System Structure and State Strategy: Adding Hedging to the Menu

This paper presents “strategic hedging” as a way to conceptualize much of the strategic behavior currently employed by second-tier states like China, Russia, Brazil, and France. Hedging is an alternative to strategies like balancing, bandwagoning, and buck-passing. Like those other strategies, hedging is driven by structural incentives associated with the current polarity of the international system and power concentration trends within it. Hedging will be most prevalent in international systems that are defined by a leading state that, while in a position of power preponderance, is also in the process of relative decline. Strategic hedging behavior is effective for second-tier states in such deconcentrating unipolar systems because it avoids outright confrontation with the system leader in the short term, while still increasing the hedging state's ability to survive such a direct military confrontation should it occur in the long run. Strategic hedging behavior can also be used to insure the hedging state against security threats that might result from the loss of public goods or subsidies that are currently being provided by the system leader. In this article, I define strategic hedging behavior, present a mechanism for identifying empirical evidence of strategic hedging, and apply that mechanism to three case studies: the Sino-Russian strategic partnership, Brazil's approach to regional leadership, and French opposition to the 2003 us invasion of Iraq.     

To Coerce or Reward? Theorizing Wedge Strategies in Alliance Politics

Wedge strategy, a policy of preventing or dividing an adversary coalition, has been attracting increasing scholarly attention. In particular, Timothy Crawford has articulated the concept and claims that reward-based strategies are more effective than coercive strategies that actually strengthen the ties between enemies. Although this sounds logical, history provides sufficient cases that contradict the claim. Why? To answer the question, I develop a theory of wedge strategy by utilizing the concept of reward power. I then argue that although countries seeking to divide adversary coalitions usually prefer reward-based strategies, they turn to coercive measures when a divider state perceives grave threats as a result of a target state's strong alignment with its primary enemy but does not have sufficient reward power to split the adversaries. I examine this theory through two case studies of us wedge strategies toward the Sino-Soviet alliance during the early Cold War period. This article addresses the specific puzzle of choices between reward and coercive wedge strategies and offers broader theoretical implications regarding the utility of the concept of reward power in international and alliance politics.     

Pierre Bourdieu and the Birth of European Defense

This paper uses an analytical framework derived from Pierre Bourdieu's sociology to explain the genesis of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Long-term social and institutional processes at work in the making of ESDP are addressed through an emphasis on the institutionalization of social fields, the impact of structural crises, and the socialization of policy makers into specific schemes of perception and action (habitus). Two arguments follow from this framework. First, the paper shows that the creation of ESDP after 1998 would have been impossible without the prior institutionalization of two transgovernmental arenas: (1) the European foreign policy field, wherein EU diplomats vie for influence over EU policies; and (2) the international defense field, centered upon military relations within NATO. Second, ESDP results from the strategies of a number of diplomats and military leaders who, following the end of the Cold War, perceived that they faced important organizational crises in their respective fields. This sociological framework provides a more nuanced account of ESDP's creation than that proposed by the two dominant explanations in international relations theory—realism's balancing and constructivism's strategic culture convergence. Combining structural and ideational factors, it elucidates three empirical puzzles: the lack of opposition to ESDP when it was launched, the motives of policy makers who proposed ESDP, and the disappearance of alternative options for the European security architecture.     

Bringing the Leader Back In: Internal Threats and Alignment Theory in the Commonwealth of Independent States

Traditional alignment theories, such as balance-of-power and balance-of-threat theories, suggest that states confronted by more powerful or threatening states are more likely to balance against those states than to bandwagon with them. Yet in the context of the newly independent states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (cis), this proposition has not held true. A refinement of Steven David's theory of omnibalancing sheds light on this empirical puzzle. Using in-depth case studies of Ukraine and Uzbekistan, the authors argue that the alignment calculations of cis leaders have been driven more by internal threats to those leaders' political survival than by external threats to the state. These internal threats include the more traditional variants, such as assassination attempts, coups, and civil war, but also include opposition leaders and parties that may be perceived as challenging a leader's political survival. The post–September 11 security environment and the u.s.-led war on terrorism has also fundamentally changed the strategic calculations of cis leaders, as the United States is now willing to assist leaders against Islamist extremism and terrorism, taking over a role formerly played by Russia. The theoretical nuances offered here provide a more robust and accurate understanding of alignment motivations in the cis, especially in light of recent revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan.     

