从战争到战争:论一战对二战的影响

本文以第一次世界大战与第二次世界大战的战争本质中的共同点为基础展开讨论。这两场战争都是大规模的工业化战争,均历经过度的、失控的暴力、死亡和破坏。它们不仅见证了包括新技术和强大武器在内的军事方法和战争手段的发展,也见证了全面的扩张,或者说是战争向人类生活各个领域的越界(Entgrenzung)。在两次世界大战中,扩张或者侵略的概念已经延伸并超越总体战的概念范畴。如果忽略德国记忆的存在和对大战争的解读,只谈第二次战争是绝对不全面的,20世纪30年代的德国社会目睹了——一代人的——第一次世界大战的异化,即一战逐渐失去了在记忆中的重要位置。随后的世界大战用大规模屠杀、破碎的档案和巨大的破坏强化了该进程。更多的受害者,特别是平民百姓的死难,对六百万欧洲犹太人的谋杀使这场规模宏大的暴力的越界达到了巅峰,这一切都使第一次世界大战似乎成了第二次世界大战的灾难的序曲。     

The Tragedy of Liberalism How Globalization Caused the First World War

The belief that globalization enhances peace, a central tenet of liberal theory, enjoys substantial support in recent scholarship on trade and conflict. To conclude that liberalism is right, however, is premature and wrong. Liberal theory is not sufficiently grounded in international trade theory to show how globalization generates constraints on military force, nor does it adequately link these constraints to strengthened peace. This article uses the Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade to connect globalization's economic effects to increased constraints on military force and then explores how, in the nineteenth century, globalization affected European peace. As liberal theory predicts, globalization generated substantial constraints on military force in prewar Europe. Yet there are important flaws in liberalism's logic linking these constraints to strengthened international peace. Contrary to liberal theory, globalization did not strengthen prospects for peace in prewar Europe but was a major cause of the First World War.     

Rage of Honor: Entente Indignation and the Lost Chance for Peace in the First World War

Why the First World War ended in 1918 and not earlier remains a major puzzle. We propose a new theory that emphasizes how honor prolongs wars beyond what rationalist theories can explain. It argues that when honor is insulted, an affronted actor will strive to punish the offender. Absent an apology, the pursuit of a satisfactory punishment leads the affronted belligerent to ignore unfavorable battlefield information, hold logically irreconcilable beliefs, process information in emotional terms, and obsess over status. We predict that wars of prevention and territorial occupation are most likely to elicit honor considerations. We test our argument against an obscure episode in the war where Germany and the United States made peace overtures in December 1916. We demonstrate that honor concerns made Entente decision makers see German aggression as an affront to their honor that only the destruction of Germany's political regime could redress.     

The First World War as Catalyst and Epiphany: The Case of Henry P. Davison

The experience of the First World War was central to the emergence of a trans-Atlantic elite committed to close collaboration and an international alliance, either formal or de facto, between Great Britain and the United States. The reactions to the conflict of Henry P. Davison, dominant partner in J. P. Morgan and Company, illustrate the manner in which the First World War was catalytic in the creation of an Atlanticist elite. Davison, moreover, experienced something like a personal epiphany during the war, metamorphosing from a hard-driving businessman into an international philanthropist who developed ambitious schemes to remake the world. For seven years, Davison energetically sought to affect the course, outcome, and consequences of the First World War. Fundamental to Davison's worldview were the desirability and necessity of Anglo-American collaboration, on which all his other plans were predicated. When the war ended, Davison proposed almost visionary schemes, on the one hand to provide massive American governmental and private economic assistance to finance European postwar relief and reconstruction efforts and, on the other, to establish an international Red Cross organization that would mount a massive campaign to eradicate global public health problems. Although abortive in the short term, in the longer run his plans proved prophetic, anticipating the post-Second World War Marshall Plan and World Health Organization.     

