End of Consensus? The European Leadership Discourse of the Second Merkel Government during the Eurozone Crisis and Its Contestation in Debates of the Bundestag (2009−13)

This article investigates the political discourse on the resolution of the Eurozone of the second Merkel government and its political contestation in plenary debates of the Bundestag. The empirical part demonstrates the high relevance of normative arguments in the debate, both for the case made by the government parties for a Stability Union and related concepts of austerity and economic reform, and for the competing discourse by the opposition parties for investment and debt mutualisation in the Eurozone. Moreover, the analysis reveals that a strong value- and identity-based commitment to European integration continues to be supported by all political parties in the Bundestag. To conclude, the final section discusses party political and institutional factors to explain why the political contestation of the European leadership by the Merkel government in the Bundestag played only a very limited role at the federal election in September 2013.     

The Europeanisation of the German Bundestag: Institutional change and informal adaptation

At first glance, the Europeanisation of the German Bundestag seems quite straightforward: in reaction to the process of European integration the Bundestag acquired a set of comparatively strong participation and scrutiny rights in EU politics. It therefore seems rather astonishing that German members of parliament make only very little use of these rights. Different explanations have been put forward in the literature, such as the complicated decision-making system of the EU and the government's gate-keeper position within it, institutional flaws of the German scrutiny system as well as the overall consensus on European integration and the low electoral salience of EU issues. The paper contributes to this discussion in two respects: On the one hand, it offers an additional explanation for the infrequent use of formal instruments. The main argument is that the formal instruments of scrutiny in EU affairs are incompatible with both the overall logic of a parliamentary system as well as the challenges of policy-making in the EU multilevel system. On the other hand, the paper argues that the exclusive focus on the use of formal parliamentary scrutiny rights leads us to overlook more informal means of parliamentary influence and therefore to underestimate the involvement of German parliamentarians in EU affairs. Thus, in order to fully assess processes of parliamentary Europeanisation, we need to take forms of informal or strategic Europeanisation into account.     

Misleading the German public: The new bundestag law on parliamentarians

This article outlines the history of several attempts to increase salaries and pensions of members of the German Bundestag in the early 1990s. It shows the unethical tactics used by parliamentarians and the way in which public information was in part consciously designed to mislead. It is argued that Bundestag members tend to form a political cartel when decisions concerning their salaries and pensions are made. Similiar tendencies can be observed in all parliamentary decisions involving party finance, providing support for Katz and Mair's thesis that ‘catch‐all’ parties are generally being replaced by ‘cartel parties’. Having analysed the issues involved, the article calls for greater accountability and responsibility on the part of German politicians when their own personal advantage is at issue.     

Courting the Voters? Policy Implications of Party Competition for the Reform Output of the Second Merkel Government

Understanding party competition as a ‘political market’, we explore its characteristics during the second Merkel government, 2009–13. On the demand side, analysing opinion polls and the Länder election results, we find that the outcome of the next Bundestag election was uncertain. Thus, electoral competition was likely to be intense. On the supply side, opposition parties presented credible alternatives to government policies with regard to social as well as environmental policy. Regarding the Euro crisis, however, a consensus across the established parties existed. Studying three of the most salient policy issues, we identify party competition as a crucial determinant of decision-making. While the debate on minimum wages was substantially shaped by party competition, resulting in ‘anticipatory obedience’, nuclear energy only became affected by electoral considerations after the ‘Fukushima shock’ which resulted in a major policy shift. Regarding the response to the Euro crisis, however, party competition was essentially suspended.     

Model or deterrence? The United States presidential election campaigns and the bundestag election campaigns

This article focuses on the election of the President of the United States of America in 2004 and on the premature election of the Bundestag in Germany in 2005. The main questions which are discussed are: Where can we currently discern central similarities in campaigning, which remain functionally powerful despite the considerable differences in system and context? What can be learned from the United States 2004 presidential election campaign for future Bundestag election campaigns in Germany? Can we observe developments in the USA which we have already seen in the 2005 Bundestag election? Could these trends be useful for the German parties in the future? This contribution argues that there are some developments in the United States which may prove useful to the German parties in future Bundestag campaigns.     

Budgetary Politics and Veto Players

In this article we examine whether and how the policy‐oriented coalition building and the gridlock model of legislative choice explain changes in the allocation of German budgetary items between 1961 and 1994. The policy‐oriented coalition‐building approach suggests that only policy‐connected budgetary actors can make changes in the budgetary composition, while the location of the status quo is essential for budgetary modifications according to the gridlock model. We also draw the attention to the identification of the set of relevant budgetary veto players and their preferences by distinguishing between models of the government, the political parties of the Bundestag, and the two of them. We test the predictive power of these approaches and conceptions in a competitive manner and control for macroeconomic and other political factors that might influence changes in the budgetary allocation. Our findings show that the gridlock model better explains budgetary changes, and that the government is responsible for decreasing, but the political parties of the Bundestag majority are decisive for increasing the size of budgetary items. We conclude that identifying the relevant veto players and using these more sophisticated approaches on budgetary decision making provide significant insights into the political reasons for changing the allocation of the German budget.     