AVOIDING TRAGEDY IN POWER POLITICS:

When and why do states adopt new grand strategies? According to a “neoclassical realist” model, changes in international conditions are the chief cause of long-term adjustments in grand strategy, while domestic political-military cultures help specify the precise grand strategies chosen by state officials. What results are outcomes that appear surprising or skewed from a realist perspective. I test the neoclassical realist model against the cases of u.s. strategic adjustment in 1918–1921 as well as 1945–1948 and find that the long-term trajectory of America's rise to world power is best explained by international pressures. The precise strategies chosen in each period, however, were heavily influenced by American political-military culture. The implication is that theoretically inclusive forms of realism can provide convincing explanations for changes in grand strategy; furthermore, states can remain somewhat “differentiated” in terms of their foreign policy behavior, for cultural reasons, and in spite of international pressures to the contrary.     

Mediation,Domestic Politics,and the Israeli-Syrian Negotiations, 1991–2000

This paper explains one of the central roles of alliance contracts, the prevention of undesirable military entanglement. The existing literature on alliances argues that entrapment is a major concern for potential and actual alliance partners, but it is difficult to point out clear cases of entrapment. I provide two answers to this puzzle: First, entrapment is a narrower concept than others have realized, and it is rarer than the literature suggests. Second, leaders anticipate entrapment and carefully design alliance agreements before and after states form alliances. I examine the second argument through case studies of us alliance agreements with South Korea, Japan, and Spain.     

Israel's Deterrence Strategy Revisited

During the 2001–2009 period when American foreign policy was internationally unpopular and perceived as unilateral, many states strengthened their security cooperation with the United States and facilitated the reach of the us military. This behavior spans a range of actions along a spectrum from reaffirming traditional alliances to far more subtle forms of alignment. This pattern is in large part driven by the actions of regional powers such as Russia and China whose rising power pushes neighboring states to seek the assurance of the United States, and it has distinct implications for the endurance of American hegemony. As those regional powers seek to expand their influence, secondary states may increase their contributions to the maintenance of American hegemony, thus helping to extend it well into the future. They are less prone to do so, however, if the United States follows a strategy of restraint that calls into question its willingness to defend its hegemony. Therefore, a policy focused on maintaining American military preeminence and the demonstrated willingness to use it may be what sustains the cooperation from second-tier states that helps to maintain American hegemony.     

If Not Soft Balancing,Then What? Reconsidering Soft Balancing and U.S. Policy Toward China

Some scholars argue that soft balancing is a typical state behavior against the hegemon under unipolarity. Others contend that soft balancing against the hegemon is ineffective. We challenge both arguments and suggest that soft balancing is not only a product of specific configurations of the power distribution in the system, unipolarity, but also a rational behavior under another condition, economic dependence. We argue that the interplay between power disparity and economic dependence shapes a state's decision in choosing different balancing strategies. The higher the power disparity and economic dependence, the more likely a state chooses soft balancing to pursue its security. Using U.S. policy toward China after the Cold War as a crucial test, we suggest that the huge power gap and increasing economic interdependence between the United States and China shape U.S. soft balancing rather than hard balancing toward China. We conclude that future U.S.-China relations depend on whether the United States declines as a result of China's rise and on the degree of economic interdependence between the two countries.     

Flipping the Switch: Combat,State Building,and Junior Officers in Iraq and Afghanistan

Contemporary us counterinsurgency doctrine in Iraq and Afghanistan requires junior leaders to engage in both combat and state-building activities. This study aims to explain the fundamental challenge in merging these. I argue that difficulty lies in separating insurgents from civilians, and translating doctrine from senior to junior officers. Junior officers consistently develop a similar ad hoc decision-making tool— role-switching—to simplify complex situations to a binary of “hostile or not.” They understand themselves to fill only two roles, the violent “on” role and the non-violent “off” role and develop several tools to minimize the difficulty of role-switching, help their subordinates switch, and signal switching to local populations. Ultimately, however, problems with role-switching—role stickiness, inappropriate switching, and role bias—can in some cases encourage indiscriminate and excessive violence, pointing to the fundamental failures of using military forces as a one-size-fits-all solution to state-building projects abroad.     

Why unipolarity doesn't matter (much)

This article first argues that states have not balanced against US unipolar power because the potential balancers do not view the United States as a major threat, because they believe it has benign security-seeking motives, at least with regard to other major powers. This explanation runs counter to the Brooks–Wohlforth argument, which holds that states are not balancing because the magnitude of the United States’ power advantage makes balancing essentially infeasible. The second part of the paper challenges the conventional wisdom on the benefits of unipolarity, arguing that the benefits the United States derives from unipolarity are generally overrated. More specifically, US security need not be significantly reduced by growth in China's economy that supports a return to bipolarity.     

