Notes on contributors

The pre-unification European and foreign policy of the ‘old’ Federal Republic was marked by four principal traits: an emphatically Western orientation, a strong commitment to multilateralism underpinned by close bilateral relations with France and the US, its civilian character, and Euro-centrism. Although it took place in radically different circumstances and under radically different conditions to the first, the second German unification nonetheless gave rise to fears among the political leaders of many other states in Western, Central and Eastern Europe – and among the proponents of some international relations theories – that it would herald sweeping changes in Germany's foreign policy orientation and profoundly destabilise inter-state relations in Europe. The contributions to this volume show that, in the decade following the second unification, there has been more continuity than change in German European and foreign policy. The most important change concerns attitudes and behaviour in respect of the use of military force. Under the pressure of its Western allies and events in the Balkans which have forced it to choose between opposition to war and opposition to genocide, Germany has shed much of its earlier inhibitions concerning the use of military force and become much more like a ‘normal’ big power in Europe. However, because this trend has been explicitly encouraged and welcomed by Germany's allies and partners and because it has taken place exclusively within the multilateral frameworks of NATO and the EU, it does not presage the return of a political ‘Frankenstein monster’ or the revival of the pre-Second World War patterns of European inter-state rivalry. The second German unification will assuredly not turn out to be a re-run of the first.     

Germany in Europe: return of the nightmare or towards an engaged Germany in a new Europe?

Especially since (re-)unification, perceptions of Germany alternate between the fear of the return of the German hegemon and – at the same time – the diametrically opposed call for more German leadership based on Germany's outstanding pro-European engagement. Nonetheless, Germany's foreign policy has changed little since 1989: it is still cautious rather than assertive. Due to Germany's experience with the two world wars, German foreign policy places great value on the enlargement as well as the deepening of the EU. In sum, Germany can best be characterised as a normal and engaged European state.     

The Power of Ideas: How Bundesbank Ideas Have Influenced the Reconstruction of the National Bank of Poland

This article is concerned with the qualitative rise of German influence in an enlarged European Union (EU). The point of departure is the assumption that eastward enlargement facilitates the further expansion and manifestation of German power in Europe via the institutionalisation of parts of the Modell Deutschland in the candidate countries prior to their accession. This article examines the power tools that have facilitated the transfer of Bundesbank ideas into the institutional structure of Poland's national central bank, Narodowy Bank Polski (NBP). The analysis demonstrates that the relationship between Germany and its eastern neighbours is not only determined by the former's physical capacities but, in reflection of post-war Germany's foreign policy strategy, relies on the persuasiveness of Germany's ideational lead.     

Taking a second look at Germany's motivation to establish economic and monetary union: A critique of ‘economic interests’ claims

One of the most widespread explanations of Germany's willingness to create European monetary union is that business or economic interest groups supported and lobbied for it, believing it would be good for them. This article refutes the argument that economic interests were actively involved in the process or that they had a causal impact on the German government's acceptance of EMU. Empirical evidence shows that economic interest groups in Germany were hesitant and sceptical about monetary union, especially since the EMS was working well. Economic interests belatedly mimicked the demands of the Bundesbank that EMU be insulated from political pressure and that price stability be enshrined in the charter, but they did not urge the government to join. Moreover, the members of peak business organisations were themselves divided on the merits of EMU. Thus, this article falsifies the claim that business or economic interests were the driving force behind Kohl's willingness to give up the DM.     

National Role Conceptions,Domestic Constraints and the New ‘Normalcy’ in German Foreign Policy: the Eurozone Crisis,Libya and Beyond

German foreign policy can fruitfully be analysed through the lens of a modified two-level framework which identifies three interdependent drivers behind government decision making: the expectations of Germany's international partners, domestic constraints and the national role conceptions of decision-makers. In recent years, the configuration of these three drivers has witnessed a two-fold change. First, there has been a nascent shift towards the role conception of Germany as a ‘normal ally’. Second, the domestic context of German foreign policy has become more politicised and contentious. In consequence, Germany's current foreign policy tends to attach relatively less weight to the expectations of its allies, to be more driven by domestic politics – and to be altogether less predictable. The widely criticised approaches of the Merkel government to the Eurozone crisis and to the NATO mission in Libya, in turn, accord to this pattern and stand for the new ‘normalcy’ in German foreign policy.     