The More,the Merrier? Interest Groups and Legislative Change in the Public Hearings of the German Parliamentary Committees

The article examines the impact of organised interests on the passage of legislation in the German Bundestag through an empirical analysis of the position papers presented in the public hearings of its standing committees in 2011. These committees are the most important forums to revise legislative proposals. Drawing on resource dependency theory, we employ GLM regression analyses to study if interest groups act as change agents that bring legislation closer to their own policy preferences. Controlling for institutional and bill characteristics, we discuss two major findings that shed light on the role of interest groups in legislation. First, business groups' opposition to government bills triggers legislative changes because their members control the means of production and make investment decisions. In contrast, fundamental opposition of non-business groups has no impact. Second, bills debated and opposed by a greater number of interest groups undergo more changes pointing to the importance of the density of interest groups and balance of opinions on a proposal.     

The Federal Dilemma: Organisational Strategies and the Consolidation of Parties in Mexico and Argentina

What accounts for the consolidation of party organisations? The specialised literature has stressed the importance of institutions in shaping the ways in which political parties organise. However, little attention has been paid to the role of federalism. We argue that in federal settings, party territorial organisational strategies condition their capacity to become consolidated parties. We illustrate our theory with an analysis of the development of conservative parties in Argentina and Mexico to explain their different levels of consolidation.     

The New Electoral Law – or: Good Things Don't Always Come to Those Who Wait

In the year 2008, the German Federal Constitutional Court ruled that the formerly applicable Electoral Law was unconstitutional due to the effect of the so-called ‘negative voting weight’. After a five-year debate, the new Electoral Law was passed in spring 2013, according to which the following parliamentary elections were conducted in autumn. This new law mainly fulfils the regulations laid down by the Constitutional Court, although not to their full extent. Through the introduction of adjustment mandates for overhang mandates, the proportional representation between the parties represented in the German Parliament Bundestag was guaranteed for the first time. At the same time, however, an abundance of new problems such as a procedural return which is hard to reason, and the risk of a severely inflated Bundestag, are created.     

Policy Gatekeepers in Latin American Legislatures

Legislators who control the congressional agenda have a significant advantage over the membership at large. Policy gatekeepers can restrict change to outcomes they prefer over the status quo and can use this prerogative to keep a legislative party or coalition unified. This article examines agenda-setting rules in 26 Latin American chambers, shows why the institutional structure is theoretically relevant, and reveals some implications for policymaking with evidence from Argentina, Chile, and Mexico. Majority leaders in the Argentine and Chilean lower chambers have successfully blocked passage of legislation opposed by most of their fellow partisans despite the lack of codified gatekeeping rights. Since 1997, none of the major Mexican parties has benefited from the gatekeeping rights established in the rules. Instead, the benefits have come from the parties' advantageous position with respect to the other parties on the steering committee setting the plenary agenda.     

Agenda control in the Bundestag, 1980–2002

We find strong evidence of monopoly legislative agenda control by government parties in the Bundestag. First, the government parties have near-zero roll rates, while the opposition parties are often rolled over half the time. Second, only opposition parties' (and not government parties') roll rates increase with the distances of each party from the floor median. Third, almost all policy moves are towards the government coalition (the only exceptions occur during periods of divided government). Fourth, roll rates for government parties skyrocket when they fall into the opposition and roll rates for opposition parties plummet when they enter government, while policy movements go from being nearly 100 per cent rightward when there is a rightist government to 100 per cent leftward under a leftist government.     

Recovering Space Lost? The German Bundestag's New Potential in European Politics

Various recent developments have highlighted the role of the German parliament in European integration. During the 2005–9 election period, several legislative acts strengthened the Bundestag within the institutional balance of the political system. Also, a Bundestag office was opened in Brussels and now functions as a national parliamentary platform in a transnational setting. In 2009, the Constitutional Court further boosted parliament's role in European affairs. This article aims at describing, systematising and evaluating these developments. The evaluation refers to three different dimensions of legitimation and shows that a more active role of the Bundestag in the future depends on norms beyond the legal framework. Although there is only limited evidence as yet, it is suggested that the Bundestag has the potential to play a bigger role in German EU affairs than is currently the case.     

