Pushing the Boundaries of the Possible at the Margins of Peacekeeping: The Promises of ESDP–Russia Co-operation for Humanitarian Intervention1

While relatively little attention has been paid to the significance of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as a newly emerged mechanism in the domain of international peacekeeping, even less research has been undertaken on the potential benefits of its external relations and co-operation with third countries. This article sheds light on such a potential by investigating the relations of the ESDP with the Russian Federation. The current debate on humanitarian intervention tends to reduce the analysis to a single plane of reality, namely the normative one, thus ignoring the material aspects of military intervention. The enlargement of the ontological horizon of research from normative to material factors uncovers the greatest advantage of ESDP–Russia co-operation for humanitarian intervention, namely their mutually complementary peacekeeping capacities. Whilst the European Union boasts a long-standing human rights culture, Russia could offer vast material resources both in terms of manpower and logistics. Ignoring this possible synergy between the ESDP and Russian capacities would be a considerable loss for the cause of humanitarian intervention. Joint operations conducted by the European Union, Russia, and NATO against genocidal governments, the “common enemies”, would not only enhance the cause of humanitarian intervention but also enable common actions and thus mitigate current tensions between the East and West. In many respects ESDP–Russia co-operation actually lags behind NATO–Russia relations.     

New threats – different response: EU and NATO and Somali piracy

When the European Union (EU) launched its first military naval mission, EU NAVFOR Somalia, Atalanta, the states who are members of both the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) made a political choice: to prioritize the EU over NATO in their multilateral military efforts to fight piracy and its consequences. Thereby, Atalanta challenges the conventional assumption that EU security cooperation will remain limited. It also challenges the widely held belief that the European states will chose to act through NATO if dealing multilaterally with international security issues. How can we explain this decision? This analysis suggests that it can be explained in two phases where different mechanisms were at work. In the first phase, which can be accounted for from a neo-realist perspective, France, who held the Presidency, used particular favorable geopolitical conditions to put an autonomous EU operation on the agenda. However, agreement on the EU option cannot be explained as a result of strategic bargaining. Instead, in a second phase and in line with an alternative hypothesis building on the theory of communicative action, the EU member states came to support the French suggestion due to legitimacy considerations regarding the legal framework of the two operations.     

Power,contribution and dependence in NATO burden sharing

This article offers three new types of variables for computation of the share that NATO countries should contribute to the common defence. I use Uppsala conflict data (UCDP) on conflict participation to reveal how the asymmetry in power that allows the US to define most of the framings on which NATO’s utility calculations are based, compensates for the greater material contribution made to NATO by the US. Then I follow Ringsmose’s model of NATO burden sharing and create two types of variables crucial to the calculation of burden sharing. One reveals the share of US military protection aimed at protecting its NATO allies. The other measures how much US global security efforts against tyranny and terror are dependent on NATO allies. These two variables are developed by means of computer-assisted discourse analysis of US Presidential Papers. The three new variables contribute to a more complex mathematical model on fair burden sharing, indicating at the same time that the imbalance between US and allied contributions is declining. If European allies have ever exploited the United States in the past, then at least the relationship has become more even during the past two decades.     

Let’s Intervene! But Only If They’re Like Us: The Effects of Group Dynamics and Emotion on the Willingness to Support Humanitarian Intervention

International relations (IR) studies on humanitarian intervention have debated both the nature and strength of intervention norms. This article contributes to this debate by exploring under what conditions individuals are willing to support military humanitarian intervention (MHI) and the psychological factors that influence whether, and the degree to which individuals support MHI. Taking a psychological approach, we hypothesized that individuals’ decision to support MHI is influenced by in-group favoritism and emotional responses to in-group suffering. We tested our theory with two experiments, each of which recruited roughly 200 American participants. Both experiments centered on the ongoing Syrian civil war and assessed Americans’ willingness to support intervention to protect different civilian groups. The results suggested that support for intervention was widespread, but not a majority view in most cases. The findings also suggested that participants exhibited slightly higher rates of support for intervention when those suffering were Christian, as opposed to Muslim. Furthermore, we found that the dynamics of support for intervention changed when chemical weapons were introduced into the scenario, which reframed the the crisis as a national security issue. Overall, our results suggest that individuals’ decisions to act upon norms can be influenced by the context of a crisis and individual level psychological factors, which have been under explored in IR scholarship on norms.     