The politics of war and debt relief in Uganda

This article analyses the politics behind Uganda's relations with its multilateral creditors, particularly the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, in the context of the country's military intervention in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Ugandan officials exploit the anxieties of creditors, which want the country to be considered a successful case of debt relief and reform to justify similar policies in other states around the world. In reality, however, multilateral creditors help to sustain patronage politics that is increasingly based on access to plunder in a neighbouring state. Positive economic-growth figures and social indicators mask the underlying vulnerability of Ugandan state institutions, as the country's military officers pursue private interests. As a result, creditors face real dilemmas in deepening their support for the regime of Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, which is increasingly reliant on its external backers. Creditors are indirectly subsidising a patronage-based political strategy and the war in the DRC. Alternatively, if they decide to abandon Uganda, they may have to accept a dramatic rise in internal instability.     

Terrorism,the LTTE and the conflict in Sri Lanka

For decades, a number of developing countries have been adversely affected by terrorism, with little sympathy or support from Western governments, in particular. The attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, DC, on 11 September 2001, however, have made the world's sole superpower and its allies painfully aware of the devastation caused by such action. This article analyses how the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LITE), a terrorist group seeking to create a separate state in northeastern Sri Lanka, has been pushing the limits of international tolerance in this regard for almost two decades. While increased international action against terrorism is necessary to stem this destructive menace, the Sri Lankan state must also put forward a durable political solution to the ethnic problem. Ultimately, it would be a mistake for Western governments to allow their frustrations with the slow pace of reform in Sri Lanka to be interpreted as empathy with a terroristic cause.     

Making and Mobilizing Moderates: Rhetorical Strategy,Political Networks,and Counterterrorism

Studies of counterterrorism have argued for the importance of bolstering, or “mobilizing,” moderates in the confrontation with violent extremists. Yet the literature has not elucidated when states seek to mobilize moderates and marginalize extremists, how they do so, or when they prove successful. The received wisdom is that states should cultivate and strengthen moderate allies by reaching out to them. This approach, however, fails to grasp the political challenges confronting potential moderates, whose priority is to build and retain legitimacy within their political community. Inspired by network approaches, we maintain that moderates can more easily emerge when their political interactions with the authorities are relatively sparse. We further argue that the state's strategies, including crucially its rhetorical moves, can bolster the moderates' local legitimacy. At times, this will entail not reaching out to moderates but isolating them. Before moderates can be mobilized, they must be made, and the state's criticism, more than its love, may do much to help moderate political forces emerge. This article explains why mobilizing moderates is critical, when it is difficult, and how authorities can nevertheless play a productive role in moderates' emergence. We establish our theoretical framework's plausibility by examining two cases—India's ultimately triumphant campaign against Sikh extremists and Spain's gradual marginalization of Basque extremists. We then suggest what lessons these campaigns against ethnonational terrorism hold for the so-called War on Terror.     

European Union Security and Defense Policy: Response to Unipolarity?

The European Union has, since 1999, moved deliberately, if slowly, to develop the capability to undertake autonomously a range of demanding political military operations beyond Europe's borders. This effort, the European Security and Defense Policy (esdp), is a puzzle insofar as post-Cold War Europe is very secure, and most European nations are members of an established alliance, the u.s.-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization. esdp is best explained by the international relations theory known as structural realism, the modern guise of balance of power theory. Balance of power theory is contrasted with balance of threat theory. Though European states are not motivated by a perception of an imminent threat from the United States, they are balancing u.s. power. The concentration of global power in the United States, unipolarity, is uncomfortable even for its friends who fear the abandonment that u.s. freedom of action permits and who wish to influence the global political environment the United States could create.     

Transaction Costs and the Establishment of the European Security and Defense Policy

This article explains the establishment of the European Union's Security and Defense Policy (esdp) in 1998–99 and its institutional design. I argue that both the soft balancing explanation and the “second wave” of approaches fall short. In contrast, the article shows that liberal-institutionalist thought and transaction costs economics offer a heuristically promising perspective. Most crucially, the pivotal concept of asset specificity provides explanatory leverage. The combination of risks of opportunism and the non-specificity of esdp's ultimate assets explains why and how the major European powers designed the eu's security and defense pillar in 1998–99. Empirically, I trace how the United Kingdom and France were gradually confronted with not fully credible commitments within nato for crisis management in Europe. Based primarily on the signals sent by us domestic politics, they were increasingly concerned about isolationism and questioned the American commitment to European security. Therefore, they were searching for another institutional option for providing security on a long-term basis. Although this assessment of ex post transaction costs triggered the initial establishment of esdp, ex ante transaction costs were responsible for its more specific design. Given the indirect American threat of disengagement when faced with Europe's aspirations for autonomy, esdp had to be designed in a compatible way with nato. Non-specific, and thus redeployable, military assets represented the institutional solution to the conflict between European autonomy and NATO's primacy. In other words, asset specificity as the key analytical concept of transaction costs economics is what differentiates this argument from previous accounts and provides a more comprehensive framework for understanding both the establishment and design of esdp in 1998–99.     