Explaining Policy Outcomes in Federal Contexts: The Politics of Reproductive Rights in Argentina and Mexico

This article explains the political and institutional factors that affect reproductive rights policies in Argentina and Mexico. Consistent with the comparative literature on gender, politics and institutions, the article reveals that federal arrangements define the arenas in which advocates can challenge governments. The comparative analysis suggests that the content and variations of policy outcomes are not only determined by the legal distribution of such rights. Women's positions towards abortion and contraception was greatly shaped by partisanship and ideology, and this was critical to legislative outcomes, while the number of women legislators was only important to introduce the issues. Important for further research are the effects of institutional and party instability on women's organising in legislatures, and the relevance of links between women's groups outside legislature and political parties for the success of gender equality policies.     

Auditing party democracy: the case of Canadian party constituency associations

Political parties are often assessed on the basis of participatory democratic theory, which emphasises the importance of openness, inclusiveness, and responsiveness as the markers by which we can measure their democratic quality. This approach can be contrasted with competitive democratic theory that emphasises the centrality of fairness, transparency, and accountability to the democratic assessment of parties and other democratic actors. We apply these contrasting frameworks to a democratic audit of one set of party institutions and actors: the grassroots constituency associations maintained by Canadian parties. We illustrate how the outcomes of such assessments are deeply informed by the frameworks employed.     

One-Sided Discussions: Deliberation in Weblogs during the 2009 National Election

Against the backdrop of the 2008 Obama campaign, participatory online tools were one main component of parties' campaigning strategy in Germany 2009. They used a wide variety of online tools to communicate directly with the voters. While political actors reiterated to accentuate the discursive potential of such tools, sceptics questioned whether such instrumental campaign communication can facilitate sound political discussions. The article analyses whether or not the internet fostered citizen participation during the 2009 national election campaign for the German Bundestag. A content analysis of the posts and comments in the weblogs of the major parties, CDU and SPD, was conducted. Results reveal that participation took place only on a very low level. Furthermore, the few comments published (370 in four weeks) failed to meet basic requirements of deliberation such as objectivity or argumentativity. Moreover, both parties actively prevented a free discourse as single comments may not have been authorised.     

The Prospects of the FDP in Comparative Perspective: Rest in Peace or Totgesagte leben länger?

This article examines the conditions under which political parties that have dropped below the threshold of legislative representation later re-enter parliament. To do so, it compares two German parties that did not return to the Bundestag and two that did. In light of the ‘lessons' of previous cases in the Federal Republic, the essay considers the prospects of the Free Democratic Party (FDP) in the wake of its 2013 federal election defeat.     

From interest groups to parties: The change in the career patterns of the legislative elite in German social policy

Analysing the careers of members of the Bundestag Standing Committee for Labour and Social Affairs, the paper demonstrates that the ties between social politicians and social policy organisations such as trade unions, faith-based social policy organisations, independent charity organisations, works councils and social insurance institutions have become blurred. Since the 1990s social politicians have become more focused on political careers in the party and in parliament than on social policy. The new social politicians are party politicians who have distanced themselves from the interest groups. The qualitative change in parliamentary personnel is explained by changes in electoral politics, parties and interest groups. The author argues that the weakening linkages confirm contemporary research results on change in German neo-corporatism.     

Who Runs at the Top of Party Lists? Determinants of Parties’ List Ranking in the 2013 German Bundestag Election

In mixed-member proportional systems with closed party lists, such as the German Bundestag election, candidates’ electoral fate is widely determined by their placement on party lists. Despite its importance for the final composition of parliaments, candidates’ list placement in such systems is still under-researched. The literature on political careers has revealed a number of prevalent recruitment factors, but how these factors actually affect candidates’ placement on party lists has rarely been tested. This paper puts forward the question of what recruitment factors affected candidates’ chances to be allocated viable list positions in the 2013 German Bundestag election. The findings suggest that in particular candidates’ incumbency status, their number of prior candidacies and district nominations play key roles in shaping candidates’ electoral viability.     

'Chief Executives' and their Parties: The Case of Germany

Based on a combination of two analytical perspectives on the relationship between chief executives and their parties, this article offers a historical assessment of chancellor/party relations in Germany since 1949. The case study provides only modest support for the popular assumption that the leaders of left-wing governments are generally more constrained by their parties than their 'bourgeois' counterparts. There is also little evidence supporting the view that the formal combination of party chairman and head of government per se determines much of the relationship between chief executives and their parties. Rather, both with regard to the durability of coalitions and the policy-making capacities of German chancellors, it is the relationship between the former and the Fraktion leaders of the coalition parties in the Bundestag that seems to constitute a key variable.