The federal republic and the future of Europe: A reassessment

Speculation concerning a dominant or hegemonic role to be played by a unified Germany in a post‐cold war Europe is misplaced. The extent to which the Federal Republic of 1949–89 has been caricatured as an economic giant but a political dwarf has undermined an appreciation of the manner in which successive Bonn governments have used multilateralism in foreign policy to further Germany's political influence in Europe long before national reunification. At the same time, it is unlikely that reunification will bring a dramatic change in German foreign policy. The nature of the Federal Republic's domestic politics, as well as the relationship with the European Community, apply substantial constraints on the ability, or the desire, to bring about a radical reorientation. The principal architect of change in Germany's relationship with its neighbours will be the country's expansive corporate sector. The gap between the restrained nature of Germany's diplomacy and the extrovert dynamism of its industry, furthermore, promises to make the Federal Republic's adjustment to a new international role awkward.     

Europe and the German Model: Growing Tension or Symbiosis?

Recent conflicts between the Commission of the European Communities and the German government suggest a growing tension between structures of the German political economy and the agenda of economic liberalisation fostered by European integration. Will mounting conflict ultimately force Germany to choose between its commitment to the integrity of the social market economy and support for European economic integration? This article considers the cases of Germany's public sector banks and the German postal service. Both entail potential conflict between the public service functions integral to the social market economy and the competition central to Europe's single market. Examination of these cases suggests that, rather than forcing change on a reluctant Germany and jeopardising the core of the social market economy (SME), enforcement of European competition policy from Brussels has taken place in fundamental symbiosis with the SME. Nonetheless, tensions between federal government and Länder indicate that a positive-sum relationship between Europe's single market and Germany's social market economy may be constrained by German federalism.     

The Hamburg election of 19 September 1993

The transformation of Polish–German relations since the end of the Cold War has been a success story. The two countries are linked by a community of interests founded on common values and goals. Although Germany, in its policies towards Central and Eastern Europe, occasionally attaches too much weight to trying to mollify Russia, the united Germany has supported the Eastern enlargement of the EU and, ultimately, of the NATO. It genuinely wants ‘Western’ neighbours to its east. German foreign policy will continue to be characterised by continuity, with a strong emphasis on multilateralism. There is a danger, however, that Germany's European engagement and support for closer integration will be weakened by its preoccupation with its domestic economic and social problems.     

Linkages between Parliamentary and Ministerial Careers in Germany, 1949–2008: The Bundestag as Recruitment Pool

Germany is noted within Europe for its weak tobacco control policies and its opposition to European Union tobacco control legislation. In this article, we aim to explain Germany's stance on tobacco control. We review two explanations commonly proposed, namely tobacco industry donations to political parties and the legacy of the Nazis' opposition to smoking, and examine the politics of tobacco control in detail. We suggest that the interplay of numerous factors explains Germany's stance. Aspects of political culture including the Nazi heritage which has resulted in a dearth of public health research and teaching, institutional factors such as the reliance on industry self-regulation facilitated by Germany's system of corporatist policy-making and interest group politics are key. The tobacco industry has also successfully used framing strategies to uphold the social acceptability of smoking and undermine the acceptability of tobacco control in Germany. In addition a phenomenon that we call ‘autarkic epistemic isolation’ explains why so little policy learning from abroad has occurred. We suggest that our multi-factor model has significant explanatory power for Germany's weak stance that has resulted in a long-standing policy equilibrium. Recent events, however, suggest that this equilibrium may now have been punctuated.     