The First World War as Catalyst and Epiphany: The Case of Henry P. Davison

The experience of the First World War was central to the emergence of a trans-Atlantic elite committed to close collaboration and an international alliance, either formal or de facto, between Great Britain and the United States. The reactions to the conflict of Henry P. Davison, dominant partner in J. P. Morgan and Company, illustrate the manner in which the First World War was catalytic in the creation of an Atlanticist elite. Davison, moreover, experienced something like a personal epiphany during the war, metamorphosing from a hard-driving businessman into an international philanthropist who developed ambitious schemes to remake the world. For seven years, Davison energetically sought to affect the course, outcome, and consequences of the First World War. Fundamental to Davison's worldview were the desirability and necessity of Anglo–American collaboration, on which all his other plans were predicated. When the war ended, Davison proposed almost visionary schemes, on the one hand to provide massive American governmental and private economic assistance to finance European postwar relief and reconstruction efforts and, on the other, to establish an international Red Cross organization that would mount a massive campaign to eradicate global public health problems. Although abortive in the short term, in the longer run his plans proved prophetic, anticipating the post–Second World War Marshall Plan and World Health Organization.     

论一战前后西伯利亚大铁路在俄国对外战略中的地位

西伯利亚大铁路的修筑改变了东北亚国家的地缘关系,是列强在东北亚地区利用铁路开展竞争的滥觞。一战前,沙皇俄国利用铁路推行扩张政策;一战后,苏维埃俄国在重构东方发展环境过程中仍须倚重西伯利亚大铁路。俄国政权的更迭并没阻碍西伯利亚大铁路战略地位的延续。     

The Commission for Relief in Belgium and the Political Diplomatic History of the First World War

During the First World War, the Commission for Relief in Belgium (CRB) supplied occupied Belgium with food, provoking discord between military and political leaders on both sides. The CRB's work undermined the Allies' economic blockade of the enemy, attracting military criticism. In Germany, politicians favoured sustaining the food supply to prevent unrest, whilst the Army wanted to exploit Belgium's resources. From 1916 onwards, the CRB became a bone of contention in Germany in the dispute between military and political leaders about unrestricted submarine warfare. It also loomed large in the political and military debate about the attitude to neutral countries: the Allies wanted them to brave the German threat and cooperate with the blockade policy—otherwise, food imports from Allied countries would be forbidden. Tonnage and food for the CRB were incorporated into the negotiations with neutral countries about their imports and the use of home-grown produce. The debates about the CRB thus exemplify the relationship between military events and the war's economic and social significance. This study of the CRB shows that political/diplomatic historiography can bridge the gap between the military and socioeconomic history of the First World War.     

When Democracies Go to War: Public Debate and the French Decision on War in 1999 and 2003

On what grounds do democratic states wage war? Public opinion is often considered as being of crucial importance in the decision to go to war. This article analyses two debates over war in France. It finds that democracies debate war within a limited range of arguments from which classical reasons for war such as the geostrategic one are absent. However, within the limited range of arguments, public support for decisions to go to war seems to depend significantly on the convergence of all public opinion actors over the interpretation of the crisis situation. The high politics nature of crisis situations gives the political leadership strong leverage in the shaping of thick discourses. The control function of public opinion is then diminished and a de facto prerogative of the government established even though justifications remain restricted to a limited number of arguments. Thick discourses of justification seem to be framed predominantly by arguments of just war.     

The Alliance Politics of Concerted Accommodation: Entente Bargaining and Italian and Ottoman Interventions in the First World War

This article examines the challenges allies face in coordinating diplomatic efforts to accommodate and peel off their main enemy's potential allies. It elucidates the key dimensions, and the underlying coordination dynamics, of this problem of “concerted accommodation,” and it develops propositions about the conditions that shape the efficacy of such efforts. The argument links allies’ strength to their divergent or convergent assessments of the target state's ability to tip the war toward victory or defeat. Divergent assessments foster weak allied efforts that are likely to fail, but when allies agree that the target is a potential “war-tipper,” they will support their concerted accommodation policy with more robust cooperation that is more likely to work. The causal arguments and mechanisms are examined in a paired comparison analysis of two First World War cases: the Entente's efforts to induce (1) Ottoman neutrality and (2) Italian intervention.     