Explaining the Awakening: Engagement,Publicity, and the Transformation of Iraqi Sunni Political Attitudes

This article explores the reasons for the dramatic change in Sunni Arab Iraqi attitudes toward the United States from 2004 to 2007, which made possible the “Awakenings,” local groups of mostly Sunni tribes and former insurgents that decided to cooperate with the United States against al Qaeda in Iraq. While there have been many studies of the military strategy, there has been little attention paid to the reasons for the underlying attitude change. This article argues that the dramatic changes in the information environment and in the nature of direct contacts across a range of Sunni society played a crucial role. It draws on a wide range of Arabic language primary sources that have generally been neglected in U.S. military-centric accounts. No single dialogue flipped the Sunnis, and the change would not likely have happened without the material changes underpinning their interests. But years of ongoing, intensive dialogues across a wide range of interlocutors reshaped the foundations of the relationship and to convince those involved individuals of the possibility of a strategic shift. American counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine and the surge helped by proliferating the points of contact with Iraqis and by transforming the relations at the individual level. This has broad implications for key debates in contemporary U.S. foreign policy, as well as for counterinsurgency and international relations (IR) theory.     

Pre-emption,Deterrence, and Self-Defence: A Legal and Historical Assessment

The policy of the United States, outlined in the 2002 National Security Strategy, whereby the US claims a right under international law to engage in pre-emptive use of force to prevent a rogue state's development of nuclear weapons, or any weapons of mass destruction (WMD), is unnecessary and therefore unlawful under customary international law of self-defence. This conclusion is reached through a comprehensive and intensive assessment of the normative reactions of politically effective actors to China's development of nuclear weapons during a two-year period between the Cuban Missile Crisis and China's first test in October 1964. While pre-emptive use of force against China, a rogue state, was considered by both the United States and most likely by the Soviet Union, neither used force to prevent it developing nuclear weapons. Since a policy of pre-emptive use of force was unnecessary for either state's self-defence, it would have been unlawful under customary international law. Given that the current strategic scenario of states vis-à-vis rogue states is the same under most circumstances, notwithstanding the existence of international terrorist networks, the article concludes that the proposed claim of the United States is, prima facie, unnecessary to its self-defence, and therefore unlawful under customary international law of self-defence. It shifts the burden of proof to policymakers claiming that all rogue states can be lawfully prevented through pre-emptive use of force from acquiring nuclear weapons, to establish that a particular state cannot be deterred from the use of nuclear weapons. Though the preventive war claim of the US National Security Strategy 2002 may turn out to be an effective strategic bluff in limiting WMD proliferation, the wisdom of the threat should not be confused with the illogic of preventive war.     

The potential of evaluation to promote sustainable development in Russian forest management

This article discusses the potential of evaluation to help NGOs, namely the WWF (the World Wide Fund for Nature), to promote sustainable development in the Russian forest sector. Application of evaluation can strengthen two out of three main functions of NGOs – their expertise and lobbying. The third function of NGOs, as legitimisers, is difficult to perform in the Russian institutional climate. International partnerships address the issue of legitimacy and secure funding for NGOs. This international support is beneficial to a capacity building process and should promote the implementation of independent evaluation, which, in turn, can be helpful to promote sustainable development.

Le potentiel de l'évaluation au moment de promouvoir le développement durable dans la gestion forestière en Russie

Cet article traite du potentiel de l'évaluation au moment d'aider les ONG, et notamment le WWF (Fonds mondial pour la nature), à promouvoir le développement durable dans le secteur forestier russe. L'application de l'évaluation peut renforcer deux des trois principales fonctions des ONG – leurs connaissances techniques et leur exercice de pression. La troisième fonction des ONG, celle de la légitimation, est difficile à mener dans le climat institutionnel russe. Les partenariats internationaux abordent la question de la légitimité et du financement sûr pour les ONG. Ce soutien international est avantageux pour un processus de renforcement des capacités et devrait promouvoir la mise en ?uvre d'une évaluation indépendante, laquelle peut se révéler utile dans la promotion du développement durable.