Interests over norms in western policy towards the Caucasus: How Abkhazia is no one's Kosovo

The potentially numerous cases of ‘genocide’ around the world can now invoke the precedent of NATO's use of military force for humanitarian purposes against Serbia in spring 1999. Such a claim was suggested by Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze over Georgia's disputed former autonomous republic of Abkhazia. The conflict over this former ‘Soviet Riviera’ again demonstrates the constraints behind gaining accurate information on the causes and consequences of a conflict. Particularly, it illustrates the difficulty of determining what constitutes ‘genocide’ and against whom, as both the Abkhaz and the displaced Georgians make such claims. On that basis, each party can expect ‐ and equally fear ‐ a NATO‐style military intervention. In the event, even if both sides view themselves as victims of ‘genocide’ and entitled to such intervention, Western perceptions of strategic interests in the Caucasus prevent this scenario. The determination of injustices, quite apart from their redress, goes unanswered.     

Intervention Is Served: The US Federal Alien Torts Claims Act and the Irony of Ironies

In recent years, there has been vigorous debate about the concept of humanitarian intervention, which, even so, remains too little understood. As one remedy for this, Canada took the initiative to create the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), to investigate coercive, military intervention. One aspect that has so far escaped much notice is an alternative mechanism of non-state intervention, namely recourse to US courts under the Federal Alien Torts Claims Act. This transnational law legislation, in the form of class action suits against foreign states partnering with Western corporations, has effectively created a form of humanitarian intervention which, even if legal arguments such as forum non conveniens prevent cases from being heard, could impact on all other forms of intervention and all of those who seek to study intervention or practise it. Indeed, even if few plaintiffs receive financial compensation in these cases, the norms declared, corporate and government practices halted and lives saved are even more important practical results of this new, understudied form of intervention. The author served as the head of Canada's 1999-2000 Fact-Finding and Assessment Mission to Sudan, the purpose of which was to determine whether Canadian oil investment was exacerbating the civil war there. His report of that mission (Harker, 2000) provided significant insight for the conclusions drawn in this article.     

HAVE THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS MEMBER STATES PUT ARMS CONTROL ON THE BACK BURNER?

The disarmament experienced during the last decade is over and the world seems poised for a new arms race. While the US government shows an open disinterest in negotiated arms control and bases its policy on a strong military posture, European governments also seem to have put arms control on the back burner. Governments and experts argue about the perceived gap in military capability between the US and Europe while in reality the actual important gap exists between NATO and the rest of the world. Several suggestions are made in this article how governments in Europe can take initiatives to foster disarmament and arms control.     

The Capability–Capacity Crunch: NATO's New Capacities for Intervention

Abstract

In September 2006 NATO's role in Afghanistan expanded to cover the whole of the country. With 32,000 troops under NATO command Stage 4 of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) represents an open-ended commitment to rebuilding a country long torn by war and instability. The Alliance's showpiece for advanced military transformation, the the NATO Response Force (NRF) represents a down payment on the future of transatlantic military co-operation. Taken together these two developments reflect the reality of NATO's new interventionism of an Alliance that bears little or no resemblance to that which won the Cold War. NATO today is an organisation designed for global reach and global effect, undertaking operations at their most robust. Unfortunately, the re-design of NATO's architecture has not been matched by a parallel development in Alliance military capabilities. NATO's big three, the US, Britain and France, have taken steps to improve their military capabilities. However, the transformation of NATO's other militaries has proved slow and uneven, leaving many members unable to fulfil any meaningful role. Thus, as NATO today plans for both robust advanced expeditionary warfare and stabilisation and reconstruction vital to mission success in complex crisis management environments a gap is emerging. Indeed, in an Alliance in which only the Americans can afford both military capability and capacity most NATO Europeans face a capability–capacity crunch, forced to make a choice between small, lethal and expensive professional military forces or larger, cheaper more ponderous stabilisation and reconstruction forces. This article explores the consequences of the crunch and the implications for NATO's current and future role as the Alliance struggles to find a balance between fighting power and staying power.     

Can We Win a War If We Have to Fight by Cosmopolitan Rules?