Change and continuity in post-unification German foreign policy

Ten years after unification, Germany still maintains its post-Second World War foreign policy course based on transatlantic multilateralism and European integration despite changes in Germany's international and domestic contexts. This study argues that neither realist nor institutionalist explanations can explain the post-unification pattern of German foreign policy. Instead, continuity and change in this policy can be understood best through a role-theoretical approach based on the civilian power idealtype. Two causal pathways are developed which account for continuity in foreign policy orientation (goals) and strategies while explaining change in the choice of foreign policy instruments. First, the apparent success of Germany's traditional foreign policy role concept during and after unification helped to reify a broad foreign policy consensus around the goals and strategies of an ideal-type civilian power. Second, major foreign policy crises, such as the Yugoslavian wars, stirred the long held hierarchy between the core values of reticence vis-à-vis the use of force (never again German militarism) and the special German responsibility to prevent genocide (never again Auschwitz). The interaction between domestic and foreign expectations provides a promising source for explaining change and continuity in Germany's foreign policy role concept and behaviour.     

Why Germany Wanted EMU: The Role of Helmut Kohl's Belief System and the Fall of the Berlin Wall

In light of the current Euro-crisis and seemingly erratic German response to it, the question of why Germany wanted EMU has gained new relevance. While EMU entailed economic and political benefits for Germany, this article indicates that taking into account the German shared historical consciousness, and the combined effect of Chancellor Kohl's beliefs and 1989 Eastern European revolution provides a more adequate answer to this question. More specifically, such an explanation provides an answer to remaining questions concerning the timing of the German acquiescence, and the ambiguous and inconsistent behaviour of the Kohl government on the road to Maastricht.     

Germany's Constitution and participation in international peacekeeping operations

In this article, Torsten Stein, Professor of Constitutional, European and Public International Law and Director of the Institute of European Studies at the University of Saarland, Saarbrücken, traces the constitutional development that has enabled Germany to take part in a meaningful way in United Nations peacekeeping operations (PKO). As in Japan, Germany's post-war Constitution (Basic Law) was held to prohibit such participation. Germany's Federal Constitutional Court, however, has found an interpretation of the Constitution that - without amending the Constitution or any other pertinent legislation - allows a "German solution" which reconciles the putative post-war prohibitions with Germany's obligations as a member of the United Nations. Stein, who is also a Colonel in the German Air Force Reserve, warns that the "five conditions" contained in Japan's 1992 Peacekeeping Operations Law are unrealistic in view of present day PKO, but envisages an interpretation of the Japanese Constitution that might follow the German example.     

Are We Doing Enough? Change and Continuity in the German Approach to Crisis Management

In the two-and-a-half decades since unification Germany has developed a distinctive approach towards international crisis management. This approach accepts the need to engage in the full spectrum of military and civilian operations but maintains a clear preference for the latter. Consequently, the European Union with its profile as a civil–military actor in international security is the preferred framework for German contributions. The article analyses the development of the German approach during the governments of Gerhard Schröder and Angela Merkel in the light of three interlinked debates on German foreign policy: continuity and change; multilateralism; and leadership. The announcement of a more active German foreign policy in 2014 has reanimated these debates. Concentrating its efforts on networked security and capacity building Germany has become an indispensable player in international crisis management. At the same time Germany's deeply rooted attachment to a culture of military restraint and continued reluctance to lead, limit its ability to work for necessary reforms at the European level.     

Germany: A ‘Normal’ Global Actor?

Liberal-idealist and constructivist approaches to German foreign and security policy share a rejection of power politics and a ‘normalisation’ of the use of force. Wedded to a ‘civilian power’ lens, these approaches cannot explain actual policy in terms other than a re-socialisation into power politics or a decline of Germany's normative preferences. This paper argues that these approaches no longer adequately reflect the choices German leaders face. They confine analysis to normatively acceptable forms of power and structural frameworks that are increasingly in flux. As a result, they are unable to explain the impact of systemic transformation on German foreign policy and lack the analytical tools to incorporate systemic change. This paper proposes instead that a different, and more accurate, conclusion can be reached if we reassess how power, norms and structure interact in shaping German foreign policy choices. What we find is that Germany is actively engaged in developing an approach to foreign policy-making that takes account of the structural transformations in Europe and beyond and its legacy of strong normative convictions.     