El potencial de la evaluación en la promoción del desarrollo sostenible en la gestión de bosques en Rusia

El presente artículo analiza el potencial que tiene la evaluación para apoyar a las ong, en particular el wwf (siglas en inglés del World Wide Fund for Nature), en su trabajo orientado a promover el desarrollo sostenible del sector forestal en Rusia. La aplicación de evaluaciones puede contribuir a fortalecer dos de las tres principales funciones de las ong: su experiencia y su cabildeo. La tercera función de las ong, ser legitimadoras, difícilmente puede ser realizada en el contexto institucional de Rusia. Más bien son las alianzas internacionales las que abordan el tema de la legitimidad y obtienen fondos para las ong. Este apoyo internacional aporta beneficios para el proceso de construcción de capacidades, pudiendo promover la implementación de evaluaciones independientes, las cuales, a su vez, pueden ser útiles para impulsar el desarrollo sostenible.

O potencial da avaliação para promover desenvolvimento sustentável na gestão florestal russa

Este artigo discute o potencial da avaliação para ajudar ONGs, especificamente o WWF (World Wide Fund for Nature), para promover o desenvolvimento sustentável no setor florestal russo. A aplicação da avaliação pode fortalecer duas das três principais funções das ONGs – seu conhecimento e trabalho de lobby. A terceira função das ONGs, como legitimadoras, é difícil desempenhar no ambiente institucional russo. Parcerias internacionais abordam a questão da legitimidade e asseguram financiamento para ONGs. Este apoio internacional é benéfico para um processo de capacitação e deve promover a implementação de avaliações independentes que, por sua vez, podem ser úteis para promover o desenvolvimento sustentável.     

“They don't garden here”: NGO constructions of Maya gardening practices in Belize

Communities in southern Belize have among the poorest health outcomes in the region, including high rates of under-nutrition. In response, an NGO school garden programme has been initiated to improve health and nutrition. An analysis of the programme as it relates to home garden practices and diet in two Q'eqchi' Maya communities illustrates the complexity of challenges faced by NGOs. Most notable are issues of legitimacy, cultural appropriateness, self-interest, and constructed conceptions of their target communities, all of which raise the question of what is more important: autonomous and healthy communities or the preservation of the NGO programme?

« Ils ne font pas de jardinage, ici » : constructions d'une ONG des pratiques de jardinage mayas au Belize

Les communautés du sud du Belize affichent certains des pires résultats de la région en matière de santé, y compris un taux élevé de sous-nutrition. Pour remédier à cette situation, un programme de potagers scolaires mené par une ONG a été lancé pour améliorer la santé et la nutrition. Une analyse du programme du point de vue de ses liens avec les pratiques de culture de potagers familiaux et le régime de deux communautés mayas Q'eqchi’ illustre la complexité des défis auxquels sont confrontés les ONG. Les questions les plus notables sont celles de la légitimité, du caractère approprié sur le plan culturel, de l'intérêt propre, et des conceptions construites de leurs communautés cibles, autant de questions qui soulèvent celle de savoir ce qui est plus important : des communautés autonomes et en bonne santé ou la préservation du programme de l'ONG?

“Aquí no realizan jardinería”: construcciones de ong en torno a las prácticas de jardinería de los indígenas mayas de Belice

Las comunidades del sur de Belice muestran algunos de los peores resultados de salud en la región, entre los que se incluye una alta tasa de desnutrición. Con el objetivo de mejorar la salud y de combatir la desnutrición, varias ong impulsaron un programa de jardines escolares. Una evaluación del programa en torno a las prácticas de jardinería en el hogar y a la dieta de dos comunidades maya q'eqchi’, ilustra la complejidad de los retos enfrentados por las ong. Entre los más destacados se encuentran temas de legitimidad, de idoneidad cultural, de interés egoísta y de conceptos construidos por las ong respecto a sus comunidades destinatarias. Estos retos provocan la reflexión en relación a si es preferible tener comunidades autónomas y sanas o conservar programas de ong.

“Eles não cultivam hortas aqui”: promoção de práticas maias de jardinagem por uma ONG em Belize

Comunidades do sul de Belize estão entre as que possuem os mais baixos indicadores de saúde da região, incluindo altas taxas de desnutrição. Em resposta ao problema, um programa de horta escolar de uma ONG foi criado para melhorar a saúde e nutrição. Uma análise do programa no que se refere a práticas de cultivo de horta doméstica e dieta em duas comunidades maias de Q'eqchi ilustra a complexidade dos desafios enfrentados pelas ONGs. Os pontos que mais chamam atenção são as questões de legitimidade, adequação cultural, interesse próprio e concepções construídas sobre suas comunidades-alvo. Tudo isso suscita a questão sobre o que é mais importante: comunidades autônomas e saudáveis ou a preservação do programa de ONG?