印度与第一次印度支那战争

第一次印度支那战争的爆发及政治解决,对印度外交来说是一次严峻的挑战,同时也是印度提升国际地位的一次难得机遇。印度出于反对殖民主义、和平共处、不结盟等因素的考虑,不断调整其印度支那政策,从中立的"不干涉"政策,进而逐渐转变为积极的调停政策。印度发挥在日内瓦会议上了独特的作用。研究这一案例,有助于加深我们对印度外交特点的认识。     

Identity,Insecurity, and Great Power Politics:The Tragedy of German Naval Ambition Before the First World War

Why did Germany pursue naval expansion at the turn of the twentieth century? This question has long puzzled scholars of international security, who consider German naval ambition to be an instance of suboptimal arming—a decision that decreased Germany's overall security and risked the survival of the German state. This article argues that the social desire to be recognized as a world power guided Germany's decision to challenge British naval hegemony. From the beginning of its naval planning, Germany had one clear aim: a powerful fleet of battleships stationed in the North Sea would alter the political relationship with Britain in such a way that it could no longer ignore Germany's claim to world power status. Reconceptualizing Germany's naval ambition as a struggle for recognition elucidates the contradictions at the center of German naval strategy, explaining how the doomed policy could proceed despite its certain failure. The article concludes that the power-maximizing practices of great powers should be seen as an important component of identity construction and an understudied dimension of contemporary security practice.     

论冷战时代世界和平运动的影响

本文论述了冷战时代世界和平运动的影响 :加强并深化了人们的反战意识 ,牵制了美苏的军备竞赛 ,影响了有关国家的政府决策 ,有助于推动世界政治的民主化进程 ,抑制局部战争的扩大和升级 ,挫败超级大国发动世界大战的战争准备和战略部署     

战后日本人饮食消费方式的变化

一、前言 饮食文化是代表饮食和人类之间的关系，并丰富人类饮食生活的一种智慧宝库。饮食是一种看似平常又极为重要的事情，“它是人类生存和改造身体素质的首要物质基础，也是社会发展的前提”。“饮食文化是人类有关饮食实践的多方面经济社会生活的各种表现形式的总和，它是跨越物质文化和精神文化的许多领域，又具有自己独特内涵和外延，是组成网络又具有独特神韵的一种文化体系”。     

略论日本战后财政体制及其影响因素

二战后 ,日本以美国人夏普的“三项劝告”为基准建立了与市场经济相适应的现代财政体制。新体制既吸收了英美公共财政“分权—分税”的成功之处 ,又依循日本传统治国理论 ,保留了中央集权的制度特点。日本现行财政体制对日本经济发展起到了至关重要的作用。     

第二次世界大战结束前日俄、日苏关系的特点

第二次世界大战前的日俄、日苏关系是影响东亚地区国际关系格局的重要双边关系。在日本明治维新以前日俄关系具有西方殖民列强与亚洲闭关锁国的封建国家之间关系的特点，总体态势是“俄攻日守”。明治维新到十月革命前的日俄关系具有老牌的殖民主义列强与新兴殖民主义列强之间关系的特点，日俄在东亚既有争夺，又有合作，日本逐渐占了上风。十月革命后日苏关系既有社会主义国家和帝国主义国家之间的关系、邻国关系的特点，又有较为浓厚的欧洲国家和亚洲国家之间关系的特点。这时期，两国之间始终未能建立真正的信赖关系，经历了“日攻苏守”到“苏攻日守”的转变过程。     

“No More War?” Belgian Reception of the League of Nations and Arbitration After the First World War

After the horrors of the First World War, different initiatives were taken to introduce and institutionalise principles of international organisation such as collective security and arbitration in international relations. The League of Nations was founded, and different bilateral and multilateral arbitration treaties were concluded. This article studies the reception of these internationalist principles by Belgian policymakers and diplomats. I will argue that this reception initially ranged from cautiousness to clear scepticism. Although an evolution towards increased trust in collective security and arbitration can be observed between 1919 and 1929, Belgian policymakers' and diplomats' views during this period remained predominantly based on realist premises and beliefs.