司令部司令；曾任美驻伊大使、现任隋报总监的内格罗蓬特被提名为常务副国务卿，将主要负责伊拉克事务；国务院中东问题专家、美驻巴基斯坦大使克罗克则被提名为驻伊大使。①布什做如此大规模的人事调整，凸现其推进新战略的决心。     

霸权诱惑与战争泥潭的宿命——美国"退出伊拉克战略"评析

自从美军占领伊拉克后,美国学者、政要及其策士们就对"美国如何退出伊拉克"命题提出自己的感性认知和理性创建,从而形成了"退出伊拉克战略"的种种构想。其实布什政府并不想让美军长久驻留伊拉克,从伊拉克脱身是布什政府的战略考量,但是现实的战略困局使美军在伊拉克驻留至今。徘徊于"退出"与"驻留"的两难境地,导致美国陷入霸权诱惑与战争泥潭的历史宿命之中。     

布什的新战略和美国在伊拉克的困境

为应对伊拉克日益严峻的安全局势,美国总统布什提出一项新战略,其措施包括要伊拉克新政府负起责任,美国向伊拉克增兵,以及对伊朗、叙利亚施压等。这一新战略的实施能否奏效,美国能否摆脱在伊拉克的困境,令人怀疑。     

American Grand Strategy from the Cold War's End to 9/11

Grand strategy is about making sense of complexity; it is the wisdom to make power serve useful purposes. After the end of the Cold War, American policymakers sought to create a new grand strategy for the United States, but they failed in this endeavor. They failed because of difficult domestic and international circumstances. They also failed because of conceptual limitations. This article traces the efforts at strategy formulation in the administrations of George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton, and it analyzes their shortcomings. Bush had process without purpose; Clinton had purpose without process. The article encourages readers to think about how future strategists might improve upon this legacy with clearer and more disciplined attention to priorities, capabilities, and trade-offs. Making grand strategy in a democracy is not easy, but it is necessary. The absence of effective grand strategy in the 1990s contributed to the crises of the early twenty-first century.