In search of a post-hegemonic order: Germany,NATO and the European security and defence policy

This article explores the erosion of the conditions which supported Germany's emergence as a ‘Civilian Power’, in particular fundamental changes in the US perspective on the transatlantic relationship and international security, but also the increased sensitivity of German foreign policy to domestic circumstances. It explores Germany's so far ambivalent and inconsistent role in the pursuit of a post-hegemonic order for Euro-Atlantic security, focusing in particular on the emerging European Security and Defence Policy.     

The end of the affair? Germany's relationship with France

French–German resistance to the US war against Iraq marked a high point in the two countries' political alignment. It was followed by French proposals for even closer integration. Yet French and German policies and priorities differ in a number of fields. Prominent among these is the EU, where Germany has long worked for a reduction in EU spending and a redistribution of votes among the member countries. After reaching a compromise on these issues, co-operation with France on foreign and security policy has grown particularly close. This has affected Germany's relations with Central and Eastern Europe and with the US, areas where Germany traditionally pursued policies different from France. At the end of the second period of the Red–Green government, Germany's national interests have been redefined as a result of the relationship with France.     

From vanguard to laggard: Germany in European security and defence policy

Guided by a federalist vision of European integration, Germany used to be a staunch supporter of a European security and defence policy. Whereas Germany's rhetorical support has remained unchanged, it has turned into a laggard in implementing the commitments arising from a European Rapid Reaction Force. Drawing on an interactionist framework, this article demonstrates that Germany's change of course is neither in line with a Europeanised identity nor a result of any deliberate grand strategy to renationalise defence policy. Rather, Germany's failure to live up to its commitments is best understood as an unintended consequence of its integrationist policies in the early 1990s.     

Non-State Actors,Political Opportunity Structures and Foreign Relations: The Case of Germany's Federation of Expellees and the ‘Foundation Flight,Expulsion and Reconciliation’

This article examines the political process leading to the creation of the controversial ‘Foundation Flight, Expulsion and Reconciliation’ in Germany. The foundation aims to establish a permanent exhibition by 2016 showcasing the flight and expulsion of up to fifteen million Germans from the East following the Second World War. The foundation was the result of lobbying by the Federation of Expellees (BdV); it caused frictions in Germany's relations with its eastern neighbours and jeopardised Germany's reconciliation process with these states. The process reveals that the structure of Germany's polity, paired with astute alliance building and its members' rhetoric, aided the BdV's cause. Thus, non-state actors can utilise favourable domestic structures for the lack of material resources in order to maximise their lobbying ‘power’. This contributes to the growing literature on reconciliation in international relations which neglects domestic structures as a variable determining reconciliation processes in favour of more normative policy instruments.     

How to Become an Independent Agency: The Creation of the German Federal Network Agency

The German Federal Network Agency (FNA) was established in 2005 as multi-utilities regulator thereby creating Germany's first energy regulator. It maintains a quite exceptional position in the landscape of German agencies because of its far-reaching independence from political influence. This independence represents an empirical puzzle, because in Germany no comprehensive agencification of the federal administration can be observed and independent agencies are rather an exception than a rule. This article explores whether this puzzle can be plausibly solved by the approach of institutional isomorphism. It argues that the German government faced informal pressure from the European Commission and its endeavour to build a network of European energy regulators at the European level. Furthermore, independent regulatory agencies increasingly became a kind of guiding model in the utilities sector. Therefore, mechanisms of coercive and mimetic isomorphism can be seen as plausible explanations of the agency's independence.     

Explaining Germany’s Position on European Banking Union

Much has been written about European banking union and Germany’s role in shaping it. Missing, however, is a comprehensive explanation for Germany's contradictory positions on banking union: German policymakers gambled on a single supervisory mechanism, and a single resolution mechanism yet drew the line on European-wide deposit insurance. We explain Germany’s mixed positions on banking union by drawing on prospect theory and theories of policy salience.