After months of bombing, NATO achieved only a stalemate in Libya. That disappointing result may reflect NATO's commitment to respect “international humanitarian law,” now understood to impose severe limits on military operations that might harm civilians. This body of rules is a departure from traditional understandings of the law of war. The embrace of these inhibiting rules raises serious questions about whether western nations are now prepared to fight and win actual wars.     

The European public sphere and the debate about humanitarian military interventions

Studies on the democratic control and legitimacy of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) have thus far mostly focused on formal institutions. However, a comprehensive analysis requires including the ‘sociocultural infrastructure’ in which such formal institutions are embedded. Students of democracy have argued that the public sphere is a crucial dimension, if not a precondition for all mechanisms of democratic control in general. This paper investigates whether and in which ways Europeans participated in transnational European communication on humanitarian military interventions (1990–2005/2006). The paper analyzes a full sample of 108,677 newspaper articles published in leading newspapers of six EU member states, and the US as a comparative case. It demonstrates that the ‘national’ arenas of political communication are intertwined and allow ordinary citizens to make up their minds about common European issues in the highly controversial and normatively sensitive realm of humanitarian military interventions.     

Beyond the fallacy of coup-ism: conceptualizing civilian control of the military in emerging democracies

It is consensus in the democratization literature that civilian control of the military is a necessary ingredient for democracy and democratic consolidation. However, there is considerable disagreement on what civilian control of the military exactly entails and there is a lack of solid theoretical arguments for how weak or absent civilian control affects democratic governance. Furthermore, a considerable portion of the research literature is captured by the fallacy of coup-ism, ignoring the many other forms in which military officers can constrain the authority of democratically elected political leaders to make political decisions and get them implemented. This article addresses these lacunae by providing a new conceptual framework for the analysis of civil–military relations in emerging democracies. From democracy theory it derives a definition of civilian control as a certain distribution of decision-making power between civilian leaders and military officers. Based on this definition, the authors develop a five-dimensional concept of civilian control, discuss the effects of weakly institutionalized civilian control on the quality of democracy and address the chances for democratic consolidation.     

Who matters for memory: Sources of institutional memory in international organization crisis management

Scholarship on organizational learning has explored how international organizations (IOs) reform but has paid little attention to the origins of institutional memory. For IOs engaged in crisis management operations, acquiring knowledge about strategic errors is necessary for adopting reforms that could save lives. This study seeks to identify the sources that affect whether or not IO elites will contribute knowledge to an IO’s institutional memory in crisis management. The study employs a survey experiment in the field on 120 NATO elites who decide on and plan operations. Findings indicate that when the United States introduces knowledge of a strategic error, NATO elites are significantly less likely to share it. This deterrent effect on knowledge-sharing illustrates an unexpected way in which the US influences international crisis management. The study also finds that an IO’s secretariat can somewhat increase elites’ likelihood of contributing to the IO’s institutional memory.     

Humanitarian Intervention After Iraq: Legal Ideals vs. Military Realities

The theory of humanitarian intervention has received new attention since the humanitarian crises of the 1990s and the United States’ becoming the world's sole superpower. The actual practice of humanitarian intervention, however, has declined. It is difficult to forge the political will for it when the countries composing the global organizations that could provide the political legitimacy disagree on an intervention, and with so few countries—mainly the United States and Great Britain—capable of providing the required expeditionary forces. Moreover, the Afghanistan and Iraq wars have diminished the United States’ political will, military capability, and diplomatic credibility to conduct future humanitarian interventions. In particular, those wars precluded its intervention in the current genocide in Darfur. Regional bodies such as the African Union may be the only entities that can, with aid and training, undertake effective interventions.     

Has the Forgotten “Stability-Instability Paradox” Belatedly Reared Its Ugly Head in Ukraine?

When Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine last February, he seemed surprisingly confident that threatening nuclear escalation would inhibit any North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) response. Despite Russia’s poor military performance, this coercive nuclear gambit seems to have paid off. Western countries preemptively ruled out direct intervention and have declined Ukraine combat aircraft and longer-range missiles as they openly agonize about how Putin could react if facing an outright military defeat. This seemingly successful use of nuclear brinkmanship raises the specter of the stability-instability paradox, a largely forgotten Cold War theory worrying that stable mutual nuclear deterrence could embolden military adventurism at lower levels of warfare     

The economic community of West African states,the defence of democracy in Sierra Leone and future prospects

The wave of democratization in the 1990s has brought considerable challenges and opportunities for post‐cold war Africa. One such challenge is the democratic intervention of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) under the aegis of the multilateral intervention force, ECOMOG, to restore a democratic government and constitutional order. The ECOWAS democratic intervention in the West African state of Sierra Leone can be located in a wider debate about international dimensions of democratization. In several respects, it also reflects the changing nature of international politics in the post‐cold war period particularly with regards to certain traditional norms of international society, namely non‐intervention and state sovereignty. The ECOWAS democratic efforts in Sierra Leone demonstrate that it is increasingly becoming acceptable for regional and international organisations to ‘defend’ democracy, albeit under the auspices of forcible as well as non‐forcible humanitarian intervention. However, these kinds of external intervention on behalf of democracy have in most cases led to its retrenchment. This article therefore critically assesses how the nature of domestic politics led to the suspension of democracy in Sierra Leone, the domestic and international implications of the ECOWAS defence of democracy there and the country's post‐conflict democratic prospects.     

The Response to the Humanitarian Crisis Created by Landmines

Anti-personnel mines are considered to be one of the most significant humanitarian problems of our time, affecting more than seventy countries. They often have a terrible effect on civilian populations long after the cessation of hostilities. The 1997 Mine Ban Convention provides an anchor for a long-term solution to the crisis created by landmines. Nations that ratified the Mine Ban Convention had to balance the military utility of those mines against humanitarian needs. While ethical norms played an important role in defining policies, they were only one of several components that led to the ban of anti-personnel landmines.     

The influence of EU officials in European Security and Defence

Abstract

European Union (EU) foreign policy has long been considered the domaine réservé of the member states. This article challenges such conventional state-centered wisdom by analyzing the influence of the Brussels-based EU officials in the Common Security and Defence Policy. Using four case studies and data from 105 semi-structured interviews, it shows that EU officials are most influential in the agenda-setting phase and more influential in civilian than in military operations. Their prominence in agenda-setting can be explained by their central position in the policy process. This allows them to get early involved in the operations. The absence of strong control mechanisms and doctrine in civilian crisis management gives them opportunities to affect civilian missions. Finally, EU officials direct civilian operations from Brussels, whereas the command of military operations is with the member states and NATO.     

Nato Enlargement and the Spread of Democracy: Evidence and Expectations

The second enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since the end of the cold war fueled an ongoing debate over whether the alliance contributes to democratization in Europe. In the 1990s, critics warned that the 1999 NATO enlargement would cultivate a new cold war and prove irrelevant to democratic consolidation in central Europe. Events have not borne out these forecasts, however. In Poland, not only did NATO build a civilian consensus in favor of democratic control over the armed forces corresponding to NATO norms, but it also delegitimized Polish arguments for defense self-sufficiency that had derived their credibility from Poland's experience of military vulnerability and foreign domination. Such democratizing and denationalizing trends have contributed to stability in postcommunist Europe. An assessment of the seven states that joined in 2004 similarly reveals some scope for NATO's influence in all cases. The alliance's access to domestic reform processes, however, will be uneven across cases in ways largely consistent with the predictions of the theoretical framework in this article.

     

The Imia/Kardak affair, 1995–96: A case of inadvertent conflict

On Christmas Day 1995, a Turkish freighter ran aground on a rocky islet in the northern Dodecanese islands, setting off a chain of events that would lead Greece and Turkey to the brink of war. Senior officials in Washington later admitted that the countries were literally hours from conflict over an issue of which decision makers in America and Europe were completely unaware prior to military forces being deployed. The Imia/Kardak affair raised significant questions on all sides about how relations between two NATO countries with well‐known, ongoing tensions could have deteriorated so rapidly without drawing international attention till the last moment. The conflict highlighted problems in both Athens and Ankara related to the exchange of information between civilian and military leadership. It also revealed that strategic warning in emerging conflicts might not appear when the cause of the incident remains unknown until after the commitment of forces or when the pace of conflict moves too quickly. In such a situation, decision‐making architecture within a coalition or alliance may prove too cumbersome to react to unexpected problems.